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CHAPTER 21

Culture planning, cohesion, and the making and maintenance of entities*

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Throughout history, deliberate initiatives have generated change in the life course of societies. Such initiatives, called in short “culture planning”, in particular when carried out on an intensive scale, have frequently been tightly connected with actions for the creation or maintenance of groups, large and small. This paper attempts to illustrate the connections between the invention, codification, and diffusion of culture repertoires and the ability of groups, societies and nations to survive.

Keywords: initiatives, culture planning, change, socio-cultural cohesion, groups, large entities, societies: emergence and maintenance, management of life, options of life management

Introduction

Planning a culture is an instance of deliberate creation of new options for social and individual life. The generally accepted view is that such options somehow emerge and develop through the anonymous contributions of untold masses. These contributions are normally described as “spontaneous”, i.e., as products, or by-products, of the very occurrence of human interaction. Items emerging under conditions of spontaneity are believed to be random. Moreover, the way by which the items accumulate, get organized and develop into accepted repertoires is supposed to be the result of free negotiations between market forces. The complex mechanism through which, out of the free negotiation between these forces, certain groups adopt or reject specific repertoires is the chief question on the agenda of all the human and social sciences.

However, this view needs several modifications; not by eliminating the ideas of spontaneity and market negotiations, but by recognizing that these very negotiations

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may unavoidably lead to acts of planning. This happens because negotiations inherently result in selection — choosing between alternatives. Thus, once any body, either an individual or a group, in whatever capacity, starts to act for the promotion of certain elements and for the suppression of other elements, “spontaneity” and “deliberate acts” are no longer unrelated types of activities. Any deliberate intervention to establish priorities in an extant set of possibilities (often discussed out-of-context as “codification”, “standardization”, or “legislation”) must therefore be recognized as a basic instance of “planning”. If, in addition to acting in favor of priorities, a given individual or a group not only supports but is actively engaged in devising new options, then planning is unmistakably at work.

Why certain individuals or groups become engaged in culture planning, what they expect to achieve by it, and what practices they use, are among the questions I intend to deal with in the following.

Planning is a regular cultural procedure

If “planning” is conceived of as deliberate intervention in an extant or a crystallizing repertoire, then this brings us to my *first hypothesis*, namely that culture planning is a regular activity in the history of collective entities.

From the very dawn of history, a major preoccupation of groups and individuals in the context of social organization has been the introduction of order into what may have emerged as a disorderly set of options. That is, they have been engaged in continuously transforming non-structured *inventories* into structured *repertoires*. By the very act of such a structuration, new relations were established for extant categories. Through combination, analogy, and contrast, new components were introduced as well. Clearly, however, any such acts could not just stop at the level of introducing some order or priorities into an extant, ready-made set, modifying it through whatever sorts of manipulation.

Culture planning definitely was at work, to judge by the evidence, in the very first organized human group that documented itself, that is the old Sumerian civilization in Mesopotamia. In this and subsequent phases of known human history, i.e. Akkad, Egypt, Babylonia, and Assyria, the Hittite Empire, and various other politically organized entities in the Fertile Crescent (such as Mari, Ebla, or Yamhad), planning was kept in the hands of those few who held physical control of the groups in whom they attempted to inculcate organized culture.

The conspicuous interest in culture planning expressed by rulers of those entities is clear evidence of their awareness of the insufficiency of sheer physical force for successful domination. The emergence of centralized religious institutions and practices (in contradistinction, perhaps, to local cults), we are told by historians, can best be explained in terms of imparting social cohesion via cognitive allegiance through persuasion. Clearly, by adhering to the same codified set of cults and beliefs (anachronisti-

cally called religions), people were told what reality was, and which options of what repertoires are available to them, or indispensable for them. Students of ancient Egypt have suggested an explanation for the enigmatic preoccupation with the burial monuments known as pyramids. In their view, the whole enterprise was dictated by the need to invent a common project for the population to accept a certain repertoire of social order and individual identity. Even in Assyria, whose disrepute was gained by cruelty and use of extreme force, rulers displayed remarkable interest in promoting themselves by propaganda (Tadmor 1981, 1986). Singing one's own praises for having provided the good life to the people seems to have become a cliché used by rulers on their inscriptions all around the Fertile Crescent (Azitawadda of Karatepe and Kilamuwa of Sam'al are two examples that come to mind).¹ And the early schools of Sumer, with the rich options they created in terms of writing systems and a textual canon, are the world's oldest prototype for education systems, academies, and canon-dictating institutions — all serving as the most readily available instruments for the implementation of desired or preferred repertoires.

In short, there is nothing modern in rulers taking deliberate action to create repertoires that would be accepted by at least part of the population under their domination. Nor is the recruitment to that end of people to undertake the planning.

It seems, however, that it is only in ancient Israel, and later in ancient Greece, that we first witness attempts carried out not by power-holders but by self-nominated persons removed from the circles of power to take upon themselves the task of offering alternative repertoires, or parts of such repertoires, and to publicly work for their acceptance, often in opposition to power. I am referring to the prophets in Israel who, defying both political and cultural rulers (the latter generally personified by the clergy), often by risking their own necks (the most famous case being that of Jeremiah), struggled for repertoire replacements. The same holds true of the Greek philosophers and other *literati*. Both groups can be seen not as agents hired to render services to demanding rulers but as archaic types of intellectuals. The absence of evidence about such individuals or groups in the other ancient societies (though glimpses of possible cognates do emerge, such as the case of Imhotep in 2630–2611 BC) does not necessarily prove that they did not exist, only that the evidence was not preserved, which by itself is not an insignificant piece of information about the relevant society.²

1. Azitawadda (8th–9th century BC) boasts repeatedly in the inscription found at Karatepe (Cilicia, Anatolia) that in his time, “all over the Adana valley from sunrise to sunset [...] there was plenty of food and good life and long life and enjoyment to all the Danaeans and the whole Adana Valley” (Tur-Sinai 1954:70). Kilamuwa of Sam'al (south-central Turkey, 12th century BC) boasts that “[...] to some people I have been a father, and to others a mother, and to others a brother. People who have not seen the face of a sheep I have made owners of a cattle, people who have not seen the face of a bull I have made owners of a herd [...]”; and so on (Donner & Röllig 1971, No. 24). For both texts, and various other of the same vein, see also Green 2003. (All translations are mine.)

2. See Even-Zohar (in print) for a further discussion of the case of intellectuals in antiquity.

Since the beginnings of the Modern Age, towards the end of the 18th century, rulers and other power-holders have been more and more inclined (although not necessarily willingly) to resort to culture planning, making growing use of the repertoires provided, directly or indirectly, by culture producers. Culture planning has definitely accumulated vigor, intensity and momentum, having become a major factor in the shaping, reshaping, and maintaining of large entities.

The implementation of planning provides socio-cultural cohesion

The implementation of planning provides cohesion to either a factual or a potential entity. This is achieved by creating a spirit of allegiance among those who adhere to the repertoire thus introduced.

By “socio-cultural cohesion” I mean a state where a widespread sense of solidarity, or togetherness, exists among a group of people, which consequently does not require conduct enforced by power. I think the key concept for such cohesion is the mental disposition that propels people to act in many ways that otherwise would have been contrary to their “natural inclinations” and vital interests. Going to war prepared to be killed would be the ultimate case, amply repeated throughout human history. To create shared readiness on a fair number of issues is something that, although vital for any society, cannot be taken for granted. For example, no government can take for granted that people will obey “laws”, whether written or not, unless people are successfully persuaded to do so. Obedience achieved by force or intimidation, applied by the military or the police, can be effective for a certain span of time. However, sooner or later such obedience will collapse, partly because few societies can afford to keep a large enough corps of law-enforcement agents.

Classical sociological thinking has recognized the powerful role of what they called “persuasion” for the “successful control” of a dominated population. As most succinctly put by Bartoli, these mechanisms consist

di persuasione alla conformità e di interiorizzazione di modelli culturali che la classe o i gruppi al potere ritengono necessari per il mantenimento dell'equilibrio del sistema sociale e che, in particolare nelle società fortemente stratificate, determinati altri gruppi o classi sociali pongono al centro di una strategia di organizzazione del consenso attorno ai propri obiettivi e attorno alle proprie definizioni della realtà. (Bartoli 1981:4)³

It is not easy to assess the level of cohesion in any society. However, it seems worthwhile to develop some clear categories for such assessments. These categories make it clear what we may mean by a “high level” — which in its turn can be re-translated to

3. “Of persuasion to conformity and of internalization of the cultural models (patterns) that the dominating classes or groups deem necessary for maintaining the equilibrium of the social system and which, especially in highly stratified societies, certain other groups or social classes put in the center of a strategy of organizing the consensus about the appropriate objectives and the appropriate definitions of reality.”

“success” from the point of view of planning — or a “low level,” which in its turn can be re-translated to “failure”. When, for example, territories are subjected to the domination of external powers, and the local population sticks to the repertoire with which it had crystallized as an entity, we may speak of a high level of cohesion. One could think of such cases as the Jews in Roman Palestine, the Polish under the domination of Germany, Russia, and Austria, or the Icelanders under the domination of Denmark. On the other hand, we have evidence of low levels of cohesion in the seemingly rapid collapse and disappearance of the Assyrians as both a distinct organized entity and a group of identifiable individuals. This is an especially striking example because of Assyria’s notorious *esprit de corps*, imparted by brutality and terror.

Cohesion is a necessary condition for the creation or survival of large entities

Socio-cultural cohesion may become a necessary condition for creating a new entity, and/or for the survival of an existing entity.

The large entities discussed here are social units such as “community”, “tribe”, “clan”, “people”, or “nation”; they are not “natural” objects. They are formed by the acts of individuals, or small groups of people, who take initiatives and are successful in mobilizing the resources needed for the task. The most vital element among those resources is a cultural repertoire that makes it possible for the endeavoring group to provide justification, contents and *raison-d’être* to the separate and distinct existence of the entity.

Various methods can be observed for the creation of large entities, especially those known as “nations”, where we witness a search for a repertoire suitable to support the existence of the entity and secure its perpetuation. The most conspicuous seem to be the following:

1. A group takes control of some territory by force and dominates its inhabitants. If the enterprise is to hold, there is a chance that the members of the controlling group will eventually realize that for the maintenance and survival of the entity, they had better do something to achieve cohesion. Many cases in history where a relative minority invades or otherwise takes control over a majority territory would provide good examples: the Franks in Gaul, the Swedes in Kievan Rus, the Swabs and Visigoths in the Iberian Peninsula, or the Ostrogoths in Italy.

2. A group of individuals organize themselves and become engaged in a power struggle to rid themselves of control they wish to reject. Once they succeed, they may find themselves at sea vis-à-vis the entity they created which, now that the struggle is over, may disintegrate for lack of cohesion. This may have been the case of Holland after the so-called rebellion against Spanish rule. According to Schama,

The most extraordinary invention of a country that was to become famous for its ingenuity was its own culture. From ingredients drawn from earlier incarnations, the Dutch created a fresh identity. Its manufacture was in response to what would otherwise have

been an unbearably negative legitimation: rebellion against royal authority. Unlike the Venetians, whose historical mythology supplied a pedigree of immemorial antiquity and continuity, the Dutch had committed themselves irrevocably to a “cut” with their actual past, and were now obliged to reinvent it so as to close the wound and make the body politic whole once again. On a more pragmatic level, it was imperative that popular allegiance be mobilized exclusively in favor of the new Fatherland. What was required of a northern Netherlandish culture, then, was that it associate all those living within the frontiers of the new Republic with a fresh common destiny, that it stigmatize the recent past as alien and unclean and rebaptize the future as patriotic and pristine. (Schama 1987:67)

And further:

Dutch patriotism was not the cause, but the consequence, of the revolt against Spain. Irrespective of its invention after the fact, however, it rapidly became a powerful focus of allegiance to people who considered themselves fighting for heart and home. No matter that heart and home more obviously meant Leiden and Haarlem than some new abstraction of a union, the concept of a new patria undoubtedly gave comfort and hope to citizens who might otherwise have felt themselves desperately isolated as well as physically beleaguered. It is not surprising, then, to find that it was in the period of the great sieges of the 1570s that the first signs of national identity became visible on coins and medals. (Schama 1987:69)

3. An individual or a group engage in devising a repertoire to justify the establishment of an entity over a certain territory that does not necessarily overlap with their home territory. This is often connected with the successful so-called unification of different territories. The same method, however, can work in the opposite way, i.e. it can make it possible for a certain territory to secede fully or partly from a larger entity (Hechter 1992).

Conspicuous examples for the first type (“unification”) may be the cases of both Germany and Italy, two states founded around almost the same time (1860–1870). In both cases, the work of planners preceded the actual political course. In Germany, as pointed out by an accidental observer, “Bismark hätte die politische Einheit nie schaffen können, wenn nicht vorher von unsern Klassikern die geistige Einheit begründet worden wäre” (Goldstein 1912:20).⁴ In Italy, if there had not been such a repertoire the tiny and in many minds ridiculous kingdom of Piedmont–Sardinia could not have succeeded in unifying the whole of the Italian peninsula including Sicily.

Examples of the second type (secession) are all cases of states and provinces created by separating from a larger state, such as Czechoslovakia after World War I, or Slovakia in 1993, or any of the “autonomous communities” of Spain, most conspicuously Catalonia and Galicia.

4. A group that cannot survive, either culturally or physically, as an entity in one territory (where they may be a persecuted or an underprivileged minority) emigrates

4. “Bismarck would have never been able to create the political unity, had our Classical writers not founded prior to it the spiritual unity.”

to some other territory and there puts to use the repertoire they could not implement in their home country. This could apply to the emigration of the Nordic groups who founded Iceland in the 9th century, or the English Puritans' emigration to New England, or the emigration of Jews to Palestine towards the end of the 19th century.⁵

In all of the varieties of the emergence and crystallization of entities, it thus becomes apparent, whatever the pace, that the maintenance of an entity over time is certainly a primary concern for those who are interested in its existence. The larger the entity, the greater the difficulty in maintaining it without some consent of its members. (For more about consent see Dodd 1986, esp. p. 2.)

The more consent is achieved through cohesion, the more this interest will become a concern of larger numbers of individuals. If not achieved, or not even attempted, it will naturally remain an interest of the very privileged few, who may be the only ones drawing benefits from the existence of the entity. This may nevertheless endanger the survival of the entity in the long run and put in peril the vested interests of the privileged group itself.

By *collapse* I do not necessarily mean the physical disappearance of a collective of individuals, although such an event may also follow violent shifts in power. The examples of such events are too numerous and too obvious to quote. Rather, what I mean is the termination, whether permanent or temporary, of the separately identifiable entity qua entity. This involves the adoption by the relevant individuals of a different repertoire, which they can no longer use to identify themselves as "distinct" from all the others.⁶

Planning needs a power base

What thus matters for planning are its prospects of being successfully implemented. Accordingly, planners must have the power, get the power, or obtain the endorsement of those who possess power.

The purpose of this hypothesis, trivial and self-evident as it may seem, is to draw attention to the fact, often neglected in both the humanities and the social sciences, that to be engaged with repertoire production *per se* is only a necessary condition for a desired planning to be implemented.

Power can be achieved on various levels, and is by no means a simple notion in relation to culture producers. Often the engagement of intellectuals with repertoire production seems to be nothing else than sheer sport. With the emergence of self-nominated producers, i.e. those whose services are not engaged by power-holders, the products they deliver may not reach more than a limited circle. People who produce texts in a language that is not acceptable to the dominating groups, or who invent or re-invent

5. About culture planning in British-ruled Palestine see Even-Zohar 1990a.

6. Quite recently, Jared Diamond (Diamond 2005) dedicated a whole book to cases of collapse.

the language involved, or become engaged in long and infinite discussions about the desired nature of the entity about which they may be dreaming, or about the nature of the members who will be born in that entity, or the kind of lifestyle which will replace the current one, and so on — may all look pitiable and pathetic to their contemporaries, who may regard what they do as wasting life on futile endeavors. However, once the product gets somehow to market, a larger circle may be created to eventually become the power base needed for action that will introduce the desired shifts. The situation then may change dramatically, transforming the erstwhile helpless culture producers into powerful agents.

A planning activity that may develop into a full-scale endeavor for repertoire replacement can start with seemingly harmless products. Indeed, many new entities can trace their roots to such products, be they epics allegedly written down from the mouths of villagers in the primordial forests of Karelia (I am thinking of course of the Finnish *Kalevala*) or lyrics written in a no longer prestigious language by a fragile woman living in half-seclusion in Santiago de Compostela (I am referring of course to Rosalía de Castro). The epic in Finland, like the lyrics of Rosalía, became cornerstones for new repertoires that impart a different sort of cohesion. In Spanish Galicia, the small circle including Rosalía and especially her husband Manuel Martínez Murguía organized the innocent *Xogos florais* (a poetry competition; literally: Floral Games), the first of which was held in La Coruña in 1861. This created the public channel for the new options to be offered to the potential market.⁷ In Italy before unification, Verdi's operas must have served a similar role, with libretti censored when their text seemed too dangerous to the contemporary rulers. Incidentally, Verdi's very name has become politically subversive as it was punningly interpreted as an acronym for the phrase "Viva Emmanuele re di Italia" (Long live Emmanuel, King of Italy).

The *xogos florais*, and a variety of associations and societies bearing such harmless names as "Language Brotherhoods" (*Irmandades da fala* in Galicia) or "Literary Societies" (the Icelandic *Hið íslenska bókmenntafélag* in Copenhagen), are often the primary, or even crude, instruments for creating power bases for the implementation of culture planning. Although they may eventually develop into full-scale political bodies such as parties and mass organizations, I cannot think of any case where their endeavors have made real progress until coupled with either actual or potential holders of power. Culture planning could have been carried out for who knows how long by the Italian culture entrepreneurs without reaching their goal, which was to create a new Italy and new Italians — not only politically disengaged from the Austrians and the Spaniards, but also positively following a new set of directives for life. It was the coupling of their aspirations with the political ambitions of the prime minister of Piedmont, Count

7. For the sake of precision, however, it should be noted that the *Xogos florais* of Galicia followed the Catalan *Jocs Florals* of 1859, which in their turn followed the tradition of the *Jeux floraux* of Occitania (Languedoc, Provence), which have never led to any success faintly similar to those of Catalonia and Galicia. The *Jocs florals* of Barcelona are still held as an annual poetry festival.

Cavour, that made it all possible, almost suddenly. Hopeless ideas, like the revival of the Italian literary language, could at last start with the establishment of the Italian state. Similarly, more than a hundred years of the lingering venture to create a unique Galician entity did not bring about the same result as did some seven or ten years of local government. Although belatedly, that government did “discover”, as it were, that it could successfully make use of the rich repertoire already created, most particularly the rejuvenated Galician language and its by-products, to provide optimal justification for the political identity of Galicia, needed to secure the continuation of its autonomy.

Effective planning may become an interest of an entity

Numerous studies show that power-holders and planners may both acquire, through successful implementation, the domination, or control, of a given entity. To return to Bartoli’s formulation, which I find representative of the socio-historical tradition, such domination is the ultimate goal and purpose of the enterprise of culture planning from the point of view of power-holders. Obviously, the latter wish to reinforce their positions by making an accommodating repertoire acceptable to larger sections of the population, while culture producers may turn into power-holders through the acceptance of their products, or obtain the support of those already in power. In any of the possible consequences of a successful implementation of planning, both may profit.

This type of analysis makes perfect sense for quite a few cases: at least one can hardly find a trace of other conspicuous interests in those cases. For an agglomerate of individuals inhabiting some territory, the benefits of establishing an organization that is larger than their own immediate environment are not at all self-evident. On the contrary, such an organization may even constitute a threat to their liberties and force upon them unwelcome burdens.

It is only when there is awareness that there may be profits from the founding of a large organization, or when there is awareness that losses will be incurred without it, that people may display passive or active consent. This does not mean that in practice everyone then gives a hand to those who take it upon themselves to carry the load of the enterprise, but it definitely allows the latter to carry on with fewer impediments.

No wonder, therefore, that in suggesting an alternative repertoire the propagators often refer to matters such as discrimination or humiliation which, it is then claimed, can be cured only if a current repertoire is overthrown. For example, if those who dominate us mock us and discriminate against us because we have not mastered the language they master best, then an alternative can be found, that is, to use “our own language” instead. This “own language” is often presented as a natural resource, equally and painlessly accessible to members of the addressed group. In fact, this is hardly ever the case, since more often than not the language must be rehashed from some non-standardized state, thus losing its immediacy for the targeted speakers. In many other cases (for instance, Italian), the language is not anyone’s actual language at all.

The same holds for any other possible items of a repertoire such as daily customs, dress and food, interaction routines, and so on. However, in all cases, whether painlessly accessible or acquired by learning, what counts is not the real state of the alternative repertoire as “native” or “indigenous”, but its ability to function as dissimilar to the current options. If a different repertoire can provide the options otherwise barred, then persuasion is undoubtedly looming.

The same factors certainly apply to the much more clearly institutionalized state where an entity is already well-established. In such cases we can expect some higher degree of socio-cultural cohesion, which makes the members of the entity prone to resist undesired repertoires whose imposition upon them is attempted. In such cases it makes perfect sense to argue that resistance to an alien repertoire, or an interest in promoting home repertoires, should become a common sentiment, if not well-spread awareness, among the members of the entity. It is indeed their only way to survive as an entity, a status through which their privileges are guaranteed.

Naturally, there is a lot of room here to discuss to what extent this awareness is a consequence of actual privileges enjoyed by people, or of manipulatively successful inculcation, i.e. an effective persuasion carried out by agents of the power-holders. I would like to contend that this is a matter of interpretation for each particular case. I would hasten to reject any one-sided or biased analysis: (a) the one that may fall into a romanticizing trap, describing such involvements as supported by all members of the community who, devoted to the cause, as it were, are said to have realized how much their deepest “values” are at stake, and (b) the one that analyses the enterprise as a basically cynical machination whose only goal is to bring profits to the exploiters of common credulity.

Market factors do not easily accommodate themselves to new repertoires

Since, by definition, the implementation of culture planning entails the introduction of change into a current state of affairs, the prospects of success also depend on an effective utilization of market conditions. The chance for the planning to be frustrated may therefore be constantly expected. In addition, where resisting forces are strong, failure — either partial or complete — may ensue.

The “market” is the aggregate of factors involved in the selling and buying of products and with the promotion of types of consumption. This includes all factors participating in the semiotic (“symbolic”) exchange involving such transactions, and with other linked activities (Bourdieu 1971). While it is the aggregate of the culture “institution” that may try to direct and dictate the types of consumption, and establish the values of the various items of production, what really determines its success or failure is the kind of interaction that it is able to establish with the free market. In the socio-cultural reality, factors of the cultural institution and those of the market may naturally intersect in the same space: for instance, literary “salons” are both institutions and

markets. Yet the specific agents playing the role of either an institution or a market, i.e. either marketers or marketees, may not overlap at all. A regular school, for instance, is a branch of “the institution” in view of its ability to sell the type of properties that the dominating establishment (i.e. the central part of the cultural institution) wishes to sell to students. Teachers actually function as marketing agents. The marketees, who willy-nilly become some sort of consumers, are the students. The facilities, including the built-in interaction patterns, which are made available by the school, actually constitute the market *strictu sensu*. However, all of these factors together may, for the sake of a closer analysis, be viewed as the “market”.

The implementation of culture planning is therefore obviously a matter of successful marketing carried out among other means by propaganda and advertising. It can be argued that this might be a simplification, since one’s willingness to buy a certain merchandise does not necessarily organize one’s life in the sense that a culture repertoire does; that is, products do not dictate one’s view of reality and, hence, all behavioral components derivable from it. I do not support this argument, because there seems to be considerable agreement regarding the role of modern consumption in the view of reality held by the members of the so-called consumer society. The distinguishing line between various modes of inculcation lies elsewhere, namely, not in the profundity and weight, as it were, of the products that are promoted, but in their degree of internalization.

As we know, the inculcation of a repertoire can only *appear to be* successful. People accept it either because there is no alternative, that is, if it is imposed, or because the surrounding milieu requires it, or because this was the only option they were raised with. Public adherence to such a repertoire renders obvious profits, such as becoming a member of the Communist Party in the U.S.S.R, or one exonerated from being deported to gulags. If this entails negation of divinity, any overt practices of religion may be wiped out from the life of people. However, on the morrow of the collapse of the old U.S.S.R, young people in post-communist Russia who may have had no apparent previous access to religious cults eagerly embraced the Orthodox religion, an alternative cultural repertoire completely contrary to their whole way of upbringing.

Let me reiterate that for a repertoire to be wiped out and replaced by another there need not be a repertoire shift within the same societal group. If a position shift occurs within society, whereby the group adhering to one repertoire is pushed towards the periphery of the overall structure of society, the repertoire may lose its primary position. Such processes are prevalent in any society, a hypothesis that reminds us to admit that if we accept the market hypothesis, then any established products are always at risk of overthrow by contenders. In culture, such contenders may be those who were defeated in some previous round. If we accept the polysystem idea (Even-Zohar 1979, 1990), then any time we allow ourselves to observe some “new phase” in a system, what we are actually observing — as was long ago clearly hypothesized by Tynjanov (1929) — is the success of some new repertoire in pushing its way to the center. This success does not necessarily obliterate the older repertoire: it may only dethrone it. The defeated may at

that moment be too weak to frustrate successful implementation of the new repertoire, but they may grow strong enough in time to have such an attempt.

I would therefore like to stress that we are too often tempted, for the sake of elegance of description, to accept neatly finalized states. In matters of culture planning, as with all matters of culture analysis, neat states are only temporary, and even then visible at only some sector of the overall network of relations we call “society” or “culture”. Accordingly, at the very moment when a given enterprise, the implementation of a certain repertoire fought for by dedicated individuals, has reached its peak, it may already be on its way towards disintegration and irrelevance for the emerging new circumstances, those which would call for another, different repertoire.

The consequences of failure of culture planning are not the entity’s collapse, but a creation of energy

When partial or complete failure ensues, planning and the activities it engenders do not necessarily create negative consequences for the welfare of the entity involved, although it may of course be detrimental for the particular persons involved with the planning.

I contend that where a planning activity has taken place, regardless of the consequences, the relevant entity — or the agglomerate of people — may have achieved improvement of life, although not necessarily according to the planners’ design or in terms of satisfying the goals and ambitions of their partners in power. Moreover, I am more and more convinced that for the maintenance of any such socio-cultural human entity, the planning activity *per se* eventually creates motion of some scale, an enhancement of vitality which makes it possible for the entity involved to access options from which it may have been previously barred. I suggest the term “energy” to cover this bundle of events, at least until a better term is found.

It can, of course, be argued that the engagement with planning is a result of energy rather than the other way around. Where there is social action, people also write texts and develop ideas, and engage very energetically in creating and implementing new repertoires. However, in all of the cases that served as input for my culture planning hypotheses, the engagement with planning began at a very low state in the welfare of the population. This does not mean that they all were equally humiliated or terribly underprivileged, but that they all had less access to resources than did others, or at least so it seemed from their own point of view. For example, in comparison with France and England, the 18th and 19th-century German provinces had inferior possibilities. Similarly, provinces such as 19th-century Galicia had not become out-of-the-way localities because of their geographical position on the Iberian Peninsula. On the contrary, Galicia was the first developed Roman province on the peninsula, and it kept its primary position almost until the political unity of Castile and Aragon in the second half of the 15th century. Its decline was a consequence of a deliberate policy of ostracism by

the central government. The slow and non-coordinated steps towards a reinvention of Galicia, carried out throughout the 19th century, became the only chance for the province to establish itself as an entity with a proper culture that would allow it not to be confined only to options that are available and permissible in the center. After all, this is a nutshell definition of the relations between “periphery” and “center”: a periphery is allowed only to follow what is already available in the center, while the center is free to offer new options daily. What I have come to label “energy” allows a certain agglomerate of people, or an entity already established to some extent, to take on the privileges of a center. By doing so, local welfare increases remarkably. In contrast, if nothing is done, the place is often doomed to a peripheral state.

It is not always a simple question to determine when the results of some enterprise of planning are to be considered a success or a failure. One of the reasons for this is that for the planners and entrepreneurs, the content of a repertoire may eventually become more important than the purpose of that repertoire as described by its propagators. For example, if reintroducing the Galician or the Italian language became a *sine qua non* for the respective so-called “Revival Movements”, then the potential failure of Galician at a time when the ultimate goals of the Galician entity may have reached their peak, might be disappointing for those who had attached their worldview and self-identity to the language, although what the language was meant to serve was to improve, not worsen, as might have been the results, the chances of people to better their access to social, political and economic resources.

The reason for such — perhaps sad — occurrences lies in the very nature of the planning enterprise. Once planners and power-holders begin to collaborate, it may take only a short time for the enterprise to advance quickly. However, if planners must create a power base and toil for the creation of a repertoire that will appear attractive enough to entice power-holders, then the span of time between planning and its outcomes may be long, sometimes over a century, as is the Galician case. In such cases, the alternative planned repertoire, designed under the initial conditions and thus fitted with solutions relevant to those conditions, may already be cruelly dated by the time of implementation. For example, if it still seemed possible, three decades ago, to pull the Galician population from its misery by legitimizing what one called “its own language”, it has since dawned upon many modern Galicians that if they confine themselves to this, the now fully legitimized official Galician language, they are more likely to make losses than gains. The results are that while you see the language on all the public signs on roads and buildings, and on all bureaucratic forms, schoolchildren and their Galician-speaking parents are more and more inclined to prefer Castilian, a language described in the Galician patrimony as the source of all evil.⁸ Without the language as a central ingredient in the new Galician repertoire, one undoubtedly could not have achieved the current socio-political success of Galicia. However, with the language as

8. For data and analysis see Fernández Rodríguez & Rodríguez Neira (1994, 1995, 1996). The current situation is described and analyzed by Beswick (2002) and O’Rourke (2003).

a major vehicle of socio-cultural interaction, Galicia may be doomed to backwardness. In spite of all that, without the conflicts about this and other components of repertoire, Galicia would have definitely created no energy. This conflict of interests is in itself a generator of energy, as painful as it may be for the individuals involved.⁹

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9. See Even-Zohar 2003 for a more elaborate discussion of "dated solutions".

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