Itamar Even-Zohar

Ideational labor
and the production
of social energy

Intellectuals, idea makers
and culture entrepreneurs

5th edition

Tel Aviv
The Culture Research Lab.,TAU

2023

Itamar Even-Zohar

Ideational labor
and the production
of social energy

Intellectuals, idea makers
and culture entrepreneurs

5th edition

Tel Aviv
The Culture Research Lab., TAU
2023

Itamar Even-Zohar
Tel Aviv University
Tel Aviv 69978, Israel
E-mail: itamarez@tauex.tau.ac.il
Website: http://www.Even-Zohar.com

Contents

PREFACE TO THE FIFTH EDITION

This is the fifth edition of this collection of papers on ideational work and social energy. I made the first edition in 2008, and it has been growing since, as my work progressed. The papers are reproduced here with some revisions, but are not homogenized. I have not attempted to convert them into chapter-style sections in a didactic book, as it was not my aim to create one. This inevitably ensued repetitions of both arguments and examples, which I have attempted to somewhat reduce, but my idea is that the papers should stay optimally independent.

I would like to express my gratitude to my Brazilian colleagues, Carolina Magaldi (Universidade Federal de Juiz de Fora), Juliana Steil, and Roberta Rego Rodrigues (both of the Universidade Federal de Pelotas), for their initiative and tireless efforts for publishing this book in a Brazilian-Portuguese translation (Even-Zohar 2021), and for their dedicated and professional translation work. Their enterprise, which stimulated me to make some revisions to the texts, and the many exchanges we have had during the translation process have inspired and instigated me to undertake the fourth (2021) and now this updated English edition. The translation into Portuguese has also been critically commented and scrutinized by Elias Torres Feijó (of the Universidade de Santiago de Compostela), a longtime friend and colleague, as well as co-author, whose many years of encouragement and critical readings of my works have been most helpful and inspiring.

The preface to the previous (fourth) edition was written under the heavy burden of the Covid-19 pandemic crisis, which I believed to be a spectacular, though naturally unwarranted, support for several of my hypotheses on the relations between ideation, social energy and their consequences for the survival and success of human groups. Being a global case of problematic, if not inadequate solution making, with only few exceptions that have not yet been studied, the Covid-19 crisis oddly seemed to turn this collection to be perhaps some more

than a scholarly work on issues of little concern. Two years later, although the pandemic seems to have been mostly contained, there are many lingering problems in all areas of life in many countries that are consensually believed to be its repercussions.

Itamar Even-Zohar
Tel Aviv, March 2023

INTRODUCTION

In my *conferência de abertura* at the III international meeting of *Rede Galabra* in a Coruña, January 24, 2019, referring to my 2003 talk about "dated solutions" in memoriam Xoán González Millán (Even-Zohar 2003), I expressed what I thought was an apparent deterioration of the situation in comparison with what I had analyzed in that paper. I was referring to the growing inability of the workers within the industry of ideas to act flexibly, namely devise appropriate solutions in times of multiple crisis, when the old conditions that have given rise to certain solutions change in such a way that calls into question the usefulness of retaining them.

Little did I guess at that moment that just within a year from that meeting the world would provide a striking illustration of the problematics that I have been attempting to uncover. The global covid-19 virus pandemic has generated a series of devastating chain crisis that have changed human life all over. If I needed a laboratory-like living experiment for testing the suggested link between social energy that enables action and idea making that fuels it, history itself – as suggested by Jared diamond and colleagues (Diamond & Robinson 2010) – overwhelmingly provided us with one. Although the pandemic seems to have been mostly contained, there are many lingering as well as new problems in all areas of life in many countries that are consensually believed to be its repercussions. Whether it is the pandemic *per se* or rather its consequences, this whole bundle of crisis clearly presents us with a powerful case where it is once more made clear that without ideational work that can be adopted by people capable of performing actions, any group of whatever size will not successfully endure. It may well be persistently justified to revitalize the discussion about this complex bundle, and this book is quite an opportunity in this direction.

Social energy may be defined as the power that enables the creation of humanly workable solutions, in particular in situations of apparent

uncertainty. Beyond the risk of failing in struggles over resources with deficiency of social energy, the very survival of a group may then be in danger. It is my contention that the ability to create such a type of energy, which is so crucial for human survival, strongly depends on the few people who are capable of devising solutions by unchained thinking. The study of the dependency parameters of such an energy becomes therefore indispensable not only for our understanding of the survival or collapse of human groups throughout history, but also for assessing what needs to be done to guarantee their future.

The search for the factors of survival or success of societies is not new. The works of Adam Smith, Karl Marx and Max Weber are among the prominent examples of this. However, it is perhaps only thanks to Joseph Schumpeter's work that attention has at least partly focused on the role of *deliberate* endeavors carried out by *individuals*, whom he called "entrepreneurs." Although Schumpeter concentrated on the economy, his basic hypotheses are valid for the study of the production and work of all kinds of social energy at large. Survival and success doubtlessly have economic manifestations, but it seems to have been a common mistake of economists to treat them only in terms of material capital. As has been acknowledged and recently reconfirmed even by leading economists, an adequate analysis must take into account *all* kinds of capitals – including, above all, various sorts of intellectual capital, such as knowledge, skills and attitudes. Without these, the production and accumulation of material capital seems impossible. However, the link between cultural ideation and entrepreneurship and the political and economic status of a group has not been sufficiently researched, or even identified and diagnosed as crucial for human existence.

This line of thinking has led me to investigating cases where idea making involved major actions, like the formation of large repertoires for socio-cultural solutions. These were historical moments where the danger of instability was identified either by way of comparing between alternative possible social agendas, or as against the threat of

external competing groups, or for confronting natural disasters like climate change or plagues. In certain cases, such moments are especially conspicuous when whole groups of idea-makers joined in attempts to invent or reinvent entire cultures, which often have led to the creation of socio-political entities. Such overtly revolutionary moments have multiplied in modern times ever since the French revolution and ensuing Napoleonic wars, first in Europe and later in a domino-like process throughout the rest of the world, in large enough numbers to justify an inductive formulation of some general hypotheses about such processes. In my own work, I naturally had to confine the scope of study to selected cases, such as Italy, Spanish Galicia, Catalonia, Iceland, Quebec, Newfoundland, and British-Ruled Palestine. In all of these cases, with which I have become familiar in the course of some 30 years of continuous studies, it has become evident that the ability of society to survive and take advantage of critical moments hinges directly on the volume of the kind of energy produced and propelled by the joined activity of local idea-makers and entrepreneurs.

The emergence of new repertoires cannot be adequately understood without studying *intercultural transfer*. In transfer, solutions generated by one group are often adopted by another. From the viewpoint of resource-utilization economy, this is by far a more economical practice than original domestic production. This perspective inevitably expands the context of our quest for factors of social energy beyond that of single groups. It sustains the need of developing what Diamond and Robinson (2010), mentioned above, called "natural experiments in history", a method based on comparative inferences between similar and dissimilar cases, given our lack of ability to produce controlled repetitive events in history. Moreover, the study of transfers also helps revealing the risks of total adoption of exogenous repertoires that can generate *maladaptation*. It naturally also brings to light the fact that the link between ideation and social energy is not a modern phenomenon, but one that has always governed human dynamics.

My hypotheses about the role of ideation in the trajectory of social energy did not emerge as such from the outset. Rather, they have crystallized only gradually through consecutive trials-and-errors. Two different channels have led me to focus on this complex of factors. One channel was my erstwhile curiosity about deliberately planned cultures, because I actually grew in such one – the Modern Hebrew culture. In my case, it had been designed several generations before my birth in Ottoman and British-Ruled Palestine to deviate completely from its previous historical roots. The other channel was my work on developing conceptual tools for coping with systemicity within heterogeneity in culture. This line, known under the name of polysystem theory, has brought to light an inherent paradox of the homogeneity vs. heterogeneity dynamics. Namely, it turned out that without heterogeneity, there normally is no socio-cultural excitation (Khrennikov 2016) able to produce alternative options for life management, and groups (or societies) may subsequently harbor in stagnation. On the other hand, excessive heterogeneity may cause disintegration of groups because it counterworks collective solidarity, thus eliminating what keeps people to negotiate successfully their individual interests. At the current state of studies on heterogeneity, complexity or diversity, we actually do not know what need be the desirable ratio between heterogeneity and homogeneity to allow optimal group dynamics. However, the inescapable need for alternative or new options for the survival and success of groups is unmistakably revealed as a major factor of human existence. This is in my view not a conclusion anymore but a point of departure for extensive research projects. I have done a modest attempt to base these hypotheses on the study of the few cases I have been able to research over the years. However, only the investigation of many more specific historically anchored cases can advance our ability to check the validity of the bundle of hypotheses presented in the presented essays.

IDEATIONAL LABOR AND THE SUCCESS OF SOCIETIES[1]

Abstract
Ideational labor is a term that refers to many types of intellectual activities. Their products range from images and narratives to explicit ideas about the management of human life. There has always been a group of people engaged in the maintenance of standards and canons for established societies. However, preservation can at times become an obstacle on the way of a society to survive and success. In such situations, there emerges a need for people who are able to produce new solutions. This category of people, whom I call 'idea-makers,' would often fail without others, whom I call "entrepreneurs," who are able to convert their ideas to actions. It is not unlikely that idea-makers and entrepreneurs might be the same people, but this is not a general rule. The situations for which new solutions must be found can range from utter disasters endangering the very existence of society to various types of deficiencies that make its life inferior in relation to others. This paper discusses various cases where ideational labor has been either functional or dysfunctional in relation to achieving success and avoiding failure.

Ideational labor is a term that refers to many types of intellectual activities, whose products range from images and narratives to explicit ideas about the management of human life. These products can be verbal, that is carried out through language, or non-verbal, that is carried out through other means, such as buildings, paintings, sculptures, music, or dance. Their efficiency depends very much on the status of the generating industry, which emanates from its particular degree of institutionalization and establishedness in the society in which it is embedded. These products enjoy vast consumption: they make the materials from which our ways of thinking, viewing the world, and acting in the world derive. Beliefs, feelings, sentiments and hopes, tools for

[1] Based on a paper delivered at the Reykjavik symposium "Athafnalandið Ísland," Reykjavík, Sigurður Nordal Institute and the Icelandic Chamber of Commerce, April 19, 2005. An abridged version was published as Even-Zohar 2012.

evaluating everything that goes around, and for generating action –
all derive from the products distributed by the ideational industries.
There is no way to evade the permeating presence of the ideational
products in any human society. Whatever the origins and the circum-
stances under which they have been made might be, their function as
a blueprint for the management of both individual and collective life
has been recognized by all students of society. As an aggregate, they
constitute human culture, which according to Geert Hofstede's sug-
gestion functions as 'software of the mind' (Hofstede 1997) – the hid-
den scripts, the "strategies of action" (Swidler 1986), with which hu-
mans manage their lives.

Is ideational labor carried out by countless anonymous workers or
by individuals who are more prominent than others are? On the one
hand, a handful of "great names" have been traditionally presented as
those who have indeed directed the course of things in all human so-
cieties. On the other hand, the flow of both repeated events and change
in those societies have been presented as the outcome of anonymous
forces, the consequence of "objective factors" that have little or noth-
ing to do with the work of individuals. Without delving too deeply
into the nature of these disagreements and controversies, which often
divide groups of researchers and sets artificial frontiers and borders
between different disciplines, I would risk being accused of shallow-
ness by saying that unless one takes extreme positions there need not
be any contradiction between the recognition of the indispensable
work of individual producers on the one hand and the anonymous
forces of society on the other.

The perpetuation of products, or otherwise the maintenance of the
recurring repertoire of possibilities for life management, is not possi-
ble without a reinforced agreement on a daily basis. As John Davis has
remarked, culture would not exist without the daily negotiation
among the members of society, who actually produce and reproduce
on a daily basis the necessary tools for social management:

> […] Every action and thought which involves other people is creative sociability, attempting to make a social world which is secure and stable to live in. It is continuous, pervasive, inescapable that we create as we go along: the words I utter reaffirm my commitment to a particular language which I re-create and modify as I speak. My spouse and children and I negotiate to create a family – one which is different, you may accept, from the family in which I am a child. This is a universal, popular and irrepressible activity: everyone is creating most of the time – a universal human propensity to make arrangements which we hope will be relatively stable and durable. (Davis 1994: 99)

In this sense, society operates as a marketplace, where the exchange of daily ideational products is carried out anonymously by just about everyone. Societies with a high level of such successful daily exchange are "stable and durable" in Davis's formulation. It is generally agreed that societies strive to achieve the stability and durability, which in concrete terms means a high level of repetition of the options available for the management of life. However, Davis actually refers to a situation where he "re-creates and modifies as he speaks." This means that modifications cannot be avoided even when a strong tendency for avoidance of change is prevalent. This is basically so because people often deviate even from their repetitive habits. People also make mistakes, that is, introduce modifications unintentionally. In addition, there cannot be a full transmission of culture from one generation to the next, partly because new generations not always are able to observe and learn everything they have been either shown or taught, partly because individuals have different learning curves, and last but not least, because at least part of the new generation do not really *want* to follow their predecessors.

Although the tendency for durability may be widely spread among the members of a group, and popularly supported in everyday life by generations of people, it normally becomes overt and acknowledged when manifest on an institutionalized level. There is always a group of people who take it upon themselves to keep the society for which

they consider themselves responsible as a durable culture. These people, who may be engaged in a large variety of ideational industries, generate the necessary ideas, images, artifacts, habits and measures to reinforce and reaffirm the repertoire of options that they want to protect against modification. In addition, at least part of them is also engaged in a host of activities where all of these are told to people. They may act in various and different fields as teachers, preachers, tribunes, or anyone in position to talk to people, tell them what to do or at least try to persuade them. These individuals are the preservers of the current order. They are the ones who create labels, standards, and canons, the "legitimizing discourse, a mode of persuasion which would secure consent" as Lawrence has put it (Lawrence 1996: 59). Undoubtedly, from the point of view of defending the interests of the group for which they stand, their contribution is not only substantial but also indispensable for the continued existence of the group, for its coherence and eventually for its survival over time.

The standardizing agencies, those preservers of the current culture, can however become an obstacle on the way of a society to maintaining itself over time. It may look, if we observe the history of a society in a superficial way, as if the transition from a positive and indispensable role to a negative and damaging one is so quick that the people who happen to get caught in such situations cannot really understand what might be wrong with what they are doing. Normally, turning points or tide reversals take place abruptly, but the processes leading to such reversals may have taken a much longer time, un-remarked and unobserved even by the most trained eyes. In such situations, the majority of the members of a group, trained as they are to employ durable strategies, are not likely to be able to know what to do, and that includes the very need to be aware and understand that something has changed that requires new measures, that is, that the established options of the current culture can no longer be helpful. A different type of ideational products – ideas, images, anything that can tell people what to do differently – becomes necessary.

The type of producers that now may or may not emerge is different from the preservers of durability. These are people who must now produce *new* options, meaning new ways of thinking, new images, new ideas, new values, new procedures and strategies. They are often called "innovators," "inventors," "revolutionaries," "heretics," and many other labels, depending on the time and the territory, and on the way, they are evaluated by their contemporaries. As it is the case with the providers of consent, some of these people can only make ideational products but have no capacity to propagate them or create the means by which they can be implemented. Others, who often do not create any new options by themselves, may or may not emerge to be able to translate potential options to realities. The first category of people can be called "idea-makers," while the second is often called "entrepreneurs." It is not unlikely that idea-makers and entrepreneurs might be the same people, but this is not a general rule, which is why I suggest thinking about what they do in terms of roles rather than in terms of persons.

When we study a variety of historical cases, it becomes apparent that what we may have diagnosed as "change" is not at all identified by the contemporaries as such. Moreover, analyzed from an "objective" perspective (a general name for many methodologies), no change could be said to be imminent. It is therefore a permanent question in any theory of change whether the designers and the entrepreneurs of the new options are people who have sensed somehow that a crucial turning point has come about or whether the turning point is their own creation, something they have initiated, an enterprise that is not necessarily warranted by the "real" circumstances but emanates from some other sources.

While for specific historical situations one can argue in favor of the one rather than for the other explanation, on the level of generalization we should better recognize that the production of new options for the

management of life could be a reaction either to some explicit, conspicuous and overt events, or to implicit, hidden and covert processes.

In other words, at times irregular circumstances may emerge to become pressuring factors that need to be urgently dealt with. These are moments where everyone can be aware of the irregularity of the situation, and it may be relatively easier for people to accept that someone should come with relevant suggestions for new options. A typical case of this type are catastrophes and misfortunes, whether caused by nature, such as drought, inundation, volcano eruptions and earthquakes, or caused by man, such as war, famine or ocean fish depletion caused by overfishing. At other times, on the other hand, no visible circumstances emerge to suggest that any steps should be taken in order to solve some situation that is not even seen, sensed or recognized. When certain idea-makers then emerge to suggest that steps should be taken, their suggestions are more likely to be rejected even though they may be arguing that if the recommended steps are not taken there will be negative repercussions for the well-being and even the very survival of their society. People may react to the suggestions, the new proposed options, with either indifference or rejection. These options would be taken to be unnecessary, uncalled-for, ludicrous, utopian to the extreme, or outright conflicting with the established order.

The success of any new proposed options naturally depends on a variety of factors. Speaking in broad terms, if the nature of the proposals has to do with some focused decisions that must lead to some action – such as using thermal waters for heating a city or founding a new air company such as *Loftleiðir* – then, again, depending on the extent and range of that action, it is not likely to have success without the ability to mobilize those people who have the power to implement decisions, replace them or circumnavigate them in order to implement those decisions. These options, however, may not be available to idea-makers under all circumstances, which naturally leave them with only those options that might be available, depending on the degree of risk,

both personal and collective, which they are prepared to take. Nevertheless, there is one more option, which often means in practical terms very slow movement towards a target, but at times may be, on the other hand, extremely quick. This option entails not a direct mobilization of power-holders, but of the large masses, implementing not focused decisions but attempting to introduce a large-scale shift in major components of culture, that is the repertoire of life management options available to society.

Replacing any components of culture, as well as introducing new components, has never been a simple matter. However, inasmuch as culture is both perpetuated and modified by the mass of anonymous members of society, it is also interfered with by deliberate thinking and acting by specific individuals. Evaluated on a cross-cultural scale, societies appear to be different in their ability on the one hand to generate those individuals who would think and act in order to initiate change and innovation, and on the other to maintain a balance between the power given to those individuals and the options available to the masses. It is my contention that it is these two parameters that make the difference between failure and success of societies.

The range of states between failure and success is large. On the extreme, absolute failure simply means ceasing to exist. The Tasmanians or the Beothucks are just two such cases out of many. It would be much more difficult, on the other hand, to think of the meaning of "absolute success." Theoretically, an unlimited number of options available to as many members of a society as possible would be an adequate description, normally known under the name of "utopia." However, in between those extremes there is a whole series of possibilities. For example, famine, diseases, a high rate of mortality and a very restricted number of options for the management of life in general would obviously be universally evaluated as a state of affairs far removed from success. In contrast, some ability to access food resources and maintain the group across generations would be some success, obviously the lowest level of it, though no one thinks of it in

these terms. More often than not, such a mode of existence is called "survival."

Survival certainly does not connote either success or prosperity, but it nevertheless requires basic proficiencies, skills, and some abilities of solution making. It requires the ability to maneuver with a restricted inventory of options. In their book, *Living on the Edge*, Lawrence Felt and Peter Sinclair even name this ability a "relatively successful adaptation […] based on flexibility, substitution and co-operation" (Felt & Sinclair 1995: 210). Analyzing the strategies of survival with the help of which communities in Newfoundland manage to carry on with their lives, they thus point at the "clever maneuvering" carried out by the members of the group. This entails learning a large variety of skills that can be traded off with other members of the community, shifting turns with relatives in getting employment and unemployment payments alternately, and the like. However, even if we could trace more conspicuous idea-makers among those who are able of clever maneuvering, it is obvious that they are not able to either think of or instigate any options that are not already known and used.

The survivalism described by Felt and Sinclair as typical of life in Newfoundland is not accidental. In the history of modern nationalism, I do not know of many societies that renounced their independence as a strategy of solving what seemed at the time to be an insoluble situation. In the Newfoundland referendum, carried out on July 22, 1948, a narrow majority of 6,989 people voted in favor of joining the Canadian Confederation (78,323 voted for Confederation, while responsible government garnered 71,334 votes).[2] In the contract signed with Canada, the Confederation government, which was then very eager to

---

[2] The story of how people were persuaded to vote for joining Canada probably will never be fully disclosed. Not unlike the case of people who were persuaded to vote for joining the Italian Union even though it turned out to be a failure from the point of view of the declared purpose of the act, people voted for joining Canada for a host of diverse motives. Much is attributed by historians to the weight of the campaign launched by J. Smallwood, who eventually became the premier of the new province (1949–1972). His endeavors are typically hailed, or strongly criticized as a conspiracy

have control over Newfoundland, committed itself to certain obliga-tions, such as providing the new province with certain supplies and services (among many other, guaranteeing for example a certain num-ber of regular ferries from Nova Scotia to Porte aux Basques). I guess this sounds quite familiar to my audience here in Reykjavík, surely reminding them of what happened in 1262 in this country.[3] Indeed, what happened in Newfoundland after the unification does not seem to be very much different from what eventually took place in Iceland after 1262, although the span of time is not the same.

To cut a long story short, similarly to what happened in medieval Iceland, a short-term, immediate improvement of life conditions in Newfoundland gradually faded into a period of long deterioration. Again, similarly to what happened in Iceland, gradually the Confed-eration government lost interest in the province – though naturally for different reasons – and actually broke many of its commitments. The massive cash flow and the improvement of supplies, such as the so much propagated milk powder, undoubtedly not only improved con-ditions of life for a number of years, but probably even saved the lives of many people. There seems to have been a short period of great en-thusiasm and a feeling that Newfoundland now finally joined the rest of the modern world. "[...] industries, office buildings, welfare ser-vices, commerce and consumer goods, the university, technical schools, and road construction" – all were transplanted to Newfound-land, as well as "A Chubby Chicken outlet, a billowing smokestack, a

---

against the people. The reason is perhaps the fact that Newfoundland is not doing very well from the point of view of success on any level. (See Robert Paine's lucid analysis of Smallwood's strategies [Paine 1985], and Mackenzie 1986.)

[3] In 1262, the Icelanders accepted the sovereignty of the Norwegian king and ceased to be an independent entity. "In return the king agreed to preserve the domestic tran-quility of the island and not to introduce new laws for Icelanders without their con-sent. Furthermore, he agreed that six ships were to sail to Iceland during each of the next two years, and afterward as many were to come as both the king and notable Icelanders should decide." (Gelsinger 1981: 178)

classical symphony, earth-moving equipment, supermarkets, pavement, and water and sewer pipes" (Crocker 2001: 86). In addition, many industries which were "most swiftly constructed, were born in a rapid explosion of industrial growth aimed at the production of consumer commodities – chocolate bars, optics, glue, leather goods, maps, car batteries" (ibid.: 87).

However, "few of these lasted more than a couple of years" (ibid.: 87). Gradually it has turned out that what was not available before the unification, namely the cultural resources indispensable for prosperity, did not really emerge after the unification in spite of the massive transplantation of products and production facilities. In fact, quite the opposite has taken place: many of the people who potentially could have become major agents in the industry of ideas have left the province to go to mainland Canada, where better prospects of life attracted them.

In the middle of this precarious existence, a severe setback took place when, towards the beginning of the 1990's a natural disaster, the depletion of the ocean entailed the Atlantic Groundfish Moratorium in 1992, "with an immediate loss of 30,000 jobs within the fisheries and the subsequent 'ripple' effect on the economy causing the loss of an additional 10,000 jobs" (Borgen at al. 2002: 117). This reduced dramatically the ability to perpetuate time-honored schemes of life management. People simply could not go on exerting their historically inherited professional skills, and subsequently could not maintain their habits of life. Men could no longer work as fishermen, and women could no longer work in the abandoned fish plants. All of a sudden, a compelling turning point dawned on the people of Newfoundland, to have never been met by any effective solutions in way of introducing alternatives. While on the one hand various subsequent committees, appointed by governments, have been trying to propagate the idea of socio-cultural reshuffling (see House 1999), aiming to lead to the creation of a new cultural infrastructure that would make the necessary

grounds for the emergence of solutions, the population at large has not been offered any real choices.

As I have argued, the majority of people in such situations, unless there is an established infrastructure for ideational labor, are not likely to come with new options. The actual ways out that have emerged in Newfoundland have therefore become survivalism as described in *Living on the Edge* on the one hand, and a relatively massive emigration on the other. To quote Crocker: "Men and women abandon the fishing berths of rural Newfoundland for the language schools of South-East Asia and the chicken factories of Alberta. The villages they leave behind are turned into museums. Houses, root cellars, and furniture have lost their functional value." (Crocker 2001: 84.) In dry numbers, between 1992 and 2002, the population fell by about 60,700 people**.** Areas heavily dependent on the Groundfish fishery such as the Northern Peninsula, the Northeast Coast, the South Coast and areas of the Avalon Peninsula experienced the largest population losses.[4] The depletion of the population of many localities as a result of emigration has naturally weakened the prospects of getting out of the loop.

The similarity between medieval and to some extent 19th-century Iceland, and modern Newfoundland is not continued in the new era. On the contrary, Iceland and Newfoundland seem to constitute sharp mirror images of one another. At two similar turning points in their respective histories, they made two diametrically opposed decisions. While in crisis, the people of Newfoundland decided to renounce their independence, whereas the people of Iceland decided to proclaim it back. Both communities were living on islands with more or less the same size, with large portions of their territories inhabitable, both

---

[4] "Total net outmigration from 1991–1992 to 2001–2002 was 59,536, and migrants were heavily concentrated in the less than thirty age group. One result of the combination of a low birth rate and the outmigration of young people has been that the percentage of Newfoundlanders under the age of 20 has fallen from 32% in 1991 to 25% in 2001." (Schrank 2005: 417)

counting very small populations – Newfoundland consisting of 335,000[5] and Iceland of 126,879[6] people – both living under tough nat-ural conditions (though Newfoundland has the disadvantage of a worse climate), both extracting their main livelihood from the ocean, both constituting clear-cut ethnicities (though Iceland had the ad-vantage of having a more homogeneous population), both offering the restricted range of options for life careers, and both quite poor, at least in terms of the rest of the Western world.

About sixty years after those diametrically opposed decisions were taken, the status of the two communities is likewise diametrically op-posed. While territory size, hardships of nature and still relatively small populations have remained unchanged, in terms of quality of life and livelihood Newfoundland, in spite of its natural riches and several promising projects (the Labrador Voisey Bay, offshore oil plan-tation etc.), lingers far behind.[7] This is manifest in about 15% unem-ployment and a continuing trend of population loss (although last year, 2004, a small reversal was noted with a surplus of 300 people). Above all, it is manifest, however, in a continued state of a small range of options. The management of life with the help of survival strategies is not only a matter of livelihood, but a matter of the range of choices in general.

---

[5] *Historical statistics of Newfoundland and Labrador* 1970. St. John's: Government of New-foundland and Labrador. There are no specific data in this publication for 1948, but the figure for 1949 is 345,000 and the figure for net natural increase for that year is 9413, so the rough calculation for 1948 would be 335,000 people.

[6] *Hagstofa Íslands* (http://www.hagstofa.is), *Lykiltölur mannfjöldans 1703-2003*. In the Icelandic referendum, carried out on May 24, 1944, 71,122 voted in favor of independ-ence and 377 against it. 69,435 voted for the Constitution, which was approved June 17, 1944, and 1051 voted against it. (Gils Guðmundsson 1951: 200-201)

[7] Officially, a more optimistic view is however expressed by Canadian agencies. Ac-cording to *The Conference Board of Canada*, "The province of Newfoundland and Lab-rador is expected to post the largest increase in provincial real Gross Domestic Prod-uct (GDP) in 2002. Thanks to offshore oil projects such as Terra Nova, White Rose and Hibernia, Newfoundland's GDP will grow by 5.8 per cent." (New Release, May 28, 2002)

Strong discontent with the union is popularly expressed by people and in the media. Although the number of people who now advocate secession from the union and the creation of an independent state for Newfoundland are quite small, the idea that independence could have been a better solution for the country is still held by at least half of the population, as was the case back in June 1948. It is not my intention to argue in favor of secessionism, nor maintain that had Newfoundland taken a different path back in 1948, its fate today would have been quite different, namely more likely to be prosperous and successful. My contention is that the difference between Newfoundland and Iceland, although manifest, among other things, in making these diametrically opposed decisions, does not lie in the opposition between "independence" and "the lack of independence." Rather, it lies in the *capacities* that have propelled these two communities to make different choices. It is the different repertoire of abilities and options, and, more concretely, the different volume of ideational labor carried out by them that has made them different.

In both popular and academic conceptualizations, and probably unavoidably so, there is a recurrent fragmentation of events and processes into many different categories. These categories more often than not follow only what can be overtly observed and has been publicly institutionalized. Quite often, this prevents us from being able to adequately evaluate what is taking, or has taken place in the life of societies and people. It is not that I am contesting irrefutable facts, such as the fact that the Icelanders really struggled for independence, or that the Icelandic language has been salvaged from dying out through the organized and deliberate endeavors of dedicated people. Nor am I contesting the need to study these events and processes in as great detail as necessary, as an attempt to explain the circumstances and the factors that contributed to specific outcomes. Political structures, literature, architecture, the arts, urban planning, the planting of trees, education, health services, general construction, irrigation and agriculture, fisheries, industries, music and sports – all of these can,

and have been dealt with as separate categories. Again, I am not contesting the importance, or the usefulness of these categories, nor the assumption that they have their own specific patterns and regularities, functioning in some autonomous way in relation to various other fields. Certainly, if one wants to understand something about, say, the planting of trees in Iceland, one must dig into the relevant historical documents and find out how it was made possible after so many years of deforestation, as well as study the necessary botanical and climatic parameters relevant to the case.

While not rejecting the study of all of the categories mentioned above as useful and revealing, my contention is that by having been engaged with all of these acts throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, the Icelanders have not simply created an array of disparate facts such as an independent state, certain industries, new social structures, electric power or transportation networks. My contention is that by doing all of these they have developed something more powerful, something that functions as an infrastructure for the modern Icelandic society – the ideational industries, which generate an ever-growing amount of energy. It is this energy that has eventually led to an ever-growing proliferation of options, constituting collective success, which has become both manifest and visible in several conspicuously established fields, such as "the economy," understood in its narrow sense. It is subsequently also my contention that the historical circumstances in Newfoundland have obviously not made it possible for such an infrastructure to be developed.

In conclusion, I am calling for a better understanding of the deep processes underlying overt actions and the apparent manifestations of institutionalized phenomena. It is my contention that what seems to distinguish between different groups is the amount of energy generated by ideational labor, comprising a large variety of industries and different types of agents, such as idea-makers, image-makers, all sorts of

entrepreneurs and agents of transmission. When the volume of ideational labor grows, meaning that more and more people actually can be effectively active in the industries, the amount of energy leading to higher levels of success definitely grows accordingly. If one wishes to trace the roots of the lack of success, one must therefore try to evaluate the status, the relative presence or relative absence, of ideational labor. If there are no conspicuous signs found for such labor, in all likelihood these are the roots of non-success. If certain from-above bodies such as governments in times of distress decide, in order to set things in motion or salvage a situation, to pour financial and other resources into a certain community, without dealing with the ideational infrastructure, these resources will generate energy in the form of employment and possible revenues, financial and social, for only a short term. As we can deduce from the case of Newfoundland, and many other less successful communities around the globe, there will sooner or later ensue failure and decline.

I think that this principle was formulated poignantly by Manuel Azaña (1880-1940), later to become the unfortunate last President (1936-1939) of the Second Spanish Republic before the Civil War. In a talk that he delivered as a young thinker on the eleventh of February, 1911, at the *Casa del Pueblo* of Alcalá de Henares, where he discussed the roots of lack of success of Spain, he said:

> It would be an error to believe that by introducing electric light, traveling by railroad and talking on the phone, we are already in the same current of ideas that has produced those inventions; as it would be mistaken to assert that by having a law of universal vote and a Parliament and a Jury, we live in democracy. In the history of the applied sciences Spanish names are absent; none of those modifications and manipulations of the natural forces have been invented in our house; and this, not for natural inability that would be absurd to suppose, but for another simpler and more shameful reason: for the reason that the electric telegraph and the vapor motors and the vaccines and the electrical appliances and the mechanical looms, are not things that are made or discovered accidentally, nor by the inspiration of God, but

rather they are the result of a special way of understanding and loving
life, of a deeper current of ideas whose manifestation and definitive
and practical crystallization, visible to the masses, are called the mar-
vels of science. (Azaña 1990: 55-56; translation mine)[8]

---

[8] […] Sería un error creer que por alumbrarnos con luz eléctrica y viajar en ferrocarril
y hablarnos por teléfono, estamos ya en la misma corriente de ideas que ha producido
esos inventos; como sería equivocado afirmar que por tener una ley de sufragio uni-
versal y un Parlamento y un Jurado, vivimos en democracia. No; en la historia de las
ciencias aplicadas faltan los nombres españoles; ninguna de esas modificaciones y
manipulaciones de las fuerzas naturales se ha inventado en nuestra casa; y esto, no
por incapacidad natural, que sería absurdo suponerla, sino por otra razón más sencilla
y más vergonzosa: por la razón de que el telégrafo eléctrico y los motores a vapor y la
vacuna y las aplicaciones de la electricidad y los telares mecánicos, no son cosas que
se hagan o descubran casualmente, ni por inspiración de Dios, sino que son el resul-
tado de una manera especial de entender y amar la vida, de una corriente de ideas
más profunda, cuya manifestación y cristalización definitiva y práctica, visible para
el vulgo, son todas esas llamadas maravillas de la ciencia.

THE COMPLEXITY OF CULTURE AND THE SUSTAINABILITY OF GROUPS[1]

Abstract

Contemporary culture research has gradually recognized heterogeneity, diversity and complexity as fundamental characteristics of culture. Culture is a tool of survival for humans and various other animals alike. In order for it to serve its purpose, it must produce dynamic solutions for changing circumstances. This requires avoiding total homogeneity, which impedes the ability of generating innovations. On the other hand, without homogeneity and with excessive heterogeneity groups may collapse for lack of solidarity and chaos. In order to survive successfully, an efficient ideational work turns out to be a condition for generating new solutions under a state of balance between complexity and homogeneity. This paper focuses on these burning issues of both ancient and modern societies and argues that the industry of ideas has a crucial role in achieving sustainability.

Introduction

It is widely accepted in culture research today that culture is both heterogeneous and diverse, with most societies maintaining a state of growing complexity. If culture is the contract that makes social relations possible, then at any given time for any given group there are more than one single contract that regulate that group's life. Even groups that managed to isolate themselves in some degree growingly find themselves tangled in a multi-group environment, which makes the number of contracts necessary for maintaining life rather large. While it used to be believed, though I have strong reservations about the validity of this generalization, that a person could normally pursue their life in some not too remote past with a once- and-for-all learned stable culture, a growing number of human beings must now face and cope with unrecognized circumstances through life.

---

[1] Based on a paper presented at the international conference "Cultural variety in Europe: policy and practice." Amsterdam, November 23, 2007. Previous versions: Even-Zohar 2018 and 2021a.

This growing awareness of the necessity of coping with a diversity of circumstances has led me to investigate the possible dependency between the complexity of culture and the sustainability of groups. Hence, my purpose is to analyze complexity not simply as a state, commonsense or otherwise, but as a factor, namely as a necessary if not sufficient condition for a group to maintain itself over time. "Complexity" therefore would mean in such a context not the same as heterogeneity, multiplicity or variety as such, but a very specific variable that emerges out of a state of multiple choices to provide solutions for coping with changing or unrecognized circumstances.

In order to be able to conceptualize a state where such solutions may emerge in the life of groups, I need to introduce an auxiliary concept to making it possible to think in concrete terms. In all discussions about culture in the social sciences, although there is an attempt to deal with culture in concrete terms with the help of long lists of components (such as beliefs, 'values' and the like), it is never clear where all those components reside, how they get organized, and what the constraints on their availability are. Both socio-semiotic traditions (e.g., Lotman's semiosphere 1984 & 1990; see also Alexandrov 2000), and the more recent Darwinian cultural evolution research (Mesoudi 2011; Mesoudi, Whiten & Laland 2006) conceive of culture as a repertoire of options that makes life, biologically and socially, possible for strategies of both acting in, and understanding of, the world.

Although the concept of culture would make no sense without its adoption by groups, all studies actually manage to discuss them separately. The separation between human beings on the one hand and repertoires of culture on the other means that groups and repertoires are conceived of as maintaining functional multi-dimensional rather than inherent relations to each other; and that these relations are generated by historical and accidental circumstances rather than by genetic or mental continuity. Such a seemingly trivial generalization is neither self-evident nor universally acknowledged in all academic

fields. Moreover, the innateness of repertoires for groups has been in-culcated into the modern mind by two hundred years of diligent in-tellectual labor at the service of the modern economic and political or-ganizations such as states, whose major project for gaining ground has been a comprehensive endeavor to create and impose homogeneity among the population controlled by them. Exported with much suc-cess all over the globe, it now clearly prevails on the market of ac-cepted ideas and images on both official and popular levels among most organized groups known under the name of 'nations'. In this ca-pacity, it still serves entities such as states to maintain their distinction and separation and similarly does groups-in-the-making to claim such rights. It has even succeeded where there were no local historical prec-edents, such as the creation of language-based new states, a principle wholly imported from the European modern repertoire. A striking ex-ample is the case of the creation in 1953 of the state of Andhra Pradesh in India, where language was mobilized by local activists (with the famous Potti Sreeramulu fasting to death in 1952). Once again, in 2014, the newer state of Telangana was created on the basis of the same lan-guage distinctiveness. (See Reddy, v. Ramakrishna 2016.)

This controversy, which on the academic level may seem highly ab-stract and detached from reality, but in the political reality has gener-ated conflicts and wars, is basically about the control of repertoires. Obviously, those who control repertoires also control the group served by those repertoires. It therefore becomes a critical issue who is authorized, and by whom, to legitimize changes in the contents of the repertoires or suggest such changes. Homogeneity blocks change by making it unthinkable, impossible or simply not available. By con-trast, heterogeneity is a pre- condition for potentially making it possi-ble for alternative components, or even whole repertoires, to emerge. Therefore, to hypothesize a relation between heterogeneity of culture and subsistence of groups is elementary in any theory of complex sys-tems. The gist of the argument would be that since it is the multiplicity of repertoires, which co-exist as permanent competitors that makes it

possible for a system to change; and since change is necessary because systems necessarily clash and conflict with other systems, heterogeneity allows systems to subsist in the long run.

These assumptions allow dealing not only with repertoire change as such, but also with repertoire creation. While repertoire creation is normally analyzed as an anonymous process, if we do not also add to this an analysis of the role played by named individuals it is often impossible to understand why seemingly similar circumstances in disparate places, such as high heterogeneity of culture, do not produce the same level of complexity, namely, the ability to generate alternatives, in a similar way. This is why I have been engaged in an ongoing attempt to study the parameters of initiatives taken with cultural repertoires in relation to processes of change in the history of collective entities. In these studies, evidence has accumulated to suggest that the massive labor invested in the making, and the endeavors of distributing and inculcating of new repertoires may eventually have created a whole array of results, a high and intensive level of activity, which is termed "energy" in the current book, or, to follow now some suggestions in complexity theory – "complexity". It was my contention therefore that it is this "energy", or "complexity", that has made it possible for the groups studied to stand reasonably well in competition with the contiguous world.

In all of the cases I have studied – such as pre-state Israel, Italy, Spanish Galicia, Iceland, Québec and Catalonia – this engagement with the making of repertoires was launched in the context of an attempt made by the makers of these repertoires to break off from some contemporary circumstances and create new conditions of life for the group of people they considered to be a legitimate target for these repertoires.

What kind of new repertoires were being created and what kind of "options" they engendered? The people who were engaged in great intensity in making new repertoires, both "idea-makers" and "culture entrepreneurs", have always had in view some vision of improving

the situation of the group for whom they targeted their repertoire inventions. Whether the "actual situation" indeed justified their enterprises or not can be assessed only in relative terms, taking into account the contextual situation as it was perceived by these individuals.

I must emphasize the fact that those new suggested practices were not explicitly directed at devising strategies for accumulating material capital. Material poverty may indeed have been a strong drive and a point of departure for such endeavors, and it surely helped create positive reverberations among the targeted public (such as having Sicilian peasants vote for the Italian union, an act that probably was not supporting their interests) but the public discourse and the new alternatives that were offered often centered around different modes of managing life. In situations that were perceived and presented as acute, discourse focused predominantly on saving the group from persecutions and humiliations, or even from perishing. In situations of high competition, it was about putting the group on an equal footing with other groups (normally described as the more advanced). Restoring a certain past grandeur, actual or imaginary, has been a default ingredient since the age of romanticism. The options devised in congruence with these views may appear as belonging to areas that have nothing to do with parameters of either economic or social prosperity. These may indeed seem like a whole battery of odd gismos, such as opening windows to let sunshine and fresh air in, or using disreputable or non-spoken languages, or walking out in nature, or planting trees in great ceremony, or getting up early to go to work, and the like.

Theoretically, what I am here referring to are two different kinds of projects. One is the making of new repertoires for whatever purpose. The other is the creation of new political entities where these repertoires were designed to prevail. However, from the point of view of the outcomes, the two projects actually are one single package on the levels of both discourse and action. Namely, the making of an entity with socio-political characteristics has often been presented as both a necessary condition and a possible result of new proposed repertoires.

For example, the creation of the modern Italian state was inseparable from the attempts to vernacularize the literary Italian language or the whole plethora of new other options devised by the handful of Italian repertoire-makers involved in that event. And although is was propagated that the expected outcome of this bundled project is the achievement of betterment of life for the targeted group, it was also widely propagated that people should be prepared to accept that there might arise incongruities between individual and collective conditions. Therefore, even when members of the collective would have to starve or get killed in war because of the new devised repertoires, they would accept the premise that the collective may survive or even thrive by their actions.

These bearings may not apply at all to those cases where the making of nations and states has taken place without the making of new repertoires. In such cases, if people do not experience any positive change in their lives, on whatever level, they are more likely to reject the outcomes. They may experience the whole enterprise as superfluous and surely would accept the famous "Lord Acton's melancholic remark" (Pratt 1985) that nationalism "does not aim either at liberty or prosperity, both of which it sacrifices to the imperative necessity of making the nation the mold and measure of the state. Its course will be marked with material as well as moral ruin, in order that a new invention may prevail over the works of god and the interests of mankind" (Acton 1967; quoted from Pratt 1985: 196).

This only means that it is important to understand that this kind of solution for a situation of perceived inferiority may not have emerged out of some unconstrained "free will" of "the people," but out of some deliberate thinking entertained by individuals who have been able to generate or spot an opportunity. These individuals were driven to thinking, and often to subsequent action, by unavoidable inter-cultural competition. Analyzed from the point of view of business evaluations (that is, by the rates of investments to yields), the benefit of certain entities that have emerged as a result may indeed be questioned.

But from the point of view of inter-group competition, to follow or reject a certain ingredient of repertoire has been, and continuously is, a matter of choosing between perpetuated inferiority and belonging to a new club that offers some new privileges.

My contention is therefore that the principle that worked in accepting an alternative under conditions of heterogeneity is not only that of "why haven't we got what our neighbor has got?" but often "we have got no alternative but to follow the example of the neighbor." It is therefore that I suggest that the fruitful question here would be: under what relations with the contemporary repertoires this action takes place? If new repertoires are involved, even when their adoption is a matter of political convenience rather than a desire to alter conditions for "the people" (as so often is maintained, e. g., in relation to such cases as the politics of piedmont and count Cavour), a deadlock may thereby be broken in a domestic repertoire. Subsequently, even in cases of a limited stock of innovations, the doors may open to allow more options. Once it is made widely acceptable that the older ways of life can be at least in part replaced by different ones, often there is no way for anybody to block the surge of complexity, or energy, which followed as a result.

The moment when new options are made permissible in whatever society is not an event that should be taken for granted. It is true that new options are being produced every day by an untold number of individuals, either accidentally or deliberately. If you accidentally find out you can cook your food with some herb you may have accidentally acquired, you thereby devised a new option, but there is no guarantee that other people will accept it, and in some places and past or present periods you might stand to trial for witchcraft and end up in unexpected bad places.

The basic reason for this is that repertoires tend to establish themselves in society to eventually become the agreed culture of that society, that is, its recognizable way for handling life situations. It is then

not at all self-evident that people will be encouraged, nor even supported, by the other members of a group in making additional – let alone alternative – options to those already in use. Sticking to accepted repertoires may often be stronger than the need to confront changing circumstances. Groups, as well as individuals, are often willing to go a long way – even risking their lives – in order to maintain the repertoire, which may have become identical with their sense of orientation in the world. Jared diamond has dedicated a whole book to discussing cases, both past and present, where he claims that societies have selected to collapse rather than change their repertoires (Diamond 2005).

For while the idea-makers and the culture entrepreneurs normally claim that the only way for the group to extract itself from its misery is to introduce changes in its culture, if not replace it completely, the opponents of such initiatives normally claim that the opposite is true. Clearly, the understanding of survival must be very different for the opposing parties. Those who normally are in favor of maintaining a current repertoire unchanged frequently consider heterogeneity as negative and change as disruptive. From their point of view, the disappearance of the current repertoire or of any part of it – the repertoire they live by – would simply mean the disappearance of the group as such. Naturally, when force is involved, or even when perceived as forceful, new repertoires may be more collectively resisted, whether actively or passively, depending on the power circumstances of the relevant case.

It therefore requires certain conditions for repertoire innovations to be suggested in the first place, before any attempt is ever made to implement these suggestions, if the aim is to have them accepted by at least a reasonable part of a targeted group. Seen from this point of view, the strategy of proposing the creation of a new group can be understood as a way for making new repertoires more attractive. That is, since they are normally not presented as aiming at serving replacements for the current group as such.

When the dynamics of the making of new repertoires is set in motion, the very nature of the situation and the different backgrounds of the people involved often create alternative sets of new options. These may never be fully compatible in the long run, even in cases where certain levels of integration or compromises have been achieved between the competitors. In most cases of deliberate creations of new options, more than one agenda is normally proposed in almost every domain of life. In the cases of the making of new entities, the alternative proposals cannot be characterized in general terms, but we can frequently observe incompatibility between "left" and "right", "religious" and "secular", "republicans" and "royalists", and the like. Each of these may have proposed a different set of new options, and sometimes no final settlement is ever reached.

As an illustration, in many of these cases, the new entity, now possessing political power to impose repertoires, often makes the choice between the proposed alternatives. In the case of the Italian language, for instance, a committee was set up and its chairman, Manzoni, after many back-and-forth hesitations, finally decided in favor of a certain variety, which subsequently was introduced into the newly established Italian schools and has now become more or less the common language of the Italians (de Mauro 1984). The Norwegian conflict in matters of language, however, could not be solved by similar governmental decisions, so the compromise was that both alternatives (in that case – both Norwegian languages) were adopted.[2] In the Israeli case, a state described as "status quo" was agreed upon between the secular majority and the religious minority back in 1948 in matters of church and state, though each section has been trying since then to erode the agreement if not to break it altogether.

---

[2] The two official Norwegian languages are Bokmål ("language of the book", formerly called Riksmål, "The language of the kingdom"), and Nynorsk ("new Norwegian", formerly called Landsmål, "language of the country"). See "Dated solutions," in this collection, about Landsmål, and Haugen's classic book on the linguistic conflict in Norway (Haugen 1966).

Such impositions or agreements have not necessarily lasted in the various cases. Resentment and rejection of new repertoires often take place partly because of the lack of a settlement between competitive agenda, but plausibly also because there always is a group there that is not content with the outcome of certain actions, which it considers to have created some disadvantage for it. This lack of contentment, if developed into passive resistance, often functions as a factor of dead-lock. On the other hand, if it develops into a state of active opposition, it seems to be able to create the necessary dynamics for a continued struggle about the desirable repertoires, which contribute to a continued state of complexity.

The continuation of the normal lack of agreement on matters of culture repertoires among groups therefore guarantees that there will be a continued struggle about those repertoires. This may guarantee the continuous dynamism, which will allow the creation of new options, and above all – the legitimacy of making new options. In this sense, the "energy" that was set free, or created, during the activities involved with the making of new repertoires, may be safe to continue at least for some time if not halted by yet another stage of immobile culture.

However, the same kind of energy may generate the opposite results. If disagreements exceed a certain level, the co-habitation of multiple repertoires in the frame of one society, and the pre-occupation with the elementary, or "core" agenda, for the various groups who would rather live by the one rather than by the other repertoire, heterogeneity does no longer guarantee survival, or success, but rather disorder and failure. This is often discussed in the social and the political sciences in terms of instability. In these discussions, naturally the focus of attention is human interaction or political power relations. These, however, may more often than not be only manifestations of the cultural discrepancies.

The problem here – and it is a problem for which I see no solution at our current stage of knowledge – is that we do not know what the

limits of heterogeneity need to be in terms of repertoire disagreements. Parameters such as "small" vs. "large", "having existed for long" vs. "having existed for a short time" may sometimes help on a heuristic, but not on a general level. We may perhaps understand why Switzerland can cope with four different cultures without falling apart. But would the same model be working in other places? A state like France surely believes that if this is allowed, it will no longer survive.

The problem of the limits of heterogeneity and its repercussions for the survival and success of groups is in fact one of the most burning practical problems of modern societies. The debate that was going on between innovators and conservers in terms of making new repertoires is continuing today between groups in relation to the legitimacy of claiming equal footing. While it is more and more apparent that without heterogeneity there are slight chances for the emergence of alternatives, and thus for the creation of complexity, which in its turn is assumed to be a pre-condition for success, heterogeneity is not a sufficient condition. How it is that one group can generate the conditions for complexity under heterogeneity while another cannot, depends, to judge by the evidence I have accumulated, on the ability of the relevant group to maintain an industry that is rarely discussed and analyzed – the industry of ideas. This topic has been discussed in few of my other works (Even-Zohar 2012, 2016, and 2020 [included in this collection]).

INTERCULTURAL COMPETITION OVER RESOURCES VIA CON-
TESTS FOR SYMBOLIC CAPITALS[1]

Abstract
Intergroup competition over resources is attested since the dawn of history. Written and archaeological evidence go back to at least the fourth millennium BC. According to accepted views, evolution has favored humans because of their ability to have cumulative cultures, which has made flexible adaptation possible. One major aspect of this adaptation has been the ability to handle power contests without engaging physical force. Instead, increasing prestige dynamics has allowed contest management by displaying symbolic assets. These have growingly been instrumental in deterring external assaults, thus guaranteeing the possession – or expansion – of a group's resources. However, while material assets are believed to create status by the evidence of their tangible usefulness (such as foods, husbandry and tools), symbolic assets are by definition subject to ongoing negotiation, entirely dependent on being socio-semiotically recognized as types of capital. Symbolic stock exchanges thus appear to have been determinative since antiquity in hierarchizing ethnic and political groups fighting over resources, prioritizing ones over the others. They have culminated in repertoires of more solid tangible and intangible assets, from impressive buildings, city gates, gardens and temples, to ideas such as freedom, quality of life and wealth, justice, personal security, or whatever values that have gained universal recognition. The article discusses the creation and expansion of such symbolic repertoires and their uncertain position in recent times.

Strategies of gaining status
This article is about strategies of gaining status that allow groups, societies and entities to access resources efficiently, focusing on semiotic strategies via the accumulation of symbolic capitals. I use the terms "symbolic capitals, goods, assets," and "prestige" in the most basic

sense, and it would be out of place here to develop a hair-splitting analysis of these notions. In the following, I cite primarily Bourdieu because what counts in his analysis is the "market" of exchange of symbolic assets, without which those would make no sense. It is mostly his works that have diffused these ideas, though they are rooted of course in the Marxian conceptualization (*Das Kapital*, CH. 1; see also Swartz 2013). Although Norbert Elias published posthumously a book about symbolism (Elias and Kilminster 1991), the issue of symbolic capital as a tradeable value does not appear in the book.

Individual and intergroup competition over resources, seen as a primary unavoidable social dynamics, becomes in particular acute under states of scarcity. As Tainter succinctly summarizes it, "[f]or at least the past 4000 years, one of the fundamental historical processes has been competition among societies organized at approximately equivalent levels of population, territory, technology, organization, per capita product, and military capability" (Tainter 2002: 109).

Competition inevitably leads to clashes, and human groups have been engaged in such clashes on various scales since time immemorial. However, engaging in violent clashes has never been the only viable solution, and often not even the major one for achieving gains. Humans – eventually more than other primates – have discovered very early that violence could become a costly venture, since losses often exceed gains in both human and material resources, because of killings and destruction. While continuous cases of belligerence, now and then profitable, are evident throughout history, many if not most of them have eventually turned out not particularly beneficial to the belligerent parties. For the most part, belligerent clashes were thus periodical rather than continuous, focused on achieving stability, with the ultimate goal of gaining security and prosperity.

The preference for non-violence in striving for social and economic prosperity has been evident since the deepest antiquity. In the late bronze age fertile crescent (late thirteenth-twelfth centuries BC), "[s]uccess on the field of battle, no matter how complete or decisive,

did not in itself provide a firm foundation for the establishment of permanent authority over newly won lands. […] diplomatic interaction between rival kingdoms jostling for supremacy in the same regions might have helped ensure a longer lease of life for many of them" (Bryce 2003: 45). So much so that non-violent management of social tensions has been sanctioned as an almost universal (though not exclusive) moral code, widely expressed.[2]

Semiotic alternatives to violence in managing intergroup tensions
Consequently, complex semiotic alternatives to violence in managing intergroup tensions have growingly been developed. They consist of announcing to the others one's power, thereby warning them that engaging in aggression would not pay, because their chances to win are scarce. Telling the others about the volume of destruction means at one's disposal – be they horses, warriors, and chariots, or tanks, airplanes and missiles – thus has become a powerful strategy, unrelated to the actual possession of those resources in reality. The name of the game here is creating deterrence by fear – yet the subject of fear is virtual. As Henrich and Gil-White (2001) have pointed out in their study about the evolution of prestige, fear creates deference towards the feared party, as a token of acknowledging its superior claims, regardless of whether or not these claims are substantial. Obviously, resorting to this strategy of mobilizing symbols rather than concrete power

---

[2] Expressions of doubt about continuous belligerence are proliferous in antiquity. *The Book of Guanzi*, a Chinese reputable treatise from the 3rd Century BC, legendarily attributed to the 7th century BC public official Kuan Chung (Guan Zhong), states: "Frequent wars fatigue the nation; frequent victories excite the sovereign. Now, with a fatigued people employed by an excited sovereign, how can the state be safe from danger? *Thus the best-governed state seldom goes to war*" (Quoted from Wu 1928: 148; emphasis mine). Likewise, sentiments of relief from wars, combined with a sense of achievement in war, are often expressed in the Hebrew Bible by the recurrent phrase "and the land had rest/peace" in reference to a successful ending of a violent conflict: "So Midian was subdued before the Israelites, and they lifted up their heads no more. And the land had rest for forty years in the days of Gideon" (*The Book of Judges* 8: 28; RSV translation).

has augmented the possibilities of flexible adaptation in coping with complex and changeable intergroup relations. Nevertheless, this strategy is still quite risky and costly, because unless material backup exists, propagating power can often backfire and symbolism fail.

A more subtle and profitable strategy of generating deference has hence prevailed since antiquity, and that is gaining respect by establishing oneself as a role model. "a country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries – admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness – want to follow" (Nye 2004: 5).[3] Unlike acknowledging someone else's superior status out of fear and resentment, having control over the other by gaining their respect and recognition entails the others' attraction and willingness to adjust without coercion. In terms of risks and benefits, this strategy is thus less costly and more effective than signalizing power exclusively. However, it still entails investment in other types of capital, which must be displayed instead, such as knowledge and expertise, and other semiotic possessions that are put at stake in intergroup contests.

Intergroup network where agreements are negotiated is a pre-condition for the function of prestige

None of the above-mentioned strategies can be effective, however, unless an intergroup network exists, in which agreements are negotiated

---

[3] In Nye's theory of power (developed also under the inspiration of Bachrach and Baratz 1962), Thissort of strategy is called "soft power," in contradistinction to "hard power," which is the direct use of force. The term "soft power" is defined as "[…] the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideals, and policies" (Nye 2004: X). Nye also suggested that only a balanced use of these strategies, which he called "smart power" (Nye 2008), may render benefits. Quite oddly, Nye believes that the strategy of using soft power has become most efficient in our own time, but his analysis actually applies to Bronze and Iron Ages, as well as to later intergroup relations.

on the value of goods that can be displayed for prestige. Once agreement on the value of possessions, whether material or immaterial, was established, these possessions became prestige-conferring assets. Individuals' as well as intergroup relations have thus been shaped by – and consequently given rise to – a "market of symbolic goods", to use Pierre Bourdieu's conceptualizations (1985), or a symbolic stock exchange sort of institution. In other words, while competition has been leading to clashes, at the same time it also has generated cooperation, in the sense of making negotiations and exchange worthwhile. The scope of this trade-off dynamics is immense. One of its conspicuous outcomes throughout history has been the growing diffusion of culture repertoires over large territories among a diversity of groups. The broader the diffusion of these repertoires and the more commonly shared they have become, the clearer the status and longevity they were allocated as generators of prestige.

The idea of gaining in competition via contests over symbolic assets may seem commonsensical, but research on these dynamics is far from exhausted. We cannot be sure how it emerged in world history, though Henrich and Gil-White's (2001) theory of the origins of prestige in human social dynamics is a very plausible explanation. It proposes that the need to acquire knowledge from a successful source emerged as a result of changes in the nature of cultural transmission. This made [cultural] selection favor new strategies to augment social learning, "as culturally transmitted knowledge became increasingly complex and important for success" (Plourde 2010: 142). Whether or not we accept this as a sound explanation, we have enough evidence of the functionality of such competitions since antiquity, which have consistently led, time and again, to intergroup learning and enhanced cultural diffusion (rather than aggressive clashes), to the extent that they have become an overwhelming type of intergroup relations. Evidence for this effect increases, however, or at least becomes more comprehensible to us, in the last two and a half centuries, most visibly first

in Europe and gradually in other parts of the world. In a similar fashion to the situation that prevailed in the Fertile Crescent at least since the third millennium BC, political entities in competition in Europe since the late eighteenth century increasingly needed to justify their legitimacy and gain status by exerting symbolic power (Elias 1994). Their intensified contests for recognition and control have generated (or re-generated from a historical point of view) a rich cross-European repertoire of symbolic assets that was sanctioned to be possessed by an entity aspiring to power. Tangible and intangible objects, embedded with spiritual aura, like paintings and texts, or the aura of being ancient, were mobilized by agents of culture planning (Even-Zohar 2008) or socio-political activists at the service of political entities, stimulating fights between them over possessing and monopolizing the same assets.

Random examples for illustrating the dynamics of asset contests
The following examples are only random cases to illustrate this dynamics: Danes and Germans still refer to the same old inscription found in Schleswig, now lost, as their very first evidence of existence.[4] In Denmark, the great romantic poet Adam Oehlenschläger (1779–1850) was instrumental to its becoming a Danish national symbol. The same sort of claims holds true of the unabashed appropriation of the medieval Icelandic texts by the Norwegians (who present them as their own old literature), which is even of greater magnitude, but curiously seems to have created no exceptional quarrels. On the other hand, quarrels about the physical possession of Icelandic manuscripts between Denmark and Sweden in the nineteenth century are expressions of the same desire to gain prestige by what McCracken (1990) suggested calling the possession of patina. In this particular case, the

---

[4] The so-called Golden Horn inscription: "Ek hlewagastiR holtijaR horna tawido." ("I, Hlewagast from Holte [?] /son of Holte [?] / 'from the wood [?] made the horn"; Nielsen 2002). Both Danish and German textbooks (such as histories of their respective literatures) begin the cultural history of their nations with this same phrase.

Nordic countries discovered that they had good assets for competing not only among themselves, but also with the rest of Europe, where patina objects were more easily available. In fact, without the popularization of prestige through patina, the Icelandic manuscripts would have completely perished by now.

"Who gets the past?"– Contests over being more ancient

Similarly, quarrels about "who gets the past" (Shnirelman 1996) have popped up in many other regions of the world. Armed with either authentic or faked evidence provided by archaeology or other sources – financed and supported by states and other interested bodies – agents were able to promote favorable images of the past for their interested parties. The fear from archaeological findings that can be interpreted to the disadvantage of some group may clarify what could appear to the uninvolved observer as irrational decisions. A case in point is the baffling order Joseph Stalin gave in 1952 to inundate the territory of the old Khazar city of Sarkel. "The soviet government flooded most of the remains of Sarkel after the completion, in 1952, of the Tsimlyansk reservoir and dam, which controls the Don River's flow. […] this has come at the expense of the Sarkel site, most of which is no longer available for further on-site exploration" (Brook 2006: 33). Although presented as part of "the great Stalin plan for the transformation of nature," it has been attributed to his wish to impede the discovery of the magnitude and grandeur of Khazaria, a subject of obsessive and heated disputes in Russia, before, during, and even long after the soviet era. Stalin actually banned any research related to the Khazars, but he was not alone in displaying emotional aversion verging on hysteria present in various layers of the Russian society, who believed that they had been deprived of their legacy.[5]

Closely connected to this historical episode, the Russian scholar Victor Shnirelman has carried out extensive research on "memory

---

[5] The literature on the Russian obsession with Khazaria is extensive. For critical discussions, see Shnirelman (2001), (Shnirelman 2007) and (Shnirelman 2012).

wars" (Shnirelman 2003) between various national and ethnic groups in the vast territories of the former soviet union, from Tatarstan in the north to the Caucasus in the south. He described the myths, often based on faked history and falsified documents (Shnirelman 2006; Petrov and Shnirelman 2011)[6], and analyzed their purpose and efficiency. In his book *Who gets the past?*, dedicated to discussing the "competition for ancestors among non-Russian intellectuals in Russia," he explains:

> The past has become a crucial means, by which an ethnic group seeks to identify itself […]. For people who believe they have been deprived of their cultural legacy, invention of the past becomes a powerful instrument – first, for the raising of self-esteem and the reevaluation of their position among other peoples, and second, for demanding special rights and privileges with respect to others who lack their glorious past. (Shnirelman 1996: 2)

---

[6] "But what if the available historical sources do not allow us to draw […] a rosy picture of some golden age? It is then that the time of faking arrives. […] Forgeries of historical documents have been made at various times, but they enjoyed unprecedented public demand only in specific periods. One can recall the era of imitations of the holy relics, but the main such period has been the 'century of nationalism.' It was then that enthusiasts appeared who were prepared by any means to provide their nation with a great past, at a time when their society felt an unquenchable thirst for such a past, and then there came specialists who considered it their duty to satisfy its desires, confirming it with their scientific authority." (Petrov and Shnirelman 2011: 6–7; my translation.) ["Но что *делать*, если имеющиеся исторические источники никак не позволяют нарисовать такую радужную картину золотого века? Здесь-то и наступает время фальшивок. Надо сказать, что подделки исторических документов производились в самые разные времена, однако небывалым общественным спросом они пользовались только во вполне определённые эпохи. Можно вспомнить эпоху подделок святых реликвий, но главной из таких эпох является «век национализма». Именно тогда появляются энтузиасты, готовые *любыми* способами обеспечить свою нацию великим прошлым, именно тогда общество испытывает неутолимую жажду к такому прошлому, и именно тогда находятся специалисты, считающие своим долгом удовлетворить его желания, подтверждая это своим научным авторитетом").]

The link between intergroup claims for symbolic assets and their claims for rights and privileges

In this and other of his studies, Shnirelman thus underlines the explicit link between intergroup standings on the one hand, and claims for symbolic assets to gain rights and privileges, on the other. The cases he discusses cannot be given here full justice, in view of their abundance and complexity. A simple minor example may however be illuminating. A public talk given in 2007 by the Ukrainian popular writer Oksana Zabuzhko, later published in the major Ukrainian newspaper *Ukrainska Pravda*, demonstrates how deep popular sentiments and convictions can go regarding the link between symbolic assets and the fortune of one's own society. In her published article, Zabuzhko says:

> I take the risk of contending that if at the time Lesya Ukrainka and Mykhailo Kotsiubynsky had been known in the world to the extent Tolstoy and Dostoevsky are, our country would not have to give up its nuclear weapons. And this is not just a metaphor. […] let us not forget: over a hundred years Tolstoy and Dostoevsky have been Russia's trademark, and to a large extent all of the Bolshevik revolution was mediated in the consciousness of western political and intellectual elite through Tolstoy and Dostoevsky as the "guides" to the "mysterious Russian soul". […] Lenin, the Bolsheviks, even the Cheka headed by Dzerzhinsky were perceived from behind the iron curtain not as political criminals, who were liquidating every living soul, including the "Russian" one, but as heroes of the Russian classics, anxious to "save the world" – and this had the most direct impact on the international success of Stalinist politics. (Zabuzhko 2007; Skachko's translation slightly modified by me)[7]

---

[7] "Ризикну ствердити, що якби на той час Леся Українка й Коцюбинський були знані в світі такою мірою, як Толстой і Достоєвський, нашій державі не довелося б відмовлятись від ядерної зброї. І це не просто метафора. (…) Не забуваймо: протягом ста років брендом Росії у світі насамперед були Толстой і Достоєвський, і вся більшовицька революція в свідомості західної інтелектуальної й політичної еліти величезною мірою опосередковувалася саме Толстим і Достоєвським, як 'путівниками' по 'загадковій російській душі'. (…) Ленін, більшовики, навіть ЧК на чолі з паном Дзержинським бачилися з-за

Zabuzhko's claims may sound naïve and far-fetched in straightforwardly reducing the advantage of Russia over that of the Ukraine to its recognized symbolic assets alone. Whether the lack of recognition of the latter has indeed forced the Ukraine to give up on its nuclear weapons or not, this example succinctly reveals the significance of this issue for the identity of a political entity and for its dignity.

The widely expressed belief, and the laborious efforts invested by groups and states in exposing, displaying, promoting and marketing symbolic goods at least point at a well-established and deeply rooted social awareness that this kind of capital is beneficial in terms of concrete gains (Bourdieu 1971, 1985; Plourde 2009). Since the rise of modern nationalism in Europe during later eighteenth century, the deliberate inculcation of this type of symbolic goods (through direct propaganda and the ever-expanding centralized educational systems) has served as powerful means for creating large entities and cope with ever-increasing competition over resources. This was achieved through a growingly centralized and sophisticated machinery of persuading disparate populations of the advantages of belonging (rather through aggressive coercion) and make them identify with the promulgated community and adhere to its projected images.

In both antiquity and modernity, a group had to promote itself both inwards and outwards

Moreover, in this respect, there is no significant difference between antiquity and modernity. In both cases, a group had to promote itself both inwards and outwards. Actual or potential members of the group had to be persuaded of the uniqueness of the promulgated entity and the advantages of belonging to it, and at the same time propagate this

---

'залізної завіси' не як політичні бандити, котрі якраз нищили всяку живу душу, з 'російською' включно, – а як персонажі російської класики, заклопотані тим, як 'врятувати світ', – і це мало щонайпряміший вплив на міжнародні успіхи сталінської політики".

advantage towards other groups in order to assume a better position in an intergroup network, commonly labelled "the world system." Beyond the obvious differences in the degrees of freedom between ancient and modern people, the distinction between the personal and the collective is not always clear-cut. When former president Obama said "[…] and it's useful when you think about this incredible collection of people to realize that this is what makes us the greatest nation on earth," (Obama 2016)[8] he does not sound very different from ancient rulers bragging about their possessions. Even in antiquity, rulers often presented themselves not as individuals, but as caretakers of their society, referring to themselves as a "father" or a "mother" to the population under their control. Even the despotic and cruel kings of ancient Assyria deemed it necessary to persuade their subjects of their value as benefactors through propaganda (Tadmor 1981; 1986). Singing one's own praises for having provided good life (rather than bragging only about conquests and killings of other nations, or even personal distinction) has become a cliché used by rulers all around the Fertile Crescent in the Iron Age. Azitawadda of Adana and Kilamuwwa of Sam'ál/Yaudi are two examples that come to mind. Both are proud to tell how they have brought satiation and good life to their peoples.[9] In

---

[8] Remarks by the President at Presentation of the Presidential Medal of Freedom in the House, November 22, 2016 at a gathering of 21 scientists, philanthropists, public servants, activists, athletes, and artists.

[9] Azitawadda (8–ninth century BC) boasts repeatedly in the bilingual inscriptions found at Karatepe (Cilicia, Anatolia) that in his time, "[line 3] Baᶜal made me a father and a mother to the Danunians. I revived [line 4] the Danunians. I extended the land of the plain of Adana from the rising of the [line 5] sun to its setting. And in my days the Danunians had everything (that was) good, [line 6] and satiation, and welfare. And I filled the granaries of Paᶜar" (Çambel et al. 1999: 50–61, and Plate 7). – Kilamuwa of Sam'al (inside modern Turkey near its border with Syria, around 840/35- 815/10 BC) boasts that "[…] to some people I have been a father, and to others a mother, and to others a brother. People who have not seen the face of a sheep I have made owners of cattle, people who have not seen the face of a bull I have made owners of a herd […]", and so on (Donner and Röllig 1971: 5 [No. 24]. For both texts, and various others of the same vein, see; Green 2010. All translations from the Phoenician are mine.)

short, there is nothing essentially 'modern' in benevolent rulers investing efforts in spreading repertoires for the targeted population under their control. The result of such actions are what we usually call sociocultural "cohesion," which can be interpreted in contradictory terms as human solidarity, but also as a less costly measure for achieving collective obedience.

The urge to construct and circulate collective symbolic assets grows under conditions of conflicts and change

The urge to construct and circulate collective symbolic assets, and their reception by wider communities, grows under conditions of conflicts and change, whether violent or otherwise, rather than in times of settled social settings. Conflicts often involve threats of losing status. The recent rows over the access to or control of the temple mount in Jerusalem have pressured people – many of whom may otherwise be politically indifferent – to take side in a feud and become emotionally engaged despite no expectations whatsoever to material gains from their participation (see Even-Zohar 2017 for a more detailed discussion). Sport contests, to take another example, usually seen as symbolic substitutions to armed fights (Elias and Dunning 1993), have similarly become a powerful channel for inciting the same kind of allegiance among people, who probably would otherwise not care much about capitals that cannot immediately be converted into usable currency.

The same kind of interest in symbolic assets that have long been put away in collective repositories, such as canons, may be activated when their status is jeopardized, and the accepted image of a collective entity is disputed (Sela-Sheffy 2002). In recent papers, my colleague Elias Torres Feijó and I dealt with cases of attempts made in Italy, Portugal, and Brazil, to remove certain canonical texts from the school curriculum (Torres-Feijó 2014; Even-Zohar, Torres-Feijó and Monegal 2019). Although few people still ever read these texts, and schoolchil-

dren do not particularly cherish them, when the measures were an-
nounced, or even hinted at, a large outcry, both learned and popular,
erupted all of a sudden in those countries, demanding the withdrawal
of these decisions. We commented that although the texts were for
most people boring and hard to read, it was evidently unacceptable
for them to think that they could be eliminated from the world's liter-
ary canon, which gave them high prestige.

In our present-day world, symbolic capitals are losing their power
In spite of that kind of evidence, I would like to suggest that in our
present-day world, symbolic capitals seem to be losing their power in
either creating in-group consensus or generating prestige that is con-
vertible to resources. Another possibility is that the actually effective
symbolic assets are not those that have been sanctioned and diligently
accumulated throughout the ages. In other words, a new and different
repertoire, which we have not identified yet, may now be emerging.
A large bulk of the traditional goods are losing their value, but never-
theless are converted into assets for a completely different domain,
which in some indirect way may still work for the sought-for prestige.
I am referring to the conversion of the large inventory of spaces and
objects labelled heritage into profitable merchandise used for attract-
ing tourists with the purpose of generating profits. This kind of shift
was diagnosed some twenty years ago by Gísli Sigurðsson in his arti-
cle "Icelandic national identity: from nationalism to tourism" (1996).
His study shows how valorized goods (such as the Old Icelandic man-
uscripts) have become touristic attractions rather than cherished na-
tional symbols, which in fact became a salvation for Iceland after the
2008 crisis. However, manuscripts have been a minor attraction in
comparison with the mighty images of the erupted volcano under the
Eyjafjalla glacier (2010) and other spectacular natural resources.
    A European commission call, "Project Cult-Coop-06–2017: Partici-
patory approaches and social innovation in culture," supports this

new understanding of the value of symbolic goods for the well-being of Europe at large:

> Recent conclusions of the council of the European union recognized cultural heritage as a "resource for a sustainable Europe" and highlighted that "participatory governance of cultural heritage offers opportunities to foster democratic participation, sustainability and social cohesion and to face the social, political and demographic challenges" in Europe. The European commission has also highlighted that the contribution of cultural heritage to economic growth and social cohesion is undervalued in spite of growing scientific evidence, and called for an integrated approach to cultural heritage for Europe. It is recognized that cultural heritage is a shared resource for everyone and set the objective of continuing to develop more participative interpretation and governance models that are better suited to the contemporary European context, through greater involvement of the private sector and civil society. Europe's dense network of cultural institutions needs to adapt to changing societal, demographic and economic circumstances. (European commission 2016)

The hierarchy of resources

One more aspect needs to be mentioned. Consumption theories of whatever kind have raised the question of the hierarchy of resources. All agree about the basics but diverge on what many call high-level capitals. Symbolic goods are normally described as the last ones to be sought, and only after basic needs have been fulfilled. In addition, they can be sought – it is contended – only under states of stability. When basic needs are no longer obtainable, symbolic capitals simply will not work. Let me dwell briefly on these two contentions.

"When basic needs are no longer obtainable, symbolic capitals simply will not work"

I must admit that indeed we lack sufficient research to support the hypothesis that symbolic capitals can be primary rather than emerge and be effective only under states of prosperity. However, I would like

to suggest that it can be observed that if there is some continuity in the history of groups, symbolic capitals are not immediately given up or lost because of basic survival struggles and are often ready for a revitalized use whenever the circumstances allow. The Greek people's struggle for independence during the nineteenth century, which was taking place, certainly not under conditions of abundance but of shortages of many kinds, managed to make use of the old prestige of the Greek nation in order to gain wide support, both moral and material, to their cause. By contrast, nothing really has helped the Kurds of the Middle East, in spite of the decision made in their favor after World War I by the League of Nations, which supported their aspirations for independent statehood. In the spirit of Oksana Zabuzhko, they were possibly not identified as a group in possession of any symbolic assets to display. Much worse was the case of others, such as the 40 million widely ignored Telangana people in the India state of Andhra Pradesh, who fought – unremarked by the rest of the world – for separate statehood for some sixty years, which involved armed struggle, terror attacks, suicides by hundreds of people (both peasants and students), and intensive media fights. Moreover, although a Telangana state was finally established as recently as 2014, it seems that thus far it has been a disappointment for the deprived Telangana people. According to Benbabaali (2016: 194) "[…] the new ruling class of Telangana goes about implementing its real agenda of reproducing the same structures of control and exploitation that bore down on the castes and classes that provided most of the foot soldiers of the [Telangana] movement […]" (see also Srikanth 2013 for a critical analysis of the case).

"Stability as an indispensable condition for symbolism to work"

As for the second contention, namely stability as an indispensable condition for symbolism to work, I find it partly plausible but not universally valid. Evidently, the grand collapse of the late Bronze Age, around 1177 BC, caused inter alia by shortages of tin (that had to be imported from nowadays Afghanistan) and violent movements of

populations, indeed created a sort of middle ages for two or three centuries, in which the intergroup exchanges of the earlier eras, especially those related to symbolic assets, ceased to work. "The elites lost the international framework and the diplomatic contacts that had supported them, at the same time as foreign goods and ideas stopped arriving" (Cline 2014: 174, based on Van de Mieroop 2007).

On the other hand, there are cases in history, evidently of lesser magnitude, where in spite of local and world system collapse groups have managed to survive, thanks to earlier prestige acquired via symbolic capitals. Old Egypt, India, or modern Iceland are some such examples.

Conclusion
In conclusion, the link between status won through the accumulation of symbolic capital and leading to enhanced access to resources of various kinds has not been sufficiently investigated. As Cline (2014: xv-xvi) has remarked in his study of the Bronze Age collapse, the world situation today quite resembles the situation in the twelfth century BC. This is rather alarming, and at least justifies investing some intellectual efforts in understanding these complex links in the context of the wider question of what can make human civilization successfully survive.

IDEA-MAKERS, CULTURE ENTREPRENEURS, MAKERS OF LIFE IMAGES, AND THE PROSPECTS OF SUCCESS[1]

Abstract

This paper argues that for human societies to achieve a level of existence beyond survival and heading for success, it is necessary, often indispensable, to have dedicated individuals, or dedicated groups of individuals, who are able to produce ideas – or at least images – that can be converted to alternative or new options for the repertoire of culture by which the life of societies is shaped and organized. These individuals have been, in the course of human history, of various and different types, but the main core of their activity has lied in their being "idea makers." Whether mostly intellectuals or cultural entrepreneurs, or even makers of life images through poetry and fiction, they have been a necessary condition for achieving well-being and success. Societies where this type of individuals – or groups of individuals – is remarkably missing often harbor in perilous situations, where they either are reduced to survival strategies of existence or fall in danger of cultural and physical dissolution.

1. Purpose of paper

This paper is about the relations between idea-makers and the prospects of success of groups. My question is: are idea-makers – and possibly also makers of life images – necessary, or even indispensable, for the success of groups? This is not a question that has emerged out of the blue, through some philosophical speculation, or theoretical deductions. Rather, it has only slowly and gradually suggested itself, as it were, as a possible direction of research, for a number of puzzling riddles encountered in my work on the connections between deliberate culture planning and the creation of new socio-political entities.

[1] Based on a paper delivered as The Annual Distinguished Lecture for the 2002-2003 academic year at the Department of Modern Languages and Literatures, Trinity College, Hartford, 10th of March 2003.

However, my subject is not to justify the question, but to try and analyze it as a factor in a larger and more general context than that in which it has originally emerged.

2. The success of groups

What is the success of groups? Throughout history, the major endeavor, perhaps the major enterprise, of human groups has been to survive. Those who have not managed to do so, perished. Those who have not perished physically often perished culturally. In such cases, although part of the members of the group may have physically survived, the failure to survive as a group with its distinctive culture often has put the individuals – who had previously belonged to a vital group – in an inferior state, if not outright a state of peril. Should we then consider the tenacity of groups, the ability to survive, both physically and culturally, an instance of generic success?

Although logically acceptable, I believe this is not what most people, as well as professional thinkers, mean when they use the word. *Success* is understood as something that is a more advanced achievement than survival. While survival may be conceived of as a minimum condition for *success*, the latter is normally understood as a state of affairs in which there is a *proliferation of options*. The success of both groups and individuals is often expressed in terms of access to resources and the ability, as well as the possibility, to select a desirable course of life *among many*. It implies, of course, that the desirable course of life provide more options, yielding various types of capital, or riches, often economic, but not necessarily nor exclusively so. It does not imply, however, that the success of a collective entity is equally shared by all of its individual members. The opposite, on the other hand, may very well be true, i.e., without group success, there is hardly individual success.

3. Success as a relative variable

It is clear, and the vast literature is very explicit about it, that *success* is a relative variable. There could never be *a-priori* set of options, nor a set number for these options, to define a universal state or level of success. The volume of the inventory of options, or the rate of option proliferation, is dependent upon two variables, which may or may not be connected, or even mutually dependent, in any given situation. The first variable is *the handling of changing circumstances*, and the second variable is *the presence of options possessed and practiced by another group*.

3.1. The handling of changing circumstances means that when changes occur, if the affected group does not produce new options to cope with these changes, the repercussions might be quite negative for the group. It does not mean that the group would not survive, but it would definitely not prosper, i.e., would have no success. It is a somewhat popular belief that changes, especially of some weight and size, always force human groups to produce appropriate measures. However, human history is full of examples of entities, which either have not been able, or have refused, to introduce new options into their way of life, that is to their culture. Many of these have not even managed to survive, let alone prosper, but others have simply been pushed into declining conditions of life. If they had been prosperous before the changes, they may have become less so after these had taken place.

This inability, or refusal, is not a simple matter to explain. The historical circumstances may be quite misleading, and our ability as researchers may be very limited in trying to understand them. For example, how are we to understand the situation of the Mamluks of Egypt, in 1516, when confronted with the danger of the victorious ottoman army? According to most historians, the Mamluks – who had been the mightiest force in the Middle East for three hundred years (1258-1517) – refused to use cannons against the ottomans because they considered the weapon "dishonorable." In other words, they are believed to have refused a measure necessary for the physical survival

of the Mamluk entity in Syria and Egypt in favor of sticking to their traditional way of life (Braudel 1976: 667).[2] However, we cannot be certain that this is the correct interpretation of the circumstances. Perhaps the overwhelming superiority of the ottomans derived from a much larger stock of advanced options, in which the cannon was just one – though major – component, that the Mamluks could not possibly have embraced. Here, the inability to generate or provide new options under change is definitely present, too, but to such a scale that the presence of cannons might not have altered the historical outcomes. As succinctly summarized by the *economist*'s anonymous reviewer:

The 20,000 Mamluks relied on tactics and equipment perfected in the 13th century. The highly trained, horse-mounted archers at the core of their army were no match for ottoman foot soldiers wielding new-fangled arquebuses, nor for the Turks' deadly light artillery. The ottomans' logistics, with separate corps for transport, engineering, food supply and surgery, enabled them to keep 60,000 men in the field. […] *the ottomans also represented a new kind of thinking* [underline mine – I.E-Z]. The regimes they replaced were feudal and venal. In the Mamluk realm, non-Muslims had been tolerated, but only just. The ottomans had a different vision. […] (*Economist*, 12.31.1999, vol. 353 issue 8151:.68)

Even more puzzling may be the case of the Tasmanians who are believed to have lost their power of resistance because of their unwillingness – among other things – to eat fish when the white man barred their access to other basic resources (diamond 1993). Nevertheless, it has been argued that the Tasmanians perished mostly because they

---

[2] "The Mamluks, who considered artillery a dishonorable weapon, could not withstand the fire of Selim's cannon on 24th August, 1516, outside Aleppo. Syria fell overnight into the hands of the conqueror who entered Damascus on 26 September. When the new Mamluk ruler refused to recognize Turkish sovereignty, Selim's army advanced into Egypt. The Mamluk forces were again shattered by Turkish cannon in January, 1517 outside Cairo." (Braudel 1976: 667)

were cruelly slaughtered by the colonial invaders. They did not even possess the tools and weaponry that were available at the time to the Australian aborigines, with whom they had lost all contacts ten thousand years before the arrival of the Europeans. The Newfoundland Beothucks are believed to have perished because of their lack of capability to establish exchange with the European invaders, or generate sustainable alternative resources to compensate for those they have lost (Pastore 1991, Marshall 2001). The comparison with other Native American tribes, it is argued by the historians, demonstrates that the ability to quickly develop exchange relations is what probably has saved such groups as the Micmacs of cape Breton.[3]

In any one of these, and a host of similar examples, various causes for the supposed deficiency can be provided. Some of these have nothing to do with cultural preferences as such, but even in those that are explained by the unwillingness of some leaders of groups to allow change of repertoire for some whimsical reason, there is an aspect of cultural survival, if the new component was identified as a menace to the contemporary state of the culture. Overall, it seems that we have been too little aware of the sometimes extreme efforts invested by groups to prevent their disintegration into a collection of individual members who do not share at least a partly overlapping repertoire of culture. While in quite a few cases this can be explained, either seriously or cynically, in terms of the ongoing endeavor to maintain power, in many other cases sticking together maintaining group solidarity, which is often based on a shared culture, has proved itself as the only way to survive.

To sum up, *success* is the ability of groups to provide, or generate – with the help of any accessible means – new or alternative options.

---

[3] This view is contested, however, by some recent historians. According to Holly Jr., "[…] a careful reading of historical documents and the archaeological record suggests that the Beothuk were actively seeking a means of adaptation throughout the historic period." (Holly Jr. 2000: 78)

3.2. The presence of options possessed and practiced by another group means that if a group is actively exposed to options practiced by some other group, the more linked to a better access to resources these options are, the more likely it is that the exposed group would have to adopt them. There are many factors governing the chances of transfer of options from one culture to another (cf. Even-Zohar 2001), but basically what counts most is whether the options practiced by another group may put the exposed group in a perilous situation of inferiority. In the view of most researchers, the sort of relations that takes place under such situations is a state of competition. While some states of competition may be of no further consequences, other may contribute to sometimes a quick deterioration of the exposed group.

For the ancient Egyptians, to take one conspicuous example from world history, the forceful introduction of horses and chariots by the Hyksos (17th century BC) constituted a real turning point in their history. Obviously, as Benette puts it "the old chariots pulled by mules or oxen did not stand a chance against the swift new horse-vehicles" (Bennette 1997). The import of the horse and chariot thus enabled *to maintain a competitive balance with other groups*, most notoriously with the Hittites and Mesopotamians. It eventually allowed the Egyptians the ability to avoid defeat by the Hittite formidable army of 2500 chariots in the battle at Kadesh (ca 1275 BC) an event considered by the Egyptians as a victory (see Redford 1992: 184-185). This allowed, though only some eleven years later, to finally coming to terms with the Hittites, signing a memorable peace treaty with them, which put the age-old strife behind them.[4] No less importantly, the adoption of the horse (and chariot) carried with it a whole array of new options,

---

[4] The implications of the peace are succinctly summarized by Redford as follows: "The fifty years following the Egypto-Hittite peace treaty were halcyon days for the entire Near East. In the Levant, borders were now open from Egypt to the Black Sea and from the Euphrates to the Aegean; and inter-national trade flourished as never before." (Redford 1992: 241.)

having to do with new professions that required new skills. These included knowledge about horses, chariot and wheel construction (Rovetta et al. 2002), and generated various new agricultural crops.

Transfers of repertoire from one group to another as means of proliferating (the repertoire of) domestic options have always been a major process in human history. As diamond puts it, "competition between human societies that are in contact with each other is what drives the invention of new technology and the continued availability of technology." (Diamond 1999); the word "technology" can easily be replaced here by the more general term of "repertoire." Of course, being "in contact," in contradistinction to a state of isolation, is a precondition for any movement and flow of options between human groups.

To sum up, success denotes the ability to maintain a competitive balance with other present groups through the proliferation of the repertoire of options available to the group.

4. Who got the ability to proliferate options by putting forward new ideas?

What does it mean, in practical and concrete terms, that a group has or does not have the ability to generate and provide new or alternative options? Whose ability is it?

In everyday life, the overwhelming majority of people in any group do not engage in deliberately creating, or thinking about, new options for either themselves or the group. The major concern of "ordinary people" is to go on with their lives with the help of the options of the culture with which they are already familiar. Certainly, the repetition and reiteration of a given repertoire is a re-confirmation of its validity, and therefore people can be said to participate in a daily re-creation of their culture by permanently negotiating it among themselves (Davis 1994). Undoubtedly, to master a current repertoire in a satisfactory manner is not a simple matter, since many individuals never manage to do that, let alone generate new items for that repertoire. For ages life has been – and still is for a vast number of people around the world

– sticking to the known and familiar. As Bernard Reilly puts it in his description of life in mediaeval Spain:

> The overwhelming majority of people, then, lived in three mental worlds. The first was constituted by the nature to which they lived so close. It was the vegetative round of life, death, and life again that provided their sustenance, conditioned their everyday life, and dominated their mental images. In it everything was in motion but nothing ever changed permanently. (Reilly 1993: 153)

Against the background of this, when in need of new options, along the variables described in the previous passages, *most people are not equipped with the necessary capabilities to provide them*. It has always been the task of a "small dedicated group of thoughtful" people (to use Margaret Mead's famous expression) to get engaged in the business of thinking, generating or providing alternative or unprecedented new options. These had to do with such disparate elements as family relations, gender roles, social hierarchies, principles of government and social management and organization, methods of writing and the making of texts, as well as the domestication of animals and crops.

This category of a "small group of people," who are involved with thinking about and providing or generating new options, undoubtedly emerged at the very dawn of history. There is much indirect evidence to that, at least since humans became sedentary. However, it is only in closer, historical times, beginning roughly with the 3rd millennium BC, that we begin to learn more specifically about groups and individuals who get a stronger say than others on what shape might take the life of other people than themselves. More often than not, these are people who, by assuming power – normally as part of a group, even when power eventually concentrated in their own hands – have been able to carry out their ideas. These ideas often touched upon many aspects of life, and if they were involved not only in exercising power, but also in designing unprecedented or alternative op-

tions, they surely can be viewed as dedicated makers of future prac-
tices, thereby proliferating the stock of options made available to their
group and contributing to its success. As such, they certainly contrib-
uted to the making of the cultures that shaped life for the groups un-
der their control. They also made it their business to laud themselves
for these acts, even when the ideas did not necessarily originate from
their own heads. Interestingly, these efforts have often been success-
ful, as we can detect accepted ideas in the common lore of many
groups around the globe about the contributions of these outstanding
– sometimes legendary – individuals. It is only dimly sensed some-
times behind the available explicit records that these individuals had
in their group people with the privilege of criticizing them and sug-
gesting new options to them. It is in this context that the story about
Jethro, Moses' father-in-law, who takes the liberty of criticizing Moses'
performance, seems to me to be very instructive. Here is how it is rec-
orded in the *Book of exodus*:

> And it came to pass on the morrow, that Moses sat to judge the peo-
> ple: and the people stood by Moses from the morning unto the even-
> ing. And when Moses' father-in-law saw all that he did to the people,
> he said, what is this thing that thou doest to the people? Why sittest
> thou thyself alone, and all the people stand by thee from morning
> unto even? And Moses said unto his father in law, because the people
> come unto me […] when they have a matter […]; and I judge between
> one and another […]. And Moses' father in law said unto him, the
> thing that thou doest is not good. Thou wilt surely wear away, both
> thou, and this people that is with thee: for this thing is too heavy for
> thee; thou art not able to perform it thyself alone. Hearken now unto
> my voice, I will give thee counsel […] thou shalt provide out of all the
> people able men, such as fear god, men of truth, hating covetousness;
> and place such over them, to be rulers of thousands, and rulers of
> hundreds, rulers of fifties, and rulers of tens: and let them judge the
> people at all seasons: and it shall be, that every great matter they shall
> bring unto thee, but every small matter they shall judge: so shall it be
> easier for thyself, and they shall bear the burden with thee. If thou
> shalt do this thing, and God command thee so, then thou shalt be able

> to endure, and all this people shall also go to their place in peace. So Moses hearkened to the voice of his father in law, and did all that he had said. (*Exodus*, chapter 18: 13-24; King James Bible Version)

Jethro, a token-representative rather than a historical person, was not unique, however, in historical terms. Gradually, more audacious people who came from outside the dominant group, or at least did not constitute part of the immediate entourage of power-holders, have emerged. These people joined in the activity of making ideas with the purpose of shaping the culture of the groups they belonged to, or creating new or modified groups in the first place. The novelty about them was that they did not aspire to take power themselves, though obviously without some sort of power, and perhaps a power of a different sort, they might have remained completely obscure to us. Their activity eventually led them into conflicts with the power-holders, with possibly costly consequences for them, such as losing life, property, or family. My contention is that these were the first wholly dedicated self-appointed idea-makers in world history, not commissioned by anyone to provide their goods.

I believe that the first figures of that kind we know of are the Hebrew prophets, people known to us by names, such as Amos and Isaiah – eighth century BC, or Jeremiah – seventh and sixth centuries BC, in spite of their audacity, they had to legitimize their subversive ideas by claiming to be agents of some higher authority, the invisible ruler of the universe, but in making that claim they also had to increase the power of that authority far beyond what was the contemporary common belief. The local god of the group was transformed to a universal ruler whose authority extends beyond the boundaries of the national territory. It was certainly a new conception that had far-reaching consequences for what could be considered right or wrong.[5]

The next group of idea-makers, making their appearance in Greece of the late fifth century BC, emerged with Socrates (470?–399) as its

---

[5] For a more extensive discussion, see "Intellectuals in Antiquity" in this collection.

leading and exemplary figure. They already forestall the modern brand of idea-makers, because they no longer needed divine legitimization. Instead, they were ready to take all responsibility upon themselves, believing in their ability as human beings to create their own ideas with critical categories that can be created and negotiated by the individual human brain.

5. Makers of ideas, which are convertible to options

At various stages of my work, it seemed to me that the familiar term "intellectuals" could be used, with some modifications, to denote that particular brand of people who are capable of designing new options by brainwork. The trouble is that such usage is not compatible with some vernacular or academic habits. In both, the term mostly refers to "people with learning," "scholars," or "people in the academic institutions," or even as synonymous with "scientists." In yet other contexts, the term is used, especially in combination with the word "public," to denote people who publicly express ideas already sanctioned as "preferred." Often, the word is used to loosely denote any kind of people who do any kind of brainwork as their major occupation or engagement. This is of course not what I was attempting to describe in the previous passages. Obviously, there are so many kinds of people normally called "intellectuals" who definitely do *not* have the mental capabilities of producing ideas that may be converted to new or alternative options for the cultural repertoires of social groups. This does not mean that such people have not had these capabilities, or played that role, in some past – a possible reason for the continuous belief that they still carry on – but they often have ceased to be or do so at some remote or recent past.

In much of the traditional discussion of intellectuals, much emphasis has been laid on the first part of my formulation, that is, the "mental capabilities of producing ideas," but little to no attention has been paid to the qualification of these ideas as spiritual products that "may be converted to new or alternative options." I would like to argue that,

whatever the label we put on such people, we take both parts of my formulation as necessary conditions identifying them among many other types of brainworkers. This will make, I hope, the connection between certain ideas on the one hand and the cultural and social realities on the other more apparent. In view of this, people who display great knowledge and scholarship, who excel in scientific work, or who give magnificent expression to some shared sentiments of the groups to which they belong, though often recognized as intellectuals, do not belong in the category of idea-makers-as-options-devisers unless what they produce generates unprecedented processes. The historical fact that many types of brainworkers often endure hardships may be an unavoidable outcome of their activity in some societies, but hardships cannot serve as a criterion for identifying the type of idea-makers I am discussing here. It is therefore that I suggest leaving the term "intellectuals" to the market use, and henceforth refer to the type of actors I am discussing here by the hardly elegant yet clear term "idea-makers-as-options-devisers," or "idea-makers" for short.

6. Idea-makers-as-options-devisers and cultural entrepreneurs

To what extent idea-makers have been engaged in basically producing ideas rather than promoting them? If by "promoting ideas" we mean talking about them and trying to spread them around, no doubt most idea-makers we know about have done that either by themselves or through some close agents. Although no doubt world history may also be full of reclusive thinkers, these cannot be considered to be idea-makers in our sense. On the other hand, if we mean by promoting ideas some sort of activity towards implementing them, that is, making them not only heard and accepted, but also converted to socio-cultural reality by implanting them into the active repertoire of the relevant group, then we would find that idea-makers are clearly divided throughout history to those who are mostly engaged in producing and preaching their ideas and those who in addition also become active in attempts towards their implementation.

This latter brand of people, whom we may call "active idea-makers," actually also assume the role of *entrepreneurs*. Since they are engaged in the creation of new or alternative ideas for the repertoires of culture, it would be adequate to call them *cultural entrepreneurs.* This is not a current term in the human sciences. "Entrepreneur" is mostly used in economics for describing and analyzing people engaged in generating new ideas and taking actual steps to implement them for solely economic purposes. Although an old concept (probably dating back to the French Physiocrats of the Eighteenth Century [Formaini 2001]), it had to slowly break its way into the mainstream of theoretical economic thought. As late as 1986, Marc Blaug complains that,

> It is a scandal that nowadays students of economics can spend years in the study of the subject before hearing the term "entrepreneur," that courses in economic development provide exhaustive lists of all the factors impeding or accelerating economic growth without mentioning the conditions under which entrepreneurship languishes or flourishes, and the learned comparisons between "socialism" and "capitalism" are virtually silent about the role of entrepreneurship under regimes of collective rather than private ownership. (Blaug 1986: 229)

Similarly to the lack of recognition of the vital role of idea-makers in various traditions of social and historical research, major traditions of economic analysis have rejected this concept. Marxian economic theories could obviously not accept the role of individuals as major generators of change in any domain of social life. "[…] for Marx," says Schumpeter, one of the founding modern theoreticians of entrepreneurship, "the business process runs substantially by itself, the one thing needed to make it run being an adequate supply of capital" ((Schumpeter 2006 [1954]: 530)).

There seems to be no longer a dispute today among economists about the usefulness of the concept of entrepreneurship as an adequate tool of analysis. Entrepreneurship is also taught as a practical

profession. This conceptual change, however, is attributed not to any development in academic thinking, but to the "profound change in the competitive environment," as Gary Hamel put it, a change which has created the situation, according to him, where,

> In industry after industry, it is the revolutionaries – usually newcomers – who are creating the new wealth. […]. The point seems incontestable: in a discontinuous world, strategy innovation is the key to wealth creation. Strategy innovation is the capacity to reconceive the existing industry model in ways that create new value […]. Strategy innovation is the only way for newcomers to succeed in the face of enormous resource disadvantages, and the only way for incumbents to renew their lease on success. And if one redefines the metric of corporate success as share of new wealth creation within some broad opportunity domain – e.g., energy, transportation, communication, computing, and so on – the innovation imperative becomes inescapable. (Hamel 1998: 7-8)

Although a very encouraging development from my point of view, there are two flaws, or at least two weaknesses, in the argumentation put forward by Hamel and many similar analyses.

The first weakness is that what seems to us as an exciting and speedy change of gear may look to next generations far less dramatic, the way we often look back at events that have taken place in some remote past that seems to us incredibly slow. As I have been trying to argue throughout this paper, without the inventors of new or alternative options, nothing would have happened in world history. The dramatic introduction of grains and animals, the invention of the sickle (between 13,000 and 10,000 BC), or the introduction of writing systems has been no less dramatic than modern human and technological inventions. Moreover, it is now the view of most prehistory scholars that these innovations did not occur slowly and gradually, but were introduced rapidly and during very short periods of time, a view supported by archaeological evidence, and which is more compatible with the hypothesis of entrepreneurship than with the idea of spontaneous

impersonal emergence of new options. In short, "strategy innovation," which can unproblematically be replaced with "initiating/visioning new options," is plausibly more intensive in certain periods than other, but has always been a major factor in the dynamics of human societies.

The second weakness is that viewing economic entrepreneurship only in economic terms hides from sight too many parameters which actively participate not only in the environment of entrepreneurial activities, but also figure as built-in features of the comportment of the entrepreneur. The inventory of available options is intimately linked with any clues for replacements, which makes the connection between the larger context of culture and the capabilities of a prospective entrepreneur an indispensable factor for any adequate analysis. Moreover, what might have been launched as an economic enterprise eventually may produce more consequences in the larger socio-cultural context. On the other hand, economists have deplorably ignored the overwhelming consequences for the proliferation of options, including clear-cut economic innovations, of the work carried out by idea-makers and cultural entrepreneurs.

Some criticism of the narrow definition of entrepreneurship and success has already been vociferated by inner circle members of the trade. For example, in a study by Paula Kantor on women entrepreneurs in south Asia, she says in a very clear voice:

> Most studies of enterprise performance measure success through economic outcomes alone [...]. The measures include size of firm, change in number of employees, growth in sales or income, productivity, and returns. This narrow definition of success highlights only economic motivations for entering into self-employment, which tends to fit the male model of self-employment [...]. It does less well in reflecting women's motivations for starting a business, which include a desire for greater income as well as creating more opportunities for advancement than in the labor market, improving a family's livelihood position, self-fulfillment, and a greater ability to balance work and family

> roles […] amongst poor women in both developed and developing nations, self-employment also is perceived as a means of empowerment through which women can reduce their dependence on the state or on male family members by gaining control over their own income [...]. (Kantor 2002: 132-133)

I believe that Kantor has been swept away too far by her distinction between the aspirations of males and females. The desire, attributed by her to women, "[...] A desire for greater income as well as creating more opportunities for advancement [...]" Perfectly applies to the gist of intellectual and entrepreneurial labor throughout history. But this is not the main point here; the main point is Kantor's recognition of the fact that the purpose of entrepreneurial labor and part of its consequences are not entirely in the economic domain. This means that the notion of entrepreneurship in economic theories should and can be extended to encompass the socio-cultural context. In concrete terms, this may mean that economic analysts understand that not only what seems to be just economic enterprise may have consequences beyond economy, but that the intellectual labor at large, which is not targeted towards economic enterprises, may constitute a factor in the economy at least on two levels. The first is the idea-makers' direct activity in creating ideas convertible to options; the second is the general socio-cultural consequences of intellectual labor, which often play a part in creating the necessary environment, the milieu and the ambiance, that can enable entrepreneurship in the first place. On the other hand, it is also high time that the study of intellectuals be not confined only to students of the history of ideas.

7. Makers of life images

While both idea-making and entrepreneurial labor is manifest, more often than not, in explicit and direct ideas, the making of new options has also been carried out throughout history through images, metaphors, and the depiction of alternative, different, or new models of life.

Such semiotic products already emerged in writing at the dawn of historical times. While many of these products certainly have served the purpose of reinforcing socio-cultural control by promoting preferred interpretations of life circumstances, other turned out to be at odds with the prevailing preferences. Like many types of intellectual products, these images could then clash with the contemporary accepted options of life by possibly showing that there might be there some other possibilities. I am of course referring to the vast activity that is nowadays called "literature," and to the variety of texts we habitually refer to as poetry, fiction, and drama. It can easily be extended to similar and parallel media like motion pictures.

From the point of view of the subject I am discussing here, these products can be most adequately described as "life images." One of the major achievements of the so-called Russian semioticians – such as Lotman, Uspenskij or Ivanov – was their analysis of literature as a major contributor of "potential models of life." They have shown us the way to conceive of the literary activity as a major industry capable of providing tools for both understanding and operating in actual life. That is, products such as fiction and poetry texts provide not only explanations, justifications and motives, but also – or sometimes in the first place – plans (or "scripts") of action. The people who read or watch these products not only get from them conceptions and coherent images of what is supposed to be "reality," but can also extract from them practical instructions for daily behavior. Thus, the texts propose not only how to behave in particular cases, but how life should be organized: whether to execute, and in what ways, various options. For example, fall in love, eat profusely or scantily, get married, have children, work or avoid working, feel happy for dying for the fatherland.[6]

The validity of this function goes, of course, only up to a certain limit; as providing these tools cannot be taken to always be the major purpose of this industry, cases of complete misunderstanding have

---

[6] For a more detailed discussion, see "Dated Solutions" in this collection.

not been rare. Cervantes' *Don Quixote* and Flaubert's *Madame Bovary* are only two too famous examples of such *bona fide* misunderstandings. The same holds true of the status of the producers, who sometimes, in particular in more modern times, have been confused with idea-makers and accorded all the latters' privileges as well as hardships. It is because of some historical coincidence since the Italian renaissance, that the makers of life images have been identified throughout with intellectuals, and the latter with idea-makers-as-option-devisers. Like the case of philosophers and other thinkers who may or may not have functioned as idea-makers, so it is with the case of the makers of life images – writers, poets, painters, composers, film directors and others. It is our task to examine in each particular historical period whether their labor has produced such images that served as a source for ideas that could be converted to the creation of new or alternative options. However, even if these images may have served to only promote, encourage, make more practicable, or more understandable, the sometimes-abstract proposals of idea-makers and entrepreneurs, then their status and function as at least part-time generators of proliferation of options need be recognized, too.

In periods of great oppression, when intellectuals of various kinds often must either hide or go in exile, the makers of life images, lyrical poets and storytellers, who are not identified by the oppressor as dangerous, can still engage in their indirect activity of devising different options. Criticism against a ruler can still be expressed in disguise. In poems written for children on a crocodile, a flea, and cockroaches, all criminally oppressing society, the Russian poet Kornei Chukovski – to take one of thousand examples – could still hint that tyranny would not last forever, and that a brave new world may shine beyond the horizon. Many of the most vital national movements of the 19th and 20th centuries started with poetry as their only alternative for expressing new preferences. Often, the poets themselves, such as Rosalía de Castro of Spanish Galicia, have become symbols of those implicit ideas that only at a later stage would be formulated more expressedly and

compellingly by intellectuals or entrepreneurs. On the other hand, there are also many examples of poets and writers who have become active cultural entrepreneurs, often using the so-called symbolic capital they had accumulated through their imaginative writing as convertible assets towards efficient entrepreneurship.[7] This does not mean that such people have always escaped the fate of being put in jail even for what we would consider today humble suggestions for a different world. And the more colorful the person, the more likely is it to witness dramatic measures taken against him, as might illustrate the infamous case of Alexander Pushkin, whose killing in a duel was concocted and orchestrated by the tsar of Russia and his army's chief-of-staff (Jakobson 1975).

8. The industry of ideas, and who are those who assume roles therein

The aggregate of activities engaged by idea-makers, cultural entrepreneurs, and makers of life images can be conceived of, in view of its function and consequences for the life of individuals and groups, as an industry. I have argued that it is not some negligible, but a major industry, which I have claimed to be a pre-condition for societies to exist and be able to compete with other societies. It can be labeled "the industry of ideas for the proliferation of options." I would like to emphasize that, much because of the established historical images, clearly created and promoted by the various professional lobbies of intellectuals and artists, we tend to confuse people who may have assumed roles in some periods through specific types of activities, with those who still are carrying on with the same activities, but no longer function, nor create any consequences, for the cultural repertoire in terms of option proliferation. I may be taking a completely wrong direction here, but I believe that, similarly to any industry, if people go on producing ideas or taking initiatives without any consequences for

---

[7] On the role of literature in contributing to the making of entities, see Even-Zohar 1996.

success, then they no longer work within the industry, or that the industry they are engaged in does no longer produce effective products. I am referring to the simple situation where those who engage in those professions historically connected with intellectuals and cultural entrepreneurs may no longer be those who devise and generate the visions for new and alternative options. I would argue that they may still create a certain amount of "noise" which often leads to the creation of "general energy" without which a group may fall into various degrees of stagnation (cf. Even-Zohar 2000: 49), but they no longer contribute to success. Perhaps they even may belong to the forces that reject new options and abhor change.

It is therefore our task, as culture researchers, to try and trace down, in each particular group, and in each particular time, who are the people in the industry. We know that in the course of the 19th century, people engaged in talking about grammar and spelling of some language not yet in use, philologists and historians, philosophers and other thinkers, sometimes amateur scholars, have intensely participated in manufacturing new options, which indeed changed the state of affairs – and subsequently the lives of many individuals – in many territories and societies. This, however, does not make it an automatic matter to limit our observation to only this group of people, and their likes, in search of those who actually assume the roles today. Not only these may no longer be people in the so-called cultural industries – thinkers, philosophers, writers, artists – but they may hide somewhere far from the public eye, devising the new options or getting involved in enterprises that either gradually or dramatically change the lives of people, through completely different channels to those we have been able to witness or observe in the past. In such cases, the role of idea-makers and cultural entrepreneurs should more adequately be attributed to them than to those who simply perpetuate some established activities that were efficient in some near or distant past. In various countries, such as Catalonia, Scotland, or Iceland, where intellectuals certainly have led towards success during late 19th and early

20th centuries, it seems to be no longer the traditional type of idea-makers who created modern success. Some other, not yet fully or well identified small group of people, seem to have been functioning more recently as such crucial idea-makers and entrepreneurs.

9. **Perhaps the connection between the industry of ideas and success is most visible in those places where it hardly exists**

It is the combination of the presence of the industry in the successful cases and its absence in the less successful ones that can serve to support –at least as circumstantial evidence – the hypothesis of the necessity, or even indispensability, of the industry. In their book, *Living on the Edge*, Lawrence Felt and Peter Sinclair analyze the strategies of survival with the help of which communities in Newfoundland manage to carry on with their lives. They name the Newfoundlanders' ability to employ these strategies a "successful adaptation […] based on flexibility, substitution and co-operation" (Felt & Sinclair 1995: 210). The words of "a former fisher turned truck driver" describe this kind of life:

> What do I do for a living? I guess anything that comes along. I fished, worked in the woods, built the high school in plum point and been driving this truck for five years. Round here, you do whatever is available.

These heroic strategies for survival are definitely no success in the sense of option proliferation. When the existence is made possible only through maneuvering – as clever as it may be – between the few options that are available, we have a clear state of lack of success. It is my argument that the fact that idea-makers and cultural entrepreneurs have been very active in such a place as Iceland, while almost completely absent in such a place as Newfoundland, has been a decisive factor in the success versus the non-success of the otherwise very similar groups. It belongs to a different paper to try and explain in more details the Whats and the Whys of these particular societies, but they

certainly make us think that even incredible social solidarity of the kind described by felt and Sinclair is not a tool that can push a society towards a competitive better quality of living. And no state *Economic Recovery Commission*, such as headed by dr. Doug House (House 1999) in Newfoundland, even when its work is not obstructed by the local bureaucracy, can unfortunately alter that.

CULTURE PLANNING, COHESION, AND THE MAKING AND MAINTENANCE OF ENTITIES[1]

Abstract

Throughout history, deliberate initiatives have generated change in the life course of societies. Such initiatives, called in short "culture planning", in particular when carried out on an intensive scale, have frequently been tightly connected with actions for the creation or maintenance of groups, large and small. This paper attempts to illustrate the connections between the invention, codification, and diffusion of culture repertoires and the ability of groups, societies and nations to survive.

Introduction

Planning a culture is an instance of deliberate creation of new options for social and individual life. The generally accepted view is that such options somehow emerge and develop through the anonymous contributions of untold masses. These contributions are normally described as "spontaneous", i.e., as products, or by-products, of the very occurrence of human interaction. Items emerging under conditions of spontaneity are believed to be random. Moreover, the ways by which the items accumulate, get organized and develop into accepted repertoires are supposed to be the result of free negotiations between market forces. The complex mechanism through which, out of the free negotiation between these forces, certain groups adopt or reject specific repertoires is the chief question on the agenda of all the human and social sciences.

---

[1] This is a revised version of a paper delivered at the Dartmouth Colloquium, "The Making of Culture", Dartmouth College, 22-27 July 1994, with a followup presented to the seminar "Literatura Galega: ¿Literatura Nacional o Subalterna?" Mondoñedo, Galicia, 3-5 September 1994. Most important for a further advancement of this set of questions have been several contributions subsequently made by Gideon Toury (Toury 1999, 2001, 2002), who also applied various hypotheses for the field of Translation Studies, refining some and putting other to a typically thorough scrutiny. I have benefited a lot from his discussion of culture planning in revising this text for inclusions in the *Festschrift* in his honor (Even-Zohar 2008).

However, this view needs several modifications; not by eliminating the ideas of spontaneity and market negotiations, but by recognizing that these very negotiations may unavoidably lead to acts of planning. This happens because negotiations inherently result in selection – choosing between alternatives. Thus, once anybody, either an individual or a group, in whatever capacity, starts to act for the promotion of certain elements and for the suppression of other elements, "spontaneity" and "deliberate acts" are no longer unrelated types of activities. Any deliberate intervention to establish priorities in an extant set of possibilities (often discussed out-of-context as "codification", "standardization", or "legislation") must therefore be recognized as a basic instance of "planning". If, in addition to acting in favor of priorities, a given individual or a group not only supports but also is actively engaged in devising new options, then planning is unmistakably at work.

Why certain individuals or groups become engaged in culture planning, what they expect to achieve by it, and what practices they use, are among the questions I intend to deal with in the following.

Planning is a regular cultural procedure
If "planning" is conceived of as deliberate intervention in an extant or a crystallizing repertoire, then this brings us to my *first hypothesis*, namely that culture planning is a regular activity in the history of collective entities.

From the very dawn of history, a major preoccupation of groups and individuals in the context of social organization has been the introduction of order into what may have emerged as a disorderly set of options. That is, they have been engaged in continuously transforming non-structured *inventories* into structured *repertoires*. By the very act of such a structuration, new relations were established for extant categories. Through combination, analogy, and contrast, new components were introduced as well. Clearly, however, any such acts could not just stop at the level of introducing some order or priorities into an

extant, ready-made set, modifying it through whatever sorts of ma-
nipulation.

Culture planning definitely was at work, to judge by the evidence,
in the very first organized human group that documented itself, that
is the old Sumerian civilization in Mesopotamia. In this and subse-
quent phases of known human history, i.e. Akkad, Egypt, Babylonia,
and Assyria, the Hittite empire, and various other politically orga-
nized entities in the Fertile Crescent (such as Mari, Ebla, or Yamhad),
planning was kept in the hands of those few who held physical control
of the groups into whom they attempted to inculcate organized cul-
ture.

The conspicuous interest in culture planning expressed by rulers of
those entities is clear evidence of their awareness of the insufficiency
of sheer physical force for successful domination. The emergence of
centralized religious institutions and practices (in contradistinction,
perhaps, to local cults), we are told by historians, can best be explained
in terms of imparting social cohesion via cognitive allegiance through
persuasion. Clearly, by adhering to the same codified set of cults and
beliefs (anachronistically called religions), people were told what re-
ality was, and which options of what repertoires are available to them,
or indispensable for them. Students of ancient Egypt have suggested
an explanation for the enigmatic preoccupation with the burial mon-
uments known as pyramids. In their view, the whole enterprise was
dictated by the need to invent a common project for the population to
accept a certain repertoire of social order and individual identity. Even
in Assyria, whose disrepute was gained by cruelty and use of extreme
force, rulers displayed remarkable interest in promoting themselves
by propaganda (Tadmor 1981; 1986). Singing one's own praises for
having provided the good life to the people seems to have become a
cliché used by rulers on their inscriptions all around the Fertile Cres-
cent (Azitawadda of Karatepe and Kilamuwa of Sam'ál are two exam-
ples that come to mind).[2] And the early schools of Sumer, with the rich

---

[2] See "Intercultural competition over resources" above, note 9.

options they created in terms of writing systems and a textual canon, are the world's oldest prototype for education systems, academies, and canon-dictating institutions – all serving as the most readily available instruments for the implementation of desired or preferred repertoires.

In short, there is nothing modern in rulers taking deliberate action to create repertoires that would be accepted by at least part of the population under their domination. Nor is the recruitment to that end of people to undertake the planning.

It seems, however, that it is only in ancient Israel, and later in ancient Greece, that we first witness attempts carried out not by power-holders but by self-nominated persons removed from the circles of power to take upon themselves the task of offering alternative repertoires, or parts of such repertoires, and to publicly work for their acceptance, often in opposition to power. I am referring to the prophets in Israel who, defying both political and cultural rulers (the latter generally personified by the clergy), often by risking their own necks (the most famous case being that of Jeremiah), struggled for repertoire replacements. The same holds true of the Greek philosophers and other *literati*. Both groups can be seen not as agents hired to render services to demanding rulers but as archaic types of intellectuals. The absence of evidence about such individuals or groups in the other ancient societies (though glimpses of possible cognates do emerge, such as the case of Imhotep in 2630-2611 BC) does not necessarily prove that they did not exist, only that the evidence was not preserved, which by itself is not an insignificant piece of information about the relevant society.[3]

Since the beginnings of the modern age, towards the end of the 18th century, rulers and other power-holders have been more and more inclined (although not necessarily willingly) to resort to culture planning, making growing use of the repertoires provided, directly or in-

---

[3] See "Intellectuals in Antiquity" below for a further discussion.

directly, by culture producers. Culture planning has definitely accumulated vigor, intensity and momentum, having become a major factor in the shaping, reshaping, and maintaining of large entities.

The implementation of planning provides socio-cultural cohesion
The implementation of planning provides cohesion to either a factual or a potential entity. This is achieved by creating a spirit of allegiance among those who adhere to the repertoire thus introduced.

By "socio-cultural cohesion," I mean a state where a widespread sense of solidarity, or togetherness, exists among a group of people, which consequently does not require conduct enforced by power. I think the key concept for such cohesion is the mental disposition that propels people to act in many ways that otherwise would have been contrary to their "natural inclinations" and vital interests. Going to war prepared to be killed would be the ultimate case, amply repeated throughout human history. To create shared readiness on a fair number of issues is something that, although vital for any society, cannot be taken for granted. For example, no government can take for granted that people will obey "laws," whether written or not, unless people are successfully persuaded to do so. Obedience achieved by force or intimidation, applied by the military or the police, can be effective for a certain span of time. However, sooner or later such obedience will collapse, partly because few societies can afford to keep a large enough corps of law-enforcement agents.

Classical sociological thinking has recognized the powerful role of what they called "persuasion" for the "successful control" of a dominated population. As most succinctly put by Bartoli, these mechanisms consist

> Di persuasione alla conformità e di interiorizzazione di modelli culturali che la classe o I gruppi al potere ritengono necessari per I mantenimento dell'equilibrio del sistema sociale e che, in particolare nelle società fortemente stratificate, determinati altri gruppi o classi sociali pongono al centro di una strategia di organizzazione del

consenso attorno ai propri obiettivi e attorno alle proprie definizioni della realtà. (Bartoli 1981: 4)[4]

It is not easy to assess the level of cohesion in any society. However, it seems worthwhile to develop some clear categories for such assessments. These categories make it clear what we may mean by a "high level" – which in its turn can be re-translated to "success" from the point of view of planning – or a "low level," which in its turn can be re-translated to "failure." When, for example, territories are subjected to the domination of external powers, and the local population sticks to the repertoire with which it had crystallized as an entity, we may speak of a high level of cohesion. One could think of such cases as the Jews in roman Palestine, the Polish under the domination of Germany, Russia, and Austria, or the Icelanders under the domination of Denmark. On the other hand, we have evidence of low levels of cohesion in the seemingly rapid collapse and disappearance of the Assyrians as both a distinct organized entity and a group of identifiable individuals. This is an especially striking example because of Assyria's notorious *esprit de corps*, imparted by brutality and terror.

Cohesion is a necessary condition for the creation or survival of large entities

Socio-cultural cohesion may become a necessary condition for creating a new entity, and/or for the survival of an existing entity.

The large entities discussed here are social units such as "community," "tribe," "clan," "people," or "nation." They are not "natural" objects. They are formed by the acts of individuals, or small groups of people, who take initiatives and are successful in mobilizing the re-

---

[4] "Of persuasion to conformity and of internalization of the cultural models (patterns) that the dominating classes or groups deem necessary for maintaining the equilibrium of the social system and which, especially in highly stratified societies, certain other groups or social classes put in the center of a strategy of organizing the consensus about the appropriate objectives and the appropriate definitions of reality."

sources needed for the task. The most vital element among those re-
sources is a cultural repertoire that makes it possible for the endeav-
oring group to provide justification, contents and *raison-d'être* to the
separate and distinct existence of the entity.

Various methods can be observed for the creation of large entities,
especially those known as "nations", where we witness a search for a
repertoire suitable to support the existence of the entity and secure its
perpetuation. The most conspicuous seem to be the following:

(1) A group takes control of some territory by force and dominates
its inhabitants. If the enterprise is to hold, there is a chance that the
members of the controlling group will eventually realize that for the
maintenance and survival of the entity, they had better do something
to achieve cohesion. Many cases in history where a relative minority
invades or otherwise takes control over a majority territory would
provide good examples: the Franks in Gaul, the Swedes in Kievan Rus,
the Swabs and Visigoths in the Iberian Peninsula, or the Ostrogoths in
Italy.

(2) A group of individuals organize themselves and become en-
gaged in a power struggle to rid themselves of control they wish to
reject. Once they succeed, they may find themselves at sea vis-à-vis
the entity they created which, now that the struggle is over, may dis-
integrate for lack of cohesion. This may have been the case of Holland
after the so-called rebellion against Spanish rule. According to
Schama,

> The most extraordinary invention of a country that was to become fa-
> mous for its ingenuity was its own culture. From ingredients drawn
> from earlier incarnations, the Dutch created a fresh identity. Its man-
> ufacture was in response to what would otherwise have been an un-
> bearably negative legitimation: rebellion against royal authority. Un-
> like the venetians, whose historical mythology supplied a pedigree of
> immemorial antiquity and continuity, the dutch had committed them-
> selves irrevocably to a "cut" with their actual past, and were now

> obliged to reinvent it so as to close the wound and make the body politic whole once again. On a more pragmatic level, it was imperative that popular allegiance be mobilized exclusively in favor of the new fatherland. What was required of a northern netherlandish culture, then, was that it associate all those living within the frontiers of the new republic with a fresh common destiny, that it stigmatize the recent past as alien and unclean and rebaptize the future as patriotic and pristine. (Schama 1987: 67)

And further:

> Dutch patriotism was not the cause, but the consequence, of the revolt against spain. Irrespective of its invention after the fact, however, it rapidly became a powerful focus of allegiance to people who considered themselves fighting for heart and home. No matter that heart and home more obviously meant leiden and haarlem than some new abstraction of a union, the concept of a new patria undoubtedly gave comfort and hope to citizens who might otherwise have felt themselves desperately isolated as well as physically beleaguered. It is not surprising, then, to find that it was in the period of the great sieges of the 1570s that the first signs of national identity became visible on coins and medals. (Schama 1987: 69)

(3) An individual or a group engage in devising a repertoire to justify the establishment of an entity over a certain territory that does not necessarily overlap with their home territory. This is often connected with the successful so-called unification of different territories. The same method, however, can work in the opposite way, i.e. It can make it possible for a certain territory to secede fully or partly from a larger entity (Hechter 1992).

Conspicuous examples for the first type ("unification") may be the cases of both Germany and Italy, two states founded around almost the same time (1860-1870). In both cases, the work of planners preceded the actual political course. In Germany, as pointed out by an accidental observer, "Bismark hätte die politische Einheit nie schaffen können, wenn nicht vorher von unsern klassikern die geistige Einheit

begründet worden wäre" (Goldstein 1912: 20).[5] In Italy, if there had not been such a repertoire the tiny and in many minds ridiculous kingdom of Piedmont-Sardinia could not have succeeded in unifying the whole of the Italian peninsula including Sicily.

Examples of the second type (secession) are all cases of states and provinces created by separating from a larger state, such as Czechoslovakia after World War I, or Slovakia in 1993, or any of the "autonomous communities" of Spain, most conspicuously Catalonia and Galicia.

(4) a group that cannot survive, either culturally or physically, as an entity in one territory (where they may be a persecuted or an underprivileged minority) emigrates to some other territory and there puts to use the repertoire they could not implement in their home country. This could apply to the emigration of the Nordic groups who founded Iceland in the 9th century, or the English puritans' emigration to New England, or the emigration of Jews to Palestine towards the end of the 19th century.[6]

In all of the varieties of the emergence and crystallization of entities, it thus becomes apparent, whatever the pace, that the maintenance of an entity over time is certainly a primary concern for those who are interested in its existence. The larger the entity, the greater the difficulty in maintaining it without some consent of its members. (For more about consent see Dodd 1986, esp. p. 2.)

The more consent is achieved through cohesion, the more this interest will become a concern of larger numbers of individuals. If not achieved, or not even attempted, it will naturally remain an interest of the very privileged few, who may be the only ones drawing benefits from the existence of the entity. This may nevertheless endanger the

---

[5] "Bismarck would have never been able to create the political unity, had our Classical writers not founded prior to it the spiritual unity."

[6] About culture planning in British-ruled Palestine, see Even-Zohar 1990b.

survival of the entity in the long run and put in peril the vested interests of the privileged group itself.

By *collapse* I do not necessarily mean the physical disappearance of a collective of individuals, although such an event may also follow violent shifts in power. The examples of such events are too numerous and too obvious to quote. Rather, what I mean is the termination, whether permanent or temporary, of the separately identifiable entity qua entity. This involves the adoption by the relevant individuals of a different repertoire, which they can no longer use to identify themselves as "distinct" from all the others. (See Diamond 2005 for an extensive discussion of cases of collapse.)

Planning needs a power base
What thus matters for planning are its prospects of being successfully implemented. Accordingly, planners must have the power, get the power, or obtain the endorsement of those who possess power.

The purpose of this hypothesis, trivial and self-evident as it may seem, is to draw attention to the fact, often neglected in both the humanities and the social sciences, that to be engaged with repertoire production *per se* is only a necessary condition for a desired planning to be implemented.

Power can be achieved on various levels, and is by no means a simple notion in relation to culture producers. Often the engagement of intellectuals with repertoire production seems to be nothing else than sheer sport. With the emergence of self-nominated producers, i.e. those whose services are not engaged by power-holders, the products they deliver may not reach more than a limited circle. People who produce texts in a language that is not acceptable to the dominating groups, or who invent or re-invent the language involved, or become engaged in long and infinite discussions about the desired nature of the entity about which they may be dreaming, or about the nature of the members who will be born in that entity, or the kind of lifestyle which will replace the current one, and so on – may all look pitiable

and pathetic to their contemporaries, who may regard what they do as wasting life on futile endeavors. However, once the product gets somehow to market, a larger circle may be created to eventually become the power base needed for action that will introduce the desired shifts. The situation then may change dramatically, transforming the erstwhile helpless culture producers into powerful agents.

A planning activity that may develop into a full-scale endeavor for repertoire replacement can start with seemingly harmless products. Indeed, many new entities can trace their roots to such products, be they epics allegedly written down from the mouths of villagers in the primordial forests of Karelia (I am thinking of course of the Finnish *Kalevala*) or lyrics written in a no longer prestigious language by a fragile woman living in half-seclusion in Santiago de Compostela (i am referring of course to Rosalía de Castro). The epic in Finland, like the lyrics of Rosalía, became cornerstones for new repertoires that impart a different sort of cohesion. In Spanish Galicia , the small circle including Rosalía and especially her husband Manuel Martínez Murguía organized the innocent *Xogos florais* (a poetry competition; literally: floral games), the first of which was held in La Coruña in 1861. This created the public channel for the new options to be offered to the potential market.[7] in Italy before unification, Verdi's operas must have served a similar role, with libretti censored when their text seemed too dangerous to the contemporary rulers. Incidentally, Verdi's very name has become politically subversive as it was punningly interpreted as an acronym for the phrase "Viva Emmanuele Re Di Italia" (long live Emmanuel, King of Italy).

The *Xogos florais*, and a variety of associations and societies bearing such harmless names as "language brotherhoods" (*Irmandades da fala*

---

[7] For the sake of precision, however, it should be noted that the *Xogos florais* of Galicia followed the Catalan *Jocs Florals* of 1859, which in their turn followed the tradition of the *Jeux floraux* of Occitania (Languedoc, Provence), which have never led to any success faintly similar to those of Catalonia and Galicia. The *Jocs florals* of Barcelona are still held as an annual poetry festival.

in Galicia) or "literary societies" (the Icelandic *Hið íslenska bók-menntafélag* in Copenhagen), are often the primary, or even crude, instruments for creating power bases for the implementation of culture planning. Although they may eventually develop into full-scale political bodies such as parties and mass organizations, I cannot think of any case where their endeavors have made real progress until coupled with either actual or potential holders of power. Culture planning could have been carried out for who knows how long by the Italian culture entrepreneurs without reaching their goal, which was to create a new Italy and new Italians – not only politically disengaged from the Austrians and the Spaniards, but also positively following a new set of directives for life. It was the coupling of their aspirations with the political ambitions of the prime minister of Piedmont, Count Cavour, that made it all possible, almost suddenly. Hopeless ideas, like the revival of the Italian literary language, could at last start with the establishment of the Italian state. Similarly, more than a hundred years of the lingering venture to create a unique Galician entity did not bring about the same result as did some seven or ten years of local government. Although belatedly, that government did "discover", as it were, that it could successfully make use of the rich repertoire already created, most particularly the rejuvenated Galician language and its by-products, to provide optimal justification for the political identity of Galicia, needed to secure the continuation of its autonomy.

Effective planning may become an interest of an entity
Numerous studies show that power-holders and planners may both acquire, through successful implementation, the domination, or control, of a given entity. To return to Bartoli's formulation, which I find representative of the socio-historical tradition, such domination is the ultimate goal and purpose of the enterprise of culture planning from the point of view of power-holders. Obviously, the latter wish to reinforce their positions by making an accommodating repertoire acceptable to larger sections of the population, while culture producers may

turn into power-holders through the acceptance of their products, or obtain the support of those already in power. In any of the possible consequences of a successful implementation of planning, both may profit.

This type of analysis makes perfect sense for quite a few cases: at least one can hardly find a trace of other conspicuous interests in those cases. For an agglomerate of individuals inhabiting some territory, the benefits of establishing an organization that is larger than their own immediate environment are not at all self-evident. On the contrary, such an organization may even constitute a threat to their liberties and force upon them unwelcome burdens.

It is only when there is awareness that there may be profits from the founding of a large organization, or when there is awareness that losses will be incurred without it, that people may display passive or active consent. This does not mean that in practice, everyone then gives a hand to those who take it upon themselves to carry the load of the enterprise, but it definitely allows the latter to carry on with fewer impediments.

No wonder, therefore, that in suggesting an alternative repertoire the propagators often refer to matters such as discrimination or humiliation which, it is then claimed, can be cured only if a current repertoire is overthrown. For example, if those who dominate us mock us and discriminate against us because we have not mastered the language they master best, then an alternative can be found, that is, to use "our own language" instead. This "own language" is often presented as a natural resource, equally and painlessly accessible to members of the addressed group. In fact, this is hardly ever the case, since more often than not the language must be rehashed from some non-standardized state, thus losing its immediacy for the targeted speakers. In many other cases (for instance, Italian), the language is not anyone's actual language at all. The same holds for any other possible items of a repertoire such as daily customs, dress and food, interaction routines, and so on. However, in all cases, whether painlessly accessible

or acquired by learning, what counts is not the real state of the alternative repertoire as "native" or "indigenous", but its ability to function as dissimilar to the current options. If a different repertoire can provide the options otherwise barred, then persuasion is undoubtedly looming.

The same factors certainly apply to the much more clearly institutionalized state where an entity is already well established. In such cases, we can expect some higher degree of socio-cultural cohesion, which makes the members of the entity prone to resist undesired repertoires whose imposition upon them is attempted. In such cases it makes perfect sense to argue that resistance to an alien repertoire, or an interest in promoting home repertoires, should become a common sentiment, if not well-spread awareness, among the members of the entity. It is indeed their only way to survive as an entity, a status through which their privileges are guaranteed.

Naturally, there is a lot of room here to discuss to what extent this awareness is a consequence of actual privileges enjoyed by people, or of manipulatively successful inculcation, i.e. an effective persuasion carried out by agents of the power-holders. I would like to contend that this is a matter of interpretation for each particular case. I would hasten to reject any one-sided or biased analysis: (a) the one that may fall into a romanticizing trap, describing such involvements as supported by all members of the community who, devoted to the cause, as it were, are said to have realized how much their deepest "values" are at stake, and (b) the one that analyses the enterprise as a basically cynical machination whose only goal is to bring profits to the exploiters of common credulity.

Market factors do not easily accommodate themselves to new repertoires
Since, by definition, the implementation of culture planning entails the introduction of change into a current state of affairs, the prospects of success also depend on an effective utilization of market conditions.

The chance for the planning to be frustrated may therefore be constantly expected. In addition, where resisting forces are strong, failure – either partial or complete – may ensue.

The "market" is the aggregate of factors involved in the selling and buying of products and with the promotion of types of consumption. This includes all factors participating in the symbolic exchange involving such transactions, and with other linked activities (Bourdieu 1971). It may well be that the aggregate of the culture institution tries to direct and dictate the types of consumption, and establish the values of the various items of production. However, in the socio-cultural reality, factors of the cultural institution and those of the market may naturally intersect in the same space: for instance, literary "salons" are both institutions and markets. Yet the specific agents playing the role of either an institution or a market, i.e. either marketers or marketees, may not overlap at all. A regular school, for instance, is a branch of "the institution" in view of its ability to sell the type of properties that the dominating establishment (i.e. the central part of the cultural institution) wishes to sell to students. Teachers actually function as marketing agents. The marketees, who willy-nilly become some sort of consumers, are the students. The facilities, including the built-in interaction patterns, which are made available by the school, actually constitute the market *strictu sensu*. However, all of these factors together may, for the sake of a closer analysis, be viewed as the "market".

The implementation of culture planning is therefore obviously a matter of successful marketing carried out among other means by propaganda and advertising. It can be argued that this might be a simplification, since one's willingness to buy a certain merchandise does not necessarily organize one's life in the sense that a culture repertoire does; that is, products do not dictate one's view of reality and, hence, all behavioral components derivable from it. I do not support this argument, because there seems to be considerable agreement regarding the role of modern consumption in the view of reality held by the members of the so-called consumer society. The distinguishing line

between various modes of inculcation lies elsewhere, namely, not in the profundity and weight, as it were, of the products that are promoted, but in their degree of internalization.

As we know, the inculcation of a repertoire can only *appear to be* successful. People may accept it either because there is no alternative, that is, if it is imposed, or because the surrounding milieu requires it, or because this was the only option with which they were raised. Public adherence to such a repertoire renders obvious profits, such as becoming a member of the communist party in the U.S.S.R, or one exonerated from being deported to gulags. If this entails negation of divinity, any overt practices of religion may be wiped out from the life of people. However, on the morrow of the collapse of the old U.S.S.R, young people in post-communist Russia who may have had no apparent previous access to religious cults eagerly embraced the Orthodox religion, an alternative cultural repertoire completely contrary to their whole way of upbringing.

Let me reiterate that for a repertoire to be wiped out and replaced by another there need not be a repertoire shift within the same societal group. If a position shift occurs within society, whereby the group adhering to one repertoire is pushed towards the periphery of the overall structure of society, the repertoire may lose its primary position. Such processes are prevalent in any society, a hypothesis that reminds us to admit that if we accept the market hypothesis, then any established products are always at risk of overthrow by contenders. In culture, such contenders may be those who were defeated in some previous round. If we accept the polysystem idea (Even-Zohar 1979, 1990), then any time we allow ourselves to observe some "new phase" in a system, what we are actually observing – as was long ago clearly hypothesized by Tynjanov (1929) – is the success of some new repertoire in pushing its way to the center. This success does not necessarily obliterate the older repertoire: it may only dethrone it. The defeated may at that moment be too weak to frustrate successful implementation of

the new repertoire, but they may grow strong enough in time to have such an attempt.

I would therefore like to stress that we are too often tempted, for the sake of elegance of description, to accept neatly finalized states. In matters of culture planning, as with all matters of culture analysis, neat states are only temporary, and even then visible at only some sector of the overall network of relations we call "society" or "culture". Accordingly, at the very moment when a given enterprise, the implementation of a certain repertoire fought for by dedicated individuals, has reached its peak, it may already be on its way towards disintegration and irrelevance for the emerging new circumstances, those which would call for another, different repertoire.

The consequences of failure of culture planning are not the entity's collapse, but a creation of energy

When partial or complete failure ensues, planning and the activities it engenders do not necessarily create negative consequences for the welfare of the entity involved, although it may of course be detrimental for the particular persons involved with the planning.

I contend that where a planning activity has taken place, regardless of the consequences, the relevant entity – or the agglomerate of people – may have achieved improvement of life, although not necessarily according to the planners' design or in terms of satisfying the goals and ambitions of their partners in power. Moreover, I am more and more convinced that for the maintenance of any such socio-cultural human entity, the planning activity *per se* eventually creates motion of some scale, an enhancement of vitality which makes it possible for the entity involved to access options from which it may have been previously barred. I suggest the term "energy" to cover this bundle of events, at least until a better term is found.

It can be argued of course that the engagement with planning is a result of energy rather than the other way around. Where there is social action, people also write texts and develop ideas, and engage very

energetically in creating and implementing new repertoires. However, in all of the cases that served as input for my culture planning hypotheses, the engagement with planning began at a very low state in the welfare of the population. This does not mean that they all were equally humiliated or terribly underprivileged, but that they all had less access to resources than did others, or at least so it seemed from their own point of view. For example, in comparison with France and England, the 18th and 19th-century German provinces had inferior possibilities. Similarly, provinces such as 19th-century Galicia had not become out-of-the-way localities because of their geographical position on the Iberian Peninsula. On the contrary, Galicia was the first developed roman province on the peninsula, and it kept its primary position almost until the political unity of Castile and Aragon in the second half of the 15th century. Its decline was a consequence of a deliberate policy of ostracism by the central government. The slow and non-coordinated steps towards a reinvention of Galicia , carried out throughout the 19th century, became the only chance for the province to establish itself as an entity with a proper culture that would allow it not to be confined only to options that are available and permissible in the center. After all, this is a nutshell a definition of the relations between "periphery" and "center": a periphery is allowed only to follow what is already available in the center, while the center is free to offer new options daily. What I have come to label "energy" allows a certain agglomerate of people, or an entity already established to some extent, to take on the privileges of a center. By doing so, local welfare increases remarkably. In contrast, if nothing is done, the place is often doomed to a peripheral state.

It is not always a simple question to determine when the results of some enterprise of planning are to be considered a success or a failure. One of the reasons for this is that for the planners and entrepreneurs, the content of a repertoire may eventually become more important than the purpose of that repertoire as described by its propagators. For example, if reintroducing the Galician or the Italian language became

a *sine qua non* for the respective so-called "revival movements", then the potential failure of Galician at a time when the ultimate goals of the Galician entity may have reached their peak, might be disappointing for those who had attached their worldview and self-identity to the language, although what the language was meant to serve was to improve, not worsen, as might have been the results, the chances of people to better their access to social, political and economic resources.

The reason for such – perhaps sad – occurrences lies in the very nature of the planning enterprise. Once planners and power-holders begin to collaborate, it may take only a short time for the enterprise to advance quickly. However, if planners must create a power base and toil for the creation of a repertoire that will appear attractive enough to entice power-holders, then the span of time between planning and its outcomes may be long, sometimes over a century, as is the Galician case. In such cases, the alternative planned repertoire, designed under the initial conditions and thus fitted with solutions relevant to those conditions, may already be cruelly dated by the time of implementation. For example, if it still seemed possible, three decades ago, to pull the Galician population from its misery by legitimizing what one called "its own language", it has since dawned upon many modern Galicians that if they confine themselves to this, the now fully legitimized official Galician language, they are more likely to make losses than gains. The results are that while you see the language on all the public signs on roads and buildings, and on all bureaucratic forms, schoolchildren and their Galician-speaking parents are more and more inclined to prefer Castilian, a language described in the Galician patrimony as the source of all evil.[8] Without the language as a central ingredient in the new Galician repertoire, one undoubtedly could not have achieved the current socio-political success of Galicia. However, with the language as a major vehicle of socio-cultural interaction, Galicia may be doomed to backwardness. In spite of all that, without the

---

[8] For data and analysis, see Fernández Rodríguez & Rodríguez Neira 1994, 1995, 1996. The current situation is described and analyzed by Beswick 2002 and O'Rourke 2003.

conflicts about this and other components of repertoire, Galicia would have definitely created no energy. This conflict of interests is in itself a generator of energy, as painful as it may be for the individuals involved.

CULTURE PLANNING AND CULTURAL RESISTANCE IN THE MAKING AND MAINTAINING OF ENTITIES[1]

Abstract

This paper suggests that we discuss the prospects of culture planning – that is, its chances for failure or success – as constrained by both collective and individual possibilities of accessing resources and exercising mobility which it offers to the targeted group. The paper maintains that resistance to culture planning may grow when the targeted, or affected, populations cannot increase their socio-cultural wealth in adopting the proposed new repertoire of options. In such situations, a whole range of alternative repertoires may be propagated in replacement. This does not necessarily mean that culture planning has been a failure, if sufficient energy is produced to create more options for access to resources.

Culture planning and the making of entities

Since antiquity, but definitely with augmented vigor since the 18th Century, culture planning has become a major factor in the making, re-making, and maintaining of collective entities. In this process, the role of "free agents," mostly people without direct access to power, has become more and more decisive. The entities referred to here, i.e., such social units as "people", or "nation", are not "natural" objects. They are formed by the acts of individuals, or small groups of people, who take initiative and are successful in mobilizing the resources needed for the task. The most vital element among those resources is a cultural repertoire that makes it possible for the endeavoring group to provide not only effective models, but also justification to the (separate and distinct) existence of the entity.

---

[1] Based on paper delivered at the International Workshop, "Relocation of Languages and Cultures," Duke University, May 6-11, 1997, subsequently published as Even-Zohar 2002.

The "making" of units is manifest on the socio-political level in a variety of ways, and on various levels:

(1) New units are created where they did not exist as such before. Examples: Germany (by unification of various other units, 1870), Italy (same, 1860), Norway (by secession, 1905), Yugoslavia (same, 1918), Israel (by partition, 1948). Each of these cases has had a different history, but what they all share in common is the more or less intensive cultural planning work that not only preceded and accompanied their making, but also partly – if not primarily – made it possible in the first place.

(2) Extant units gained more cohesion. Example: France, Sweden (throughout the 19th and 20th Centuries).

While the most conspicuous cases are those of nations and states, there is no reason to restrict this concept to them alone. Rather, making may refer to any initiatives taken in order to create a social formation on whatever scale. Such processes are universal, but at some periods thus may be more vigorous on the larger scale than in other periods. For example, during the 19th and the 20th centuries, the option for making large entities has been more forceful than for several centuries before.

Re-making and maintaining

By "re-making" I refer to all of those cases where political, social, and cultural entities have been transformed in some way and eventually are re-made, or re-constructed, via deliberate endeavors. Cases that belong here may include entities that had lost their separate ("independent") existence (such as Poland before 1914), or have adapted themselves to an exogenous repertoire thus altering their erstwhile culture (such as Finland until the late 19th Century). In all of these cases, for re-making the entity, efforts were invested in making, or re-making, the necessary repertoire for augmenting the level of belonging and affinity of the population to the made entity.

Among the indispensable ingredients of any made repertoire there is normally an established subset with the help of which the group's distinct entity is demarcated. This marked subset is perceived as creating a collective as well as individual identity. For both made, re-made, and maintained entities, this subset becomes a major vehicle for the making and preservation of the entity.

Cultural labor as a source of energy

I contend that where a planning activity takes place, regardless of the consequences, the relevant entity – or the agglomerate of people who form it – may have achieved better access to resources, which means an improvement of their standard of life. Moreover, from the point of view of the maintenance of any collective human entity, the labor involved with the making of repertoires is in itself an advantage because it eventually creates motion of some scale, i.e., a socio-cultural energy. This alone increases the chance that members of this entity may attain access to options from which they have been previously deprived or barred.

It can, of course, be argued that the engagement with cultural labor is a result of energy rather than the other way around. Wherever there is social action, people react to and reflect on it. They may also write texts and develop ideas, and thereby contribute very lively to creating new repertoires.

However, in all of the cases which served as input for my work on culture planning, one could clearly observe that preoccupation with planning began at a very low state in the welfare of a population. This does not mean that they all were equally humiliated or underprivileged, but that they all had less access to resources than what were their expectations.

Energy and wealth

1 would like to propose the use of the term "wealth" for the relation between socio-cultural energy and the accessibility of resources, first

and foremost on the level of the collective, but in a more detailed analysis also on the level of individuals. As a rule, wealth in economic theories must eventually be manifest in such parameters as GNP. While this parameter is not irrelevant to the concept of wealth suggested here, the decisive concept in my approach is the access to resources on a more encompassing level. I am thinking of Bourdieu's notion of cultural capital which may be enlarged to apply to entities as wholes, in addition to its validity for the life of individuals. That such capitals may eventually surface in terms of GNP, as well as in material wealth of individuals and defined groups, goes without saying. The point is here, however, to get relatively liberated from this restrictive view in order to allow for other, less technical parameters of wealth, such as the positions that can be acquired, mutual aid between members of the collective, the scope of allowed activities, the sense of self-confidence, access to enterprising options, and more.

Success and failure of initiated repertoires

Planned repertoires may succeed, wholly or partly. It is not a simple task to determine when the results of repertoire making is to be considered a success or a failure. Often, what seems to be a failure in the eyes of the people involved with the enterprise appears to be a success in terms of its effectiveness in the long run. One of the reasons for this discrepancy is that for the entrepreneurs, the content of a repertoire may have become – throughout the years dedicated to its making and distribution – more important than the function of that repertoire for what was described as its ultimate goal.

For example, if re-introducing a language is considered a *sine qua non* for the making, or re-making of an entity, then in a case where this language does not prevail in the successfully made entity, this will be considered a disappointment for those who attached their worldview and self-identity to the language. The fact that their initiatives may have created real energy will then be no consolation at all.

The reason for such – perhaps pathetic – occurrences lies in the very nature of the cultural enterprise. Success of a cultural enterprise may be achieved in a short time once culture entrepreneurs and holders of power begin to collaborate. However, if repertoire makers must create a power base and persevere for making their labor attractive enough to entice power holders, then the span of time between labor and its outcomes may be long, sometimes over a century. In such cases, the advocated alternative repertoire, designed under the initial conditions and thus fitted with solutions relevant to those conditions, by the time of implementation may already be cruelly dated.

Resistance to planned repertoire

A partial success, or failure, means that some – or even major – bulks of the made repertoire(s) fail to be accepted and implemented by the targeted group. Among the crucial factors that determine the rate of success in the targeted group 1 would like to point out cultural resistance, both passive and active.

Any kind of resistance is a form of unwillingness towards the advocated, or inculcated, repertoire. I am not referring here to what Pujol (1979: 35) calls "[la] non-participation ouvrière aux institutions socio-culturelles," where "institutions" denote organized activities in the restricted sense only, e.g., "the arts." I am referring to a much wider repertoire, covering the wide range of organizing tools from daily habits to the image-of-the-self.

With *a passive resistance*, people do not engage themselves with working covertly against the new options. They simply ignore them. If they cannot avoid the options proposed for – or already current in – the public domain, they at least can avoid those meant for the homes.

For example, people may learn to speak a language in public, but do not necessarily make it their home vernacular. (In Italy, for example, it has taken almost over a century for Italian to become a domestic language. [De Mauro 1984: xvii]).

With *an active resistance*, people do more than avoidance. They may engage themselves in a more or less overt and straightforward struggle against the planned repertoire. This may take place at any stage of the active endeavors to implement the planned repertoire, i.e., while implemented, or when implementation seems to have been fully done.

The problem of resistance

Resistance seems to need no explanation when repertoire is imposed by force, as means of political action, against the explicit culture of the targeted population. Throughout history, people resisted conversion, reforms pertaining to beliefs and time-honored habits. Under totalitarian regimes, people often kept their culture concealed from the public eye, but returned to practicing it the moment it became feasible. In all of these cases, cultural resistance may be only a form of an overt political resistance.

However, what may be puzzling in understanding cultural resistance are all of those cases where a seemingly common cause has been served by culture planning, or at least where culture planning appears as coinciding with the interests of the targeted group. In such cases, the self-image of the concerned entity, and the ensuing official history written by the advocators of the endeavor, do not recognize any such prospective unwillingness. The parameters of such cultural resistance may not be complicated or enigmatic at all, but to the best of my knowledge, they have not been sufficiently discussed, certainly not in the context of culture planning.

Resistance and access to resources

I would like to contend, fully aware of the crudeness of this hypothesis, that it would be necessary for all of these cases of cultural resistance to understand the conditions and terms of access to resources prevailing in the relevant society.

For example, the working class in France refuse to participate not only in the "socio-cultural institutions" of the dominant bourgeoisie, like the theater and literature. They also refuse to eat, talk, drink, marry, walk and wash like them, as so amply demonstrated by a host of researchers (most conspicuously, of course, by Bourdieu 1984 [originally 1979]). This seems to take place partly because, as suggested by Pujol (1979) and Swidler (1986), acquiring a different repertoire is painful and risky. That is, it is not an easy learning, especially when one is from the outset unequal to others, who may already be more familiar with the new repertoire. But this also makes it clear that people know that even if they try to learn the alternate repertoire, they will not be able to master it with the same ease as others, and hence would have little to gain by it.

Cases of culture planning coupled with unestablished entities seem to be different

In these cases, such as Italy, Germany, Iberian Galicia, Norway, or Israel (to name just a few), the very rationale for making new repertoires, as propagated by their advocators, was to achieve improvement of life for the targeted collective. Theoretically, none of the people in the targeted group had any advantageous position vis-a-vis the new repertoire, and hence its acquisition was to be open to everybody on equal terms. The skepticism and sense of discrimination usually involved with the adoption of a repertoire of a dominant group (as is the case of the French working class) are not present, as it were, in these cases.

In view of the current situation in most of the cases mentioned above, this assumption seems to be a fallacy. It is true that for a short span of time, everybody can adhere to the new repertoire and gain better position and access to better life if the new entity succeeds in getting established and maintained. However, the distribution of the triumphant repertoire has not, and cannot, be even among the population. If, as a result of the triumph of the repertoire, the endeavors

towards its continued implementation decrease (because it may be believed that it has been fully accepted), all those members of the entity who never really adhered to the enterprise, or begin to feel unable to learn the new repertoire, or begin to identify the repertoire with discrimination, may develop ever growing resistance. The situation that emerges can be summarized to be one where either for lack of learning or competing ability, the planned, new repertoire does not lead to a successful access to resources.

Resistance in Spanish Galicia
In the Galician case, the adoption of the refurbished Galician language by the masses in contemporary autonomous Galicia seems to be perceived as disadvantageous. Today, it seems that only those members of the entity who have acquired satisfactory proficiency in Castilian are prone to adopt and advocate the new Galician. As matters stand now, it seems that the majority of the Galicians who are in the process of urbanization do not encourage their children to use the new Galician. Rather, it is with mastering Castilian that access to resources appears to be more promising even in the framework of the by now separate Galician entity. If this observation is correct (it still needs to be supported by more research), then what has been a most crucial item in the new Galician repertoire, one which has been a flag for the Galician enterprise, may disappear in the course of a few decades to be fully replaced by a language which up to a certain point was identified with oppression and disadvantage.

Resistance in Israel
In Israel, a quite radically invented repertoire managed to establish itself by 1948. The masses of ensuing immigrants, however, needed some forty years to bring their resistance to this repertoire to a level of overt cultural struggle, involved with political repercussion of quite a large scale.

In this case, the Hebrew language, an essential part of the new repertoire, which was beginning to return to be a living vernacular towards the end of the 19th Century in Ottoman Palestine, has been a tremendous success. In contradistinction to the Galician case, there has been no other language capable of replacing it. However, many other ingredients of the new repertoire are now becoming more and more questionable. Be the level one chooses to discuss "high" (such as "identity" and "self-image"), or "low" (such as food, drink, and mobility habits), there will be one segment defending one repertoire, and another defending a different one, with little ability to compromise. Again, if this observation is correct, then either a state of multi-culturalism is eventually accepted, or a bitter *Kulturkampf* will endanger the whole entity[2].

Summing up

It is definitely not my contention that the questions of access to resources and mobility are the magic clue to understanding cultural resistance and, on a more general level, the chances of any particular culture planning to succeed. But it seems that the analysis of resistance in the context of culture planning and the making of entities provides better explanations for the function of this cultural procedure than the discussion of the ideas involved with the propagation of repertoire, the nature of the ingredients involved, or the abstract prospects of models of collective figurations, such as small communities or nations.

---

[2] The situation since 2002, when these lines were drafted, has become much more acute in 2023. Disintegration and civil revolt is almost imminent.

THE MARKET OF COLLECTIVE IDENTITIES AND LEGACY WORK[1]

Abstract

'Legacy work' may refer to two aspects of identity work, namely the creation of cohesion and the display of valuable goods. There is a steady ebb and flow movement in respect to which aspect of the identity work, and the creation of legacies as part of it, dominates in different points of time. Identity policy, the deliberate inculcation of a cluster of elements as inherently representative of a group, has been an indispensable procedure for group management since time immemorial. However, in established countries, those which no longer have to legitimize their existence or justify the value of their legacies, legacy work is already often currently detached from identity work, serving the purpose of reinforcing the value of the assets on display for sale. On the other hand, what seems to be a stable situation may quickly change once people in a group sense a threat to their established identity. When this occurs, indifference makes room for heated engagement and conflictual states.

Identity policy, the deliberate inculcation of a cluster of elements as inherently representative of a group, has been an indispensable procedure for group management since time immemorial.[2] Dominant forces have been using quite consistently this procedure to rule efficiently. When this policy is successful, optimally every single member of the group takes that cluster of elements as their personal property. The group would then reject, individually and collectively, attempts at eliminating elements from the cluster, whether initiated from within or from without. Being in possession of a collective identity has

---

[1] Based on paper delivered at The Second Ibn Battuta symposium on Cultural Heritage and Identity Politics, Wageningen University, the Netherlands, 11 October 2010, and subsequently published in During 2011: 31-37. I am grateful to Rakefet Sela-Sheffy for her invaluable suggestions and comments.

[2] For an extensive discussion of deliberate culture planning, see "Culture Planning" above.

evidently been a primary condition not only for keeping a group together, but also for legitimizing its existence as a separate entity, which allows it privileges and distinction from other groups: '[…] the Egyptians might not eat bread with the Hebrews; for that is an abomination unto the Egyptians' (Genesis 43: 32; KJV version).

An illustration for such a collective commitment was recently provided by the controversy over the crucifix in school classrooms in Italy. A lawsuit was brought to the European court of human rights in Strasbourg by an Italian citizen of Finnish origin and others,[3] who maintained that,

> …the presence of crucifixes in state-school classrooms in Italy, […] [is] incompatible with the obligation on the state, in the exercise of the functions which it assumed in relation to education and to teaching, to respect the right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in accordance with their own religious and philosophical convictions. (Press release by the registrar of the court, no. 234, 18/03/2011).

The court ruled against the plaintiffs, thus confirming that Christianity is an indispensable component of the European identity. Italy's foreign minister, franco frattini, is quoted to have said: 'Oggi ha vinto il sentimento popolare dell'europa. Perchè la decisione interpreta soprattutto la voce dei cittadini in difesa dei propri valori e della propria identità' (*Corriere della Sera*, 18/03/2011).[4] In the Vatican, reported *El Pais*, 'el presidente del pontificio consejo para la cultura del vaticano, el cardenal Gianfranco Ravasi, […] ha recordado que "si Europa pierde la herencia cristiana" pierde también "su propio rostro"'

---

[3] Lautsi and Others vs. Italy (application no. 30814/06).

[4] 'Today has won the popular sentiment of Europe; because the decision interprets above all the voice of the citizens in defense of their proper values and their proper identity.'

(Miguel Mora, *El Pais*, 18/03/2011).[5] this crucifix controversy is probably only the tip of the iceberg in nowadays conflicts within the European union countries over who owns the culture, namely who has got the right to tell whom what to do. Certainly, the reluctance to accept countries with predominantly non-Christian population has been a major cause for not accepting such a country as turkey as a member.

Similarly, refusing secession for a group is also frequently based on the belief that the group seeking secession has no legitimate claim for a distinct identity. The slogan used by the Quebec separatists, 'nous sommes différents', amply vociferated during the 1995 referendum campaign by Quebec's premier Jacques Parizeau, was rejected by the Anglophone members of the confederation. In a meeting held on October 9, 1991, Parizeau said:

> Eux [the anglophones] ont défini leur pays (sur la charte canadienne des droits, laquelle est devenue […] le symbole de l'identité canadienne). Nous sommes en train d'en définir un autre. Cela ne nous rend pas moins démocrates pour autant. […]. Cela nous rend différents (Parizeau 1997: 237-238)[6].

"Being different," that is having a different culture, and consequently a different identity, has thus been the major argument for justifying the separation of Quebec, or any other group for that matter in history, ancient or modern.

It is thus evident that the endeavors invested in the making, inculcation and declaration of a cluster of elements, which constitute a group's identity, has always had a double function: to achieve group cohesion as well as distinction on the basis of recognized assets.

---

[5] 'The president of the Pontifical Council for Culture in the Vatican, Cardinal Gianfranco Ravasi, […] has maintained that 'if Europe loses the Christian heritage' it'll also lose "its proper face".'

[6] 'They [the Anglophones] have defined their country (on the Canadian Charter of Rights [and Freedoms], which has become […] the symbol of Canadian identity). We are in the course of defining another one. This does not make us less democratic as such. […] This makes us different.'

Achieving group cohesion, and the creation of a sense of belonging, may entail demands for group loyalty and sacrifices from the group members. Without such individual dispositions, there can be no group agreements that are a fundamental condition for maintaining life among human beings. While in many periods in human history, such socially cementing elements have been created and diffused 'from below' by individuals or small groups, other times this kind of work was initiated and maintained 'from above', namely by rulers and leaders of groups. Ruling bodies do not necessarily cater for the interests of the population ruled by them, which in extreme cases may simply lead to cultural and political revolutions (that is, a drastic deliberate change of repertoire).

Evidently, whether in ancient Egypt or in modern Great Britain, beyond a certain level of discrepancies between the repertoire promoted by the population and the one imposed by dominant forces, the latters' tolerance can no longer be upheld. The ancient Egyptian state was engaged in a constant endeavor to harmonize the enormous variety of its population, as well as absorb the endless flux of migrants from all over the ancient world. In our own era, policies vary largely in different parts of the globe: some states, mostly totalitarian-ideological, would tolerate no such discrepancies, while other (western democracies, for example) seem to allow certain latitude, even endorse 'multiculturalism'. However, outbursts of discontent take place even within those more liberal states. Recently, on February 2011, the prime minister of Great Britain, David Cameron, launched a fierce attack against what he considered to be an exaggerated tolerance towards what he believed to be unacceptable cultural repertoire. In his view,

> State multiculturalism is a wrong-headed doctrine that has had disastrous results. It has fostered difference between communities, and it

has stopped us from strengthening our collective identity. Indeed, it has deliberately weakened it' (*The Guardian*, 6/2/2011).[7]

The function of collective identity as an asset, both endogenously and exogenously, makes it a symbolic capital that allows for the group's status claims, namely justifying its existence as a separate entity (political or otherwise) and the exclusion of others. In his study "Icelandic nationality identity: from nationalism to tourism," Gísli Sigurðsson (Sigurðsson 1996) shows how valorized goods (such as the Old Icelandic manuscripts) are shown to official foreign visitors to reinforce Iceland's cause. It is symptomatic that even though Iceland declared its independence in 1944, it was only in 1971, when the agreement with Denmark on the return of the manuscripts was signed, it was "the final confirmation that Iceland had gained its independence from Denmark" (Sigurðsson 1996: 60-61).

The valuation of identities is thus part of the everlasting intergroup competition over prestige and status, which in the final analysis means competition over access to resources. An intergroup stock exchange of such assets has been determinative since antiquity in hierarchizing the various ethnic and political groups vis-à-vis each other, allowing some to have more say than others. To win the competition, 'better elements' always had to be shown as pertinent to the claimant group, and therefore the repertoires of elements quickly crystallized to encompass a variety of components: from impressive buildings, like pyramids, city gates, hanging gardens and temples, to claims about freedom, quality of life and wealth, more powerful gods, better justice, personal security, and any possessions or principles that happened to

---

[7] *The Guardian*'s editorial, however, strongly criticized Cameron: "David Cameron had an opportunity this weekend to say something interesting and relevant about a subject important to anyone who lives in Britain: how hyper-diverse societies can not only cohere, but thrive. He flunked it. What the prime minister offered instead was a mix of clichés, tired thinking and some downright offensive terminology (*The Guardian*, 7/2/2011).

be highly valued at a time. This basic repertoire was providing powerful tools for groups to exercise identity formation. It has not changed much since ancient Egypt with its pyramids (or chariots, horses and ornaments) and its *ma'at* ('justice') concept (Assmann 1989),[8] or since rulers of big and small states in the ancient fertile crescent boasted about the high quality of life for everyone within the territories they ruled (Green 2003).[9]

To enhance and facilitate the inculcation of identities, a variety of procedures has always been used, among which boasting about achievements in the form of rituals such as memorizing events and raising monuments have become to be the most popular.[10] A collective memory indispensably had to become part of the repertoire shared by the relevant group. 'Remember what Amalek did unto thee by the way, when ye were come forth out of Egypt' (Deuteronomy 25: 17; KJV), or the Passover text (*Haggadah*) instruction 'and ye shall tell it to your son' (that is, the story of the exodus from Egypt) are two typical examples for memorizing rituals. No less symptomatic is the exhortation "raccontiamone la storia ai nostri figli e ai nostri nipoti;"[11] in an article entitled "Ritroviamo l'orgoglio dell'unità' ("Let's recover the pride of the unity," Aldo Cazzulo, *Corriere della Sera*, 17/3/2011).

---

[8] I am grateful to Orly Goldwasser for her personal communication on *Ma'at* as a factor of culture planning.

[9] Green summarizes the purpose of the boasting as follows: '[The boasted about] achievements cannot be divorced from the international competition for honor with friend and foe alike. Thus, they can be presented as the reversal of negative conditions--the destruction and desolation--created by the enemy. In this way, they are an extension of the king's victories over his enemies and so provide further evidence of his superiority over them. Domestic achievements were also used to demonstrate the king's superiority over other kings who were not regarded as enemies, e.g. fellow-vassals, and predecessors on the throne. They were also employed in a complex balance between the impulse to self-glorification and the recognition of the superiority of the king's suzerain.'

[10] For more about such procedures see During 2010.

[11] "Let us tell the story [of the unification of Italy] to our children and grandchildren."

These memories, stories told from one generation to the next, thus become common legacies, patrimony, an indispensable baggage to never be forgotten. Monuments, whether constructions or sites – stelae, sculptures, paintings, buildings, artifacts – work on the one hand to inscribe events and persons as part of the group's identity, and to display the splendor of the group's assets on the other. "Legacy work" may thus refer to the two aspects of identity work, namely the creation of cohesion and the display of valuable goods.

Attempts at inculcating repertoires without some sort of persuasion hardly hold for more than a limited time, or do not hold at all. Violence, coercion, terror, and other non-peaceful methods of dictation cannot create the necessary consent among a group, and are therefore more costly to rulers, even if well-intended. In such cases as Peter the First's, the czar of Russia, or Muhammad Tughluq's, the Sultan of Delhi, both aimed at reforming the repertoires of culture and the collective identity of their states. Tughluq has been far less successful than Peter the First, because he even failed to recruit the indispensable small group of adepts to support his reforms, as did Peter. Ibn Battuta has told the story of Tughluq's abortive projects, which were intended as innovations on a grand scale. The reluctance of the people to accept his decisions has not made him understand what others along history seem to have known from the outset, namely that mere coercion does not pay. Typically for him (as for similar dictators), the opposition to his decisions was taken by him as just

> …une résistance ignorante et malveillante d'un peuple récalcitrant et mal disposé face à la justesse des actes d'un souverain éclairé. Cette vision des choses donne à ce dernier le droit d'imposer ses vues par la force et de punir les insoumis. Ainsi les plus grandes injustices et les plus grandes cruautés se feront au nom de l'ordre, de la justice et des grands principes de gouvernement. (Yerasimos 1982)

There is a steady ebb and flow movement in respect to which aspect of the identity work, and the creation of legacies as part of it, dominates in different points of time. Roughly, it would seem justified to

maintain that when a group is unstable, whether in a state of emergence or in crisis, identity work and the creation of legacies become major tools for securing its maintenance. In contrast, when a group has achieved a high level of cohesion, or when it is not threatened by adversaries, identity work may lose its intensity, and legacy work is mostly reduced to commodification of the objects and images (including stories and memories) that are part of the already recognized repertoire. It seems that at least in the cases of Greece and the Netherlands discussed by During (2010) this is actually the case. In contrast, in Lithuania "the underlying resistance of the inhabitants of Kaunas against the military history of the town" (ibid.: 115) obliterated legacy plans devised by policymakers, and similarly in Crete, where "Cretan people didn't like heritage, because it reminded them of periods in history in which they were not free" (ibid.: 137).

Thus, in established countries of the European union, those which no longer have to legitimize their existence or justify the value of their legacies, legacy work is already often detached from identity work, serving the purpose of reinforcing the value of the assets on display for sale. When there is an abundance of objects and images, the state institutions involved with the promotion of legacies often mostly only work to facilitate the physical access to such assets (like places and monuments, books and manuscripts) or duly promote them via publications, visiting deals, or the internet (Sigurðsson 1996). On the other hand, for areas little known, or which need some economic injection, legacy objects and images may be dug from some imaginary or covert sources. In short, it would be justified to contend that heritage has become mostly a matter of competition about "who has got the better goods for sale," while for the majority of people in everyday life they carry very little meaning.

However, this is not an unchanging matter. As the unanticipated outburst of the British prime minister quoted above shows, what seems to be a stable situation may quickly change once people in the group sense a threat to their established identity. When this occurs,

indifference makes room for heated engagement; identity clashes may splash seemingly out of the blue over some forgotten, or until that moment unimportant objects, images, or memories stored in some obfuscated cache.

INTELLECTUALS IN ANTIQUITY[1]

Abstract

It is well-established that people capable of maintaining, handling and directing formalized repertoires of life-instructions has existed since the dawn of history, and probably long before that. These have been skilled workers, such as managers and agents of cults and beliefs, or technical workers in the professions of reading, writing, and deciphering ideas and texts, or designing any size of constructions. While some of them were operating at the very core of power, others emerged as "independent agents" to dispute accepted solutions, especially if sensed as leading to failure on whatever level ranging from survival to well-being. This paper contends that the ancient Hebrew so-called prophets indeed embodied such a category of individuals, who dared confront both masses and power with differing solutions about what needed to be done. On the surface, they look less bold or outspoken than the Greek intellectuals like Socrates, because they legitimized their messages by attributing them to a divine source. However, contemporary power did not take that seriously, since even the image of their divine source differed from what was conventionally accepted.

In the epilogue to his exuberant book *Egypt, Canaan, and Israel in Ancient Times*, Donald Redford says:

> The dominance of foreigners in the affairs of Egypt and Judah set the intelligentsia in both communities in a defensive posture. In Egypt, certainly from the Greek conquest, the temple personnel turned in upon themselves, and with the progressive loss of patronage and approbation by the authorities, began to consider themselves the last repository and bastion of the old ways of pharaonic times. In Judah, in a reactionary effort to hold the line, the sacerdotal mentors of the com-

munity linked orthodoxy with nationalism, and produced the intransigence of the Maccabees and the savagery of the zealots. (Redford 1992: 470)

I find these perhaps hastily formulated generalizations quite compatible with some hypotheses I have been trying to advance in my work on the problematics of subsistence in a framework of contact pressures in modern societies. Redford's remarks encourage me to suggest the application of some of these hypotheses for discussing contemporary societies. Admittedly, it seems a bit puzzling that at the very last accord of this overloaded work, a new category of people in the history of humanity – *the intelligentsia* – should suddenly make its grandiose appearance on the stage. Critically minded people might say that this is a slip of the tongue, perhaps something Redford could allow himself be written down without his customary meticulous elaboration, in an essayistic rather than exploratory tone, because it was put in the epilogue, that is, the place where some free tone is allowed. This, they might say, is but another instance of Redford's flamboyant style, a historical anachronism, a jargon that is more appropriate for discussing matters pertaining to the 19th century and which therefore should be interpreted as having been meant to be a metaphor rather than a description of a real community of people playing a specific role in that remote moment in world history.

This is, however, not the way I would suggest understanding the quoted passage. I think that Redford is suggesting here, whether knowingly or unknowingly, a critical, however sketchy, explanation for the complex relations – or perhaps the Gordian knot – obtaining between power, success, and the role of idea-makers in the fate of communities. He is offering to discuss the inability of a community to allow innovations into its cultural repertoire as a growing failure to cope with intense changes generated by the more and more unavoidable presence of other cultural repertoires. He seems to suggest that this failure should be attributed to the specific community of people whose major preoccupation is with the production, distribution and the

maintenance of ideas. This community is described to have practically replaced the political power-holders of ancient times, at least as far as the management of high cultural repertoire is concerned. It is argued that their ability to control the cultural repertoires makes them responsible for the gradual decline and the growing marginalization of these communities in a world they no longer fitted in, unlike the way their society is believed to have done in earlier, more successful times.

What I find interesting in these suggestions are the following points:

[1] The acknowledgement of the role of the intelligentsia as a decisive factor in shaping the life of communities.

[2] The suggestion that the factors governing the existence of communities have to do with intergroup relations. It is these relations that determine whether the community is successful, prosperous and influential, or the very opposite.

[3] The implied idea that the intelligentsia is above anything else the custodians of the *repertoire* they believe indispensable rather than the champions of the *community.* The maintenance of the repertoire thus takes precedence in the way they act over the interests of the community.

[4] The implied idea that by restricting the cultural repertoire to the exclusively established components, the implicated community eventually harbors in a situation where it lags behind the other communities possibly competing with it.

Is it adequate to assume that the intelligentsia emerged in world history in the sixth century BC? Perhaps it would be more plausible to suggest that the intelligentsia, which became visible, or possibly surfaced, in the sixth century BC indeed crystallized as such during that century and not before. Whether operating as a coherent and co-ordinated group, or whether divided into conflicting parties, it basi-

cally functioned as a surrogate of political power as a source of decisions. In the history of the Jews, to follow Redford's example, especially after the destruction of Jerusalem by the Romans, no doubt the established intelligentsia took it upon itself to replace political power, directing the daily life of the community by devising a complex codex of substitutional laws for many centuries to come. However, even if this is indeed the case that the intelligentsia surfaced so late, I believe it would be completely wrong to assume that such a category of people could have assumed so strong a position in controlling the cultural repertoire, and through it the community, which embraced it, had it not existed in some mode before.

I believe we only need to remind ourselves of what is common knowledge, namely, of the fact that groups of people capable of maintaining, handling and directing some formalized stock of life-instructions had existed since the dawn of history, and probably long before that. I am obviously referring here to the group of skilled workers in the industry of handling ideas, who have always been available to all sorts of power in the ancient world, as well as in every subsequent stage in history. This is a very heterogeneous group, which included among others managers and agents of cults and beliefs, as well as more technical workers in the professions of reading, writing, and deciphering ideas, texts and messages. While some of them were operating at the very core of power, thus under the immediate control of power-holders, others naturally were working more marginally, somewhat removed from power, a position which might have given them some opportunities for relative independence that the more centrally located workers could not entertain. It is not unlikely that this unavoidable state of affairs has given rise to the option of assuming substitutional power by members of the intelligentsia at the later stages of ancient history, as hypothesized by Redford.

One can also ask whether it is adequate to consider all people whose major preoccupation has been with producing or maintaining ideas as members of an established intelligentsia. I am afraid I cannot

trace in Redford's argumentation any hint to any other sort of people engaged with the business of ideas. In other words, Redford does not mention people not engaged in the maintenance of cultural repertoires. I am referring here to a category that seems to be far less evident for many historians, namely self-appointed idea-makers, people who were working not only as *critics* of the institutionalized worldview or contemporary politics and culture, but also as *producers of new alternatives*. I am fully aware of the fact that while we are familiar with this category of people in the modern era, where these have often been depicted in romantic terms, many of us might find the idea that such people might have existed already in antiquity a bit odd. Indeed, it is very hard to find traces of such people in the history of the large and powerful states of the ancient world. The only written tradition where they loom large is the Hebrew Scriptures commonly known as the Bible.

Edited at a later stage, thus certainly reflecting views and beliefs much closer to the sixth than to high antiquity, the Hebrew Scriptures nevertheless contain information about individuals whose activity has not been contested as either fabricated or anachronistic. I am obviously referring here to the so-called Hebrew prophets, people known to us by names, such as Amos and Isaiah – eighth century B.C., or Jeremiah – seventh and sixth centuries B.C. In the texts attributed to them, as well as in the stories about their activities, they take the liberty of expressing attitudes, ideas and beliefs that sharply contradicted those of the established guardians of the cultural repertoires backed by contemporary power. One could argue that they cannot be equaled with really independent intellectuals since in spite of their uncontestable audacity they still needed to legitimize their subversive ideas by claiming to be agents of some higher authority, namely, the invisible ruler of the universe. Unlike Socrates and all those who followed in his footsteps, the prophets did not consider themselves personally responsible for their ideas. However, by attributing their ideas

to a universal ruler who does not discriminate between humans, they were not simply using a recognized source of legitimization, but actually re-invented that source, going far beyond, and in contradiction to what was the contemporary common belief. Transforming the local god of the community, the god who had "chosen his people," into a universal ruler whose authority extends beyond the boundaries of the domestic territory and for whom all human communities were equal, was in itself at least as dangerous an act as the scandalous teachings of Socrates. Moreover, their attribution of their ides to a supreme ruler of the universe did not move people, and above all power-holders, to treat them with reverence. They were viewed as suspicious and often dangerous, and while Amos was just warned to shut up (Amos 7:12),[2] Jeremiah was actually tortured (Jeremiah 20: 1-2),[3] and his book, which he had dictated to his secretary, was torn apart and burnt by the king (Jeremiah 36: 22-23).[4] Such testimonies simply are evidence that they were held personally responsible for their ideas, in the same manner intellectuals were treated in Athens.

The prophets, many of whom took particular care to spell out their relatively humble origin as positive credentials, would definitely not fit into Redford's description of the established intelligentsia. They are everything but keepers of an inherited repertoire that should not be changed. In this sense, they are indeed the most conspicuous forerunners of later time's idea-makers and dedicated intellectuals. The fact that we have not been informed about similar actors in neighboring

---

[2] "Seer, go, run away to the land of Judah and eat bread there; and prophesy there."

[3] "Now Pashur the son of Immer the priest, who was also chief governor in the house of the lord, heard that Jeremiah prophesied these things. Then Pashur smote Jeremiah the prophet, and put him in the stocks that were in the high gate of Benjamin, which was by the house of the Lord."

[4] "Now the king sat in the winterhouse in the ninth month: and there was a fire on the hearth burning before him. And it came to pass, that when Jehudi had read three or four leaves, he cut it with the penknife, and cast it into the fire that was on the hearth, until all the roll was consumed in the fire that was on the hearth."

communities is no proof of their absence. In view of the fact that deliberate changes have been initiated and implemented in all ancient societies, I believe it would be preferable to assume that they must have existed, although perhaps under different shapes and personalized by various people not necessarily carrying out overtly as contesters of established ideas and proponents of new ones. I believe we must not expect them to either look or act like either the Hebrew prophets or the people who emerged at later stages in human history, but instead look for people who, by disagreeing or contesting an established repertoire, have played a role in introducing innovations and change.

It is generally accepted that it is by the third millennium BC that we actually begin to learn more specifically about individuals who get a stronger say than others on what shape might take the life of other people than themselves. More often than not, these people, by assuming power are able to carry out their ideas about the modelling of life. In many cases, the act of assuming power was in itself part of the struggle for implementing certain ideas which had to do with changing the conditions of life for the community that these people were aspiring to rule. I believe it is obvious that if these people were involved not only in exercising power, but also in designing unprecedented or alternative options for the life of their human environment – whatever their motives or gains might have been – they surely can be viewed as initiators and makers of practices. Throughout antiquity, many such engagements were not carried out casually, but quite deliberately and often with great self-consciousness. This can be inferred, *inter alia*, from the fact that many of these power-holders made it their business to laud themselves for their innovative acts. It is only dimly sensed sometimes behind the available explicit records that these individuals had in their closer or more distant entourage people with the privilege of criticizing them and suggesting new options to them. However, the fact that they functioned as power-holders does not make them unable of functioning as idea-makers and cultural en-

trepreneurs, before they may at some stage switch over to mostly protect their innovations by prohibiting change. New contenders may then emerge to work for their removal, or succession, for the sake of implementing new life-management policies.

Long before some Sixth Century BC intelligentsia had substituted power in some ancient societies, the originators of ideas exercised power, assisted it, or clashed with it in a variety of channels either already available or newly created. This chapter in world history awaits its recovery, like a hidden Avaris salvaged from the shadows of the past by the admirable Manfred Bietak. I think it is high time, in spite of all the objective difficulties involved with such an endeavor, to look more thoroughly for these people in antiquity. Such a quest would help us bridge the conceptual gap between ancient and modern times.

DATED SOLUTIONS AND THE INDUSTRY OF IDEAS[1]

In Memoriam Xoán Gonzalez-Millán (1951-2002)

Abstract

While the industry of ideas is indispensable for any community to achieve a level of subsistence beyond survival, enterprises related to the making of separate distinctive cultures may eventually harm this goal when the industry malfunctions. This peril seems to be built-in into the nature of the enterprise, since reshuffling and implementing repertoire shifts is more complex than replacing machinery and production procedures (which is not a little matter either). The paper proposes a number of parameters for the malfunction of this vital industry.

In September 1994, I presented my paper on culture planning at the seminar "Literatura Galega: ¿Literatura Nacional o Subalterna?" organized in Mondoñedo (Galicia). The chairperson of my session was Xoán Gonzalez-Millán, and of course, I immediately thought of that session when I was invited to come here and talk at this Memorial Day. At that stage of my research on culture planning and the implications of entrepreneurial endeavors for mobilizing collective activities, I could not avoid drawing what I believed were inescapable conclusions not about the success of such endeavors, but rather about the traps and problems that they entail. From the point of view of a Galician champion, such as was Xoán, some of my conclusions understandably did not have a very agreeable ring. The text was subsequently published in Galician translation by another good friend whose departure I deeply deplore, Carlos Casares (Even-Zohar 1995). I was thinking that as disagreeable as those conclusions might have been for such devoted *galeguistas*, they never daunted the challenge to enter into discussions about them, discussions of the fiery nature that was so typical of Xoán, or of the cool and humorous one that was so

---

[1] Paper presented at the Xoán Gonzalez-Millán Memorial Symposium, Graduate Center, City University of New York (CUNY), September 5, 2003, subsequently published in Galician (Even-Zohar 2003).

typical of Carlos. This text is an attempt to expand my 1994 conclusions with regard to later research. I have imagined it as a talk directed to Xoán and Carlos, both of whom I dearly miss.

My work on "culture planning," initiated in the late 1970s,[2] has actually been an attempt to analyze initiatives taken by various communities in order to establish themselves as capable of competition on an inter-communal level. In these communities, idea-makers and cultural entrepreneurs evidently arrived at the conclusion that the interests of the community they belonged to – or that would be created through their endeavors – would best be served by making or consolidating a distinctive domestic repertoire. The view shared by most such actors in many such communities has been that such an endeavor would allow the community a better level of life through a two-head sort of strategy: on the one hand claiming political self-management, thereby allowing the members of the targeted community a free, as it were, access to resources; on the other – by exploiting domestic resources, liberating, as it were, the members of the community from the hard task of competing over non-domestic resources. Both domestic repertoire and self-management have been perceived as allowing easier access to those ingredients of both cultural and organizational repertoires that are necessary for a better handling of the tasks of life.

The idea that political self-management must be an improvement for any group of people has long become a universal commonplace, hardly contested by anybody, and still being universally aspired to. The cases where a community, especially one living in a well-defined territory, has not claimed self-management for itself seem to be rare in modern history. As far as I know, in the period since World War II, there has been only one such case, that of Newfoundland, where in a referendum back in December 1948 a slight majority decided to give

---

[2] My first investigation on the deliberate culture planning in Palestine in the period between 1882 and 1948 was presented at a conference in 1978, subsequently published in 1980, 1987 and 1990 (Even-Zohar 1990).

up the option of an independent state and join the Canadian confederation instead. In contradistinction, the overwhelming majority of communities around the globe, at least more than a hundred since 1945, whenever the opportunity had become available to them, decided almost unhesitatingly in favor of the self-management principle.

The idea of using domestic resources for constructing or "preserving" a separate local culture has likewise become a universally accepted dogma. The need of many groups to use a culture that was not "their own" has been conceived of as a major obstacle to the ability of individuals to attain success on a competitive level with other individuals for whom that culture was more accessible. In almost all of the enterprises since the end of the 18th century, the making of cultures for the sake of communities whose "cultures" had not been institutionally codified, has been presented as the clue to a better handling of life tasks for the vast majority of people. Much effort has been invested in the making or re-making of cultures, which, as a consequence, often have become as remote from the targeted native individuals as the cultures that were to be replaced. Today, it has become a dogma that a person who is not allowed, as it were, to use his domestic culture under all circumstances is put in an underprivileged position and is discriminated by what is commonly called the "dominant culture."

In all of the cases where the industry of ideas has provided communities with means of distinction, the dilemma often has been how far to go. On the level of political aspirations, there have always been – like with any enterprise – moderates and extremists. The extremists have always been interested in a radical solution, namely the establishment of a completely separate entity, such as a separate Catalonian or Scottish state. Moderates, on the other hand, have always preferred what many students of political science have labeled "the pragmatic approach." In various communities, the enthusiasm of the zealots has been tampered down by people more inclined to "pragmatism." In

the 1994 referendum carried out in Quebec, only 50,000 votes prevented the province from transforming itself into an independent state. In the case of Slovakia, it has been maintained that the secession from the Czechoslovak confederation, in relation to which there are already hints of repent, has not been decided with a regular voting procedure. In the Faroe Islands, where many activists have been promoting the idea of independence until quite recently, it seems nowadays that the majority of the people are taking a more moderate path, one that would allow them to have self-rule without seceding from Denmark. In 2003 (when I reported it), in Catalonia, Galicia, and the Basque country, only small groups of people were thinking of secession. This has changed dramatically for Catalonia in the decade after 2010, where in 2020 almost half of the population, if not more, now support secession because of the growing clashes with the central Spanish state. In Galicia, it seems that there are growing sentiments for what might be called "virtual secession," probably expressed most explicitly in the so-called "Lusitanian spelling" of the Galician language that has become more and more radical. As for the Basque country, the small group of Basque secessionists is indeed very strident, but it does not seem to have mobilized the people at large.

The extent of distinction through the making and/or the institutionalization of a culture, on the other hand, is much more complex. Here we are not dealing with an either-or choice. In the most heated moments of making a new repertoire for a community, it is obvious that the policy taken by both inventors and entrepreneurs tends to be fargoing. However, even in the most radical or extreme cases, where powerholders, usually helped by intellectuals, have attempted to isolate the local culture as much as possible from the rest of the world (or at least from the most relevant neighbors), the enterprise in its entirety could not last for long. On the other hand, certain specific items, where separation could be implemented, sometimes have been implemented with great success.

The most conspicuous item on the repertoire of many such cases has been a language attached to the cultural and political enterprise. Language creators and standardizers, especially those who had to create languages by distinguishing them from other similar ones (such as Norwegian, Galician, or Urdu), have taken – more often than not – many ingenious measures on a linguistic level in order to make their creations as distinct and different as possible. When doing that, they often ended up distantiating the regulated and standardized (or "normalized") product from the domestic resource upon which it had been based in the first place. In Norway of the 19th century, "the language of the land" (Landsmål), devised by Ivar Aasen, had from the outset many ingredients that had nothing to do with the language of the land from where it was pretended to have been composed (mostly "dialects" in Western Norway). In the modern state of Norway, where this language (in various modified versions) is now officially called "New Norwegian" (Nynorsk), one can hardly find any native speaker of this most authentic indigenous language which was to replace the language of the foreign colonial Denmark. The same actually applies to various other languages, though in many other cases successful inculcation has been able to introduce the new creations into actual common use. In France, Sweden, or Italy, the non-spoken variants of the respective literary languages introduced by the cultural entrepreneurs of the 19th century have almost become a daily reality. In other cultures, such as Iceland, the principle of extreme distinction, even though it was not an omnipresent feature of the domestic vernacular at the turn of the 19th century, has been successfully implemented.

However, in a more and more competitive world of the 20th and 21st centuries, the principle of maintaining highly separate and distinct cultures is becoming more and more problematic. This is not to say that this might not have been the case already at the time when the creation of these separate cultures was initiated in the first place. However, implementing this principle probably has been the only vi-

able alternative for those involved in the enterprise of making cultures. In other words, it may not have been practical from a practical point of view, but it certainly may have been indispensable for gaining the necessary symbolic capital, which would allow the targeted community to achieve the goals it had been striving for. In some communities, the awareness of this conflicting interests perhaps might have led to a less energetic endeavor to implement in the daily reality those items recognized as indispensable for gaining a symbolic capital. In Ireland, in spite of the most recent Language Act (passed on the 14th of July, 2003), "the state has moved Irish off the centre stage […] Irish is no longer required to join the civil service except in the Department of Foreign Affairs.," according to Tadhg Ó hIfearnáin (Ó hIfearnáin 2000, pp 98-99). In Scotland, now enjoying a recently established self-rule, the attempts to revitalize "a synthetic modern Scots" (probably following the example of Ivar Aasen's Landsmål) died almost completely out already towards the end of the 1950s, evidently replaced by assigning a higher status to the local accent of Standard English. All over the world, from New Zealand to Black Africa, there are lots of symbolic items which have remained symbolic, often ending up in the shape of "folklore," that is, put in use only in specific festivities and other special occasions.

The question how far one needs to go in trying to make a distinct repertoire of culture in order to alter living conditions of a community cannot be answered without the necessary historical context. And here is the root of the catch that is built in into such endeavors. Most likely, at the very moment when a differing and distinct repertoire is absolutely indispensable for achieving the goals set for the community, it is already beginning to stop rendering the results for which it has been devised. For decades and decades, communities around the globe have been competing about which has created the most distinct, "original," symbolic products and other items of repertoire that would allow them to justify, as it were, their separate mode of existence. Even technology has not fully escaped the race, with such items as TV

broadcasting techniques completely different between, say, France and the rest of Europe, different measurements between most of the world and the United States, and many others stubborn relics of parochial standards (such as telephone and electricity sockets).

In the course of the twentieth century, people have been trying everywhere to create, promote or reinforce distinct types of architecture, food, music, painting, or any other imaginable item (such as the Maori *Ta Moko* tattoo; see Pritchard 2000). One may ask: was it really necessary to create, to take one example out of many, "a distinct Icelandic architecture"? The answer might be: Probably no less than the need to keep and maintain a distinct Icelandic language from the point of view of the group of people interested in maintaining an Icelandic successful community. However, the endeavors in Iceland towards that end have now tempered down, if not stopped altogether. It seems that the point has been stated, and now people do not need it anymore, since everything that is created in Icelandic architecture is by definition distinctly Icelandic even when it shares many features with other instances of architecture around the globe.

What is it I am actually discussing? The point I am trying to make here has to do with the ability or inability of the industry of ideas to perform flexibly when the erstwhile conditions that have given rise to a certain enterprise eventually change in such a way which puts in doubt the usefulness of keeping that enterprise going unchanged. In concrete terms, this may mean either modifying the components of the enterprise, or completely replacing it by a different one. In spite of the fact that ideas, in contradistinction to machinery and materials, are cheap and mobile, this is something that few individuals, let alone communities, are capable of doing. Since the industry of ideas has to move within culture, and culture consists of a complex repertoire of options inherited from previous generations and painstakingly inculcated into the minds of human beings, introducing major turns in that repertoire over a relatively short span of time is not an easy task. Moreover, cultures are not necessarily target-oriented, and the ability of the

members of a culture to sense danger to the community embracing that culture, in such a way that would instigate crying out for replacements, is not always ever present, to say the least. The industry of ideas, inasmuch as it exists in a certain community, may therefore – more often than not – malfunction in the course of its history as a provider of possible solutions for difficult or challenging situations. The repercussions of such situations may cause a lot of damage, unless a mass of balancing wills and acts by "ordinary people" is set in motion, something that simply does not often happen. Although it is very difficult to determine whether the origin of "public opinion" is popular interpretation of the industry of ideas or ideas produced "from below," media studies have shown very convincingly that it is the industry that tends to be the origin (see also Bourdieu 1983 [1972]). This may explain why malfunction among that social group can often be more significant than what could be considered as a general failure by "the population at large."

The circumstances under which the industry of ideas malfunctions probably have been investigated even less than the circumstances under which the industry achieves success. It is therefore very little I can offer on the basis of the literature. What I am able to offer, however, is a schematic description of two instances of malfunction, which I have been able to observe in the cases I have studied:

1. Successful idea-makers and entrepreneurs cannot liberate themselves from the specific enterprise they have generated.

2. Second generation intelligentsia is normally capable of mostly perpetuating inherited enterprises.

1. Successful idea-makers and entrepreneurs cannot liberate themselves from the specific enterprise they have generated.
This type of malfunction is highly characteristic of great cultural enterprises taking place in times of socio-cultural turmoil involving na-

tional movements, revolutionary groups and often generating political shifts. In many of these cases, the goal is often set up towards the making of a separate socio-political entity, all efforts being targeted towards the achievement of this goal. In such instances, once the goal has been achieved, the members of the industry of ideas, who at least initially had no access to power, subsequently either get closer to power or become themselves imbued with power, as a result of which they often cease to be idea-makers or entrepreneurs in the sense they were in the previous stages, having converted themselves to members of the establishment of the new entity.

This type of malfunction simply has to do with the fact that people who have been involved, often for many years, with activities that habitually entailed struggles and conflicts, are not likely at the moment of success – or even at a somewhat later stage – to be able to revise their ideas or their enterprises, trying to match them against the gained realities. The examples we can think of are any of the most conspicuous revolutions, such as the French, the Russian, the Chinese, or any one of the sweeping cases of political and socio-cultural change, such as the unification of Italy and Germany in the 19th century, the creation of the modern Turkish state after World War I, or the creation of the Spanish semi-autonomous entities like Catalonia, Galicia, and the Basque country. In all of these cases, the ingredient of the industry of ideas has been highly important and very active. Although in history books, as well as in the analyses offered by political science, this ingredient is hardly ever given the attention it deserves, it is obvious that in the overwhelming majority of these cases idea-makers and cultural entrepreneurs either took the lead, or made their products available to those who took the lead, typically powerholders who captured the opportunity of using them.

The amount of suggestions that had to be produced, the quantity of invention, and the energy invested in attempts towards implementation have all been quite enormous in all of these cases. A great deal

of repertoires had to be introduced to either replace older ones or function where none existed before. Although in most of these cases the actual number of the individuals intensely preoccupied with the relevant activities has never been very high, they were the only ones available to the relevant societies for the task, at least for a while. Therefore, those of them who did not immediately feel disappointed, or often betrayed, normally invested most of their energies in helping implement what they had initiated in the first place.

For example, those who were suggesting the introduction of a new language for the relevant community – in Germany, Italy, Catalonia, Galicia, Jewish Palestine, or Turkey – as one major ingredient in the proposed set of solutions, often were actively involved in implementing this suggestion in the period after their success. In all of the new entities, the relevant cultural entrepreneurs continued their activities by taking more steps towards implementing and consolidating the introduction of the relevant languages. Often, the new entity has naturally empowered them, giving them new possibilities and other conditions for implementing their suggestions. The Italian state nominated the writer Manzoni to chair a committee whose task it was to decide what sort of language would be adopted by the state and inculcated through its new educational system. In post-World War I Turkey, the new leader, who definitely was a cultural entrepreneur himself if not an idea-maker, Mustafa Kemal (later officially titled "Ata Türk [Father Turk]"), invested much energy in propagating personally, by going by train from one village to another, the newly devised language, in conjunction with many other ingredients of the new repertoire he was interested in introducing (see Lewis 1968, Landau 1984).

Parallel examples can be provided for many other, perhaps less conspicuous, ingredients of the new repertoires. Each of these ingredients normally had its supporters and champions, who naturally preferred capitalizing on the success rather than developing critical minds as to whether the enterprise was useful or not from the point of

view of the more general target of life improvement for the relevant community. In sociological terms, one might say that they preferred converting their often-profitless actions before the successful stage to profitable cultural capital rather than going through the same motions again.

2. Second generation intelligentsia is normally capable of mostly perpetuating inherited enterprises.

The inheritors of the enterprise, normally themselves either *Intellocrats* (Hamon Hancock & Rotman 1981) or institutionalized intelligentsia, are often no longer attentive to – or even aware of – the erstwhile circumstances which have given rise to the enterprise. Instead, they are more interested in keeping the institutionalized established repertoire as it is, protecting it from revisions or replacement. These people often emerge after some finalized stage in the course of some enterprise initiated, supported, or reinforced by the industry of ideas. They replace the initiating cultural entrepreneurs either by pushing them aside or by eliminating them, as has been the case with most enterprises history calls "revolutions," or simply constitute the next generation, who already grew up when the new realities had been fully established. If these people did not become idea-makers themselves, which means that they are not inclined to criticizing and revising, it often turns out that the maintenance of the repertoire they have inherited from previous stages, or previous generations, often becomes more important to them than the goals for which this repertoire had been originally devised. The separation between cultural means and cultural goals thus gives full priority to the means, without any critical consideration of the question whether they are justified or justifiable in terms of such goals. This does not mean that in all of the studied cases people never mention, or talk about, those goals, but these are either not matched against the means with which they are supposed to be achieved, or it is accepted that the institutionalized means are indeed suitable for these goals.

I am naturally referring first and foremost to those ingredients in those new repertoires which have to do with a more or less substantial separation and distinction of the targeted communities. Rather than develop flexible intellectuals tools for coping with the situation where the targeted community is diagnosed to be in some risk, the established intelligentsia often tends to enhance the enterprise initiated by their forerunners. Such a position has been repeatedly taken in the course of history. In most recent years, it has characterized the behavior of repertoire-controlling establishments in big and small, strong and weak communities, such as France with its language protective laws on the one hand and the new Balkan states on the other (Greenberg 2001). This behavior has even received a new impetus in mobilizing fears against what is popularly called "globalization." Such fears have been providing new possibilities for mobilizing groups of activists, and justifying the cultivation of any cultural item that could be presented as carrying a symbolic negation of globalization. A rather exceptional cooperation of political radicals and cultural traditionalists has become the order of the day in many communities, where, irrespectably of their purport, those marked items have been inserted into the pantheon of "values," a term very much in use by cultural establishments to denote those items of repertoire that are not allowed to be changed.

The recent developments in Ireland could probably teach us something about what seems to be a quiet reversal of the steps taken by several generations of culture builders, both innovative idea-makers and cultural entrepreneurs and the intelligentsia of consecutive generations. Many students of modern Irish history have described the immense burden laid upon the efforts to widely introduce the Irish language into the population of the new Irish state. The knowledge of Irish has been made a condition, as it were, for being Irish in the first place. However, this has changed, and with it, I guess many other attitudes towards separatedness and distinctiveness. It would not surprise me at all to find out that this reversal, plausibly by a new group

of idea-makers and cultural entrepreneurs, has been among the most conspicuous causes of the recent social and economic prosperity in Ireland.

When I conducted my first tentative pilot study in Galicia, back in summer 1993, I could not avoid noticing, almost immediately, that the most arduous champions of the standardized Galician language were those who could speak it out of choice rather than out of lack of sufficient knowledge of Castilian. As a matter of fact, as also pointed out by Sharon Roseman (Roseman 1995, 1997), many of the most outspoken champions for a separate Galician culture were people for whom Spanish was either their first language, or one they were very fluent in using. The socio-cultural and socio-political meaning of castilianization is obviously not a linguistic matter, that is, the question of knowing a language, but evidently a matter of social position. In these terms, my conclusion was that only people who have already acquired the necessary socio-cultural status could afford the luxury of using Galician. Others, still struggling to gain such a status, could find no use in Galician for achieving that goal. Of course, this is not an exceptional phenomenon in the history of movements of socio-cultural change; after all, few of the leaders of any modern revolution have been working-class people themselves. Later, I was able to find many indications for what one might call a quiet, but persistent and even stubborn, popular sentiment of resentment in Galicia against a distinctive Galician repertoire, whose most conspicuous component unsurprisingly has been the modern normalized Galician language. This does not necessarily mean that people do not subscribe *publicly* to what has been propagated for decades, and which had at the time a very strong symbolic power, especially under the Franco dictatorship.

The younger generations of Galicians display basically pragmatic attitudes towards their integration in society, in most cases fully encouraged and supported by their parents. The new circumstances can no longer display persecution, humiliation and exploitation of power

given by a language not widely mastered by the majority of the population. The heartbreaking description in Castelao's *Sempre en Galiza* of "o neno galego [the Galician child]" who can have no future if compelled to use his non-native tongue (and who would consequently be redeemed when allowed to use his indigenous language) does not conform any longer to the realities of life in nowadays Galicia. Similar conditions have similarly changed in various other similar communities, such as Ireland or the Faroes, where attitudes based on an already acquired sense of collective self-assuredness have been widely recorded. For example, according to Nauerby's report of a study conducted back in 1990 by a committee nominated by the Faroese Schoolboard,

> In schools […] Faroese [is] being associated with a bygone age with which the pupils cannot identify (Jespersen & Mikkelsen 1990: 33f). Danish, on the other hand, has the appeal of a subject which deals with present-day and interesting topics. The *present*, in other words, belongs to Danish and the *past* to Faroese: "[...] pupils in Faroese schools become accustomed to identifying themselves with a foreign culture while regarding their own with an indulgent smile, as something that never really made it out of the Middle Ages" (ibid.: 35). (Nauerby 1996: 128-129)[3]

An even stronger testimony of resentment is expressed by Helen Kelly-Holmes, who also analyzes the case as a scholar. In her words,
> The experience of being socialized into an ideal of a Gaelic Ireland through excessive and compulsory Irish language teaching […] has left me with an abhorrence of the over-ideologisation of language and the simplistic equation of language with identity. […] the fact that Irish is not now the language of everyday life in Ireland is in no small way due to the fact that the language was hijacked by ideologues and

---

[3] This situation has been confirmed by later surveys and analyses. See Knudsen 2010 for more details. Knudsen's paper "questions whether the present language policy in the Faroes is an effective strategy to maintain and protect a demographically small language – like Faroese – as a viable language." (Knudsen 2010: 128)

imbued with values, qualities, histories far removed from the everyday culture lived by individuals. […] Growing up in Ireland, the cultural imperialists lived in Dublin, not in London or Hollywood. This was not simply the feeling among many of my peers learning Irish as a second language at school; the resentment was at times perhaps stronger in the Irish speaking Gaeltacht: "The failure to reconcile romantic nationalism and nationalist myth with the realities of Gaeltacht life has been a conspicuous element in the failure to save the language. There is little common ground between Gaeltacht workers who see language as a tool, to be discarded for a better one when it becomes obsolete and nationalists who believe Irish people should speak Irish because they are Irish and regardless of utilitarian considerations. (Hindley, 1990: 212)." (Kelly-Holmes 1997: 168-169)

My assessment of the Galician case is in fact fully supported by Henrique Monteagudo and Xosé Manoel Nuñez Seixas in a relatively recent article (2001), although naturally not in any explicit terms. I find the following passage most crucial from my point of view:

Existe el riesgo de que el nacionalismo gallego del siglo XXI se convierta en un movimiento votado y apoyado por neoconversos al idioma gallego de lengua inicial castellana y residentes en zonas urbanas. Pero, dado que se trata de un idioma neolatino y de fácil adquisición para un castellanohablante, todo sigue siendo posible. Incluso que nuevas generaciones, imbuidas de nacionalismo, o sencillamente, de una consideración socialmente positiva de su identidad étnica, recuperen conscientemente el idioma que sus abuelos quisieron abandonar. (Monteagudo & Nuñez 2001: 65)[4]

---

[4] There is a danger that Galician nationalism of the 21st century will be converted to a movement chosen and supported by new converts to the Galician tongue, people whose first language is Castilian and who dwell in urban regions. However, given the fact that this is a neo-Latin language, which can easily be acquired by speakers of Castilian, everything continues to be possible. Even the possibility that new generations, imbued with nationalism or simply having a positive attitude towards their ethnic identity, might consciously recover the tongue that their grandparents wished to abandon.

The discrepancy between the agenda of life of ordinary people and the visionary schemes devised by previous generations of idea-makers and supported by the intelligentsia of subsequent generations seems to be so manifest here that even such loyal people to the cause of the Galician language like the authors of this article, in their capacity as skilled and conscientious scholars, cannot ignore. As Galician language loyalists they perceive the fate of Galician in terms of "optimism" and "pessimism." In contrast, as researchers they fully understand the somewhat paradoxical situation, although by no means unique in the history of modern nationalism, namely that the most resolutely dedicated people to a certain cause might be those who had to be recruited rather than those for whom the whole enterprise was believed to have been initiated in the first place.

The choices and the tasks that decision makers on all levels and of whatever brand must face nowadays, especially in communities where cultural distances must become more flexible if those communities do not wish to fall into a dead end alley, are understandably difficult and often unbearable. It is very likely that they cannot be solved by any intelligentsia whose main task it is to perpetuate solutions inherited from their predecessors, which often have lost their validity. It is not unlikely, especially if one of the outcomes of the activity of the industry of ideas has been the generation of energy that the ultimate solution eventually will be implemented without, or even in spite of, the endeavors of intellectuals and other people with invested interests in cultural capitals. The "generation of energy" means, in concrete and simple terms, that less and less people within a certain community are afraid of making decisions and taking responsibilities for their own life as well as for the life of those in their immediate environment. I guess that if this is what has taken place in Ireland, it is not unlikely that it also can take place in many other places.

WHO PROFIT FROM HERITAGE (AND WHO LOOSE)?[1]

Abstract
If we adopt the notion of 'heritage' not as synonymic with 'culture,' but as a set of branded culture traits, then we must recognize the omnipresence of power interests inevitably involved with it. Selecting certain traits rather than other to be memorized, cherished and transmitted inter-generationally through inculcation unavoidably stems from preferences depending on the interests of decision makers. Great efforts have been invested throughout human history to justify those traits as valuable. Endogenously, i.e. within the pertinent group, all sorts of sales-friendly strategies have been used to make heritage popular and consequently embraced both mentally and emotionally. Such an embracement has created identification that engaged people for action and sacrifices. Exogenously, on the other hand, traits that could be branded as valuable on an agreed-upon intergroup market of symbolic goods naturally have served to promote the status of the pertinent group vis-à-vis its competitors. Whatever the case, those who have been profiting mostly from a situation where a heritage has been successfully promoted inwards and/or outwards have always been the powers behind heritage making. They profit first in being able to negotiate status and position and gain prestige, and then by earning revenues emanating from these privileges in all domains of life. The present paper attempts to shed some light on the parameters of heritage promotion and the creation of profits.

If we conceive of heritage, as suggested by standard definitions, as a repertoire of traits transmitted from one generation to the next, we inevitably fall into the trap of a circular conceptualization, because 'heritage' then simply becomes a synonym of 'culture' at large and thus loses its particular meaning. I therefore suggest to prefer the alternative explanation of 'heritage,' namely the one that conceives of it as a *selected set of traits* in a culture, ones that are explicitly 'branded' (or otherwise 'marked') as valuable and indispensable for the subsistence

---

[1] Based on a paper delivered at the first ProPeace meeting, University of Wageningen, Wageningen (The Netherlands), January 16–20, 2017, integrating stuff from Even-Zohar 2017. It was later published as Even-Zohar 2021b.

of a given group. In short, culture transmission as such does not become heritage unless the transmitted traits are branded to acquire symbolic values.

Branding culture traits to make them valuable assets for those who possess them has been a known practice since the dawn of history, and plausibly also a long time before that. There is a magnificent evidence to such a possible marking in pre-historical times from the archaeological site of Göbekli Tepe in the Southeastern Anatolia Region of modern-day Turkey, a Neolithic site that was in continued use between 10,000 and 8000 BC. Although we cannot be sure about its uses, Klaus Schmidt, who discovered the site in 1996 and carried out excavations there until 2014, believed that it was used as a holy site (Schmidt 2010; Dietrich et al. 2012), and that "[d]ie Steinpfeiler stellen womöglich Ahnen, Totengeister oder Dämonen dar" (Schmidt 2007: 14).[2] Its continuous use, elaborate symbolism, and the lack of any relics of dwellings certainly suggests its status as inter-generational heritage site. Whether such an interpretation is solidly supported by the material findings is still a matter of controversy, but the idea of perpetuated heritage practices in prehistory is no longer something that is inconceivable.

By contrast, there is abundant evidence of the prominent use of heritage in historical times since the deepest antiquity in the fourth millennium BC, with the foundation of Egypt, the world's first state. It is surprising to find that prominent scholars ignore the evidence and present heritage as a novelty.[3] Contrary to these views, it is quite striking to find in these periods of early antiquity all of the components of heritage uses and manipulations that allegedly characterize primarily our own times. First in Egypt, but soon throughout the entire Levant,

---

[2] "The stone pillars probably represent ancestors, spirits of the dead, or demons."

[3] For example, Bugge believes that "the idea that such objects have a value beyond their utility and constitute a 'heritage' is in itself relatively new" (Bugge 2003: 62). Similarly, in Rodney Harrison's view, "[h]eritage, and the formally staged experience of encountering the physical traces of the past in the present, has become an all-pervasive aspect of contemporary life" (Harrison 2013: 1).

a large repertoire of traits – both material and immaterial – has been created and utilized to serve as branded features.

Naturally, this repertoire included monumental buildings like pyramids and *ziggurat*s, gold and precious stones, statues and stelae, furniture, chariots and horses, hanging gardens and other marvels. They all clearly served to symbolize power and gain prestige by means of assigning values that make them sought-after and indispensable goods for assuming not only a prominent position in the world system, but also actually any position at all. Since those times immemorial until our own, a set of such possessions has become a standard for being recognized as an entity in the world system. Those who have accumulated such goods naturally have better options for branding and converting them into assets. Newcomers, on the other hand, like new nations and states, must either adopt them from prior groups or invent them. New circumstances may of course make it possible to add new components to the already established set, and thus get better options for attaining such assets. Just a random example: Old Icelandic manuscripts that were scattered for centuries in various homes in Iceland without any sense of importance attached to them all of a sudden became hot goods towards the end of the eighteenth century under the vogue of European Romanticism that generated a competition for proving ancientness.

However, the material set of components has been only one way of using heritage since antiquity. The other way, and perhaps the more powerful one, has been the ideational, or immaterial, traits that are branded as valuable and become in their turn assets by which to gain prestige. Such is the self-image that rulers have been projecting as benefactors of their ruled population. This kind of projected image, diffused through verbal and visual propaganda, has been perpetuated for centuries. At least from the third millennium BC for some two thousand years onwards, this is how even the cruelest rulers often preferred to present themselves to their subjects. This rhetoric was carried out often in combination with proclaiming a strong attachment to

some past, even – and perhaps mainly – when reforms were introduced rather than an actual preservation of some past traditions.

The examples for such practices are abundant, but among the highlights I would like to mention the Sumerian king Ur-Nammu (2047-2030 BC) and the Babylonian king Hammurabi (c. 1810-1750 BC), both of whom managed, each in his term, to create and maintain a large empire in Mesopotamia. In order to pacify the heterogeneous population whose territories they conquered, they demonstrated loyalty to local past traditions not only through verbal declarations, but more efficiently by initiating large building projects dedicated to the local gods and by maintaining practical traditions of economic measures, such as keeping up and developing the vast network of irrigation canals. The procedures taken by Hammurabi show an almost one-to-one resemblance to his predecessors. A conspicuous initiative taken by him, one that has made him famous in world history is his new Code of Law. However, with Ur-Nammu, who initiated the first known such code, the very making of a code of law has become an indispensable trait, part of the repertoire that must be followed and implemented by any ruler or group. Moreover, the act itself had to be branded as valuable in order to guarantee that it serve for gaining prestige. No ruler with some aspirations has later been able to evade the creation or adaptation of a code of law.[4] Another trait introduced by Ur-Nammu was a royal hymn. It was perhaps unprecedented but became highly popular with all of his successors and was established ever since in all repertoires of heritage (Heinz 2012: 713; see also Tinney 1999). According to Hallo, "[…] the extent of our genre can be said to cover close to five hundred years and as many as seven different

---

[4] Among the most famous lawgivers, many centuries later, one can name the Ottoman Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent, known in his own country as "The Law-Giver" (Kanunî Sultan). As much as his codex is considered a bold act in view of the sanctity of the Islamic Sharia, it should not be forgotten that Suleiman could not possibly allow himself not to follow both his father Selim I, and his great-grandfather Mehmet II, both of whom had created innovative codes.

dynasties. At no time is there a certain gap of even so much as a generation between the rulers or dynasties commemorated in the genre" (Hallo 2010: 185).

Showing respect for the past through verbalism and impressive construction projects certainly has been instrumental for such rulers as the Egyptian pharaohs or the Mesopotamian kings for inculcating some degree of socio-cultural cohesion into the populations under their domination. As the Ur-Nammu and Hammurabi cases demonstrate, and so many similar cases in the course of the history of the Levant, persuasion became a preferred manner of interaction with a population rather than the exercise of sheer force. Ultimately, to achieve deference not by creating *fear* but by gaining *respect* has turned out to be much more profitable, not the least in terms of expenditure. It makes a lot of difference between acknowledging someone else's superior status out of fear or out of respect. This is simply so, because respect means acting voluntarily with no coercion. The same sort of procedures served also outwardly, that is as assets that can create prestige vis-à-vis others. When in competition, each participant tries to be at least equal with the others, and possibly more respected. This kind of respect is generally referred to as "prestige."

This sought-after prestige makes others wish to follow one's example in adopting the same kind of traits that have given one a better status in a contemporary world system. Thus, traits that are established in one period by successful groups, like Egypt, Sumer and Babylonia are accepted as branded heritage for many ages to come. Indeed, most of the traits invented and diffused already in the Bronze and Iron Ages in the Levant are still with us (See Hallo 1996). Evidently, those who managed to possess those traits and control them did it for profit. Rulers and their elites were those who profited most, but one could say with due caution that in cases of true prosperity, which also meant freedom of movement and safety conveyed by law and order, larger circles also acquired some share in that profit. Nevertheless, evidence tends to indicate that those in control, that is, rulers

and governance bodies in general, are more interested than the population at large in those assets that are supposed to create prestige. It seems that in both antiquity and today, the efficiency of the group's proclaimed symbolic goods may grow under conditions of clashes and conflicts, whether violent or otherwise, rather than in times of peacefulness. Contests for symbolic assets may incite normally indifferent people to take sides in a feud. A few examples may illustrate the case.

A strong commotion arose between Armenians and Turks following the Göbekli Tepe site discovery in the Southeastern Anatolia Region of Turkey. Each party claimed historical possession of the discovered culture, which evidently had nothing to do with any of them. Graham Hancock (2015) reports that "many Armenians are outraged that Turkey claims this uniquely important site as its own heritage as though the ancient Armenian connection did not even exist." In a comment to a *YouTube* video, cited by Hancock (ibid.), one Armenian wrote: "Those people who built Portasar (the Armenian name of Göbekli Tepe) are here among the Armenians. Their spirits have transcended into the Armenian people of today."

A more notorious example is the case of the so-called Temple Mount in Jerusalem, which displays various strategies of utilizing heritage used by groups for gaining advantage over their opponents. These go from complete annihilation and elimination of the other's heritage to its negation by adoption, direct usurpation, or appropriation. Annihilation and elimination means that one group destroys another's heritage, both physically, politically and mentally. The ancient Assyrian and Babylonian methods of destroying conquered cities, the Roman devastation of Carthage and Jerusalem, or the Taliban's destruction of Buddha statues are just emblematic examples of collective consciousness. Similarly, Stalin's decision to flood the alleged territory of Sarkel – the medieval city of the Khazar Empire – with a new dam construction near Astrakhan was attributed to his desire to erase the memory of the Khazars, a subject sensitive to the Soviet era.

Negation, usurpation and appropriation may appear as more subtle means of elimination, but in fact they are no less radical, and perhaps even more so for the affected party. These measures are not only aimed at eliminating the heritage of the other both physically and in memory, materially and immaterially: they aspire to assume possession in place of the other. The victorious group does not destroy or erase the heritage in memory, but on the contrary adopts it by reclaiming it, while at the same time denying the rights of the previous owner. Examples: pagan heritage monuments (such as temples and other places of worship) are transformed into churches, churches are converted into mosques (such as the basilica of Jerusalem or the Hagia Sophia in Constantinople, which became a museum and recently a mosque again). Synagogues as well as mosques have been converted into churches in all parts of Spain after the expulsion of Muslims and Jews in 1492. This extends to other types of possessions, such as various instances of intellectual property. The Hebrew Bible became the property of Christian peoples, not to mention the Hebrew protagonists, such as patriarchs and prophets, who have been adopted or confiscated by various other cultures.

The sacred hill of Jerusalem, whose buildings were destroyed by the Babylonians and Romans, was partially rebuilt with a Byzantine church, which was later destroyed but finally rebuilt in 705 AD by the Caliph al-Walid in its form of basilica to function as a mosque. It became a church with the crusades after 1099, and then rehabilitated as a mosque under Sallah ad-Din (Saladin) in 1187. Popular traditions introduced the hill as the place where the patriarch Abraham took his son Isaac to be sacrificed to his god. Islam has erased Isaac from memory and replaced him with Ishmael. A holiday has been instituted to mark the event in the collective memory, namely the Feast of the Sacrifice (ʿīd al-aḍḥā; عيد الأضحى). It should be noted that this is not an indigenous pre-Islamic Arab tradition, because even the format of the name shows its Greek origin rather than Arabic or even Hebrew. It

was certainly meant to claim possession and consequently the symbolic value of the mount, expropriating it from the other parties involved.

In this war of possession, the double game of appropriation and substitution played its role in the treatment of names. For a long time, the hill received in Arabic the name of *Bayt al-Maqdis* ("The House of the Temple"), literal translation of the Hebrew *Bet ha-Miqdash* (בית המקדש), even giving its name to the entire city. This was later abbreviated to *Al-Quds* ("Holiness"), but recent conflicts have led Arab activists to take once more the name *Bayt al-Maqdis* to name organizations and institutions, such as The Jerusalem Center for Documentary Studies"[5] On the other hand, the current name of the mount in Arabic, i.e., "Noble Sanctuary" (*Al-Haram ash-Sharif,* الحرم الشريف), cuts all links with the original name.

This process of patrimonial usurpation and re-appropriation is still active thanks to the power of Internet diffusion used by journalists, semi-scientists and even Islamic religious authorities, who go so far as to even deny the historical existence of Judaic temples on the mount.[6]

Obviously, heritage is mobilized and exploited in the above-mentioned cases to win a symbolic but important geopolitical battle. Heritage itself is certainly neither the source nor the cause of most such conflicts. However, when a conflict is already taking place, even in situations where the arsenal of physical measures is effective in the hands of some party, stirring emotions by the excitement of heritage

---

[5] مركز بيت المقدس للدراسات التوثيقية (http://www.aqsaonline.org).

[6] The arguments in this regard are very varied and typically contradictory: some deny the existence of a Judaic temple ("there is lack of material evidence"), others deny that there is a link between "the Jews of today" and "The sons of Jacob, the Israelites of old". Another argument is promoting the idea that Moses, "the founder of Judaism," had nothing to do with Jerusalem, "since he was born and died in Egypt" (according to Islamic tradition). Another argument is that even though it is true that there were Judaic temples on the mount, the Arabs of Palestine are still "older than the Jews," being "of Canaanite origins."

always helps raising the level of commitment of the members of the groups involved. It seems that the need is even stronger and perhaps more effective when the group concerned is the weakest participant in the conflict and that symbolism can then become the last resort in the absence of other means. In such situations, even if there were no heritage resources available for such use, groups have no trouble inventing patrimonial repertoires on the spot and claiming they are old.

This use of heritage in conflict situations paradoxically helps heritage (and of course its adherents) retain its real potential or power at a time when it seems to have lost it. At least in Western countries, until recently, namely before new waves of immigration and terrorist threats, it seemed that people had become quite indifferent to heritage. It is widely recognized that it is becoming less and less a tool for socio-cultural organization and increasingly a revenue-generating commodity, especially by attracting exogenous people to the group to consume it in various ways, which in the most cases are simply expressed by tourism. In short, the use of heritage to encourage conflictual behavior obviously causes damage to the groups involved, but at the same time also prevents heritage from completely losing its power to generate or maintain cohesion.

Similar kind of unexpected care and interest for goods kept in some storehouse, like art canons or museums surprisingly erupt when someone makes an attempt to change their status in that storehouse. In a recent article, my colleagues Elias Torres, Antonio Monegal and I (Even-Zohar, Torres Feijó & Monegal 2019) dealt with attempts made in Italy, Portugal, and Brazil to remove certain canonical texts from the school curriculum. Although few people still ever read these texts nowadays, and schoolchildren do not particularly cherish them, when the mentioned measures were announced, or even hinted at, a large outcry, both learned and popular, erupted all of a sudden in those countries demanding withdrawal of the decisions. We commented that although the texts were for most people boring and hard to read, it was evidently unacceptable for them to think that they could be

eliminated from the world's literary canon, where they were recognized as part and parcel of the prestigious world canon.

Ancient rulers and modern national movements have tried to persuade populations at large that branded traits can be profitable, as well as mold their collective sentiments with it. This has been at least partly successful. Nevertheless, there are strong indications that in our actual world, such symbolic capitals are losing their power in either creating in-group consensus or generating prestige that is convertible to tangible profits for an inter-group competition. Many efforts and financial resources are invested by modern nations, or larger entities like the European Union, in preserving and propagating both material and ideational traits, branding them as valuable and making them part of local and global identities to be emulated by groups and individuals. In spite of all that, when it comes to stable and established societies, what seems to take place was diagnosed more than twenty years ago by Gísli Sigurðsson in his masterpiece "Icelandic national identity: From nationalism to tourism" (1996). His study indicates that while Icelanders have become relatively indifferent to their heralded heritage, which includes volcanos, glaciers and geysers, Iceland is now flooded by tourists who deliberately come to see all those riches. Thus, as I suggested back in 2010,

> […] in established countries of the European Union, those which no longer have to legitimize their existence or justify the value of their legacies, legacy work is already often detached from identity work, serving the purpose of reinforcing the value of the assets on display for sale. When there is an abundance of objects and images, the state institutions involved with the promotion of legacies often mostly only work to facilitate the physical access to such assets (like places and monuments, books and manuscripts) or duly promote them via publications, visiting deals, or the Internet (Sigurðsson, 1996). On the other hand, for little known areas, or which need some economic injection, legacy objects and images may be dug from some imaginary or covert sources. In short, it would be justified to contend that heritage has become mostly a matter of competition about 'who has got

the better goods for sale,' while for the majority of people in everyday life they carry very little meaning. […] (Even-Zohar 2011: 36)

It would be proper to ask once more: "So who profit from heritage now?" The answer must be roughly the same: it is the ruling bodies and their elites that get the profit first in being able to negotiate status and position and gain prestige by attracting more tourism, and then by earning revenues from that industry. It cannot be contested that parts of the population at large also benefit, but other parts may begin to suffer from the touristic surplus, which have converted many sites to souvenir shops and drained normal life for the local residents. Entities like states or the European Union have learnt how to embellish this heritage commodification with a sophisticated jargon, provided by members of the educated classes, to actually initiate a new level of competition about desired assets by branding even banal tourism as motivated by high values of time-honored heritage. This is a clever strategy or a smoke screen if you wish.

In addition, *intra*group conflicts must also be mentioned as a case where heritage generates both profits and losses. I am referring to situations where ordinary people's ways of life are threatened not by an outside adversary but by their often democratically elected governing bodies. One of these cases is the harm done to the inhabitants of many urban neighborhoods by the authorities who decide to evacuate residents in order to perform what some researchers call "heritage-making" (heritageization, Hammami 2015, Harvey 2001, Smith 2006) namely, the use of available or fabricated assets to generate financial profit conditions to the detriment of local populations. According to Hammami and Uzer (2017),

> […] authorities select specific places and objects, and place value on them through processes of "heritageisation" […]. Such processes often provide authorities with legitimate and moral reason to intervene in people's daily lives […], and construct the historic and cultural values of places and objects. This may develop into enforced urban

change and result in "displacement" (Lees, Bang Shin, and López-Morales 2015), "gentrification" (Non 2016), "exclusion" (Ingram 2016), "marginalisation" (Wacquant 2007), "spatial cleansing" (Herzfeld 2006), or "alienation" of both built environment and community (Timothy and Guelke 2008). (Hammami et Uzer 2017 : 1)

In this type of clash between the heritage imposed from above and the emotions of local heritage "from below", we get evidence not only for how heritage causes damage to modern city dwellers, but also how it was executed in the past, even the most remote one, such as when building the pyramids subjected people to painful living conditions. In these cases, what is being carried out is setting one heritage against another, namely the official heritage, often fabricated or fake, against the heritage of people's daily lives.

Conclusion
Heritage agencies always tend to present it as an indispensable component of any culture, which performs useful and positive functions to improve the quality of life of any group vis-à-vis all the others through the acquisition of prestige, which is intended to produce benefits. The fact that the insistence on the necessity of heritage inevitably leads to the creation and amplification of rivalries is often ignored, as well as the fact that these rivalries generate conflicts with detrimental results for all parties involved. It is time for heritage research to take a critical look at this complex, to admit its dangerous consequences and raise universal awareness of them.

TEXTUAL EFFLORESCENCE AND SOCIAL RESOURCES: THE MEDIEVAL ICELANDIC CASE[1]

Abstract

The overt double function of culture traits and products, namely instrumentality and symbolicity, which may be explicit in some elements, often remains hidden for other ones. Cars as practical vehicles and signs of status may appear as an obvious case that does not need much explanation. In contrast, texts, especially those considered to be non–practical, seem to be a less obvious case. What useful or practical purposes can non–practical texts serve, and in what sense and to what extent may they become valuable possessions? These questions have been discussed in various scholarly traditions in a variety of ways, but somehow the operation of texts as a major factor in the creation of social resources and energy has not yet become a high priority issue on the agenda of whatever related disciplines. In this paper, I will attempt to draw attention to the relation between textual activity and social energy in connection mostly with the puzzling case of mediaeval Iceland.

The overt double function of culture traits and products, namely *instrumentality* and *symbolicity*, which may be explicit in some elements, often remains hidden for other ones. Cars as both practical vehicles and signs of status may appear as an obvious case that does not need much explanation. In contrast, texts, especially those considered to be non–practical, seem to be a less obvious case. What useful or practical purposes can non–practical texts serve, and in what sense and to what extent may they become valuable possessions? These questions have been discussed in various scholarly traditions in a variety of ways, but somehow the operation of texts as a major factor in the creation of social resources and energy has not yet become a high priority issue on

---

the agenda of whatever related disciplines. In this paper, I will attempt to draw attention to the relation between textual activity and social energy in connection mostly with the puzzling case of mediaeval Iceland.

"Textual symbolicity" means that the possession of texts *per se* is a symbol of prestige and status, thus allowing possessors to assume more privileges in any relevant context – an inner circle, a whole society, or a group of different societies – thus playing a role in the competition between individuals and groups. Shifting has been taking place along history between individual (by power–holders) and common possession (by an entire group). In periods when the very existence of a group has become contingent upon solidarity and cohesion among its members, common possessions have become indispensable. In such instances, language and texts were often pushed to the top of priorities for their easy diffusion and immediate consumability, in contradistinction to immovable objects (though even such objects could be diffused for sharing via language and texts).

The notion of "texts" should not be restricted to written ones only, though ever since the invention of writing, roughly by the end of the fourth millennium BCE in Mesopotamia, written texts tended to assume continually higher values than oral ones. However, oral texts persevered along history as natural production of everyday speech, as peripheral products of low status or dissident and subversive groups, or as the very opposite, that is, as the epitome of high authority and exclusive knowledge. Many texts of high status, which have become enduring items of institutionalized canons, were produced orally, *or presented as such*, before eventually making their way to script. Texts like the Gilgamesh epic, the Hebrew Bible, the New Testament, the Quran, the Mahabharata, the Iliad, the Talmud, and the Kalevala are all just few examples of this long–lasting tradition. It is accepted that the texts of the evangelists, for example, had to be perpetuated orally and partly in subversion before Christianity assumed power to become able to spread freely its gospel. The Talmud, on the other hand,

was written down as a planned project when it was feared that the texts rehearsed by generations (from 200 to 500 CE) could no longer be safely maintained orally.

In Iceland, the Law remained an oral text until the very end of the Commonwealth era, its reciting being the major obligation of the Law Speaker ((*lǫgsǫgumaðr*)) at the *Alþingi* ("General Assembly") several centuries after the dominance of textual writing in the country. Thus, Snorri Sturluson, a proliferous author of prominent historical and narrative texts, remained loyal to oral textuality in his long and repeated tenures as law–speaker, in spite of the fact that a written compilation of laws (the now lost *Hafliðaskrá*) had already existed since 1117–1118 as a consequence of the *Alþingi*'s decision. As Gísli Sigurðsson (2004a: 57) puts it, "[the law–speaker's] power and prestige was based not on a book, as happened within the Church, but on knowledge that the lawspeaker had had to acquire from the lips of other wise men". Quoting a passage from *Grágás*, Gísli comments:

> […] the power this lack of a book to consult on points of dispute puts into the hands of a small group of legal experts who were able to decide among themselves on what was law and what was not. In light of what is said later about Hafliði Masson's connections with the episcopal sees of Skálholt and Hólar, the writing up of the law at Breiðabólstaður in the winter of 1117-8 may be viewed as the first step in a movement led by the allies of the Church to encroach upon the secular domain of the lawspeakers, a domain in which the Church was later to exercise considerable influence (Sigurðsson 2004a: 58).[2]

Consequently, there is no reason to assume that the law–speakers "necessarily have found it a great relief to their overtaxed memories to have the law fixed in writing – as modern scholars seem to assume when they express astonishment that the law was not put into writing earlier" (Ibid.: 59), which finally leads Sigurðsson to the conclusion that "there is in fact *no* compelling reason to suppose that it came as a

---

[2] This view was propounded by Gísli Sigurðsson already in Sigurdsson 1994

relief to the lawspeakers to have the law in written form. On the contrary, they may well have been proud of their knowledge and looked upon the oral exercise and learning of the law as an essential part in the training of young lawmen" (Ibid.: 60; see also Kjartansson 2009).

The oral or written state of the so-called Icelandic sagas, on the other hand, seems to be less clearly settled, with evidence pro and con alternately propounded through the last two hundred years, though it seems that no one contests the plausibility of oral traditions at the basis of at least some of the family sagas, and Gísli Sigurðsson's strong advocation in his significant book (2004a [Icelandic: 2002]) for dropping the controversy altogether to benefit from the advantages of oral traits analysis is very appealing.

Both oral and written texts could thus get and confer power, status and prestige. The ability to produce or have produced them as well as materially possess them has become a matter of value. Groups with a rich canon could look down upon groups with a poor or no canon at all, and the possession, whether symbolic (like "we have got Shakespeare") or material (like "we have got the original manuscripts of the sagas") conferred better competitive positions, which in turn could serve as legitimation for all sorts of actions and claims over territories and resources. For example, even though Iceland declared its independence in 1944, it was only in 1971, when the agreement with Denmark on the return of the manuscripts was signed, that "the final confirmation that Iceland had gained its independence from Denmark" was received (Sigurðsson 1996: 60–61).[3] An opposite case, which I find to be rare evidence of the frustration of the non-possessors, was delivered by the Ukrainian writer Oksana Zabuzhko, who claimed that "if

---

[3] Jón Karl Helgason discusses a previous repatriation attempt, the transfer of the national poet Jónas Hallgrímsson's bones from Denmark to Iceland in 1946 (Helgason 2003, 2011), but the initiative in that act was a private matter, it did not involve any animosities between Denmark and Iceland, and above all, as Helgason describes in detail, it did not create a spirit of national unification like the later repatriation of the sagas. However, it might have inspired the Icelandic government to initiate its more audacious project of "bringing the sagas home".

at the time Lesya Ukrainka and Mykhailo Kotsiubynskyi had been known in the world to the extent Tolstoy and Dostoevsky are, our country need not have given up its nuclear weapons. And this is not just a metaphor" (Zabuzhko 2007). In contradistinction to the failure of the Ukraine, in her view the USSR gained success even in its darkest terror days based on the reputation of the Russian literary texts. (For further discussion of this case, see "The complexity of culture and the sustainability of groups."

According to the rule of canon (Sela-Sheffy 2002), prestigious texts need not be at the same time texts in circulation as working tools (Even-Zohar 2002a). Tokens of status, whether material or immaterial, may shift between direct and indirect instrumental states. Thus, a text that is no longer directly active as such may be recycled or "revived" to become one at some point. On the whole, it is not always clear which the major function is in a given case, thus allowing us to think of a given situation of textual activity as potentially always doubly functional. Actually, the distinction may become important not for periods when texts are directly active, but when they cease to be so and yet keep maintaining their impact via the market of valued goods.

By "directly active," I am referring to texts consumed by their contents. As such, they may become "tools" for a large range of tasks, the major ones being a source for interpreting the world as well as for acting within it. In other words, they function as *loci* of cultural repertoires, where solutions for the management of life that are known implicitly through cultural practices become explicitly formulated. As written grammars have made people conscious of the ways they use language and served as tools for teaching new generations how to maintain the language of their ancestors, so did texts deliver sets of options for managing life. This applies to all kinds of texts, direct and indirect, practical and non-practical. Since antiquity, we have got direct explicit sets of instructions, like compilations of laws and manuals. The Laws of Hammurabi (Harper 1904; Driver, Miles 1952–1955), or Kikkuli's ancient Hittite manual for the training and treatment of

chariot horses used in warfare[4] are certainly ones of the most promi-
nent in world history. Certainly most people would not find it concep-
tually difficult to think of such texts as directly instrumental.[5] The
question would arise for texts that seem to serve no instrumental pur-
pose whatsoever. The *Gilgamesh epic*, for example, may appear a puz-
zling case because it is difficult for us to understand what purpose it
might have served in the context of societies so remote to our own,
since thinking of it in terms of "literature", an institution already taken
for granted nowadays, would be extremely anachronistic. However,
no doubt it served an important purpose in view of the fact that it has
been repeatedly copied all over the Fertile Crescent for several centu-
ries and kept in royal libraries, quite like the Kikkuli manual, as well
as almost verbatim embedded in texts produced by other groups.[6]

The instrumental function of non-practical texts must then be
acknowledged in view of their production and consumption by so
many human societies along history. There is of course a well-known
argument, which explains their existence by the primeval human pro-
clivity for telling stories as pastime entertainment. It is believed to
have been permeating the life of human societies to such a degree that

---

[4] This text, found in the royal archive of the Hittite capital Ḫattuša (now Boğazkale in
Turkey), is a 13th century BCE Neo–Hittite rendition of the original. According to some
scholars, this redaction corrects the non-proficient use of Hittite in previous redactions
(from the later 15th and 14th centuries), a feature I find to reinforce the practical nature
of the original redactions, and possibly evidence of the high standing of the latest one
(known in Hittitology as CTH 284; see Raulwing 2006 for a detailed discussion, and
Raulwing 2006: 62, for discussion of the level of linguistic mastery).

[5] The Laws of Hammurabi contain not only laws, but also self–praises where Ham-
murabi describes himself as someone who has come to rule under the aegis of the
gods, and made laws "to cause justice to prevail in the land, to destroy the wicked
and the evil, to prevent the strong from oppressing the weak, [...] to enlighten the
land and to further the welfare of the people" (Harper 1904: 3, 99).

[6] For example, the main story and certain phrases in the history of the flood in the
book of Genesis are fully identical to those in the *Gilgamesh epic*, though the narrative
framework and the names of the protagonists are different. Another reincarnation
surfaces in *Landnámabók* in the story of Flóki (see Cleworth 2009 with further bibli-
ography).

groups that lack this trait are therefore often considered to be exceptional rather than typical.[7] Whether this is true or not, beyond entertainment, or perhaps as its very *raison d'être*, these texts may function like the overtly practical sets of instructions, or even more powerfully than the latter, since indirectness may often work more efficiently than directness. Telling a story about a poor peasant robbed on his way to the town market, but then compensated by the local governor as a gesture of *Mâat* (justice; see Assmann 1989) may be a more powerful promotion for the advantages of the state than some abstract law that stipulates such a treatment (like Hammurabi's Law, §23).[8] By not instructing but providing representations of possible situations, such texts may thus better function as models for matters allowed, possible or prohibited. As such, they have been able to serve along history variegated purposes of human and societal control, obviously also playing for power and domination. We may therefore conceive of them not as some secondary type, one that may have emerged as it were in the history of humankind when people got some free time from more urgent tasks (such as training horses or regulating traffic), but as a primary one that may have emerged prior to or in parallel with practical texts.

In short, while urgent tasks of regulation must often be addressed by overt and explicit instructions, persuasion and cohesion can better be achieved indirectly through what might be taken as credible life illustrations in the form of parables and stories. A commonly accepted "legitimizing discourse, a mode of persuasion which would secure consent" (Lawrence 1996: 59) turns out to be a profitable investment. Clearly, when at unsettled states, namely either emergent, in the pro-

---

[7] For example, Daniel Everett (2011) considers the Pirahã people in the Amazonas to be such a case.

[8] "If the brigand be not captured, the man who has been robbed, shall, in the presence of god, make an itemized statement of his loss, and the city and the governor, in whose province and jurisdiction the robbery was committed, shall compensate him for whatever was lost" (Hammurabi's Law, §23, Harper 1904: 19).

cess of getting organized, or in crisis, a group is in critical need to create agreements for regulating the relations among its members, such as tell each other who is who, that is, who has got more rights and who must obey, who can claim possessions and who cannot, and so on. This is why we often find textual efflorescence to be more intense at such moments and perhaps more so within small rather than large entities. Although this requires much more historical scrutiny, it seems that the governing principle here is the degree of establishedness. The more established the power, the less efflorescence takes place. The more there is need for justification, legitimation and creating consent, the more likely it is for texts to multiply.

Societies in flux obviously need to establish themselves rather intensely. Flux situations may arise under diverse conditions, such as migration, loss of political control, forced or voluntary unification, secession, and more. Establishing agreements, setting up a system of trust (Fukuyama 1995), or otherwise accumulating social capital (Lin 1995, 2010) become an urgent task both on the collective and individual levels. It concerns the group as well as each single one of its individual members, since the chances of both to survive and proceed for better positions in the internal and external competition networks depend on the amount of social capital eventually accumulated.

Icelandic Textual Efflorescence

The case of mediaeval Iceland perfectly suits these conditions at several historical points. The long-perpetuated puzzlement as to how we can explain the fact that more texts have been produced in Iceland than in almost any other territory in Europe may get one more answer added to the stock of extant ones. Indeed, if one thinks in terms of large and small, or central and peripheral societies, one could have expected to find such textual efflorescence rather elsewhere, that is, anywhere in Scandinavia or Europe between the Black Sea and the Atlantic Ocean. However, it is precisely because such countries as Denmark, Norway or Sweden are relatively established entities in the

11th century, and because their population has been sedentary, their basic cultural – including socio-political and economic – agreements accepted, there is no wonder why no major efforts had to be invested there in creating or diffusing what seems to have been basically resolved. In contradistinction, Icelanders had to deal with their origins, create genealogies to legitimize their possession of lands or make explicit their relations with the other members of society, establish their system of government, and invest much energy in regulating their language – all in order to make life possible in the new territory they had come to occupy. Like the ancient Israelites they probably memorized their genealogies for several centuries before these were written down, described who has taken which territory (*Landnámabók*, "The Book of Settlement"), put forth histories of the Nordic past, Norway, Iceland and Greenland, the Faroe Islands and even went back to telling about mythical times (*Íslendingabók*, "The Book of the Icelanders", *Heimskringla*, "The History of the Norwegian Kings", and more). They wrote stories that served for all of the above, combining genealogies with the histories of prominent families involved in struggles over a large range of various claims.

What should not be overlooked in this context, although too often taken for granted, is the fact that all this activity took place in the vernacular, which became comparatively standardized in terms of the times. Icelandic thus was not marginalized as most vernaculars in other parts of the Latinized Europe. On the contrary, the adoption of the Roman alphabet has given it its operational fundament. It soon developed as a language sufficiently distinct from the other Nordic languages, including Norwegian.[9] This is strong evidence of domestic

---

[9] See Stefán Karlsson's extensive discussion (1979) of the difference between Icelandic and Norwegian, in particular the characteristically Norwegian traits ("norvagismer") in the manuscripts imported from Iceland to Norway. "The divide between the languages increased in the thirteenth and still more in the fourteenth century" (Karlsson 2004: 9), when even norwegianized Icelandic could no longer be understood in Norway.

rather than "international" targeting, in sharp contrast with the rest of mediaeval Christendom. Just for illustration, in contrast with *Land-námabók*, *Íslendingabók* and *Heimskringla*, texts written in Latin such as *Gesta Hungarorum* (see note 15 below) that eventually played a formative role in 19th century Hungarian nationalism, were targeted towards Italy and other parts of civilized Europe and hardly had any significance for the contemporary local population.[10]

The Israelites wrote down the story about their exodus from Egypt and their occupation of the Land of Canaan. If this was a true account of their history, they had to explain to themselves where they had come from and in what right they had taken the land from other groups who lived there. If this was not a true account, as maintained by some modern archaeologists (see Finkelstein et al. 2007), then they had to invent those stories in order to legitimize their separate identity. The Icelanders, a similarly immigrant group, created the story of their exodus from Norway and told the story about how the land they discovered was empty and hospitable. This story, too, does not appear to be fully credible. Various testimonies in the Icelandic sources themselves mention the Celtic origins of Icelanders. Some thoughts by revisionist historians based on carbon tests and other materials,[11] and the Icelandic genome project that has revealed that "63% of Icelandic female settlers were of Celtic origin and had ancestral lines traceable to the British Isles" (*The Origins of the Icelanders* 2010; see also Helgason 2004) now reinforce the view that the mediaeval narrative was created within the framework of a propagated historical image. Nevertheless, no doubt the fact that most males indeed derived from Norway had

---

[10] "[…] the work was originally commissioned for propagandists' purposes, specifically with a view to an Italian audience. […] The whole structure of the work is influenced by the intention to demonstrate that Hungary was always a lawful polity, in which even its Hunnish predecessors lived and were ruled *Romano more*, and where the workings of government as well as the relations between free and servile elements were based on customary and statute law" (Veszprémy & Schaer 1999: xx).

[11] An account of some of these studies is given by Smith 1995. For some later studies, see Wallace 2003 and 2009.

its impact on both self-image and actual relations between Iceland and Norway, eventually leading to Norwegian claims over Iceland, which were fully effected in the 13th century by the Icelanders' acceptance of Norwegian sovereignty. This could not have occurred without the long-held treatment of Norway as the mother homeland of Iceland, a position that had allowed the Norwegian kings to meddle between settlers (at least according to Hauk's version of *Landnámabók*), enforce Christianity around 1000, and otherwise interfere in Icelandic politics and trade during the Commonwealth era.

The idea that the Icelandic texts emerged and proliferated for concrete purposes of self–promotion, political and social gains has been expressed time and again by many, especially Icelandic, scholars often in connection with particular texts. Jakob Benediksson's (1978) and Sveinbjörn Rafnsson's (1974; 2001) argument that *Landnámabók* "manipulates genealogical and historical traditions to legitimate twelfth – and thirteenth –century elite families' claims to property and prerogative" (Smith 1995: 320) are well known. Lönnroth, who extensively supports the idea that *Njál's Saga* was written "from the standpoint of the Svinfelling family" (1976: 178) to promote the family's status claims, acknowledges Barði Guðmundsson as probably the first to have raised this hypothesis (Guðmundsson 1937; 1958). Another well–known example is the case of *Erik's Saga*, succinctly summarized by Birgitta Wallace as follows:

> Scholars have shown that *Erik's Saga* was written to support the canonization of Bishop Björn Gílsson, who died in 1162 [...]. An account of illustrious and exceptional ancestors was expected to accompany any petition for beatification and Bishop Björn was a direct descendant of Thorfinn Karlsefni and Gudrid Thorbjarnardóttir. Furthermore, Law Speaker Hauk Erlendsson, who edited the *Hauk's Book* version of *Erik's Saga*, was himself also a direct descendant of Thorfinn and Gudrid, removed from them by nine generations. Hence, the roles of Thorfinn Karlsefni and Gudrid were greatly magnified and embellished, while those of Leif Eriksson and his family almost vanished altogether (Wallace 2003: 10).

Similar assertions have been expressed in connection with various other sagas. In general terms, it has been suggested by major scholars of the saga texts, like Hallberg, Durrenberger and Hastrup, that "these texts were written to preserve a sense of cultural unity when Icelandic independence was crumbling or to create a sense of identity when the society was developing" (Smith 1995: 320).

Quite recently, however, a more comprehensive position was powerfully propounded by Axel Kristinsson in a number of works (Kristinsson 2003; 2004; 2010, esp. 211–228), where he made a connection between 13th century text production and the *political division* of Iceland. In contradistinction to other mediaeval societies, where similar texts may have served the same purpose,[12] Axel Kristinsson believes that Iceland produced more saga texts simply because "it was divided into a large number of autonomous political units, all requiring some means to help them survive in a hostile environment" (Kristinsson 2003: 2). He thus accepts the idea that the need for self-promotion grows where the environment is hostile, while a relatively peaceful environment that is free of conflicts might not have necessitated the release of such energies.

Kristinsson's convincing argument (substantiated by a detailed discussion of the relevant texts) has the advantage of being concretely linked to more specific conditions of the 13th century than hitherto suggested. My argument, in contrast, is less concrete and thus may

---

[12] For example, Ström believes that in the 10th century "the struggle for power, lasting through several generations, between the Norwegian royal house and the dynasty of the jarls of Northern Norway" (1981: 456) produced a plethora of skaldic poetry that overwhelmingly supported the case of the *jarls*, in particular Hákon Jarl's (937–995) case against Ólafr Tryggvason and Ólafr Haraldsson. However, I would like to recall that when the struggle eventually terminated with the victory of the royal dynasty, these skaldic texts were no longer preserved in Norway, probably because no longer necessary and certainly because grossly at clash with the now dominating Christianity. The texts are mostly known to us from the Icelandic compilations, in particular Snorri's *Edda*.

seem weaker in the sense that it does not refer to concrete relations between specific texts and specific power-holders. However, beyond the matters of defending by verbal products the positions of particular power-holders in conflict with their peers, my contention is that the texts eventually created, even if not intended to do so, *social agreements* and consequently *increased social capital*.[13] While there is no contradiction between the arguments, they do present somewhat different perspectives. In Kristinsson's view, *each division* had to make an utmost effort to produce self-images for self-legitimation. My contention is that the *totality* of the production may have helped create the overall balance of power, which is basically what we normally call "social pacts" without which society as a whole, and not just certain of its members, would not survive. In other words, my argument is that the accumulated "noise" generated by those texts actually produced *social energy*, meaning access to resources and a network of sustained interactions.

A support for this view as a whole I dare say to have found in an exceptional insight – by some sort of a closer insider – about the relation between textual efflorescence and textual decline in connection with status and power struggles. I am referring to the 19th century Jón Espolin, "Bailiff of the Skagarfjord County," who made a heroic effort to revive historical records mostly for the periods when there was no longer interest in continuing the records or anything like the older texts. In his preface to the second volume of his monumental *Íslands árbækur í söguformi* ("Iceland's Annals in a Narrative Form"), he briefly expressed the view that security in power makes texts and records dispensable. In his view, the fact that after the death of so many people in the plague of 1402–1404 wealth accumulated at the hands of so few made these very few so secure in their social positions that they no

---

[13] As for the function of this kind of industry in generating cultural capital, see Tulinius 2004, esp. pp. 8–12.

longer had to toil for keeping it against competitors.[14] Actually, this may also be a correct description of the situation that had prevailed during the first generations after the settlement.

According to the accepted dating of the Icelandic texts, they did not emerge immediately at the early time of the settlement, but at a much later time, in the 12th century and onwards. Social arrangements also took some time to crystallize. The most significant event in the emergence of social order, the foundation of the *Alþingi*, did not take place until 930, which is more than 60 years after the believed first colonization. A comparison with other societies, from the deepest antiquity to much later periods, shows that this is by no means unique. Even in cases presented as organized mass migration and conquests, like the exodus of the Israelites and their conquest of the Land of Canaan, or the Magyars' exodus to conquer the Basin of Pannonia (896–900),[15] social arrangements and text production took several generations to

[14] "Enn í hinni XVdu öndverðri kom plágann mikla, féll þá allr forn dugnadr, ok allt atferli af fólksfæd, enn sumir menn urdu sva audugir, at þeirra gætti einna samann í landinu, ok þurftu ei at ástunda fornra manna yðun, þó mannfolkid fjölgadi nokkuð aptr, því féd vann fyrir. Við þat aflagðist allr áhugi til annars frama enn auds, ok giördist vanþekkíng mikil um allt þat er ádr var, ok hyrduleysi á því at terkna upp þat er á þeirra dögum skedi, ok hverskyns lærdomsléysi, enn rostr urdu þat at eins, er rikismönnum, fraendum eda mágum bar samann um fiár edr arfadeilr, ok efldust þær því meira, sem þeir fiölgudu meira, ok urdu fiærskyldari." (Espolin 1823, "Formáli" [no page number]; the quotation is brought here in its original spelling). "But during the first half of the 15th century a great plague struck, consequently all earlier vigor disappeared, but some men became so wealthy that they were the only ones of significance in the country, and did not have to work as people did in the earlier days, even if the population grew again, since the capital worked for them. Consequently, (people) were only interested in wealth, and became very ignorant about how things were before, and uninterested in reporting (?) what happened in their own times, and lacked education, but (life) became ferocious as officials, cousins or brothers-in-law disputed over cash or inheritance, and (these classes) were more fierce as they grew in number and the parties were more distant relatives». (I am grateful to Jón Karl Helgason for the translation of this passage).

[15] Hungarian historiography names the Magyar conquest of Pannonia "Land-taking" (*Honfoglalás*, "the settlement in the fatherland", literally: "the taking of the home"). It

crystallize. I believe that Birgitta Wallace's phrasing would be perfect here: "A colony is not created overnight. [...] Developing further settlement and freeing up labor for new enterprises takes time, especially in a hitherto uninhabited area" (Wallace 2009: 116).

If we adopt the current hypothesis that proposes a relation between competition and the need to make socio-cultural arrangements, then clearly the first settlers may not have got involved in fierce competition because there was sufficient arable land for all, a situation that unavoidably changed in subsequent generations, when large land properties had to be divided between many offspring, border conflicts intensified and clashes of interests grew wildly. In addition, although writing was known in the runic alphabet, only the decision to become part of the Christian world – thus entering into relations of comparison, competition and interaction with various centers in Europe (like Paris, Rome or Hamburg) – enabled the Icelanders, as well as actually pressured them, to engage in written textual production. The need to go through all of the procedures to establish themselves (as described above) thus did not prevail until roughly the 12th century, when history and other stories were consequently written in accordance with the contemporary views and priorities.

Some scholars, such as Callow (2006), raise doubts about the acceptability of the dating of the texts discussed above. In his view, some texts may have been produced earlier than thought. On the other hand, as mentioned above, others no longer accept the canonical history of Icelandic settlement propounded by the canonized texts. In their view, the group that originally settled in Iceland may not have been the one that eventually created order and imposed its memory through its texts. Whatever might be the case, growing rivalry and

---

is not a mediaeval notion but rather a modern coinage, probably based on the German *Landnahme* (Róna-Tas 1999: xviii), though others contest that (I am grateful to Görgy Kálmán for this communication). The first historical works, notably Simon of Keza's *Gesta Hungarorum*, were produced in Hungary in the 13th century (Veszprémy & Schaer 1999), that is, about three hundred years after the settlement.

conflagration of clashing interests gradually paved the way for the creation of hegemonic versions about origins and about families. These were designed to eliminate all other voices, whether those of the possibly original descendants of the first settlers, or more plausibly those of the other contemporary contenders.

While an emerging society may quickly need to establish agreements, if, on the other hand, dominant agents immediately take the lead without the others' ability to contest, then those agents do not need to account for their actions. It is only when society proliferates and disagreement grows as a result of a larger population and larger density combined with diminishing resources (like land, water, and pastures) that the need for agreements begins to be pressuring. This process in Iceland was slow (Kristinsson 2010: 219), but around 1200 there was a "rather sudden breakthrough of elitization [...] when the level of wealth among the richest men increased about tenfold in just a few decades, [which] seems to have been the result of a positive feedback loop between the concentration of wealth and the concentration of power" (Ibid.: 219).

However, since the leaders have not been able, or had no interest, to devise a central power state like the Scandinavian ones, the need for persuading and demonstrating one's prominence, including by verbalism that appeals to peoples' imagination and emotions, must have been bigger than elsewhere. "Without central power to execute law and order, true power rested with networks of kinship and allegiance. Social and political survival depended on the number of allies that could be mustered in times of conflict" (Vésteinsson et al. 2002: 19).

For Whom the Bell Tolls? By Whom and How the Texts were Consumed?
The discussion of texts quite often stops at the level of production (and producers' intentions). The type of questions raised in this paper does not allow contending with text consumption taken for granted. The very essence of my argument has been that the Icelandic texts served

for communal and public purposes, even when motivated by individual or group interests. Without "target audience," it would make no sense to support such an argument, as it would *ipso facto* become void of any meaning. I do not pretend that this is an easy question to answer. After all, generations of scholars have been engaged with this question for a large variety of text productions all over the globe. However, I believe that it simply cannot be ignored. What is meant by "consumption," however, should not be confounded with literary scholarship ideas about "reception" (as in Vodička's *reception history* [Galan 1982], or Hans-Robert Jauss's later *Rezeptionsästhetik*). There are no "texts" here to be "read" as "literary works of art" by individual "readers," but rather stories to be communicated, through reading or in various degrees of oral performance, to sought-after groups and individuals whose consent and support are solicited.

Assertions about the purpose of texts to confer legitimacy, and hence justify often-dubious actions, permeate not only literary but also historical and philological scholarship. These texts are thus explained in the light of their assumed purpose. For example, "The entire Ögödei story is a later interpolation which served purely the legitimacy of the Tolui branch",[16] [*] explains Róna-Tas (1999: 417–418) in his discussion of the story of the puzzling ascent to power of Genghis Khan's second son Ögödei instead of his elder brother, who supposedly ceded his primogeniture. However, Róna-Tas, as so many others, typically finds it unnecessary to explain who the people are from whose consent to this act as legitimate is solicited. Although the story appears in a passage in the rather obscure 13th century *Secret History of the Mongols*, it seems that the question of the sought after target group and the conjectured ways by which it has been reached to be convinced does not constitute a problem that calls for some elucidation. This example could be multiplied, and it therefore seems to me imperative to try to

---

[16] This refers to the family of Tolui, the youngest son of Genghis Khan, whose line ruled Outer and Inner Mongolia from 1251 to 1635, and Outer Mongolia until 1691.

avoid falling into the same trap with our hypotheses about textual efflorescence.

The methods often used for checking the use of texts rely on various sorts of evidence. One method is accumulating recorded written testimonies about the ways texts have been consumed. Another one is the existence of a significant number of copies. If the relevant texts were copied in schools as part of the curriculum (as is the case in the Sumerian, Egyptian or Akkadian and Babylonian schools), this may be taken as evidence of their high consumption. The physical condition of texts can also render some information about their use: in every library, there is wear and tear of the books massively loaned and read. In Jewish tradition, texts that have reached a state of complete wear have not been thrown away but buried in the ground or cached in an attic.[17] A criterion that deserves to be explored, particularly in the Icelandic context, is Driscoll's suggestion (2004) about writings on the margins of manuscripts, recently vividly expounded by Schott (2010).

In the case of the Icelandic texts, we have indeed some glimpses about habits of reading. Everyone knows the passage from *The Saga of the Sturlungs* about Þorgils Skarði who is asked by his host what kind of entertainment (*gaman*) he would prefer to have in the evening: "stories or dance". Þorgils chooses to hear the story about Thomas of Canterbury, and "var þá lesin sagan" (the story was then read) to him (*Sturlungasaga*, Vigfússon's edition 1878: 245, Ch. 314). However, the enthusiasm with which this passage has been repeatedly quoted has long been toned down (notably Pálsson 1962), but in some views, it is not without value as it can be supported by what some scholars describe as a long continuity in Icelandic society to justify such conclusions.[18]

---

[17] The most famous example is the invaluable treasure of some 280,000 fragments of medieval texts that was found in the attic of the Ben Ezra Synagogue in Cairo around 1896; many of them were books of unquestionably high circulation.

[18] "Manuscripts were read out loud in the Middle Ages, and as book ownership became more common in later centuries this custom continued, even after printing had begun. In his description of Iceland from 1590, Oddur Einarsson says that farmers in

As for copying, there is "likelihood that more medieval manu-scripts have been lost than preserved" (Ólason 2004: 32), not to men-tion the disastrous Copenhagen fire of 1728 that destroyed a number of manuscripts (though the major part of Árni Magnússon's collection survived intact or in paper copies). The current state of copies thus cannot be interpreted as a safe indication of consumption. It might not be insignificant that there are more copies of certain sagas, such as *Njál's Saga*, than of other texts. This possibly points to its higher pop-ularity than other texts for which exits only one copy. On the other hand, of a formative text like *Landnámabók* only five copies are extant today, and only two of them are full versions, though in 18th century paper copies. This criterion need thus also be handled very cautiously.

Finally, we can plausibly infer much from the physical condition of the Icelandic manuscripts. Most of them, like the Cairo *Genizah* texts, are quite worn: the vellum is inflexible and the page tends to be dark. The text is not always easily legible either, because the characters are blurred or faded. All historians of the manuscripts have interpreted that as evidence of much use, and also because the manuscripts were "kept in sooty, damp turf–built farm-houses" (Guðmundsdóttir & Guðnadóttir 2004: 46), though other explanations have been sug-gested. This is normally contrasted with the current good condition of

---

Iceland entertained and delighted their guests by reading for them for hours from the sagas. In the eighteenth century it was still the main form of leisure in the evenings to read the old Icelandic Sagas and recite ballads, a custom which continued into the twentieth century" (Sigurðsson 2004a: 8).

In Jón Karl Helgason's opinion, "[t]he contemporary documentation of how these texts were utilized between 1300 and 1600 is scarce, but as Pálsson [1962] has convincingly illustrated, we may suppose that semi–public readings of family sagas and various forms of non–secular literature were a favourite pastime on Icelandic farms in this pe-riod. [...] This tradition of reading, which continued into the twentieth century, reveals how the typical Icelandic audience of the ancient sagas initially received these narra-tives in oral form. And just as individual scribes rewrote the manuscripts they were transcribing – adding and omitting words, sentences, verses and even passages – so one can imagine that each reading (or performance) of a particular manuscript would be different from another" (Helgason 2008: 65–66).

the Norwegian royal manuscripts, as well as the Icelandic manuscripts kept in Norway that have remained more flexible and lighter, plausibly because they were less frequently taken to be read, and at any rate used under much better conditions and by fewer individuals. Nevertheless, it must be borne in mind that we cannot know anything about the condition of the manuscripts in periods closer to their making, i.e., between the 12th and the 15th centuries. Their condition might have worsened even without connection with their use as reading material, since towards the end of the 18th century, when Árni Magnússon began collecting them, many of them were simply dumped in some unused storage. The revered precautions taken with the vellums are recent. 19th century saga philologists did not hesitate to try and read difficult lines with a wet finger, and even more technologically advanced methods like quartz lamps used in the 1940s by such a prominent saga scholar as Einar Ólafur Sveinsson are now considered harmful. In short, while the state of the vellums can be interpreted as evidence of their ample use in the last seven hundred years or so, it is not at all inferable that at the time discussed here their condition was so deteriorated.

It goes without saying that the popularity of texts need not be interpreted in terms of silent reading. Since antiquity, relatively few people could read texts by themselves, and therefore these had to be read aloud to them (Gitay 1980: 191; Redford 1992: 66; Silverman 1990; Niditch 1996)[19] Texts that were of particular importance to power–holders would be distributed publicly by such loud reading. This method could also better guarantee more attention and certainly more control over the audience. Obviously, people need not really listen if coerced to attend such reading events, but few would stand temptation if the text happens to tell an attractive story, full of adventure, conflicts, hatred, love, and humor.

---

[19] "Even solitary readers, reading only to themselves, read aloud. [...] Reading was therefore oral performance whenever it occurred and in whatever circumstances. Late antiquity knew nothing of the 'silent, solitary reader'" (Achtemeier 1990: 16).

When Nehemiah, assisted by the priest Ezra, re–built – or some would say invented – the Jewish nation after the return from Babylonian exile, they set up public reading of the scriptures:

> And Ezra the scribe stood upon a pulpit of wood, which they had made for the purpose [.]. And Ezra opened the book in the sight of all the people; (for he was above all the people;) and when he opened it, all the people stood up. [.] [and] all the people wept, when they heard the words of the law (*Neh.*, 8, 4–9, King James Version).

One could say that in the above description, the Israelites that were summoned to the congregation became captive audience of the reading performance. What possible parallel could be conceived for the diffusion of the stories of the sagas?

If the texts indeed had to play a role and achieve some results (as clearly is the situation surmised by Axel Kristinsson), then one should need to reach interested listeners. Can we even entertain the idea that a hostile clan might wish to listen to stories about some rival clan with whom they have some feud? I believe that this is highly unlikely. I also believe that we must exclude the possibility that in the period discussed here the texts travelled freely, like modern books, around the country, with some mediaeval colporteur as it were or a travelling entertainer. Although some texts may have circulated in such ways, and some have found their way to remote countries, like Norway (Karlsson 1979), we must recognize that the suggested propaganda or promotion was meant primarily not for adversaries but for *actual or potential allies and friends*. It was meant to reinforce their loyalty or at least gain their acquiescence, along the same lines that national texts began to play a role in creating cohesion and consent through massive diffusion by the modern European states since the end of the 18th century. In Iceland, it was the power–holder who probably not only made it financially possible for someone to write, compile or copy texts, as well as provide the necessary expensive materials (vellum and ink), but also had the means to gather people for reading sessions.

Such sessions were often taking place in connection with feasts and banquets. "Feasting was a central part of the chiefly societies of the North-Atlantic, a means to cement bonds of friendship and dependence and to impress competitors, and reflects the prestige-based social economy of the settlement age" (Vésteinsson et al. 2002: 19). In the banquets, many good dishes were served "that included sea fish, eggs, milk, cheese, lamb, beef and even some beer" (Ibid.: 19). I would like to add to the list of "sea fish, eggs, milk, cheese, lamb, beef and even some beer" also another important ingredient that has long been acknowledged – text performance. This is not to say that it was the most important component of the party, but it must have been a unique occasion to tempt people to listening.

In Lieu of a Conclusion

This study is not about the literary nature of texts, but rather an attempt to draw attention to their major function in the creation of social resources. Without such resources, human groups, whether large or small, cannot manage efficiently. Theories of social capital have suggested that in want of such capital there is more likelihood for a general failure in terms of survival and adaptation. Icelandic society between the 12th and the 14th centuries managed to generate complex socio-cultural arrangements under the tough conditions of absence of enforcement governance and growingly wild rivalry between local power-holders. It is the modern tradition of viewing texts and their production almost exclusively in the context of "literature" that often impedes understanding what powerful role they may have had in various crucial moments in human history. And Iceland had definitely one of such moments in the specified centuries. What happens with these texts in later centuries, the emergence of text compilations as precious goods, their recycling since the late 18th century for purposes of achieving prestige, and their use for the project of nation building are of course different historical chapters.

REFERENCES

Achtemeier, Paul J. 1990. "Omne verbum sonat: The New Testament and the Oral Environment of Late Western Antiquity." *Journal of Biblical Literature* 109 (1), pp. 3-27.

Acton, John Emerich Edward Dalberg 1967. *Essays in the Liberal Interpretation of History: Selected Papers*. McNeill, William Hardy, ed. Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press.

Arnason, Johann P. 2004. "Icelandic Anomalies." *Thesis Eleven*. 77, pp. 103-120.

Arnason, Ragnar, Rögnvaldur Hannesson & William E. Schrank 2000. "Costs of Fisheries Management: The Cases of Iceland, Norway and Newfoundland," *Marine Policy*, Volume 24, Issue 3, May 2000, pp. 233-243.

Arneborg, Jette.& Gullöv, H. C. Eds. 1998. *Man, culture and environment in Ancient Greenland: report on a research programme*. [=*Danish Polar Center publication*] no 4. Copenhagen: The Danish National Museum.

Assmann, Jan 1989. *Maât, l'Égypte pharaonique et l'idée de justice sociale*. [Paris]: Julliard.

Avishur, Yitzhak 1979. *Ketobot feniqiyot ve ha-miqra* [Phoenician Inscriptions and the Bible], I-II. Jerusalem: Rubinstein.

Azaña, Manuel 1990. *El problema español y Apelación a la república*. Madrid: Aguilar.

Bachrach, Peter & Morton S. Baratz 1962. "Two Faces of Power." *The American Political Science Review* 56 (4), pp. 947-952.

Barker, Joel Arthur 1992. *Future Edge: Discovering the New Paradigms of Success.* New York: W. Morrow.

Barth, Fredrik 1995. "Ethnicity and the Concept of Culture." Conference Proceedings "Rethinking Culture."

Bartoli, Paolo 1981. *Il condizionamento sociale*. Firenze: La Nuova Italia.

Benbabaali, Dalel 2016. "From the peasant armed struggle to the Telangana State: changes and continuities in a South Indian region's uprisings." *Contemporary South Asia* 24 (2), pp. 184-196.

Benediktsson, Jakob 1978. "Some problems in the History of the Settlement of Iceland." In *The Vikings: Proceedings of the Symposium of the Faculty of Arts of Uppsala University, June 6-9, 1977,* Andersson, Thorsten & Karl Inge Sandred, eds. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, pp. 161-165.

Bennett, Dirk 1997 "Chariot Racing in the Ancient World." *History Today*, Dec 1997 Vol. 47 No 12, pp. 41-48.

Ben-Simon, Daniel 1997. *A New Israel*. Tel Aviv: Nir & Modan. [Hebrew]

Berger, Peter Ludwig, & Thomas Luckmann 1966. *The Social Construction of Reality: Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge*. London: Penguin Press.

Beswick, Jaine 2002. "Galician Language Planning and Implications for Regional Identity: Restoration or Elimination?" *National Identities*, Vol. 4, No. 3, pp. 257-271.

Bietak, Manfred. 1981. *Avaris and Piramesse: Archaeological Exploration in the Eastern Nile Delta*. Mortimer Wheeler Archaeological Lecture. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bietak, Manfred ed. 1995. *Trade, Power and Cultural Exchange: Hyksos, Egypt and the East.* Vienna: Osterreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften.

Blaug, Marc 1986. *Economic History and the History of Economics*. New York: NYU Press.

Borgen, William A., Norman E. Amundson and Jonathan McVicar 2002. "The experience of unemployment for fishery workers in Newfoundland: what helps and hinders." *Journal of Employment Counseling*, Volume 39, pp. 117-126.

Bourdieu, Pierre 1971. "Le marché des biens symboliques." *L'année Sociologique* 22, pp. 49-126.

Bourdieu, Pierre 1979. *La distinction : critique sociale du jugement.* Paris: Editions de Minuit.

Bourdieu, Pierre. 1983 (1972). "Public Opinion does not Exist." *Communication and Class Struggle* (Vol. 1). Armand Mattelart & Seth Siegelaub eds., pp. 124-130.

Bourdieu, Pierre 1984. *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste.* Richard Nice Trans. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP.

Bourdieu, Pierre 1985. "The market of symbolic goods." *Poetics* 14 (1), pp. 13-44.

Braudel, Fernand 1976. *The Mediterranean and the Medfterranean World in the Age of Philip II*; trans. Siân Reynolds, New York: Harper and Row.

Brook, Kevin Alan 2006. *The Jews of Khazaria*. 2nd edition. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield.

Callow, Chris 2006. "Reconstructing the Past in Medieval Iceland." *Early Medieval Europe* 14 (3), pp. 297-324.

Cleworth, Betsie A.M. 2009. "An Icelandic Genesis." In *Á austrvega: Saga and East Scandinavia – Preprint Papers of The 14th International Saga Conference, Uppsala, 9th–15th August 2009,* Ney, Agneta, Henrik Williams & Fredrik Charpentier Ljungqvist, eds. Gävle: Gävle University Press, pp. 176-184.

Cline, Eric H. 2014. *1177 B.C.: The year civilization collapsed*. [=*Turning points in ancient history*]. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Crocker, Stephen 2001. "Hauled Kicking and Screaming into Modernity: Non-Synchronicity and Globalization in Post-War Newfoundland." *Topia*, Spring 2000, Issue 3, pp. 81-94.

Davis, J. 1994. "Social Creativity." In Hann, C. M. ed. 1994 *When History Accelerates: Essays on Rapid Social Change, Complexity and Creativity*, pp. 95-110. The Athlone Press: London and Atlantic Highlands, NJ.

De Mauro, Tullio 1984 [1963]. *Storia linguistica dell'Italia unita*. Roma-Bari: Laterza.

Diamond, Jared 2005. *Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed*. New York: Viking.

Diamond, Jared M. & James A. Robinson, eds. 2010. *Natural experiments of history*. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

Dietrich, Oliver, Manfred Heun, Jens Notroff, Klaus Schmidt, and Martin Zarnkow. 2012. "The role of cult and feasting in the emergence of Neolithic communities. New evidence from Göbekli Tepe, South-Eastern Turkey." *Antiquity* 86 (333), pp. 674–695.

Dodd, Philip 1986. "Englishness and the National Culture." In *Englishness: Politics and Culture 1880-1920*, Colls, Robert & Philip Dodd eds. London: Croom Helm, pp. 1-28.

Donner, Herbert, and Wolfgang Röllig 1971. *Kanaanäische und Aramäische Inschriften, I-II*. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz.

Driscoll, Matthew James. 2004. "Postcards from the Edge." *Variants: The Journal of the European Society for Textual Scholarship* 2-3, pp. 21-36.

Driver, Godfrey Rolles & John C. Miles 1952-1955. *The Babylonian Laws*, I-II. [=*Ancient Codes and Laws of the Near East*]. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Drucker, P E 1995. *Managing in a Time of Great Change*. New York.

During, Roel. 2010. *Cultural heritage discourses and Europeanisation: discursive embedding of cultural heritage in Europe of the regions*. Wageningen: Universiteit van Wageningen.

During, Roel, ed. 2011. *Cultural Heritage and Identity Politics*. Wageningen: Wageningen: Wageningen UR/ The Silk Road Research Foundation.

Durrenberger, E. P. 1992. *The Dynamics of Medieval Iceland: Political Economy and Literature*. Iowa City: University of Iowa Press.

Elias, Norbert & Richard Kilminster 1991. *The symbol theory*. Kilminster, Richard ed. London: Sage.

Elias, Norbert & Eric Dunning 1993. *Quest for excitement: Sport and leisure in the civilizing process*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Elias, Norbert 1994. *The civilizing process*. Dunning, Eric, Johan Goudsbfom & Stephen Mennell eds. Revised edition. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. [Jephcott, Edmund trans.]

Espólín, Jón 1823. *Íslands árbækur í sögu-formi*. Vol. II. Kaupmannahöfn: Íslenzka Bókmentafélag.

Even-Zohar, Basmat 1999. *The Construction of Children's Literature within the Creation of Hebrew Culture in Eretz-Israel*. Thesis Submitted for the Degree "Doctor of Philosophy", Tel Aviv University.

Even-Zohar, Itamar 1990. *Polysystem Studies* [= *Poetics Today* 11:1]. Durham: Duke University Press.

Even-Zohar, Itamar 1990a. "Polysystem Theory." *Poetics Today* 11(1), pp. 9-26.

Even-Zohar, Itamar 1990b. "The Emergence of a Native Hebrew Culture in Palestine, 1882-1948." In *Polysystem Studies* [=*Poetics Today* 11:1], Durham: Duke University Press, pp. 175-191.

Even-Zohar, Itamar 1994. "Culture Planning." *In this collection*.

Even-Zohar, Itamar 1994. "La Función de la literatura en la creación de las naciones de Europa," in Darío Villanueva (ed) *Avances en Teoría de la literatura: Estética de la Recepción, Pragmáitica, Teoría Empirica y Teoría de los Polisistemas*, Santiago de Compostela: Universidade de Santiago de Compostela, pp. 357-377

Even-Zohar, Itamar 1996. "The Role of Literature in the Making of the Nations of Europe: A Socio-Semiotic Study." *Applied Semiotics/Sémiotique Appliquée* 1, pp. 20-30.

Even-Zohar, Itamar 2002. "Culture Planning and Cultural Resistance." *Sun Yat-Sen Journal of Humanities* 14 (April 2002), pp. 45-52.

Even-Zohar, Itamar 2002a. "Literature as Goods, Literature as Tools." *Neohelicon* 29 (1), pp. 75-83.

Even-Zohar, Itamar 2003. "Solucións anticuadas e a industria de ideas." *Anuario de estudios literarios galegos* 2002, pp. 39-53. [Fernández de Gabriel, Susana, trans.]

Even-Zohar, Itamar 2008. "Culture Planning, Cohesion, and The Making and Maintenance of Entities." In *Beyond Descriptive Translation Studies: Investigations in Homage to Gideon Toury*, Pym, Anthony, Miriam Shlesinger & Daniel Simeoni, eds. Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John Benjamins, pp. 277–292.

Even-Zohar, Itamar 2011. "The Market of Collective Identities and Legacy Work." In *Cultural Heritage and Identity Politics*, During, Roel, ed. Wageningen: Wageningen UR/ The Silk Road Research Foundation, pp. 31-37.

Even-Zohar, Itamar 2012. "Intellectual Labor and the Success of Societies." In Sign Culture – Zeichen Kultur [To Honor Roland Posner], Hess-Lüttich, Ernest W.B., ed. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, pp. 307-313

Even-Zohar, Itamar 2013. "Textual Efflorescence and Social Resources: Notes on Mediaeval Iceland." In *Textual Production and Status Contests in Rising and Unstable Societies*, Bampi, Massimiliano & Marina Buzzoni, eds. [=*Filologie medievali e moderne*]. Venice: Edizioni Ca' Foscari - Digital Publishing, pp. 11-32.

Even-Zohar, Itamar 2018. "The complexity of culture and the sustainability of groups." In *Polissistemas* [=*IPOTESI – Revista de estudos literários*, Vol. 22: 2] Alves Magaldi, Carolina, ed, pp. 02-08.

Even-Zohar, Itamar, Elias J. Torres Feijó & Antonio Monegal 2019. "The End of Literature; or, What Purposes Does It Continue to Serve?" *Poetics Today* 40 (1), pp. 7-31.

Even-Zohar, Itamar 2020. "Intercultural competition over resources via contests for symbolic capitals." In *The Making of Them and Us – Cultural encounters conveyed also through pictorial means* [=*Semiotica*, Vol. 2020: 232] Sonesson, Göran, Sara Lenninger & Anna Cabak Rédei, eds, pp. 235-250.

Even Zohar, Itamar 2021. *O trabalho ideacional e a produção de energia social: Intelectuais, elaboradores de ideias e empreendedores culturais.* Florianópolis: Rafael Copetti. [Magaldi, Carolina Alves, Juliana Steil & Roberta Rego Rodrigues trans.]

Even-Zohar, Itamar 2021a. "The complexity of culture and the sustainability of groups." In *Indradhanush of Ideas in Language, Literature and Translation: Papers in Honour of Prof. Panchanan Mohanty,* Khan, Tariq, Ramesh Chandra Malik & P. Sarath Chandra, eds. Munich (Germany): Lincom Europa, pp. 1-9.

Even-Zohar, Itamar 2021b. "Who profit from heritage (and who loose)?" In *Circuits in motion: Polysystems theory and the analysis of culture,* Souto, David, Aiora Sampedro & Jon Kortazar, eds. Bilbao: Universidad del País Vasco - Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea, Argitalpen Zerbitzua / Servicio Editorial, pp. 23-31.

Everett, Daniel Leonard 2011. *Language: The Cultural Tool*. New York: Pantheon Books.

Felt, Larry & Peter R. Sinclair. 1995. "Conclusions." In Felt, Larry & Peter R. Sinclair eds., *Living on the Edge the Great Northern Peninsula of Newfoundland.* St. John's Nfld.: Institute of Social and Economic Research, Memorial University of Newfoundland.

Fernández Rodríguez, Mauro A. & Modesto Rodríguez Neira eds. 1994. *Lingua inicial e competencia lingüística en Galicia*, (volume 1 of *Mapa Sociolingüística de Galicia* (*MSG*)), Vigo: Real Academia Galega.

Fernández Rodríguez, Mauro A. & Modesto Rodríguez Neira eds. 1995. *Usos lingüísticos en Galicia* (volume 2).

Fernández Rodríguez, Mauro A. & Modesto Rodríguez Neira eds. 1996 *Actitudes lingüísticas en Galicia* (volume 3).

Finkelstein, Israel, Amihay Mazar & Brian B. Schmidt 2007. *The Quest for the Historical Israel: Debating Archaeology and the History of Early Israel*. [=*Archaeology and Biblical Studies*]. Atlanta, GA: Society of Biblical Literature.

Formaini, Robert L. 2001. "The Engine of Capitalist Process: Entrepreneurs in Economic Theory." *Economic & Financial Review*, Vol. 2001, No. 4, pp. 2-11).

Fukuyama, Francis 1995. *Trust: the Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity*. New York: Free Press.

Galan, František W. 1982. "Is Reception History a Literary Theory?" In *The Structure of the literary process: studies dedicated to the memory of Felix Vodička*, Steiner, Peter, Miroslav Červenka & Ronald Vroon, eds. Amsterdam ; Philadelphia: J. Benjamins Pub. Co., pp. 161-186.

Gelsinger, Bruce E. 1981. *Icelandic Enterprise: Commerce and Economy in the Middle Ages*. Columbia SC: University of South Carolina Press.

Gils Guðmundsson 1951. *Öldin Okkar: Minnisverð Tíðindi 1931-1950*. Reykjavík: Iðunn.

Goldstein, Moritz. 1912. *Begriff und Programm einer Jüdischen Nationalliteratur*. Berlin: Jüdischer Verlag.

Green, Douglas James, 2003. *"I Undertook Great Works": The Ideology of Domestic Achievements in West Semitic Royal Inscriptions*. Ph.D. Dissertation: Yale University.

Greenberg, Robert D. 2001. "Language, Nationalism, and the Yugoslav Successor States." In O'Reilly, Camille ed. *Language, Ethnicity and the State*, Vol II, pp. 17-43. Hampshire New York: Palgrave.

Guðmundsdóttir, Soffía Guðný & Laufey Guðnadóttir 2004. "Book Production in the Middle Ages." In *The Manuscripts of Iceland,* Vésteinn, Ólason & Gísli Sigurðsson, eds. Reykjavík: Árni Magnússon Institute in Iceland, pp. 45-61.

Guðmundsson, Barði 1937. "Goðorð forn og ný." *Skirnir,* 111: 56-83.

Guðmundsson, Barði 1958. *Höfundur Njálu: safn ritgerða* [Skúli Þórðarson og Stefán Pjetursson bjuggu til prentunar]. Reykjavík: Menningarsjóður.

Hallberg, Peter 1956. *Den isländska sagan* (Stockholm: Bonnier).

Hallberg, Peter 1962. *The Icelandic Saga,* translated, with introduction and notes, by Paul Schach (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press).

Hallo, William W. 1996. *Origins: The Ancient Near Eastern Background of Some Modern Western Institutions.* [=*Studies in the history and culture of the ancient Near East,* 6]. Leiden & New York: Brill.

Hallo, William W. 2010. *The World's Oldest Literature: Studies in Sumerian Belles-Lettres* Leiden & Boston: Brill.

Hamel, Gary 1998. "Strategy Innovation and the Quest for Value." *Sloan Management Review*, Winter 1998 Vol. 39, No 2 pp. 7-15.

Hammami, Feras, 2015. "Conservation, Innovation and Healing of the Well-Preserved Medieval Ystad." *Journal of Urban Research and Practice* 8 (2), pp. 165-195.

Hammami, Feras & Evren Uzer, 2017. "Heritage and resistance: irregularities, temporalities and cumulative impact." *International Journal of Heritage Studies* 24 (5), pp. 1-20.

Hamon, Hervé, & Patrick Rotman 1981. *Les intellocrates: expédition en haute intelligentsia*. Paris: Ramsay.

Hancock, Graham 2015. *Magicians of the gods: the forgotten wisdom of earth's lost civilization*. First U.S. edition. New York: Thomas Dunne Books.

Harper, Robert Francis, ed. 1904. *The Code of Hammurabi, King of Babylon*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press: Callaghan & Co.

Harrison, Rodney 2013. *Heritage: Critical Approaches*. Abington & New York: Routledge.

Harvey, David C., 2001. "Heritage Pasts and Heritage Presents: Temporality, Meaning and the Scope of Heritage Studies." *International Journal of Heritage Studies* 7 (4), pp. 319-338.

Hastrup, Kirsten 1985. *Culture and History in Medieval Iceland: An Anthropological Analysis of Structure and Change*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Haugen, Einar 1966. Language Conflict and Language Planning: The Case of Modern Norwegian Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Hechter, Michael 1992 "The Dynamics of Secession." *Acta Sociologica* 35, pp. 267-283.

Heinz, Marlies 2012. "The Ur III, Old Babylonian, and Kassite Empires." In *A Companion to the Archaeology of the Ancient Near East*, Potts, Daniel T., ed. Oxford & Malden US: Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 706-721.

Helgason, Agnar 2004. "Uppruni Íslendinga: Vitnisburður erfðafræðinnar." In *Hlutavelta tímans. Menningararfur á Þjóðminjasafni*, Björnsson, Árni & Hrefna Róbertsdóttir, eds. Reykjavík: Þjóðminjasafn Íslands, pp. 48-55.

Helgason, Jón Karl 2003. *Ferðalok*. Reykjavík: Bjartur.

Helgason, Jón Karl 2008. "Continuity? The Icelandic Sagas in Post-Medieval Times." In *A Companion to Old Norse-Icelandic Literature and Culture*. Malden, Mass. & Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 64-81.

Helgason, Jón Karl 2011. "A Poet's Great Return: Jónas Hallgrímsson's reburial and Milan Kundera's *Ignorance*." *Scandinavian-Canadian Studies* 20, pp. 52-61.

Henrich, Joseph & Francisco J. Gil-White 2001. "The evolution of prestige: freely conferred deference as a mechanism for enhancing the benefits of cultural transmission." *Evolution and Human Behavior* 22 (3), pp. 165-196.

Herzfeld, Michael, 2009. *Evicted from Eternity: The Restructuring of Modern Rome*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press

Hindley, R. 1990. The Death of the Irish Language: A Qualified Obituary. London: Routledge.

Hofstede, Geert 1997. *Cultures and organizations: software of the mind*. New York & London: McGraw-Hill.

Holly Jr., Donald H. 2000. "The Beothuk on the Eve of Their Extinction." *Arctic Anthropology*, Vol. 37 Issue 1, pp. 79-96.

House, J. D.1999. *Against The Tide: Battling For Economic Renewal in Newfoundland and Labrador*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Ingram, Mark, 2016. "Emplacement and the Politics of Heritage in Low- Income Neighbourhoods of Marseille." *International Journal of Heritage Studies* 22 (2), pp. 117-130.

Jakobson, Roman. 1975. *Pushkin and His Sculptural Myth.* The Hague: Mouton.

Jespersen, P. & J. Mikkelsen eds. 1990. Føroyskt mál og støða tess í hf- og studentaskúlanu. Skráseting og tilráðing, ið nevnd, sett av landsskúlastjóranum, hevur gjørt. Tórshavn: Føroya skúlabókagrunnur.

Kantor, Paula 2002. "Gender, Microenterprise Success and Cultural Context: The Case of South Asia." *Entrepreneurship – Theory and Practice*, Summer 2002, Vol. 26, No 4, pp. 131-143.

Karlsson, Stefán 1979. "Islandsk bogeksport til norge i middelalderen." *Maal og Minne* 1-2, pp. 1-17.

Karlsson, Stefán 2004. *The Icelandic Language*. London: Viking Society for Northern Research, University College London. [McTurk, Rory trans.]

Kelly-Holmes, Helen 1997. "Language Maintenance or Language Fetishisation? A Response to Michael Clyne." *Current Issues in Language & Society*, Vol.4, No 2, pp. 167-171.

Khrennikov, Andrei 2016. "'Social Laser': action amplification by stimulated emission of social energy." *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences* 374 (2058), pp. 20150094.

Kjartansson, Helgi Skúli 2009. "Law Recital According to Old Icelandic Law: Written Evidence of Oral Transmission?" In *Scripta Islandica: Isländska Sällskapets Årsbok,* Sävborg, Daniel, ed. Uppsala: Samfundet Sverige–Island, pp. 89-103.

Kristinsson, Axel 2003. "Lords and Literature: The Icelandic Sagas as Political and Social Instruments." *Scandinavian Journal of History* 28 (1), pp. 1-17.

Kristinsson, Axel 2004. "Sagas and Politics in 13th Century Borgarfjörður." In *Sagas & Societies: Proceedings of the International Conference at Borgarnes, Iceland, September 5- 9, 2002, Section 4: Sagas as History*. Tübingen: Universitätsbibliothek Tübingen.

Kristinsson, Axel 2010. *Expansions: Competition and Conquest in Europe since the Bronze Age*. Reykjavík: Reykjavíkur Akademían.

Landau, Jacob M 1984. *Atatürk and the Modernization of Turkey*, E.J. Brill, Leiden.

Lawrence, Philip K. 1996. "Strategy, Hegemony and Ideology: the Role of Intellectuals." *Political Studies*, XLIV, pp. 44-59.

Lees, Loretta, Hyun Bang Shin & Ernesto López-Morales eds. 2015. *Global Gentrifications. Uneven Development and Displacement.* Bristol, Policy Press.

Lewis, Bernard 1968. *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, London 1968.

Lin, Nan 1999. "Building a Network Theory of Social Capital." *Connections (INSNA)* 22, pp. 28-51.

Lin, Nan 2010. *Social capital: critical concepts in the social sciences*. Abingdon ; New York, NY: Routledge.

Lönnroth, Lars 1976. *Njál's Saga: A Critical Introduction* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press).

Marshall, Ingeborg 2001. *The Beothuk*. St. John's: Newfoundland Historical Society.

Mesoudi, Alex, Andrew Whiten & Kevin N. Laland 2006. "Towards a unified science of cultural evolution." *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 29 (4), pp. 329-383.

Mesoudi, Alex 2011. *Cultural Evolution: How Darwinian Theory Can Explain Human Culture and Synthesize the Social Sciences*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Monteagudo, Henrique & Núñez Seixas, Xosé M. 2001. "La política de la lengua en Galicia: De la reivindicación nacionalista a la planificación gubernamental." In Beln, Roberto & Born, Joachim (eds) 2001, *Políticas Lingüísticas Norma E Identidad: Estudios de casos y aspectos teóricos en torno al gallego,*

el español y lenguas minoritarias. Buenos Aires: Universidad de Buenos Aires, pp. 33-65.

Nauerby, Tom. 1996. *No Nation is an Island Language, Culture and National Identity in the Faroe Islands*. North Atlantic monographs. Aarhus, Denmark: SNAI-North Atlantic Publications Aarhus University Press.

Niditch, Susan 1996. *Oral World and Written Word: Ancient Israelite Literature*. [=*Library of Ancient Israel*]. Louisville, Kentucky: Westminster John Knox Press.

Non, Arkaraprasertkul. 2016. "Gentrification from within: Urban Social Change as Anthropological Process." *Asian Anthropology*, 15, 1, pp. 1-20.

Ó hIfearnáin, Tadhg. 2000. "Irish Language Broadcast Media: The Interaction of State Language Policy, Broadcasters and their Audiences." *Current Issues in Language & Society*, 1 October 2000, vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 92-116.

O'Rourke, Bernadette 2003. "Conflicting values in contemporary Galicia: attitudes to 'O Galego' since autonomy." *International Journal of Iberian Studies* 16 (1), pp. 33-48.

Ólason, Vésteinn 2004. "Society and Literature." In *The Manuscripts of Iceland*, Ólason, Vésteinn & Gísli Sigurðsson, eds. Reykjavík: Árni Magnússon Institute in Iceland, pp. 25-41.

Paine, Robert 1985. "The Persuasiveness of Smallwood: Rhetoric of Cuffer and Scoff, of Metonym and Metaphor." In: *Newfoundland Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Fall 1985), 57-75.

Pálsson, Hermann 1962. *Sagnaskemmtun íslendinga*. Reykjavík: Mál og menning.

Pastore, Ralph T. 1991 [1922]. *The Beothuks* (Revised edition by Archaeology Unit, Memorial University of Newfoundland). St. John's: The Newfoundland Museum – Museum Notes, 1.

Petrov, A. E. & Shnirelman, Victor eds. 2011. Петров, А. Е. & Виктор А. Шнирельман, eds. 2011. *Фальсификация исторических источников и конструирование этнократических мифов* [=*Актуальное Прошлое: Наука и Общество*]. Москва: РАН.

Pratt, L. 1985. "Energy, Regionalism and Canadian Nationalism." In: *New-foundland Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Fall 1985), 175 -199.

Pritchard, Stephen 2000. "Essence, Identity, Signature: Tattoos and Cultural Property." *Social Semiotics*, Vol.10, No.3, pp. 331-346.

Pujol, Geneviève 1979. "La resistance à 1'inculcation; resistans ou handicapés ?" In Pujol, Geneviève & Raymond Labourie, eds. *Les cultures populaires.* Paris: Privat, pp. 31-39.

Rafnsson, Sveinbjörn 1974. *Studier i Landnámabók: kritiska bidrag till den isländska fristatstidens historia*. [=*Bibliotheca historica Lundensis*] Volumes 31-32. Lund: Gleerup.

Rafnsson, Sveinbjörn 2001. *Sögugerð landnámabókar : um íslenska sagnaritun á 12. og 13. öld*. Reykjavík: Sagnfræðistofnun Háskóla Íslands.

Raulwing, Peter 2005-2006. "The Kikkuli Text (CTH 284): Some Interdisciplinary Remarks on Hittite Training Texts for Chariot Horses in the Second Half of the 2nd Millennium B.C." In *Les équidés dans le monde méditerranéen antique*, Gardeisen, Armelle, ed. Lattes: L'Association pour le développement de l'archéologie en Languedoc-Rousillon, pp. 61–75.

Redford, Donald B. 1992. *Egypt, Canaan, and Israel in Ancient Times*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Reddy, V. Ramakrishna 2016. *Contemporary History of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana, AD 1956-1990s*. Hyderabad: Emesco Books.

HaReilly, Bernard F. 1993. *The Medieval Spains*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Róna-Tas, András 1999. *Hungarians and Europe in the Early Middle Ages: An Introduction to Early Hungarian History*. Budapest ; New York: Central European University Press.

Roseman, Sharon R. 1995. "'Falamos Como Falamos': Linguistic Revitalization and the Maintenance of Local Vernaculars in Galicia." *Journal of Linguistic Anthropology* 5(1), pp. 3-32.

Roseman, Sharon R. 1997. "'Lenguas de solidaridad' en el medio rural: El mantenimiento del gallego vernáculo." In *As linguas e as identidades: Ensaios*

de etnografía e de interpretación antropolóxica, ed. Xaquín Roderíguez Campos. Santiago de Compostela: Universidade de Santiago de Compostela.

Rovetta, Alberto, Iskander Nasry, Abeer Helmi 2000. "The chariots of the Egyptian Pharaoh Tut Ankh Amun in 1337 B.C." *Mechanism and Machine Theory* 35, pp..1013-1031.

Schama, Simon. 1987. *The Embarrassment of Riches: An Interpretation of Dutch Culture in the Golden Age*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Schmidt, Klaus 2007. "Als die Menschen sesshaft wurden." *Forschung* 32 (2), pp. 12-15.

Schmidt, Klaus 2010. "Göbekli Tepe–the Stone Age Sanctuaries. New results of ongoing excavations with a special focus on sculptures and high reliefs." *Documenta Praehistorica* 37, pp. 239-256.

Shnirelman, Victor A. 1996. *Who gets the past?: Competition for ancestors among non-Russian intellectuals in Russia*. Washington, Baltimore & London: Woodrow Wilson Center Press & Johns Hopkins University Press.

Shnirelman, Victor A. 2001. "'Aryans' and 'Khazars': Anti-semitic propaganda in contemporary Russia." In *Remembering for the Future: The Holocaust in an Age of Genocide, Vol. I,* Roth, John K., et al., eds. London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 884-896.

Shnirelman, Victor A. 2003. "Myths of descent: Views of the remote past, as reflected in school textbooks in contemporary Russia." *Public Archaeology* 3 (1), pp. 33-51.

Shnirelman, Victor A. 2007. "The story of a euphemism: The khazars in Russian nationalist literature." In *The world of the Khazars: new perspectives,* Golden, Peter B., Haggai Ben-Shammai & András Róna-Tas, eds. [=*Handbook of Oriental Studies. Section 8, Uralic and Central Asian Studies*]. Leiden & Boston: Brill, pp. 353-372.

Shnirelman, Victor 2010. "A symbolic past: the struggle for ancestors in Central Asia." *Russian Politics & Law* 48 (5), pp. 48-64.

Shnirelman, Victor A. 2011. "From social classes to ethnicities: Ethnocentric views in history textbooks in post-Soviet Russia." *Journal of Eurasian Studies* 2 (2), pp. 125-133.

Shnirelman 2012; Шнирельман, Виктор 2012. *Русское родноверие неоязыче-ство и национализм в современной России*. [=*Диалог*]. Москва: Изд-во ББИ.

Schott, Christine M. 2010. "Footnotes on Life: Marginalia in Three Medieval Icelandic Manuscripts." M.A Thesis [Ritgerð til M.A.-prófs]; Reykjavík: Háskóli Íslands.

Schrank, William E. 2005. "The Newfoundland fishery: ten years after the moratorium." *Marine Policy* 29 (5), pp. 407-420.

Schumpeter, Joseph A. 2006 [1954]. *History of economic analysis*. Schumpeter, Elizabeth Boody ed. Abingdon: Taylor & Francis e-Library. Introduction by Mark Perlman.

Sela-Sheffy, Rakefet 2002. "Canon Formation Revisited: Canon and Cultural Production." *Neohelicon* 29 (2), pp. 141-159.

Sigurðsson, Gísli 1994. "Bók í stað lögsögumanns: Valdabarátta kirkju og veraldlegra höfðingja." In *Sagnaþing helgað Jónasi Kristjdnssyni sjötugum 10. apríl 1994,* Sigurðsson, Gísli, Guðrún Kvaran & Sigurgeir Steingrímsson, eds. Reykjavik: Hið íslenska bókmenntafélag, pp. 207-232.

Sigurðsson, Gísli 1996. "Icelandic nationality identity: from nationalism to tourism." In *Making Europe in Nordic Contexts,* Anttonen, Pertti J., ed. Turku: Nordic Institute of Folklore (University of Turku), pp. 41-75.

Sigurðsson, Gísli 2002. *Túlkun íslendingasagna í ljósi munnlegrar hefðar: tilgáta um aðferð*. [=*RIT / Stofnun Árna Magnússonar á Íslandi*] 56. Reykjavík: Stofnun Árna Magnússonar á Íslandi.

Sigurðsson, Gísli 2004. *The Medieval Icelandic Saga and Oral Tradition: A Discourse on Method*. [=Publications of the Milman Parry collection of oral literature], N° 2. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. [Jones, Nicholas trans.]

Sigurðsson, Gísli 2004a. "Oral Sagas, Poems and Lore." In *The Manuscripts of Iceland,* Ólason, Vésteinn & Gísli Sigurðsson, eds. Reykjavík: Árni Magnússon Institute in Iceland, pp. 1-11.

Silverman, David P. 1990. *Language and writing in ancient Egypt*. [=*The Carnegie series on Egypt*]. Pittsburgh, PA: Carnegie Museum of Natural History.

Smith, Kevin P. 1995. "Landnam: The Settlement of Iceland in Archaeological and Historical Perspective." *World Archaeology* 26 (3), pp. 319-347.

Smith, Laurajane, 2006, *Uses of Heritage*. London: Routledge.

Srikanth, H. 2013. "Construction and consolidation of the Telangana identity." *Economic and Political Weekly* 48 (45-46), pp. 39-45.

Ström, Folke 1981. "Poetry as an Instrument of Propaganda: Jarl Hákon and his Poets." In *Speculum Norrænum: Norse Studies in Memory of Gabriel Turville-Petre,* Dronke, Ursula et al. eds. [Odense]: Odense University Press, pp. 440–458.

Swidler, Ann 1986. "Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies." *American Sociological Review* 51 (April), pp. 273-286.

Tadmor, Hayim 1981. "History and Ideology in the Assyrian Royal Inscriptions." In *Assyrian Royal Inscriptions: New Horizons (in Literary, Ideological, and Historical Analysis)*, Ed F. M. Fales, pp. 13-33. Orientes Antiqvi Collectio – XVII. Roma: Istituto per L'Oriente.

Tadmor, Hayim 1986. "Monarchy and the Elite in Assyria and Babylonia: The Question of Royal Accountability." In *The Origins and Diversity of Axial Age Civilizations*, Ed S. N. Eisenstadt, pp. 203-207 (Chapter 8). Buffalo?: State University of New York Press.

The Origins of the Icelanders 2010. On the website of The Árni Magnússon Institute for Icelandic Studies / Stofnun Árna Magnússonar í íslenskum fræðum

https://english.arnastofnun.is/page/the_origins_of_the_icelanders

Timothy, Dallen & Jeanne Kay Guelke, 2008, *Geography and Genealogy: Locating Personal Pasts*. Hampshire, Ashgate Publishing Ltd.

Tinney, Steve 1999. "Ur-Namma the Canal-Digger: Context, Continuity and Change in Sumerian Literature." *Journal of Cuneiform Studies* 51, pp. 31-54.

Torres Feijó, Elias J. 2014. "Historiar e comparar literatura como meio e análise de comunidades. Espaços literaturizados como exemplo e proposta." *Letras de hoje, História da Literatura e Comparatismo*, 49, 4, pp. 434-445.

Toury, Gideon 1999. "Culture Planning and Translation." In *Anovar/anosar: Estudios de traducción e interpretación*, I.. Alberto Álvarez Lugrís and Anxo

Fernández Ocampo eds. Vigo: Servicio de Publicacións da Universidade de Vigo, pp.13-25.

Toury, Gideon 1999-2000. "Progettazione culturale e traduzione". *La traduzione*, ed. Susan Petrilli ed. (= Athanor: Semiotica, Filosofia, Arte, Letteratura, Anno X, nuova serie, n. 2). Roma: Meltemi editore, pp. 188-200.

Toury, Gideon 2001. "A tradução como meio de planificação e a planificação da tradução". *Histórias Literárias Comparadas: Colóquio Internacional*. Teresa Seruya & Maria Lin Moniz eds. Lisbon: Edições Colibri & Centro de Literatura e Cultura Portuguesa e Brasileira, pp.17-32.

Toury, Gideon 2002. "Translation and reflection on translation: A skeletal history for the uninitiated." In *Jewish Translation History: A Bibliography of Bibliographies and Studies*, Singerman, Robert, ed. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, pp. IX-XXXI.

Tulinius, Torfi 2004. "Capital, Field, Illusio: Can Bourdieu's Sociology Help us Understand the Development of Literature in Medieval Iceland?" In *Sagas & Societies: Proceedings of the International Conference at Borgarnes, Iceland, September 5- 9, 2002*. Tübingen: Universitätsbibliothek Tübingen, pp. 1-23.

Tur-Sinai, N. H. 1954. "Ha ktobet ha kenaanit mi Karatepe [The Canaanite Inscription of Karatepe]." In *Ha-lashon ve ha-sefer*. Vol. 1: *Ha-lashon* [The Language and the Book: The Language], 66-80. Jerusalem: Mossad Bialik.

Tynjanov, Jurij 1929. *Arxaisty i novatory* (Moscow: Akademia) [rpt. Munich: Fink, 1967].

Van de Mieroop, Marc 2007. *The Eastern Mediterranean in the age of Ramesses II*. Malden, MA. ; Oxford: Blackwell Pub.

Vésteinsson, Orri, Thomas H. McGovern & Christian Keller 2002. "Enduring Impacts: Social and Environmental Aspects of Viking Age Settlement in Iceland and Greenland." *Archaeologia Islandica* 2, pp. 98-136.

Veszprémy, László & Frank Schaer 1999. "Introduction." In *Simonis de Keza, Gesta Hungarorum: The deeds of the Hungarians*, Veszprémy, László, Frank Schaer & Jenő Szűcs eds. & trans. Budapest: Central European University Press, pp. XV-XXVII.

Wacquant, Loïc, 2007, "Territorial Stigmatization in the Age of Advanced Marginality." *Thesis Eleven* 91 (1), pp. 66-77.

Wallace, Birgitta Linderoth 2003. "L'Anse aux Meadows and Vinland: An Abandoned Experiment." In *Contact, Continuity, and Collapse: The Norse Colonization of the North Atlantic,* Barrett, James H., ed., pp. 207-238.

Wallace, Birgitta 2009. "L'Anse aux Meadows, Leif Eriksson's Home in Vinland." *Journal of the North Atlantic* 2 (Special Volume 2: Norse Greenland: Selected Papers from the Hvalsey Conference 2008), pp. 114-125.

Wu, Kuo-Cheng 1928. *Ancient Chinese political theories*. Shanghai: The Commercial press.

Yerasimos, Stéphane. 1982. Introduction. In *Voyages d'Ibn Battuta, Muhammad ibn 'Abd Allâh*, Charles Defrémery & Beniamino Raffaelo Sanguinetti eds. Paris: F. Maspero, pp. 4-67.

Zabuzhko, Oksana 2007. "They're Asking if We Have Culture!" *Українська правда [Ukrain'ska Pravda]* 15.04.2007. [Skachko, Sofiya trans.]