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Yaron Yehezkel

Coller School of Management
Tel Aviv University
Ramat Aviv, Tel Aviv, 69978
Email: yehezkel@tauex.tau.ac.il


Research interests: Industrial Organization, Platform Competition, Vertical Relations, Contract Theory



Collusion between supply chains under Asymmetric InformationJournal of Industrial Economics (forthcoming)



“For the public benefit": data policy in platform markets  (joint with Sarit Markovich) Journal of Economics and Management Strategy (forthcoming)


“Regulating platform competition in markets with network externalities: will predatory pricing restrictions increase social welfare? ” (Joint with Ohad Atad) Journal of Industrial Economics (forthcoming)


“Vertical collusion to exclude product improvement” (joint with David Gilo) Journal of Industrial Economics (forthcoming)

·       Online appendix A: “A strategic firm is selling the new product.”

·       Online appendix B: “How the discount factor affects the welfare comparison among the three antitrust regimes.”  

·       Online appendix C: “All or nothing clause.”

·       Online appendix D: “A finite game.”


“Sales information transparency and trust in repeated vertical relationships (Joint with Noam Shamir) Manufacturing and Service Operations Management 2023, Vol. 25, pp. 1660 – 1676.


“Group hug: platform competition with user-groups.”  (joint with Sarit Markovich) American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 2022, Vol 14, pp. 1 – 39.

§  Online Appendix B: “Absolute number of group and individual users. 

§  Online Appendix C: “Horizontally Differentiated Platforms.”


“Dynamic competition with network externalities: how history matters.” (joint with Hanna Halaburda and Bruno Jullien) The RAND Journal of Economics 2020, Vol. 51, pp 3-31 Online appendix


“Vertical collusion” (joint with David Gilo) The RAND Journal of Economics 2020, Vol. 51, pp 133-157  (Supplementary proofs)   (Note: numerical example of vertical collusion with product differentiation)


“Focality advantage in platform competition.” (joint with Hanna Halaburda) Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 2019, Vol. 28, pp. 49-59


“The role of coordination bias in platform competition.” (joint with Hanna Halaburda) Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 2016, Vol. 25, pp.274 - 312 


“Motivating a supplier to test product quality.” Journal of Industrial Economics, 2014, Vol.  62, pp. 309 - 345 (click here for a Supplementary Note on the paper)


“Platform competition under asymmetric information.” (joint with Hanna Halaburda) American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2013, Vol. 5, pp. 22–68


“Oligopoly limit-pricing in the lab.” (joint with Wieland Muller and Yossi Spiegel) Games and Economic Behavior, 2009, Vol. 66, pp. 373–393


“Signaling quality in oligopoly when some consumers are informed.” Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 2008, Vol. 17, pp. 937 – 972.


Retailer’s choice of product variety and exclusive dealing under asymmetric information.”  The RAND Journal of Economics, 2008. Vol. 39, pp. 115 – 143.


Price and non-price restraints when retailers are vertically differentiated.” (joint with Yossi Spiegel) International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2003, Vol. 21, pp. 923-947 (click here for a Supplementary Note on the paper)


Work in progress

“Competing for cookies: Platforms’ business models in data markets with network effects.” (joint with Sarit Markovich)


“Seller’s Privacy Concerns and Information Leakage by a Platform.” (joint with Sarit Markovich and Noam Shamir)  





Unpublished working papers

“On the robustness of the full-information separating equilibrium in multi-sender signaling games.”


“Downstream competition between an upstream supplier and an independent downstream firm.” (Ph.D chapter)