Short-Run Demand for Palestinian Labor

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Palestinian residents of the West Bank and Gaza Strip who work in Israel generally earn more than Palestinians employed locally, but this wage premium is highly volatile. Beginning with the 1987 Palestinian uprising, changes in wage differentials by work location parallel Palestinian absences from work in Israel. This article interprets changing location differentials in response to exogenous shocks as movements along an Israeli demand curve for migrant workers. Estimates of a model of the West Bank and Gaza Strip labor market are used to evaluate the effect of policies governing Palestinian access to the Israeli labor market.

I. Introduction

Since October 1970, changes in access to the Israeli labor market have constituted the major field for innovations in the economic relationship between Israel and the occupied territories. An important recent example...
Angrist is the Palestinian uprising, which has periodically restricted access to the Israeli labor market because of actions taken on both sides. On one hand, strikes and curfews restrict mobility and employment opportunities for workers from the territories. On the other, beginning in 1988, and especially since the 1991 Gulf War, Israeli authorities stepped up enforcement of laws against employing Palestinian workers who are not registered with the Israeli Employment Service, and registration itself has become more difficult (Jerusalem Post 1988; Jerusalem Media and Communications Center 1991).

Recent changes in Palestinian employment patterns have been widely noted (see, e.g., Angrist 1992; Fishelson 1992; Kleiman 1992). In Angrist (1992), I also documented a number of significant changes in the wage distribution of workers from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip over the period 1981–90. One of the most important changes is the virtual elimination of the wage premium paid to Palestinians for working in Israel in the mid-1980s. This was a period of inflation and economic crisis that included a severe contraction in the Israeli construction sector where many Palestinians are employed. Following Israeli stabilization, however, the daily wage premium paid for work in Israel climbed to a new high, reaching 40% by 1989.1

Since December 1987, changes in the Israeli wage premium have roughly paralleled the pattern of absences from work by Palestinians employed in Israel. Such a correlation suggests that recent wage increases may reflect movements along a short-run Israeli demand curve in response to the sudden withdrawal of labor from the territories. This article develops a model of the Palestinian labor market that is used to estimate parameters affecting short-run Israeli demand for Palestinian labor. An understanding of this issue is essential for developing effective policies governing the evolving relationship between the Palestinian and Israeli labor markets. Suppose, for example, that the Palestinian Authority is able to tax the wages of Palestinians employed in Israel or to impose payroll taxes on their employers. How much revenue are such taxes likely to generate? Might the Palestinian Authority rationally choose to restrict exported labor supply so as to maximize repatriated earnings or tax revenue? Of more immediate relevance, to what extent do higher wages offset the earnings costs of periodic restrictions on Palestinian labor mobility? Answers to such questions turn partly on the elasticity of demand for the labor services exported by Palestinians to Israel.

The article is organized as follows. Section II provides background information on the Israeli-Palestinian employment relationship, describes data from the Territories Labor Force Survey (TLFS), and provides a brief

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1 Wage differentials between Palestinians working in Israel and Palestinians employed locally generally declined throughout most of the 1970s (Zakai 1988).
empirical description of Palestinian labor market outcomes in recent years. Section III outlines a simple equilibrium model that describes how supply and demand for labor might interact to determine Palestinian wages and employment. Section IV presents estimates of key parameters in the model, and Section V discusses policy implications of the estimates. Section VI offers a summary and some conclusions.

II. Background, Data, and Descriptive Analysis

Official Israeli policy requires residents of the territories who want to work in Israel to apply for work through the Israeli Employment Service. The Employment Service then channels Palestinian workers to Israeli employers (Israel Employment Service 1991). The Employment Service is the only legal avenue through which Israelis may employ Palestinians, and the Palestinian payrolls of Israeli employers are supposed to be disbursed by the Employment Service. The Employment Service also deducts taxes, social insurance contributions, and union dues from these payrolls. Until recently, the Employment Service was also the only legal employment agency for most noncollege-educated Israeli citizens, and most job openings in Israel were posted through this agency (Berman 1994).

Legal restrictions notwithstanding, until the 1991 Gulf War, the vast majority of Palestinians employed in Israel did not actually reach their employers through the Employment Service. Rather, most Palestinians were contacted directly by Israeli employers or through a Palestinian labor contractor. Employment Service data typically record between 30,000 and 40,000 registered Palestinians working for Israeli employers in the 1980s, while data from the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics’ quarterly Territories Labor Force Survey (e.g., Israel Central Bureau of Statistics 1991) show that 100,000–110,000 Palestinians were employed in Israel, including Jerusalem.2

A. The Territories Labor Force Survey

This study is based on TLFS microdata.3 Survey interviews are conducted by local Palestinian enumerators employed by the Israeli Civil Administration in the territories. The TLFS sampling frame includes most households in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, regardless of the employment status or work location of the head of household. The TLFS extract used to prepare this article contains observations on men aged 18–64, interviewed

2 Since early 1991, enforcement of the official work registration requirements has become stricter. From the Gulf War until March 1993, roughly 70,000 Palestinians were registered as working for Israeli employers each month.

3 Wage and employment data from the TLFS are compared to wage and employment data from Employment Service administrative records in the appendix to Angrist (1995).
in the years 1981–91. Men constitute the bulk of the Palestinian labor force because labor force participation rates for women are very low (6%–9% in the sample period; see Israel Central Bureau of Statistics 1991).

Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the sample of men aged 18–64 by region of residence. Some 8,000–10,000 interviews were conducted each year in the Gaza Strip, and between 22,000 and 30,000 interviews were conducted each year in the West Bank. Because of the sample rotation scheme, only one-quarter of these observations are newly sampled in any given year. The sample sizes show that the number of completed interviews fell with the onset of the Palestinian uprising in 1988, especially in the Gaza Strip, where the uprising started earliest and was most intense.

The average age of men in the sample is 33, and the proportion married rose from 67% to 75% in the Gaza Strip and from 64% to 67% in the West Bank. Married men are probably overrepresented in the sample because the interviews of employed men are often completed by proxy respondents. The average level of schooling rose considerably over the sample period, from 7.6 years to 8.8 years in the Gaza Strip and from 7.7 years to 8.6 years in the West Bank. This is partly attributable to the large number of new college graduates who entered the labor force in the 1980s (Angrist 1995; Simon 1988). The descriptive statistics also show a substantial increase in labor force participation, which is primarily a consequence of increased participation by men aged 18–24.

B. Employment Patterns

Table 1 shows that the fraction of the Palestinian labor force employed as wage earners was stable at roughly one-half over the sample period. Members of the labor force not employed as wage earners are either self-employed or unemployed. The data analyzed below are for wage earners only.

The last column of table 1 shows that 41%–50% of Gazans were employed in Israel and 35%–41% of West Bank residents were employed in either Israel or Jerusalem. The proportion of the Gaza labor force working in Israel was stable until 1987; after 1987 this proportion declined from 48% to 41%. The proportion of the West Bank labor force employed in Israel (outside Jerusalem) increased from 22% to 27% between 1981 and 1987 and reached 29% by 1991. Between 1987 and 1991 the proportion of

4 These rates are based on weighted counts from the TLFS. In 1991, there were an estimated 166,000 West Bank and 102,000 Gazan men aged 18–64 working as wage laborers. In addition to the work locations mentioned in the text, a few Palestinian men were employed in Jewish settlements in the territories, and a few were probably working abroad in the reference week. Work abroad was an important source of employment for residents of the territories over some of the sample period (Gabriel and Sabatello 1986).
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* Statistics are unweighted except for those in the last column, which are based on weighted counts.
+ Sample size: 373,825 men aged 18–64 in the sample period; one-quarter of these are independent observations.
the West Bank labor force employed in Jerusalem declined from 13% to 10%.

Palestinian workers, especially those employed in Israel, have generally been concentrated in a number of industries. In 1981, half of the Palestinians employed in Israel worked in construction; by 1991 this proportion had risen to 70%. Most Palestinians working in Jerusalem were also employed in the construction sector. Agriculture was the second most important source of employment for Palestinians working in Israel, accounting for 13%-17% of the total. Roughly 20% of the Palestinians who were employed in their region of residence also worked in the agricultural sector. The importance of employment in manufacturing, mining, other types of industries, and the service sector has declined as the proportion employed in construction has risen. Workers employed in construction and industry account for a larger share of local employment in the West Bank than in the Gaza Strip.5

This study focuses on recent changes in Palestinian employment patterns. The data on average days worked per month in table 1 show a sharp drop in 1988, from 22 to 17 days for residents of the Gaza Strip and from 23 to 18 days for residents of the West Bank, again a consequence of the Palestinian uprising. An important component of this change comes from work absences and difficulties in getting to work. Figure 1 shows the fraction of the labor force absent from work by workplace location.6 Data on absences exhibit a seasonal pattern across quarters and a large increase in absences beginning in 1988 and during the Gulf War in the first quarter of 1991.

A related aspect of the changing work environment for migrants is documented in figure 2, which plots the difference between daily hours worked in Israel and locally by region of residence. Until 1988, both Gazans and residents of the West Bank who were employed in Israel worked roughly 1 hour longer per day than men employed locally. Beginning in 1988, however, the gap in length of workday grows to almost 4.5 hours for Gazans and almost 2.5 hours for residents of the West Bank. It seems likely that the many proxy responses to the TLFS question on hours worked record the time elapsed between leaving home and returning. Significant changes in hours worked are therefore most likely due to changes in travel

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6 Absentees are defined as labor force participants who did not work, assist on a farm or family business, or actively seek work during the reference week who reported that they had a job, farm, or agricultural position from which they were absent (for any reason).
time rather than hours on the job. The gap has grown larger for residents of the Gaza Strip because time-consuming security measures at the Gaza border are relatively easy to enforce.

C. Wages and Work Location

Figure 3 plots survey data on average real daily wages by work location for the period 1981–91. The wage series were computed from the monthly wages of men employed in either Jerusalem, Israel, the Gaza Strip, or the West Bank, who reported real monthly wages under NIS 10,000 (in fourth-quarter 1991 shekels). Daily wages were computed by dividing monthly wages by days worked. Figure 3 shows a decline in real wages at all work locations in 1984–85, with subsequent strong real wage growth until early 1987. The real wages of Palestinian men employed in Jerusalem continued to grow into 1988 and the real wages of men employed in Israel continued to grow into 1989. Subsequently, real wages fall sharply for men employed at these locations. Real wages in Gaza were flat for the period 1987–89 and fell thereafter; real wages in the West Bank fall sharply beginning in early 1988. Note that the period 1985–89 was generally one of strong real

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7 The TLFS question on hours worked asks, “How many hours did the household member work at all jobs last week?” This number was multiplied by 4.35 weeks per month and then divided by the number of reported workdays in the month to estimate hours worked per day.
wage growth for Israeli citizens as well as for residents of the territories (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics 1992).

Regression estimates are used to describe changes in average Palestinian wages conditional on demographic characteristics. Table 2 reports parameter estimates from the following equation (computed by weighted least squares using the Central Bureau of Statistics sampling weights):

$$\ln w_{it} = \sum_q d_{iq} \delta_{qt} + \sum_c a_{ic} \beta_{ct} + \sum_g b_{ig} \gamma_{igt} + f_i \theta_t + \sum_s c_{is} \mu_{is} + f_i \psi + v_{it},$$

(1)

where $d_{iq}$ is a dummy variable that indicates whether observation $i$ is observed in quarter $q$, $\delta_{qt}$ is a quarter effect in year $t$, $a_{ic}$ is a dummy variable that indicates if $i$ is in age group $c$, $\beta_{ct}$ is an age effect in year $t$, $b_{ig}$ is a dummy variable indicating if $i$ is in schooling group $g$, $\gamma_{igt}$ is a schooling effect in year $t$, $c$ is a dummy variable indicating if $i$ is employed in industrial sector $s$, $\mu_{is}$ is an industry wage effect in year $t$, $f_i$ is a dummy variable indicating if $i$ works in Israel in year $t$, $\theta_t$ is a work-in-Israel effect in year $t$, $\psi$ is a work-in-Jerusalem effect. The age groups indexed by $c$ are 25–34, 35–44, 45–54, 55–64. The schooling groups indexed by $g$ are 13–15 years, 16 or more years. The industries indexed by $s$ are agriculture, manufacturing and related industries, construction, and services. The omitted industry group is public and community services.
Column 1 of table 2 reports estimates of the daily wage premium for working in Israel. The premium falls from 17% (in logs) in 1981 to zero in 1984 and 1985, then rises to an all-time high of 36% in 1991. Columns 2–3 report schooling coefficients, which decline monotonically until 1989 and then increase slightly. The wage gap in favor of men who completed 13–15 years of schooling is less than 6% for the period 1987–91. Elsewhere (Angrist 1995) I discuss the possibility that shifts in the supply of educated workers were a major contributing factor in the decline in returns to schooling. Angrist (1992) also shows that workers with different characteristics were employed in Israel at different times, which suggests that changes in the Israeli wage premium and schooling coefficients may reflect worker heterogeneity. But a set of estimates using panel data show that both of these changes exist even after allowing for individual heterogeneity.

The industry wage effects in columns 4–7 indicate that in the beginning of the sample period agricultural workers earned least while construction workers earned most. By 1988, however, workers in agriculture were no longer paid less than those in the reference group (public and community services). By 1989, agricultural workers earned more than workers in the general service sector and in the manufacturing sector. The premium paid to construction workers also grew to almost 20% by 1988, while the wage gap between construction and agriculture shrank from roughly 30% to 15%. The wage gap between manufacturing and construction was fairly stable at roughly 15%. The growth in relative
## Table 2
**Daily Wage Equations (Selected Parameter Estimates)**

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<th>Education, 16+ (3)</th>
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<th>1 Manufacturing (5)</th>
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**Note.**—This table shows estimates of equation (1) in the text. The sample size for all years combined is 173,588. The estimates were constructed using Israel Central Bureau of Statistics sampling weights. Standard errors in parentheses.

* The omitted industry is public and community services.
construction and agricultural wages probably reflects upward pressure on wages in labor markets where Palestinians have had the most employment opportunities in Israel.

D. The Relationship between Wages and Days Worked

This subsection describes ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates from a simple regression of the 1987–91 wages earned by Palestinian men employed in Israel on the average days worked by Palestinian men employed in Israel. Some of these regressions include controls for the average daily wages of Israeli citizens. Although these OLS estimates have no structural interpretation, they provide initial evidence that wages paid to Palestinians working in Israel are negatively correlated with days worked by Palestinians in Israel.

Column 1 in the top half of table 3 reports OLS estimates from a regression of wages on days worked, quarter dummies, and two Gulf War dummies for the first two quarters of 1991. Column 2 reports the results of adding data on the average daily wage of Israeli citizens to this basic equation. The extra wage series provides a partial control for macroeconomic conditions in Israel. Adding the average wage of Israelis employed in construction and the average wage of Israelis employed in agriculture reduces the coefficient on average days worked by Palestinians in Israel from −0.17 to −0.14.

Separate regressions for men employed in agriculture, construction, and manufacturing also show a negative covariance between days worked and average daily wages, even after controlling for wages earned by Israeli citizens (except for manufacturing workers). For example, the coefficient in a regression of log average daily wages paid to construction workers on their days of work is −0.16. Note that, for each industry group, wages paid to Palestinians working in Israel are strongly positively correlated with the wages paid to Israeli citizens working in those industries. This suggests that some of the movement in Palestinian wages reflects an Israeli trend or demand shock and highlights the importance of isolating a source of exogenous variation in labor supply that can be used to identify structural demand parameters.

III. Theoretical Framework

This section develops a theoretical framework that can be used to interpret the effect of exogenous supply shocks on Palestinian wages and

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9 Data on the wages of Israeli citizens were derived from table R/3 in National Insurance Institute (1992, and selected earlier issues); see Angrist (1994) for details. It should be noted that 15% or fewer observations in these data are on Palestinians registered with the Israeli Employment Service. Although far from ideal, these series appear to contain the most reliable data available on average quarterly wages by industry for Israelis.
Table 3
Relationship between Daily Wages and Days Worked by Industry (Undifferenced Equations)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All</th>
<th>Agriculture</th>
<th>Construction</th>
<th>Manufacturing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. OLS estimates:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Days worked</td>
<td>-.17</td>
<td>-.14</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>-.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.01)</td>
<td>(.01)</td>
<td>(.07)</td>
<td>(.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log average daily wage of Israeli citizens employed in:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.07)</td>
<td>(.03)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>.72</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.07)</td>
<td>(.06)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>(.15)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|                      | (5)  | (6)         | (7)          | (8)           |
|                      |      |             |              |               |
| B. IV Estimates:    |      |             |              |               |
| Days worked          | -.28 | -.23        | -.22         | -.15          |
|                      | (.01)| (.01)       | (.03)        | (.03)         |
| Log average daily wage of Israeli citizens employed in: |      |             |              |               |
| Construction         | .43  | ...         | .73          | ...           |
|                      | (.07)| (.03)       |              |               |
| Agriculture          | .09  | .70         | ...          | ...           |
|                      | (.07)| (.06)       |              |               |
| Manufacturing        | ...  | ...         | .60          | (.16)         |

Overidentification $\chi^2(3)$ test: 173, 41, 48, 11, 199, 32, 39, 35

Note.—The top panel reports ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates from regressions of the log of real daily wages for Palestinian men employed in Israel on quarter dummies, two Gulf War dummies, average log days worked in Israel, and log real wages of Israeli citizens by industry. The Israeli wage series are quarterly by major industrial sector, from the National Insurance Institute (1992 and selected issues). The bottom panel reports instrumental variables (IV) estimates from the same specification using linear and quadratic terms in person-days under curfew in the West Bank and Gaza Strip as instruments. The sample includes 39,856 observations on Palestinian men employed in Israel: 5,663 employed in agriculture, 22,282 employed in construction, and 11,921 employed in manufacturing during the years 1987–91. Standard errors in parentheses.
employment. The wages and employment of workers from the territories could be affected by employment opportunities in Israel in at least two ways. First, the possibility of employment in Israel should act to close the gap between wages paid locally and in Israel. This means an increase in wages paid to workers employed locally and a reduction in labor costs for Israeli employers. Second, higher Israeli wages may stimulate local demand for products and services produced in the territories. A comparative advantage in labor services may also have worked to slow the growth of an industrial base in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Metzer 1992). However, the analysis presented here takes the industrial structure of Israel and the territories as given.

The following model describes key features of the Palestinian labor market. Workers in the territories are assumed to supply working days per month according to the following labor supply equations:

\[ N_{j} = L_{j}(w_{t}, w_{m}, z_{j}), \]

where \( L_{j} \) is a per capita supply function, \( w_{t} \) is the wage paid in the territories, \( w_{m} \) is the wage paid in Israel, \( z_{t} \) and \( z_{m} \) are variables that shift the per capita functions, and \( N \) is the size of the working-age population in the territories.

Workers employed locally produce \( y_{t} \), and workers employed in Israel produce \( y_{m} \). In both cases, the production function is assumed to exhibit constant returns to scale, with the following unit cost functions:

\[ c_{j}(w_{j}, x_{j}), \]

where \( x_{j} \) is the price of a second Hicks composite input in each production function.

Local demand for the local product, \( y_{t} \), is assumed to be a function of the wages paid in Israel and in the territories and the price of the local good, \( p_{t} \):

\[ N \cdot d_{t}(E, p_{t}), \]

where \( E = w_{t}L_{t} + w_{m}L_{m} \) is the per capita earnings of Palestinian workers, and \( d_{t}(E, p_{t}) \) is a per capita demand function. This function can include a component of “export demand” by Israel for the local Palestinian good without introducing substantive changes in what follows. Aggregate de-

\[10\] This model is an adaptation of Altonji and Card’s (1991) model of a labor market with two skill groups.
mand for the Israeli good is assumed to be a function of price, $d_m(p_m)$. Equilibrium in the product market requires

$$y_e = d_e(E, p_e)$$

and

$$y_m = d_m(p_m),$$

where $d_e = N \cdot d_e(E, p_e)$.

Producers are assumed to be cost minimizers in the factor market, so that conditional factor demands can be obtained from cost functions by Shepherd’s Lemma. In factor market equilibrium, we therefore have

$$y_j = c_j(w_j, x_j) = \ell_j(w_e, w_m, z_j), \quad j = \ell, m,$$

where $c_j(w_j, x_j)$ denotes the partial derivatives of the unit cost function with respect to wage rates, and where $\ell_j = N \cdot \ell_j$.

Finally, firms are assumed to choose a level of output by equating marginal cost to price, where each firm takes the product price as given. Therefore, product prices are set by

$$p_j = c_j(w_j, x_j), \quad j = \ell, m.$$

Equations (5), (6), and (7) determine the equilibrium level of Palestinians’ wages paid locally and in Israel and the prices of goods produced using Palestinian labor locally and in Israel. The exogenous variables that affect equilibrium are the prices of other inputs, $x_e$ and $x_m$, and shifts in the labor supply functions, $z_e$ and $z_m$.

The effect of shifts in exogenous variables on equilibrium wage rates can be obtained by substituting (7) into (5) and (5) into (6) to give

$$d_e[E, c_e(w_e, x_e)] \cdot c_e(w_e, x_e) = \ell_e(w_e, w_m, z_e)$$

and

$$d_m[c_m(w_m, x_m)] \cdot c_m(w_m, x_m) = \ell_m(w_e, w_m, z_m).$$

This substitution eliminates the endogenous product prices and leaves a pair of equations that jointly determine the wage rates, $w_e$ and $w_m$.

Taking logarithms and differentiating, the proportional changes in wage rates can be shown to satisfy the following two equations:

$$[\xi \lambda_e + \eta_{e\ell} - \epsilon_{e\ell} \xi]d \ln w_e + [\xi \lambda_m - \epsilon_{e\ell} \xi]d \ln w_m$$

$$= \epsilon_{e\ell}(1 - \phi \xi) d \ln z_e - \epsilon_{e\ell z}(1 - \phi \xi) d \ln z_m - \eta_{e\ell} d \ln x_e,$$

$$-\epsilon_{e\ell} d \ln w_e + [\eta_{e\ell m} - \epsilon_{e\ell m}]d \ln w_m = \epsilon_{e\ell z} d \ln z_m - \eta_{e\ell z} d \ln x_m.$$
where $\varepsilon_{jk}$ is the elasticity of labor supply to location $j$ with respect to argument $k$ ($k = m$ for $w_m$, $k = \ell$ for $w_\ell$, and $k = z$ for $z_m$ or $z_\ell$). Similarly, $\eta_{jk}$ is the elasticity of factor demand at location $j$ with respect to factor price $k$.

The parameter $\xi$ is the income elasticity of demand for the local product, $y_\ell, \phi = w_\ell \ell / E$ is the share of local earnings in total labor earnings, and $\lambda_\ell = d \ln E / d \ln w_\ell$ and $\lambda_m = d \ln E / d \ln w_m$ characterize the labor supply effects of wages on earnings.

Given estimates or assumptions about the underlying structural parameters, system (9) can be used to predict the effect of exogenous demand shocks (components of $d \ln w_\ell, d \ln w_m$) and supply shocks (components of $d \ln z_\ell, d \ln z_m$) on Palestinian wages and employment. This system also provides a framework for estimation. Note that the terms in (9) can be rearranged and simplified as follows:

$$d \ln w_\ell = (1/\eta_{\ell\ell})d \ln \ell + (\xi/\eta_{\ell\ell})d \ln E - (\eta_{\ell x}/\eta_{\ell\ell})d \ln x_\ell$$

and

$$d \ln w_m = (1/\eta_{mm})d \ln m - (\eta_{mx}/\eta_{mm})d \ln x_m.$$  

At this point, the definitions of $d \ln x_m$ and $d \ln x_\ell$ are expanded to include labor demand shocks of any sort, as well as shifts in the prices of other factor inputs. The values $d \ln x_m$ and $d \ln x_\ell$ can therefore be interpreted as error terms for the purposes of structural estimation. Supply shocks that are independent of these error terms can be used as instrumental variables to identify the parameters in (10).

**IV. Structural Estimation**

The supply shocks to be used for instrumental variables (IV) estimation consist of quarterly time-series data on person-days under curfew in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, combined with control variables derived from Israeli Army data on civil disturbances. Figure 4 plots the Pales-

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11 This is the total elasticity of demand including scale effects (see, e.g., Hamermesh 1986).

12 These parameters are $\lambda_\ell = \phi(1 + \varepsilon_{\ell\ell}) + \varepsilon_{m\ell}(1 - \phi)$ and $\lambda_m = (1 - \phi)(1 + \varepsilon_{mm}) + \varepsilon_{m\ell}\phi$.

13 The role of $x_\ell$ and $x_m$ in the theoretical product demand equations can be generalized so that these components are interpreted as vectors of variables that include prices of other factor inputs and a generic demand shock. The product demand equations then become

$$y_\ell = d_\ell[E, c_\ell(w_\ell, x_\ell), x_\ell], \quad y_m = d_m[c_m(w_m, x_m), x_m].$$

The only implication of this change for equation (9) is that $\eta_{\ell x}$ and $\eta_{mx}$ must be redefined.
tinian curfew data along with the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) data on civil disturbances in the territories. Both series are described in the Data Appendix. The most prominent feature of figure 4 is the extended curfew during the Gulf War. Figure 4 also shows that, with the exception of the Gulf War period, the Palestinian series on person-days under curfew is positively correlated with the IDF series on civil disturbances. The curfew data are useful here because curfews and closures of the territories have a major effect on the number of Palestinians working in Israel. It should be noted, however, that curfews are often imposed in response to disruptive incidents or personal attacks that can directly or indirectly shift local labor or product demand as well as labor supply to Israel. The value of having both the curfew and disturbance data is that the IDF data on disturbances can provide a partial control for the local disruptions associated with incidents leading to curfews.

A. Measurement Framework

In addition to using the IDF disturbances data as a control variable, a variance components structure is introduced to allow for the fact that supply shocks like curfews and closures can appear in the demand equation or be associated with variables that have an effect on labor demand. Let $Z_t$ denote a vector of candidate instruments that might shift labor supply at either location ($Z_t$ includes $z_m$ and $z_e$ in the notation of the previous section). The candidate instruments are connected to demand shifts in period $t$ as follows:
\[-(\eta_{\text{m}}/\eta_{\text{mm}})\ln x_{\text{mt}} = Z_{t}\pi_{m} + \eta_{\text{mt}} \]

and

\[-(\eta_{\text{et}}/\eta_{\text{mm}})\ln x_{\text{et}} = Z_{t}\pi_{\text{e}} + \eta_{\text{et}} , \]

where \(\pi_{m}\) and \(\pi_{\text{e}}\) are population regression coefficients and \(\eta_{\text{mt}}\) and \(\eta_{\text{et}}\) are random components uncorrelated with \(Z_{t}\) by construction. As an identifying assumption, the relationship between \(\pi_{m}\) and \(\pi_{\text{e}}\) is restricted to be proportional:

**Assumption 1.** \(\pi_{m} = \kappa \pi_{\text{e}}\) for some constant, \(\kappa\).

This assumption means that the elements of \(Z_{t}\) can be bundled in a linear combination that captures all the demand shocks generated by \(Z_{t}\) up to a factor of proportionality. Note that if \(Z_{t}\) itself is a scalar, assumption 1 is not really a restriction. In practice, however, identification of structural parameters in the demand equations requires more than a single instrument.

To generate an estimating equation, the demand functions are assumed to be approximately log-linear, so that, when equation (10) is quasi-differenced across locations in period \(t\), we have

\[
\ln w_{\text{mt}} = \kappa \ln w_{\text{et}} + (1/\eta_{\text{mm}})\ln \ell_{\text{mt}} - (\kappa/\eta_{\text{e}})\ln \ell_{\text{et}} + (\kappa \xi/\eta_{\text{e}})\ln E_{t} + (\mu_{\text{mt}} - \kappa \mu_{\text{et}}). \tag{12}
\]

Quasi-differencing removes supply shocks other than \((\mu_{\text{mt}} - \kappa \mu_{\text{et}})\) from the demand equation. The error term in equation (12) is therefore uncorrelated with \(Z_{t}\), and elements of \(Z_{t}\) are available as instruments.

Finally, an estimating equation for individual observations is derived by assuming that equation (12) holds for average log wages in quarter \(t\) for workers employed in Israel. But to allow for the possibility of composition effects as workers move in and out of the labor force, a set of individual-level regressors, \(X_{it}\), is also included. In particular, I assume the wages of worker \(i\) employed in Israel can be written

\[
\ln w_{\text{mt}(i)} = \ln w_{\text{mt}} + X_{it}\beta + \nu_{i}(i) \]

or

\[
\ln w_{\text{mt}(i)} = \kappa \ln w_{\text{et}} + (1/\eta_{\text{mm}})\ln \ell_{\text{mt}} - (\kappa/\eta_{\text{e}})\ln \ell_{\text{et}} + (\kappa \xi/\eta_{\text{e}})\ln E_{t} + X_{it}\beta + \{(\mu_{\text{mt}} - \kappa \mu_{\text{et}}) + \nu_{i}(i)\}, \tag{13}
\]

where \(\nu_{i}(i)\) is an error term that has mean zero each year by construction (because \(X_{it}\) includes year dummies). The individual-level regressors should help control for the fact that Israeli curfew policies can affect the demo-
graphic mix of Palestinians coming to work in Israel (e.g., by favoring married and skilled workers).

To illustrate how instrumental variables can be used in this model, suppose $k = 0$ and $\beta = 0$. Instrumental variables estimates using curfew data in such a specification correspond directly to the OLS estimates reported in the top half of table 3 and are reported in the bottom half of table 3. The instruments consist of linear and quadratic terms in person-days under curfew in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, for a total of four instruments. Estimates of the coefficient on days worked can be interpreted as estimates of $\left(1/\eta_{mm}\right)$ in the restricted model. The resulting estimates range from $-0.23$ to $-0.28$ when all industries are pooled, suggesting an aggregate demand elasticity on the order of $-3.5$ to $-4.5$. The IV estimates decline somewhat but remain negative when the average wages of Israeli citizens are added to the model as a partial control for demand shifts. The overidentification test statistics reported at the bottom of table 3 indicate that the fit improves considerably when data on the wages of Israeli citizens are added, but the test statistics continue to indicate that these specifications are highly at odds with the data.

An alternative illustration of how the curfew data can be used is given in figures 5-7, which provide a graphical depiction of IV estimates of equation (13) when $k$ is set equal to one and $\eta_{mm} = \eta_{ee}$. In this case, equation (13) simplifies to a model relating the difference in wages by work location to the difference in days worked by work location. The corresponding reduced form relationships are shown in figures 5 and 6. Figure 5 graphs the Israel/West Bank wage difference against person-days under curfew in the West Bank, after regression-adjusting for Gulf War and quarter effects. Figure 6 shows the relationship between West Bank curfews and the difference between days worked in Israel and days worked in the West Bank (after regression-adjusting for Gulf War and quarter effects). The figures show that curfews are strongly associated with higher relative wages and fewer days worked in Israel.

Figure 7 pictures the IV estimate of a labor demand curve in this restricted model by graphing fitted values from the $y$-axes in figures 5 and 6 against one another. There is only one instrument, so the figure shows a perfect linear relationship. The slope of the line in the figure is approximately $-1.3$. The slope of the same line computed using person-days under curfew in the Gaza Strip and using the Gaza Strip as the comparison region is approximately $-1.4$. In the context of equation (13), these relationships imply that the short-run Israeli demand for Palestinian labor is not very elastic.

B. Parameter Estimates

When estimating equation (13) without $k$ restricted to be zero, a local region for quasi-differencing has to be chosen to control for demand shocks
correlated with the instruments. Empirical results are reported here for comparisons to both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The dependent variable is the log of positive real daily wages for the sample of men employed in Israel. Men employed in Jerusalem are excluded from the analysis. The regressors include the quarterly average log local wage in the comparison region (West Bank or Gaza Strip) by industrial sector (agriculture, construction, or other), the quarterly average log days worked in Israel by sector, the quarterly average log days worked in the comparison region by sector, and the log of total per capita real monthly wages (over all sectors) in the comparison region. Averages were computed using the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics sampling weight and excluding outliers. The estimation pools men from different industries but allows for an industry-specific constant. This procedure is equivalent to estimation of (13) separately by sector, with the restriction that the parameters of interest are the same across industries.

Table 4 reports OLS and IV estimates. To compute the IV estimates, four variables were treated as endogenous: days worked in Israel, days worked in the comparison region, wages in the comparison region, and average total earnings in the comparison region. The four excluded

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\[ \text{Figure 5.---Curfews and Israeli/local differences in daily wages} \]
The parameters in equation (13) are just-identified if no additional restrictions are imposed or instruments added. Part of the identification therefore comes from the fact that quadratic functions are used as instruments while the regressions are log-linear. If there is an omitted nonlinear term in one of the regressors, identification breaks down. Therefore, to provide some evidence on the validity of the orthogonality restrictions and to see whether the estimates are sensitive to alternative
identifying assumptions, additional restrictions were imposed one at a time:

**ASSUMPTION 2a.** The income elasticity of local product demand is zero; \( \xi = 0 \).

**ASSUMPTION 2b.** Demand elasticities and demand shifts are related by the same factor of proportionality; \( \eta_{\ell\ell} = \kappa \eta_{\text{mom}} \).

**ASSUMPTION 2c.** Local and Israeli demand shifts induced by \( Z_t \) are the same; \( \kappa = 1 \).

Given one or more of assumptions 2a, 2b, or 2c, equation (13) is over-identified and subject to partial validation using data.

Results using the Gaza Strip as a comparison region appear in the first five columns of table 4, and results using the West Bank as a comparison region are reported in columns 6–10. The results are reported as coefficients on the regressors in equation (13). The coefficient on log wages in the comparison region is an estimate of \( \kappa \), the coefficient on log days worked in Israel is an estimate of \( 1/\eta_{\text{mom}} \), the coefficient on days worked in the comparison region is an estimate of \( -\kappa/\eta_{\ell\ell} \), and the coefficient on log total per-capita earnings is an estimate of \( \kappa \xi/\eta_{\ell\ell} \). Below the estimates reported in each column, the implied elasticities (\( \eta_{\text{mom}}, \eta_{\ell\ell}, \) and \( \xi \)) are also reported.\(^{16}\)

\(^{16}\) Coefficients on the individual-level regressors are not reported. The marriage coefficients suggest a 5% wage premium for married men. The age coefficients imply a concave earnings profile.
Columns 1–2 report OLS and IV estimates for the Gaza Strip comparison under assumption 2a (that the income elasticity of product demand in the comparison region is zero). The OLS estimates are unlikely to have a structural interpretation, but they are reported for comparison purposes. In this case, the OLS estimate of the Israeli demand elasticity is positive, but the IV estimate is negative, though imprecisely estimated. Other IV estimates based on models using the Gaza Strip as a comparison region generate estimated Israeli demand elasticities between $-0.76$ and $-2.2$, with local demand elasticities in a similar range. Estimates of the income elasticity of product demand suggest that declines in income do not generate large changes in product demand for the local industries employing wage-earners. Finally, the $\chi^2$ goodness-of-fit statistics suggest that these models fit the data well.

As in columns 1–2, OLS estimates of $1/\eta_{mm}$ using the West Bank as a comparison region (col. 6) are positive, while IV estimates (col. 7) are negative. Most of the IV results in columns 7–10 support the notion that negative demand elasticities explain wage increases and two out of four of the estimates of $1/\eta_{mm}$ are in the same range as those in columns 2–5. The results in column 9 corresponds most closely to the graphical representation in figure 7. But some results (such as those in col. 10) clearly cannot be rationalized in the context of the model outlined here. It should be noted, however, that estimates using the West Bank as a comparison region are associated with much larger values of the goodness-of-fit statistic than estimates using the Gaza Strip as a comparison region. This suggests that the restrictions motivating IV estimation are more likely to be satisfied for the Gaza Strip comparison used in the models underlying columns 2–5.\textsuperscript{17}

V. Policy Analysis

The empirical results from the previous section can be combined with the theoretical framework in Section III above to assess the possible impact of policies that reduce Palestinian access to the Israeli labor market. To illustrate the potential labor market effect of supply shifts, the general comparative statics relationship, (9), is applied to a simple numerical example. Suppose that half of the roughly 105,000 Palestinians who were regularly employed in Israel (including Jerusalem) before 1991 were unwilling or unable to come to work at current wage rates. This shift might

\textsuperscript{17}The notion that Gaza is a better comparison region is supported by Razin and Sadka (1993, p. 86), who note that “the Intifada (in Gaza) disturbed mostly the work of Gaza’s residents in Israel.” Razin and Sadka also note that the local non-agricultural sector in Gaza was hardest hit by the uprising. Results not reported here suggest that estimates of equation (13) by industry fit the data on Gazan agricultural workers especially well.
Table 4  
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Instrumental Variables (IV) Estimates of the Demand Equation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Contrast to Gaza Strip</th>
<th>Contrast to West Bank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OLS (1)</td>
<td>( \xi = 0 ) (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \kappa )</td>
<td>.19 (.02)</td>
<td>.62 (.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( 1/\eta_{mm} )</td>
<td>.30 (.05)</td>
<td>-.45 (.40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( -\kappa/\eta_{TV} )</td>
<td>-.11 (.02)</td>
<td>.26 (.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \kappa \xi/\eta_{TV} )</td>
<td>-.17 (.24)</td>
<td>-.25 (.08)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Overidentification \( \chi^2(1) \) test
Implied elasticity estimates:
- \( \eta_{mm} \)
- \( \eta_{TV} \)
- \( \xi \)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overidentification</th>
<th>( \chi^2(1) ) test</th>
<th>( \eta_{mm} )</th>
<th>( \eta_{TV} )</th>
<th>( \xi )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>.57</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| \( \eta_{mm} \) | -2.2 | -2.2 | -76 | -95 |
| \( \eta_{TV} \) | -2.4 | -1.6 | -91 | -105 |
| \( \xi \)     | .38  | .23  | .21 |     |

Note.—The table shows estimates of equation (13) in text. Aggregate regressors are annual averages by year and three coarse industry groups. The estimating equation includes industry-group dummies and the key parameters of interest are restricted to be the same across industries. Other regressors are listed in the text. The sample includes 39,806 observations on Palestinian men employed in Israel and is the same as that underlying table 3. Standard errors in parentheses.
be the consequence of stricter enforcement of access rules, the sale of Israeli work permits to workers or employers, or both. Suppose also that local (in the territories') labor supply shifts to partly offset this reduction, so almost half the workers who used to work in Israel are willing to work locally at current wage rates. This means about 26,000 new local workers, implying an increase of roughly 15% in local labor supply.

The possible consequences of such a scenario are described in figure 8, which shows a range of solutions to equation (9) when \( \varepsilon_{mx} d \ln z_m = -0.50 \) and \( \varepsilon_{Ze} d \ln z_e = +0.15 \). The solutions are presented in terms of the effect on labor earnings. The upper part of the figure was calculated assuming an income elasticity of demand equal to one for the local product and the lower part was calculated assuming an income elasticity of demand equal to zero. For both halves of the figure, the local elasticity of labor demand was set at negative one. These parameter choices are in the range of estimates reported in table 4. In particular, table 4 provides little evidence of a highly wage-elastic local labor demand or a highly price-elastic local product demand that feeds back into local labor demand.

Four lines are graphed in each half of figure 8, corresponding to four different assumptions about supply elasticities.\(^{18}\) The median estimate of the elasticity of Israeli demand for Palestinian labor in table 4 is between \(-1.1\) and \(-2.2\). Figure 8 suggests that for elasticities in this range, a 50% negative shift in labor supply to Israel, offset by a 15% positive local shift, is unlikely to reduce total Palestinian earnings by more than 20%. If Israeli demand for Palestinian labor is sufficiently inelastic, total earnings could even rise. Although the latter possibility (less than unit-elastic Israeli demand) seems unlikely, both the theoretical and empirical analysis suggest that past Israeli wage responses have worked to considerably dampen the aggregate earnings impact of reduced access to the Israeli labor market.

Finally, note that unless local product demand is highly income elastic, this dampening effect works for Israeli demand elasticities that are much larger in magnitude than \(-2.2\) as well. However, the magnitude of any behavioral response depends partly on whether the relevant shock is viewed by workers and employers as permanent or temporary. The example in this section takes all elasticities as fixed, whereas economic theory suggests that the product market response to permanent income shocks should be larger than the response to transitory shocks. Similarly, long-run elasticities of labor demand are likely to be larger than short-run elasticities of labor demand in both Israel and the territories.

\(^{18}\) Supply elasticities are assumed to be equal for both locations, and cross-elasticities equal to \( \text{minus} \) the own-location elasticity. Another assumption used to construct the figure is that the share of local earnings in total labor earnings (\( \phi \)) is fixed at 60%.
Fig. 8.—Earnings effect of +15% local and −50% Israel supply shocks
VI. Summary and Conclusions

A range of graphical and statistical evidence strongly suggests that exogenous decreases in Palestinian labor supply are associated with significant increases in the wages Israeli employers pay their Palestinian workers. Instrumental variable estimates of demand equations are somewhat sensitive to the details of model specification, but the best-fitting models consistently suggest that the observed covariance between Palestinian wages and days worked can be rationalized by a short-run Israeli elasticity of demand for Palestinian labor ranging between $-1$ and $-2$. Even simple IV estimates that do not control for demand shocks by quasi-differencing imply a short-run elasticity of between $-3$ and $-4\dagger$.

More and better data on the Palestinian labor market may lead to more robust results in future work. In the meantime, the results presented here suggest that labor market policies in the territories should be analyzed with a number of possibilities in mind. First, and most important, short-run Israeli demand for Palestinian labor may be inelastic enough to considerably dampen the earnings loss from reduced access to the Israeli labor market, at least for a while. Second, local labor and product demand do not appear to change dramatically in response to transitory changes in earnings from Israeli employment.

In light of these findings, a Palestinian social planner might well choose to exploit the monopoly power Palestinians have if they continue as the principal supplier of semi-skilled construction and agricultural labor to the Israeli labor market. In particular, rents might be obtained by deliberately restricting labor supply. Of course, social planners would also consider factors like the distribution of unemployment and the loss of skills among the unemployed. Such consideration might well outweigh simple calculations designed to maximize earnings or income tax revenues. Finally, higher Palestinian wages create a strong incentive for Israeli employers to develop alternative labor resources. Israel’s increasing use of non-Palestinian guest workers to fill positions vacated by Palestinians appears to be an attempt to develop such resources.

The use of a model and the associated empirical results for forecasting is most helpful when future economic circumstances are likely to be similar to past circumstances. This point is worth emphasizing in a study of Palestinian-Israeli labor relations because changes in access policy that come about as part of a deliberate regime shift could have labor market consequences very different from the effect of the shocks analyzed here.

\dagger This finding contradicts those in Fishelson (1992), who reports a positive coefficient from a regression of log wages on the number of Palestinians employed in Israel. But his estimates are from a large multiequation macro model for a long time period that ends in 1986. The Fishelson results therefore do not seem directly comparable to those reported here.
Data Appendix
Curfew and Disturbance Data

A. Curfews

The Jerusalem Media and Communications Center (JMCC) compiles press releases and monographs in an effort to represent Palestinian positions to members of the press. As part of this effort, the JMCC collects data on the number of days under curfew by locality. The curfew data used here were taken from a JMCC data set listing curfew incidents by month and locality between December 1987 and December 1991. Those data were compiled primarily from reports by local observers, from press reports and from the UN Relief and Works Agency records (Jerusalem Media and Communications Center 1991). Local population data used to inflate incidents into person-days were taken from Benvenisti and Khayat (1988). The incidents and population series were then combined to construct aggregate time series on person-days under curfew. Unpublished data on curfews from a second Palestinian source for the period December 1987–November 1988 (Al-Haq in Ramallah, West Bank) are highly correlated with the JMCC figures, as are the IDF data on civil disturbances in the territories.

B. Disturbances

The IDF compiles data on the number of Israeli citizens, local residents, and soldiers injured or killed each month in the territories, on the number of attacks by local residents on Israeli citizens and soldiers (with and without use of firearms), incidents of arson, Molotov cocktails thrown, grenade attacks, and the number of civil disturbances. Some of these data are published in Israel Defense Forces (1992). The detailed monthly series used here were provided by the IDF spokesman’s office. The civil disturbances series includes a count of incidents of stone throwing, road blockades, tires set ablaze, and unruliness. These data do not count incidents involving firearms.

References


