The Superhero Next Door:

Democratic Leadership and the Duality of Character

by

Michael S. Kochin

Department of Political Science
Tel Aviv University
kochin@post.tau.ac.il

ABSTRACT: Democratic leaders stand out, and yet they must persuade an audience that they are one of the crowd. I untangle this apparent paradox by clarifying the duality of a trustworthy and persuasive character. As a speaker in a democracy you must show that you are “one of the boys.” You might not be like them in education, speaking style, or economic circumstances; you must not be like them in that you have special knowledge relevant to the matter at hand; but you must be like them in that you share their moral values and political interests. I then give two further applications of the duality of character: I use that duality to explore how the speaker claims our attention in the first place, and to explain the role of principled arguments and the role of factual assertions in political speech.

An earlier version of this paper was the 2009 Karl Ritter Lecture in Political Rhetoric at Texas A&M University. I am grateful to Anna Kochin, and to the audiences at Texas A & M, Purdue, Memphis, Tulane, University of Washington, Virginia Commonwealth, American University, and Tel Aviv University Law School for their comments and suggestions. The title was much improved under gentle but firm pressure from Lance Bennett.

v35 3 November 2009
Democratic leaders stand out, and yet they must persuade their audience that they are one of the crowd. I untangle this apparent paradox by clarifying the duality of character. By "the duality of character" I mean the fact that some components of a trustworthy and persuasive character or ἑθος must be shared between speaker and audience, and some are unshared, unique to the speaker. As a speaker in a democracy you must show that you are "one of the boys." You might not be like them in education, speaking style, or economic circumstances; you must not be like them in that you have special knowledge relevant to the matter at hand; but you must be like them in that you share their moral values and political interests. I then give two further applications of this duality of ἑθος: First, I use this duality to explore how the speaker claims our attention at all. Second, I use the duality of character to explain the role of principled arguments and the role of factual assertions in political speech.

But before I get to character, perhaps I should say something about my general view of rhetoric. Rhetoric, I take it, is the art of conscious reflection on what does and should persuade. In the received views of rhetoric there are three notions about what is central to such reflection, three notions that I reject in my book, Five Chapters on Rhetoric. First, the notion of rhetoric as the art of moving the passions, which has a long history, but has been advocated in recent times as the core of rhetoric by Brian Vickers' book In Defense of Rhetoric. Second, rhetoric as the art of changing the appearances of things: this is the notion of rhetoric at work in, say, Neil Postman, Murray Edelman, and Rod Hart when he is channeling Murray Edelman. Third, rhetoric as adornment to the substance of what you have to say, the view of rhetoric put forward by Socrates in Plato's Gorgias. This third notion is, perhaps, a version or metaphor for rhetoric as the art of changing the appearances of things.

I reject all three of these views. In the account of rhetoric I present in Five Chapters, the speaker or writer or Youtube video artist moves the passions by showing the things that move the passions. Second, there aren't things called appearances, and there is thus "no thing" you can add to a speech to change how it appears. To believe that there are things called appearances is yet another instance of what one might call the fundamental Platonic ontological error: From the fact that things appear to
people you assume that there is something called an appearance, and there must be a separable aspect of speech which changes how the speech appears to hearers or readers. This aspect is supposedly rhetorical ornament or adornment. In my book I call this view "add rhetoric sauce and serve:" there is some kind of rhetoric sauce, and to persuade people you take the substance of what you have to say, add rhetoric sauce, and serve up the speech.

Now, constructively, what is the core of rhetoric? First, rhetoric, thinking about how to persuade, is thinking about how to present yourself. Thinking about how to present yourself means thinking about who you are in relation to your audience, and thinking about why they should trust you and your advice. Second, rhetoric is thinking about how to present things. In practice this usually means how to make things clear, how to speak the plain, clear, style, rather than the adorned style that comes naturally to us. Thinking about how to present things can also mean thinking about how and when to stand back and let things speak for themselves.

The remainder of the paper will be devoted to three "issues of character:" namely, the duality of character: the shared and the unshared; ēthos and attention; ēthos, assertion, and argument.

1. THE DUALITY OF CHARACTER

By character, I mean the full-blown Aristotelian conception of ēthos as displayed in the "Art of Rhetoric." For a single speaker to persuade a mass audience, Aristotle says, he must show his audience that he possesses three traits of character. These three traits are virtue (in Greek, aretē), benevolence toward his audience (eunoia), and practical knowledge (phronēsis). The orator needs to manifest his virtue in order to show that he grasps what is good for his audience, that he does not have a perverted view of their good. He needs to show himself to be benevolent toward his audience, so that his listeners are confident that he advises them for their own good. Finally, the orator needs to manifest practical
knowledge in order to show that he knows what is to be done, both in the specific case at hand and in the more general situation.⁴

"The duality of character" is what Karen Johnson-Cartee and Gary Copeland, two analysts of American political advertising, call "the Everyman/Heroic conflict": "Americans like for their candidates to be similar to themselves; yet they also want their candidates to excel in some particular area of character that they do not."⁵

In rising to speak, speakers single themselves out from their many listeners by speaking, but at the same time they must show themselves to be similar to the many in their interests and affections. In getting the audience’s attention, getting a hearing, it is just as important for the speaker to show that he or she has something special to contribute as to show that he or she is part of the community that he or she would address.

Thus of the three components of Aristotelian ἔθος, two components should ideally be shared between speaker and audience and one component ideally should be unshared. The shared components are, first, what we would call "values" but which Aristotle calls aretē, and, second, what we would call "interests" and Aristotle calls eunoia, which I translated above literally as the speaker's "benevolence" toward her audience or the speaker's wishing that her audience flourish and prosper. The shared components are insufficient for effective persuasive speech, because if I trust you because you share my values and my interests, if what is important is what we have in common, why should I make a special effort to attend to your thoughts? Unless, of course, you have something to say that I don't or can't.

To analyze practical knowledge, the unshared component of character, it helps to break it up into the elements that that can be made to appear in a speech or that can be known as aspects of a speaker's reputation. In the first place, one might think of a record of achievements in the past that show extraordinarily good judgment or rational foresight. An example of rational foresight shows up in a famous pair of dueling political ads, the "3am Phone" advertisements from the 2008 Democratic Presidential nomination campaign.⁶
First, Hillary Clinton's version, narrated principally over images of sleeping children:

[Narrator (voiceover):] It's 3am, and your children are safe and asleep.

But there's a phone in the White House and it's ringing.

Something's happening in the world.

Your vote will decide who answers that call.

Whether it's someone who already knows the world's leaders, knows the military, someone tested and ready to lead in a dangerous world.

It's 3am, and your children are safe and asleep.

Who do you want answering the phone?

[Text: Vote / March 4 / Attend your Precinct Convention / at 6:45pm on March 4th

Approved by Hillary Clinton, Paid for by Hillary Clinton for President]

[Hillary Clinton (speaking):] I am Hillary Clinton, and I approve this message.

The Obama campaign was not caught napping by what seemed to be a devastating attack on his inexperience, and had their response up the next day:

[Narrator (voiceover):] It's 3am, and your children are safe and asleep.

But there's a phone ringing in the White House.

Something's happening in the world.

When that call gets answered, shouldn't the President be the one, the only one, who had judgment and courage to oppose the Iraq war from the start?

[Text: "Obama showed courage opposing the Iraq war" / Austin American-Statesman 2/2/08]

Who understood the real threat to America was Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, not Iraq?

[Text: Iraq distracted us from the "real threat" in Afghanistan / Barack Obama 10/2/07]

Who led the effort to secure loose nuclear weapons around the globe?

[Text: "Obama joins Lugar to curb nuclear weapons" / Copley News Service 11/1/05]
In a dangerous world, it's judgment that matters.

[Text: Barack Obama. President. / Vote Tuesday ·BarackObama.com

Approved by Barack Obama Paid for by Obama for America]

[Barack Obama (voiceover):] I'm Barack Obama, and I approve this message.

To put these ads in context: Hillary Clinton had spent her years in the Senate after 9-11 moving to the center of the American electorate (and the right wing of the Democratic Party) by supporting the Bush Administration in its war policies on Afghanistan, and more saliently, Iraq: tell us what you need, Clinton famously told Donald Rumsfeld during a Senate Armed Forces Committee meeting, and we will get it for you, and don't hesitate to come back for more, she said, if you need more.

For a Democratic primary electorate more focused on the causes of these wars than how to fight them, and on whether Saddam Hussein actually possessed weapons of mass destruction or whether he intended to restart production of them as soon as he could get away with it, Barack Obama's ad is more effective than Hillary Clinton's. His 3am ad shows that his judgment was superior to hers on what these voters see as the crucial issue of the last eight years. What makes this example striking is that Barack Obama, who in 2002 when he came out against the war in Iraq was an Illinois State Senator, had no knowledge or experience that distinguished him from other members of the American political class. He simply judged better than we did given what we all knew at the time, and better than Mrs. Clinton did given her experience as First Lady and her access as Senate Armed Services Committee member to intelligence and evaluations.

More common, though, than opportunities to show superior judgment in circumstances of common knowledge are opportunities to show special knowledge of things present. Such opportunities may be classified in two categories, special technical knowledge, the more readily graspable form of expertise, and special knowledge from special experience. The expert with special technical knowledge sees things in a situation the ordinary person doesn’t see, and then, with a bit of rhetorical skill, she can point these things out to her audience.
Special knowledge from special experience, on the other hand, comes from what Max Black called "being in a position to know." It is, for example, the kind of experience diplomats and intelligence operatives acquire in dealing with foreigners. Because dealing with foreigners and foreign policy is one thing that our leaders do that we, mostly, do not do, special knowledge from special experience is particularly salient in public life. What the speaker offers to the audience is what they would know if they were in his or her position. Here not just the inference, but the process of inferring, can be shared between speaker and audience.

Another form of special knowledge from special experience that had, at least, a great deal of historical importance is special knowledge that comes from the experience of talking with God, that is, prophesy. Consider Martin Luther King in his last public speech, in Memphis on April 3, 1968. In the middle of the speech, King says "Somehow the preacher must be an Amos, who said "When God speaks, who can but prophesy." But the prophesy itself comes in the famous peroration:

Well, I don't know what will happen now; we've got some difficult days ahead. But it really doesn't matter with me now, because I've been to the mountaintop. And I don't mind. Like anybody, I would like to live a long life – longevity has its place. But I'm not concerned about that now. I just want to do God's will. And He's allowed me to go up to the mountaintop. And I've looked over and I've seen the Promised Land. I may not get there with you. But I want you to know tonight, that we, as a people, will get to the Promised Land. And so I'm happy tonight; I'm not worried about anything; I'm not fearing any man. Mine eyes have seen the glory of the coming of the Lord.

How does King know that his people will reach the Promised Land? How can he tell his audience that they will achieve economic as well as political dignity? Because his eyes have seen the glory of the coming of the Lord: God has taken him to a metaphorical place, "the mountaintop," where none of us have been. Like Moses ascending Mount Nebo east of the Jordan before his death, God has vouchsafed him a vision of the Promised Land (Deuteronomy 34:1-4):
And Moses went up from the plains of Moab unto the mountain of Nebo, to the top of "the Peak", that is over against Jericho. And the LORD showed him all the land of Gilead, unto Dan. And all Naphtali, and the land of Ephraim, and Manasseh, and all the land of Judah, unto the utmost sea. And the south, and the plain of the valley of Jericho, the city of palm trees, unto Zoar. And the LORD said unto him, This is the land which I swore unto Abraham, unto Isaac, and unto Jacob, saying, I will give it unto your seed: I have caused you to see it with your eyes, but there you shall not pass.¹⁰

King's prophesy is credible in part because it is so limited: he has been, he says, to the mountaintop, and he has seen the Promised Land. But, and in this King is no Moses, of Dr. King's own personal fate, of the assassin lurking in the city, God has given him no word at all.

Let us return from the peak of revelation back to the plains of ordinary political speech. We need to understand why, even if you have special knowledge, I should believe your factual claims, or believe that you are presenting me with factual claims that will help me decide on a course that accords with my interests and values, rather than misleading me with irrelevant truths. For persuasion one also needs shared values and interests: One needs to trust that the speaker is genuinely concerned for your own good: that is Aristotle's eunoia. One also needs to believe that the speaker has a correct and not a perverted sense of that good, that he or she shares one's own values: that is what Aristotle, once again, called aretē. There is a failure of aretē if someone asserts that global climate change is unimportant because the future of the environment is unimportant, since we can all be presumed to agree that the future of the environment is important. There is a failure of eunoia or benevolence if a farmer from Siberia attempts to persuade his audience that global climate change is beneficial. This is because we can see why it would be beneficial to him in ways that it would not be beneficial to us!

To sum up this first section, on the duality of character: are successful politicians "Everymen" or "heroes," to use the terminology of Johnson-Cartee and Copeland? I would say that successful
politicians are "the superhero next door": everyman in interest and values, heroes in judgment, knowledge, experience, and, especially, commitment to acting on their judgment, knowledge and values.

This way of looking at the duality of character helps us to understand three things about politicians. First, politicians profit from certain markers of elite status; second, it is particularly difficult to project a persuasive character when one is trying to explain foreign affairs to a domestic public; and third, politicians must make a special effort to show that they can condescend to the little problems of little people.

First, politicians profit from certain marks of elite status: Elite status profits the speaker insofar as it marks him or her out as a possessor of special knowledge or special experience, but it is bad for the speaker insofar as it marks him with special values or interests.

Second, the problem of maintaining a persuasive character has its own peculiar challenges when one is trying to present a domestic political audience with the facts of global political life. Consider the ambiguity of John Kerry's "global test" for American foreign policy, as he discussed it during the 2004 General Election campaign. Did he mean to indicate that the country would benefit from his special knowledge of what foreigners thought, or that he as President would mitigate his pursuit of American interests in deference to what foreigners thought? -- indicating that he himself was, to some extent, influenced by foreign interest and values.

Of course, in practice, it is very difficult to tell whether our agent is telling the truth when she tells us that we have to adjust our wishes to the views of others. Our agent knows the views of foreigners better than we do: that is why we have taken her on as our agent in dealing with them. Is she demanding that we adjust our wishes to others' views because we need to be reasonable about the views of others? Or, bad enough, because she finds others' values and interests more reasonable than ours? Or, even worse, because she has been corrupted by foreign influence to put others' interests and values ahead of ours?
Third, the duality of character helps us to understand the challenges that politicians face in condescending to the interests of their audience. Politicians have to show that they care about the problems of their audience, which can appear the little problems of little people. To see the ridiculousness of the situation one might compare the stentorian proclamation of the personified Athenian People in Aristophanes’ comedy, *Knights*, a play which is perhaps the most powerful treatment of the relation between elite leaders and the populace who favor they seek. Responding to a gift of slippers from that would-be demagogue the Sausage-seller, the Athenian Demos proclaims with great dignity and no sense of irony "I judge you, of all whom I know, the man most benevolent to the city and these my little toesies" (*Knights* 873-4).

Politicians need to show that they care that our toesies not get cold, or that we get our prescription hemorrhoid medicine without too large a co-payment. To do this they make a show of listening, and in particular, they "show up" to listen to our grievances. Would-be democratic leaders thus show that they take our problems seriously – part of the difficulty of their task is that we, when get a proper perspective on our own unimportance, have a hard time believing that someone so handsome, well-dressed, and well-educated could take our problems seriously.

2. ÉTHOS AND ATTENTION

Contemplating the duality of character helps to understand the reasons why we attend to a speaker or writer. We can classify the reasons for attending to a speaker under two headings.

First heading: we may attend to the speaker because we have a preexisting relation to the speaker, and attending to what they say is one way of carrying on that relation. Mary comes to Topeka to give a lecture on the future of the International Whaling Commission: her brother George attends and listens attentively, but not out of interest in whaling,
international law, or the future of seemingly moribund international organizations, but simply as a way of "catching up" with Mary

Second heading: We attend to the speaker because we hope to hear something that we couldn't, for some reason, say ourselves. Here there are two subcategories that require analysis: cases where we listen primarily in order to be strengthened in our preexisting commitments, and cases where we listen primarily in order to receive novel and relevant information on which we propose to act.

Cases in the first subcategory include those whose in which we attend to the speaker in order to be reminded of some forgotten or neglected commitment, which is to say to be told something we don’t know or something we have forgotten about the proper balance of our commitments. Here the pure case is the preacher: what we get from the preacher is what in Hebrew is called "chizuk," or strengthening; what God offers to Joshua: יָזַע וְאָמָץ "Be strong and of courage" (Joshua 1:6). The preacher, at his or her best, strengthens some commitments, that is to say, the preacher strengthens those commitments at the expense of other commitments. After all, if I were previously aware of the commitments to which the preacher is drawing my attention, there must be a reason why I didn't act on them. Such a reason might not be sufficient, I may now think having heard the preacher, to excuse my behavior.

Note that the preacher enables me to see things I have always known, but to see them anew. In his sermon Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God (1741), Jonathan Edwards depicts unjustified human existence as spiders dangling over boiling pitch, suspended only by the Hand of God:

The God that holds you over the pit of hell, much as one holds a spider, or some loathsome insect over the fire, abhors you, and is dreadfully provoked: his wrath towards you burns like fire; he looks upon you as worthy of nothing else, but to be cast into the fire; he is of purer eyes than to bear to have you in his sight; you are ten thousand times more abominable in his eyes, than the most hateful venomous serpent is in ours.

And Edwards continues:
You hang by a slender thread, with the flames of divine wrath flashing about it, and ready every moment to singe it, and burn it asunder; and you have no interest in any Mediator, and nothing to lay hold of to save yourself, nothing to keep off the flames of wrath, nothing of your own, nothing that you ever have done, nothing that you can do, to induce God to spare you one moment.

Yet for all the excitement, for all the vivid images, Edwards is conveying no new facts about the divine economy of salvation to a congregation brought up from childhood in a Calvinist church.

The point as it relates to ethos is that I trust the preacher not because she knows something I don't, but because of her commitment to living a godly life, because she is different from me in the extent to which she takes seriously the things that I, too, think I ought to take into account more seriously. As S. M. Halloran put it in what has been called a seminal essay on character, "the speaker's voice becomes the voice of the hearer's own best self."12

The second subcategory, which I analyze at length in Five Chapters on Rhetoric, is when I listen to the speaker in order to be told new facts. The pure case is the chemistry lecturer, the intelligence briefer, or more mundanely, the guy we ask for directions.

In actual political communication, factual assertion is more important and preaching less important than we tend to think. Rival policies are usually premised on rival versions of the facts: did or did not Saddam have Weapons of Mass Destruction (the Bush Administration critics' version of the question)? Or, was he or was he not planning to resume pursuing his WMD programs as soon as sanctions were lifted? (the Bush Administration's post facto version of the question). This means that the unshared or special components of ethos are more important than we tend to think.
3. ETHOS, FACTS, AND ARGUMENT

Again, when I ask for directions, I accept the directions I have received and act on them. Why? The answer is obvious: I don't have a choice if I want to get somewhere without relying on my map-reading skills.

To understand how judgment of character enters into our decision about whether to act based on what somebody else has said, we need a terminological distinction between two kinds of reasons. In other work I have called these two kinds of reasons "argument" and "assertion": Argument means drawing conclusions from premises that are shared with the audience. Assertion means drawing conclusions, or leaving the audience to draw conclusions, from factual assertions that are new to the audience.

Insofar as what the speaker is giving me is argument, he is relying principally on shared premises. This means that trust in him, as a speaker, matters less, because he isn't telling me anything new except the conclusion, which, ideally, I can see for myself following from the stated, and shared, premises. Insofar as the speaker is giving me facts, he is relying on unshared knowledge -- the speaker's asserted facts are new to me. It is almost invariably the case that I have to judge what he is saying before I can invest the resources required to check his assertions and thus put myself in a position to share his knowledge. Such a position may, at the limit, be inaccessible to me: consider the position of Dr. King's audience in Memphis, who can only hear but not experience his God-granted vision of the "Promised Land" of a just America.

It is well known that the more arguments in a speech, the less the speaker is presuming on ēthos: this is the basis for the claim that the appeal to authority is indeed a fallacy, an unworthy substitute for valid argument from shared premises. The converse statement appears paradoxical, but is nonetheless true: the more assertions in a speech, the more the speaker is presuming on his or her character. While Steve Shapin and his collaborator Simon Schaffer may have been the first people to really pay attention
to this, I want to give an example less remote than their field of Seventeenth Century English "natural
philosophy."^{14}

My example is from the US 2008 Presidential campaign (or to be pedantic, the 2008 US Vice-
Presidential Campaign): Joe Biden in the 2008 Vice-Presidential debate talked about the opportunity
offered by the 2006 Israel-Lebanon War: "When we kicked -- along with France, we kicked Hezbollah
out of Lebanon, I said and Barack said, "Move NATO forces in there. Fill the vacuum, because if you
don't know [sic] -- if you don't, Hezbollah will control it."^{15} Of course, nothing like this supposed
expulsion of Hezbollah from Lebanon happened in the real world of 2006, and as an Israeli academic
who has tried to understand the events and consequences of that war, I can assure you that nobody in
Israel (or, it seems safe to say, in Lebanon) had the slightest idea of what Joe Biden was talking about
when he said that the US and France had kicked Hezbollah out of Lebanon.

The more facts in a speech, the more the speaker is demonstrating his purported special
knowledge or expertise, precisely because he is "putting his reputation on the line." We infer from the
detailed style of somebody's claim that they know the details because otherwise, we naturally assume,
somebody who did know the details would call them on it. To parody Eugene Garver, one could say that
"facts make a speech ethical": the very quantity of facts and the detail of factual depiction make us infer
that the speaker really knows what he or she is talking about. In Against Ctesiphon, Aeschines accuses
Demosthenes of lying in concrete detail: "And on this account, too, he is greatly worthy of being hated,
that he is such a wicked man as to destroy the signs of honesty."^{16}

The validity of our "ethical inference" or inference of ēthos, from the detailed style of
somebody's claims to their actual knowledge, depends in practice on somebody out there who can
criticize: who is listening critically, has the knowledge to critique and, the greatest challenge, has the
ability to gain our attention with their critique. Because the critic usually can’t get our attention, we are
often fooled –fooled, say, into believing that Joe Biden's fluency with the terms of foreign policy
discourse equals actual knowledge and judgment concerning foreign policy.
Arguments that infer conclusions from supposedly shared premises and aim to change minds about those conclusions assume that the audience is not intelligent or strong-willed enough to do the inferring on their own. Assertions assume that your audience lacks the relevant factual knowledge. Speakers who are not preachers should keep in mind the great English journalist C.P. Scott's advice: "Never overestimate your audience's knowledge; never underestimate their intelligence." In other words: never assume that they have enough information, and never assume they are incapable of drawing inferences from the information they have or the information you supply them.

This is why in public affairs, arguments are not usually effective. When arguments are effective, it is almost always not because they change minds about the substance of what is argued, which is the role of logos in Aristotle's rhetorical theory. Rather, arguments work, in the rare cases where they do, indeed, work, as part of ethical proof, as part of showing the arguer as one who has a trustworthy character. In particular, one argues from principles in order to show that one shares those principles. This is what Aristotle means when he says that maxims, pithy expressions of principles, make your speech present your character.

NOTES


10KJV, slightly modified.

11See Michael S. Kochin, "Democratic Leadership Between Inside and Outside."

12S. M. Halloran "On the End of Rhetoric, Classical and Modern" College English 36 (February 1975):621-31. Halloran gives this observation an unsuitable generality, though, because he does not recognize the audience's need for the speaker as a source of trustworthy and relevant information.


18 January 2009); video of Biden’s response at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wkOkm0yUGzI (accessed 18 January 2009). The quoted passage is at approximately 1:07.
