Talk:Skeptical theism

I clarified a couple of minor points in the article. Just a note on the following statement:

The argument goes that if one is unable to determine whether some particular good or evil is truly good or evil, such that we cannot even believe that there exists at least one instance of gratuitous evil, how can we be said to have any meaningful morality?

While I'm not intimately familiar with this area of philosophy, it strikes me that most philosophically-adept theists would claim, "Good and evil really do exist in the actual world, but it is possible that there is no gratuitous evil in the actual world." Indeed, I think that's a basic summary of sceptical theism: but the fact that one cannot tell whether there is a good purpose behind some instance of evil does not seem to undercut the belief that such an instance is, in fact, really evil. It might be good to clarify the statement (I don't know the work by Michael, Rea, or Jeff, so I'm not sure how they understood the argument).—Tom Larsen (talk) 02:05, 13 July 2011 (EDT)