
In her preface to *Pragmatics and grammar* Ariel writes that there is a narrative development to her textbook: Part I splits utterances into separate grammatical and pragmatic components, Part II demonstrates how during grammaticization and semanticization processes the pragmatic crosses over to become grammatical, and Part III combines semantic codes and pragmatic inferences into one synchronic whole, what usually goes under the name of ‘what is said’. This narrative is both fascinating and convincing. The picture Ariel draws of various points of grammar/pragmatics interface is complex, rich in detail, and highly impressive in its coverage of central topics, as well as topics not hitherto considered central to the field. Yet, students are sure to enjoy Ariel’s very clear prose in explaining complex issues. They will also appreciate the natural, mostly spoken examples, accompanying the arguments made. Linguists at large and even experts on questions of pragmatics and semantics can benefit from the book too. Above all, perhaps, from Ariel’s conscious decision to include grammaticization issues, which to date have not been deemed relevant for a discussion of the grammar/pragmatics interface. I highly recommend this textbook not only for advanced undergraduate students and graduate students, but also for semantics/pragmatics specialists.

*Pragmatics and grammar* naturally discusses the relations between pragmatics and grammar (note the unconventional order of the conjuncts here). The introductory Chapter One defines grammar and pragmatics, and motivates the distinction from cognitive and discourse perspectives. Ariel chooses a code versus inference division of labor between grammar and pragmatics. Accordingly, she defines grammar as a set of conventions associating linguistic forms with specific functions, and pragmatics as plausible (as distinct from logical) inferences speakers intend their addressees to draw based on their explicit message, the specific context and a set of pragmatic principles. This originally Gricean definition is consensual among experts in the field, although there is a debate among philosophers of language, semanticists, neo-Griceans and Relevance theoreticians on what should count as code and what as inference in specific cases. Since current disagreements often pertain to more subtle distinctions among inferences, the chapter also introduces a variety of pragmatically derived interpretations proposed in the literature: Particularized and generalized conversational implicatures, explicatures and explicated inferences and what Ariel considers to be truth-compatible inferences (ones plausibly compatible with the speaker’s utterance, though not intended by her). Conventional implicatures are assimilated into grammar in her model (contra Griceans). Ariel only briefly introduces the Gricean Maxims and the neo-Gricean and Relevance-theoretic principles responsible for triggering pragmatic inferences, since the grammar/pragmatics analyses she chose to address in the book do not depend on the specifics of these theories.

Equipped with this battery of theoretical concepts, students are invited to learn how they can implement the different tools in order to draw a grammar/pragmatics division of labor (Part I). Chapter Two focuses on referring expressions, a long-time specialization of Ariel (Ariel, 1990, 2001). True to her promise to apply only a code versus inference distinction, Ariel guides her reader in observing consistency when applying the distinction. For the existential presupposition associated with definite descriptions (e.g., *the queen is bald*) this means splitting the commonly assumed holistic “presuppositional interpretation” in two: Speaker commitment on the one hand and Givenness on the other. As Ariel demonstrates, speaker’s commitment to the existence of such entities is cancelable. It must therefore be pragmatically inferred. The Givenness of the existential assumption (its familiarity in the specific context, on whatever basis), on the other hand, is not cancelable. As she points out, an Israeli speaker at the hairdresser’s cannot felicitously utter *the queen is not bald*, despite the “canceling” negative, just because there is no Givenness basis for *the queen* in Israel. That aspect is then encoded.
The second case discussed in this chapter concerns the status of form/function associations for referring expressions. The conclusion from a strict code versus inference distinction here is that some aspects of referential interpretations are encoded (for example, how liberal zeroes can be used), but many aspects are pragmatically driven (e.g., choosing the intended referent from two equally accessible antecedents). Crucially, Ariel argues that degree of mental accessibility is encoded for many referring expressions and is not left (only) to pragmatic inferencing. If that had been the case, it would be a mystery why languages which have a rich verbal morphology (marking persons) ever use their overt pronouns, which add no information. Two cases are then examined with respect to the third question in this chapter, pertaining to discourse functions and discourse profiles. Discourse functions are grammatically defined, discourse profiles are only strong discoursal tendencies, indirectly created. Ariel demonstrates that it is not statistical differences that distinguish the two. Although there are hardly any new subject agents in discourse (only 1% in the Spanish data cited), this Preferred Argument Structure fact (Du Bois, 1987) constitutes only a pragmatically motivated discourse profile, not a linguistic convention. A similar point is made regarding extremely strong genre-related conventions associated with referring expressions. Most of them turn out to be extralinguistically motivated discourse profiles, and not the (direct) product of genre-specific linguistic conventions.

Chapter Three continues with the question of drawing the semantics/pragmatics divide, but adding on another complication, that of distinguishing between types of inferred interpretations: conversational implicatures (whether generalized or particularized), explicated inferences, and truth-compatible inferences (i.e., inferences not actually intended by the speaker). The latter are necessary for accounting for interpretations commonly assumed to be explicative or implicated in the literature, although they are not in fact intended by the speaker. Ariel first takes on the case of the inferences associated with and, e.g., the causal interpretation associated with an utterance like: So I eat the local food, and get deathly ill (example 1b). Griceans have advocated an implicature analysis and Relevance theoreticians have argued for an explicated inference status for the causal understanding, here clearly intended by the speaker.

Following Wilson (1975), and especially Carston (2002), Ariel demonstrates that such inferences may contribute truth-conditional meaning aspects, which is why reversing the order of the conjuncts may create a semantically distinct proposition (e.g., I read somewhere that it’s not that she fell and broke her hip, but, she broke her hip and fell, example 16). Chronological and causal interpretations associated with and conjunctions are then often explicated. But these inferences may be weakly implicated, and at times be only truth-compatible. An example for the latter case is So Cathy calls me up, and she wants Jonathan’s address (example 28a), where most likely, the speaker does not intend a causal inference such that ‘Cathy calls me up because she wants Jonathan’s address’. Still, an addressee may go ahead and derive this truth-compatible inference anyway. The very important conclusion of this discussion is that what seem to linguists to be the very same type of pragmatic inferences (those associated with and conjunctions) may carry different cognitive statuses under different discourse circumstances.

The very same theoretical statuses are played against each other in the second part of the chapter, where Ariel discusses the semantics/pragmatics division of labor for the scalar quantifier most. But here, semantic (lexical), explicated and implicated statuses often compete with each other over which of them provides the better account for the upper-bounded interpretation associated with most. Ariel herself (Ariel, 2004, 2006) had argued for a lexical status for the upper bound interpretation, but she makes a genuine effort to fairly present the motivations and advantages of the classical implicature analysis (Horn, 1972, 2006 inter alia) and the Relevance-theoretic analysis (Carston, 1990). The implicature analysis is supported by judgments that a speaker uttering The target date for the meeting is Jan 17 in Los Angeles, provided most of the Hall of Famers can make it (example 33) most probably intends most to mean ‘most but not all’, but is not seen to have told a false proposition should all the Hall of Famers be able to make it. The explicated inference account is vindicated by questionnaire data, which show that subjects consistently refuse to confirm that a speaker using most could have intended ‘all’, which should be the case if ‘not all’ is only an implicature. Accordingly, the upper-bound is truth-conditional, as in Regretfully, I can’t say all Knesset members, but most of the Knesset members... (example 45). The idea is that the explicated meaning of most results from a narrowing down of its lexical meaning (‘more than half’). This narrowing tends to exclude ‘all’.

Ariel’s lexical analysis for most crucially relies on distinguishing between ‘not all’ and the meaning she attributes to the quantifier, ‘a proper subset larger than 50%’. The difference is that whereas ‘a proper subset larger than 50%’ of entities is compatible with ‘all’, ‘not all’ absolutely excludes such a possibility. Her analysis is vindicated by subjects refusing to confirm that most can denote ‘all’, even when all the other options they can choose from violate the clearly semantic lower-bound on most (20%, 50%, 49%). Compatibility with ‘all’, as in the Hall of Famers example, is seen as a truth-compatible inference, i.e., not one intended by the speaker. Ariel also shows how unstable ‘compatibility with
all’ interpretations are, which is consistent with a pragmatic inference status, rather than with a lexical status. Despite the chapter’s bias towards the lexical analysis, Ariel is very clear about what it is that Chapter Three is all about:

It’s not the task of this chapter to decide the issue of the correct analyses of *and* inferences, of *most* and other scalar expressions, and of the more general question of whether we should prefer a “small” (“Occamistic”) grammar or a “large” (“anti-Occamistic”) grammar. Each of the three approaches presented can account for the data in an insightful way, and each should be considered seriously. Together, they demonstrate the challenge facing linguists engaged in drawing the grammar/pragmatics division of labor. Our main goal has been to lay out the features of each of the approaches, so that linguists keep an open mind when setting out to distinguish the inferred from the coded, the explicated from the implicated and the conveyed from the potentially truth-compatible. The important message of this chapter is that awareness of the variety of analytical concepts must be part of the mental equipment of anybody undertaking work of this kind.

While Part I addressed questions discussed in the classical grammar/pragmatics interface literature, Part II addresses topics normally analyzed only in the semanticization and grammaticization literature. Ariel insists on including such topics in her textbook since she regards semanticization and grammaticization as involving an interface point between the pragmatic and the grammatical. The first issue discussed is the question of the arbitrariness of grammar. Chapter Four is a defense of the thesis that grammar is motivated by extralinguistic factors. In order to make her point, Ariel attempts to explain away the fact that a considerable amount of grammatical aspects do seem quite arbitrary. She first argues that extralinguistic motivation need not be taken as iconic motivation. In other words, for a construction such as Left Dislocation, for example, to be motivated, its form need not necessarily somehow resemble the three functions it serves (according to Prince, 1998). Moreover, despite the fact that LDs are used under seemingly three sets of contextual circumstances, they are motivated by a single pragmatic factor (a relatively low degree of accessibility for the entity thus introduced – Ziv, 1994).

Other counter-examples to the thesis are accounted for by reference to the concept of competing motivations, where grammar can only satisfy one of the competing pragmatic motivations, not both simultaneously. Accordingly, she argues, there is no one-to-one relation between forms and their functions, though this does not mean that each such association is not motivated. Motivation, she stresses, does not entail a necessary relation, only a pragmatically plausible one and therefore different languages may manifest different form/function correlations, although each is motivated. The variation among languages is consequently quite restricted, she argues. It boils down to different translations of extralinguistic concepts into grammatical terms. The discussion of the conventions governing the use of resumptive pronouns in the world’s languages, based on Keenan and Comrie (1977) NP Accessibility hierarchy, is very instructive in this connection. The differences between languages lie in what syntactic positions are viewed as entailing a relatively lower degree of mental activation. Finally, Ariel emphasizes that the restriction on grammars necessarily being motivated applies only to the evolution of grammar. Grammatical conventions need not remain transparently motivated. I have assigned this chapter to my second-year undergraduate students, and they found the reading clear and engaging. More importantly, they were able to come up with examples of their own where a seemingly arbitrary linguistic phenomenon turns out to be extralinguistically motivated after all.

Chapter Five turns to an even harder puzzle. Given the facts established by now that pragmatic functions often turn grammatical (Traugott and Heine, 1991), where and how does this interface occur? Moreover, how can linguists advocate a grammar/pragmatics division of labor, and at the same time subscribe to a grammaticization process, which renders a previously pragmatic pattern into a currently grammatical one? Does the latter not undermine the former? Indeed, many pragmatists have basically given up on a grammar/pragmatics divide, precisely because of such problems. Ariel sets out to show that the two positions are compatible with each other. She casts a very wide net in her search for extralinguistic explanations for grammar: Cognitive constraints, sociocultural norms, and discourse-based constraints, namely the requirement for cooperative exchanges. She carefully leads the reader, starting with these very general and far-removed forces and ending with grammar formation. Ariel suggests two main gate-keepers in the transfer of the extragrammatical to the grammatical. The first one is discourse use, the other, the salient discourse pattern. The idea is that the synchronic discourse is the arena where the current grammar meets very many pressures: some cognitive, others socio-cultural, and yet others discourse-specific. When interacting, speakers have their local communicative goals, of course. The discourse they produce therefore reflects their juggling of all these factors.

In a particularly interesting section of this chapter (5.2) Ariel demonstrates how the various extralinguistic forces do not operate to affect grammar in a simple additive manner. Rather, discourse use reflects the global decision the
speaker makes in the face of very many, indeed too many motivations. Very much in the spirit of Hopper and Thompson (1980, 1984), Ariel convincingly argues that “external forces propose”, but it is discourse which disposes. She cites a few cases where despite a strong cognitive motivation for grammar to be shaped in a certain way, grammar follows the discourse way (e.g., various nominal markings, the linear ordering of tense, mood and aspect vis a vis the verb, case marking). For example, causal relations are conceptually represented as temporally ordered events, the causing event preceding the later, caused event (Noordman and Vonk, 1998). Psycholinguistic experiments accordingly support the assumption that iconically ordered causal relations are easier to process. Yet, natural discourse findings reveal that overwhelmingly causing events tend to follow their caused events (e.g., I felt horrible about it, cause I had to do shit like...). Ariel’s explanation for this seemingly curious fact is that discourse first of all imposes a relevance condition on utterances. Indeed, it is the caused events which are directly relevant to the discourse for the most part. The causing event only becomes relevant once the caused event has been mentioned. Hence, despite the cognitive advantage for causes to precede caused events, when discourse requirements (such as relevance) are in conflict with the cognitive advantage, it is the former that win out. Not surprisingly, this has grammatical implications. Cause, short for because, cannot occur with “appropriately” ordered clauses (Cf. Because/ ??cause I had to punish my students, I felt horrible about teaching at first). Discourse has the upper hand. Still, most local ad hoc discourse solutions do not get grammaticized. There are far too many of those. Eventually, Ariel narrows down the path from the extragrammatical to grammar to the salient, usually frequent discourse patterns. Discourse patterns associate specific forms with specific functions (whether relating to meaning or to contextual constraints). A small subset of these acquires a high degree of salience (not necessarily consciously so) because they seem highly useful to speakers, and these have the potential (but by no means necessity) to turn into a grammatical convention. The mechanism by which such changes are brought about is attributed to the working of neural networking systems. Models of such systems are the only ones that can accommodate both entrenched (grammatical) associations and associations only approaching grammaticization (represented as weaker, lower-probability neural connections). Ariel emphasizes, however, that forming a salient discourse pattern is a necessary condition for turning grammatical, but by no means is it a sufficient condition for it. In other words, grammaticization is only motivated. It is never predictable.

Chapter Six exemplifies the points made in Chapters Four and Five about the nature of grammar and grammaticization vis a vis pragmatics, as they apply to reflexive pronouns. Ariel first tells the fascinating story of how reflexive pronouns evolve, where each small step is highly motivated: Reflexives start out as a marked coreference indicators, but gradually, the concept of ‘marked coreference’ is translated into the syntactically defined ‘co-argument coreference’ (Reinhart and Reuland, 1993). The inevitable conclusion from this chapter is that language is a dynamic system, speakers using it ingeniously for their purposes, creating their grammar as an unintended by-product of their local intended communicative acts. English reflexive pronouns, Ariel mentions, have evolved out of emphatic adjuncts used optionally, depending on extralinguistic circumstances. The question she raises in this context concerns the status of the Binding conditions said to govern the use of current reflexive pronouns: Is it still pragmatic or is it absolutely grammatical by now? Based on numerous examples and statistical counts, Ariel convinces the reader that to this day, both grammar and pragmatics are here involved. In other words, the relevant grammaticization process has not been completed, and left-over pragmatic principles still account for some of the uses (and nonuses) of reflexive pronouns (e.g., She took upon her the yoke of Christ example 46a, where, because coreference is not marked, a pronoun, rather than a reflexive, can be used, despite the fact that her is a co-argument of she). This is an intriguing explanation of some distributional facts which constitute a problem for strictly grammatical analyses.

Part III (Chapter Seven) discusses the combination of grammatical codes with pragmatic inferences into ad hoc utterance interpretations. Ariel focuses on basic-level meaning representations, excluding conversational implicatures, namely what Grice has called ‘what is said’. She introduces and motivates various proposals for this meaning level, both minimalistic representations (‘what is said’) and maximalist representations (most notably the Relevance-theoretic explicature). Based on natural discourse examples, and relying on Recanati’s (1989) ‘Availability Principle’, Ariel supports the conclusion that we cannot make do with one formula for computing the discourse-relevant basic semantic/pragmatic meaning combinations. While the most prevalent representation seems to be the explicature, she adduces evidence also for more minimalist, as well as even more maximalist types of basic meanings, since, as she shows, speakers find them all useful in natural discourse.

As far as I know, Pragmatics and grammar is the first textbook for grammar/pragmatic interface courses. It is also very useful for courses and even seminars on pragmatics and on grammaticization. Among the intriguing questions
that Ariel raises, and at least partially answers, are: How can we distinguish grammar from pragmatics in controversial and notoriously difficult cases? Where do grammar and pragmatics meet? How does pragmatics turn grammatical? How come grammar often seems arbitrary, if it evolved out of pragmatic pressures? What is the appropriate basic-level meaning hybrid (between grammar and pragmatics)? and many more. The arguments she brings to bear on these questions are clearly laid out, and emphasis is put on empirical support for theoretical claims. Students are bound to find the textbook highly instructive and to enjoy the natural examples it abounds with. Experts will find in it a highly sophisticated treatment of current issues in the growing field of the grammar/pragmatics interface. Cambridge University Press should be commended for the initiation and publication of this much needed textbook. I have no doubt it will become a classical book, not only for pragmatists, but also for semanticists, philosophers of language, and in fact, for all linguists with an interest in meaning.

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