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# Whether Verbal or Visual, Affirmative or Negative, Tautologies are Not Tautologies

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## ABSTRACT

In this paper we test the hypothesis that tautologies (An X is an X; X is X) are actually not tautologies (i.e., not repetitive). Indeed, when exploring natural language use, it seems that, having expressed such “uninformative” statements, speakers, most often, spell out their specific intended interpretation, rendering these messages informative (Section 2). Visual/pictorial tautologies are also informative; either they allow the observers to come up with their own interpretation, or often, the artists use language to spell out the intended message (Section 3). Whether in language or in picture, artists tend to deautomatize the familiar, thereby rendering tautologies Optimally Innovative. Additionally, they often produce tautologies that convey figurative messages, whether metaphorical or sarcastic, thus allowing these tautologies to be highly creative (Section 5). Tautologies, then, communicate innovative messages, even when implicitly so. In fact, tautologies may often covertly reject the default salient meaning, while explicitly enlarging on it by using a novel, nondefault alternative.

“Repetition only makes what is said enter into essential difference” Blanchot (1993, p. 341)

## Introduction: tautologies are not tautologies, instead they are innovative

Are tautologies such as “A kid is kid” or “Murder is murder” really tautological, i.e., a kind of a circular, uninformative and repetitive message, or do they form a construction or formation, whose repetitive ordering, whether in language or in visual art, invokes more than just the given? To be able to answer these questions, consider the following verbal tautologies in [Section 2](#), both in affirmative and negative (examples 1–27); consider also pictorial tautologies (examples 32–36), in [Section 3](#); [Section 4](#) (including examples 37–43) discusses Optimally Innovative tautologies in language and in art; and metaphorical and sarcastic tautologies in language and in art are discussed in [Section 5](#) (examples 44–51).

The following examples in [Section 2](#), (target utterances in bold, their specific informative interpretation, resonated with and reflected by the context, in italics) show that neither affirmative tautologies (An X is an X; X is X) nor negative counterparts (An X is not an X; X is not X) are actually repetitive or redundant. Instead, they convey an informative message, mostly spelt out and enlarged on by their speakers. Indeed, the only way to zoom in on the intended interpretation of a tautology is by looking at how the context reflects it and resonates with it. (On discourse resonance, see Du Bois, 2014; Du Bois & Giora, 2014; Giora, Drucker & Fein, 2014; on the role of context in affecting tautologies’ meaningfulness, see also Berntsen & Kennedy, 1996; Farghal, 1992; Fraser, 1988; Gibbs & McCarrell, 1990<sup>1</sup>; Meibauer, 2008; Smarandache, 2000; Ward & Hirschberg, 1991 among others; on negative and affirmative tautologies, see; Giora, 2007).

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<sup>1</sup>Note that Gibbs and McCarrell (1990, p. 138) further attest experimentally to “the importance of pragmatic, semantic, and syntactic information in understanding tautological expressions” in colloquial language.

This article has been corrected with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.

Tautologies, then, do not always convey the expected. As shown by the verbal examples (1–4) below, the same tautologies, rather than being repetitive, have a variety of interpretations. The context, however, narrows them down by mirroring the speaker's intent, often rendered explicit by that very same speaker, who rejects a possible default, automatic interpretation, which springs to mind first, by making explicit the intended less or nondefault interpretation. (On default and nondefault *interpretations*, see Giora, Givoni, & Fein, 2015b).<sup>2</sup> Spelling out the intended output is communicated via echoing and elaborating on what that message conveys, so as to allow the addressee to home in on the (unexpected yet) intended interpretation.

## Verbal tautologies

In this section, we focus on verbal tautologies. As mentioned above, most verbal tautologies (e.g., An X is an X; X is X) do not have a specific coded meaning, listed in the mental lexicon. As a result, speakers expand on their intended interpretation (see italicized parts in the examples), which they provide for (whether before or after uttering the tautology), in order to allow addressees to make sense of the tautologies.

We test here the prediction that what is termed “a tautology” is not necessarily a tautology, regardless of whether the message is in the affirmative (examples 1–14) or negative (examples 15–19). Instead, we will show that the 2nd, repeated mention, always adds new information on top of the first one, as reflected by the context, usually provided by the speaker.

Consider example (1). It illustrates the informativeness of a tautology which, at first sight, might seem to reflect redundant information:

### (1) A kid is kid

*But a kid is kid, it has feelings it needs to be pampered and loved and cherished. One of the parent has to sacrifice when they have a child ...* (<https://www.quora.com/What-are-the-problems-in-joining-my-kid-in-a-Preschool>)

The dictionary meaning of “kid” is “a child”, “a young person”. However, the repetition of “kid” in (1), in terms of “a kid is kid”, is provoking in that it openly breaches the informativeness requirement by being repetitive (Grice, 1975). As a result, it triggers an implicature, which, however, is explicated and further resonated with by the ongoing discourse, aiming to highlight the intended interpretation. The result here is a statement that indicates that a kid is vulnerable and dependent on love and care, etc., (as made explicit by the italicized utterances following the tautology).<sup>3</sup>

Consider, further, example (2), which suggests a different interpretation for a similar tautology (i.e., “a child is a child”). Here, the tautology indicates that, for Israelis, there is a difference, in terms of moral obligations, between an Israeli child, who they really care for, and a Palestinian child, who they do not care about at all, even when the children are imprisoned, beaten, and humiliated (as illustrated by the italicized parts in bold, which resonate with this interpretation):

### (2) To Israelis **a Child Is a Child, Unless He Is a Palestinian**

The separation of migrant kids from their parents in the United States caused outrage, but for decades, Palestinian children have faced detention away from their homes.

Trump has come down from the tree. Horrifying pictures and numbers of children separated from their parents and penned in cages did the trick ... The moral line was drawn and reemphasized: *Children are a red line that is not to be crossed ...*

<sup>2</sup>Default interpretations might be termed “shared knowledge” ... “tautologies mean what they mean because they involve an evocation of shared knowledge, and they take the forms they do because shared knowledge is described in ways that maximal linguistic redundancy is achieved for rhetorical purposes” (Miki, 1996, p. 635).

<sup>3</sup>On tautology-based implicatures and their reliance on context, see, e.g., (Bulhof & Gimbel, 2001: 282; Gibbs & McCarrell, 1990, p. 127).

In Israel people didn't remain indifferent either: *We are a nation that loves children, and the sight of children in cages gave us no rest either . . . Our children are our most precious possession, personally and collectively. And in spite of that, **there are children who are unable to touch the hearts of Israeli Jews: Palestinian children. At any given moment, hundreds of Palestinian children are filling the prisons and the interrogation facilities, beaten and humiliated, isolated and thrown into cages. And still the Israelis are not taking a stand nor mobilizing to change the situation.*** <https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/.premium-palestinian-children-are-unable-to-touch-the-hearts-of-israeli-jews-1.6243975>

Example (3) below projects a new, different interpretation of **kids are kids**. Although the parents want to make their kids feel trusted and reliable and see this as their (the parents') responsibility to make them feel that way, they also know that *you can't keep your kids in a tube. They go out and the parents can't control their life nor totally protect them:*

**(3) Kids are kids. *You have to show them you trust them. Then they go out the door and who knows, really, what can happen***

"It was a normal, typical Saturday night," said Catherine Belardo, an auburn-haired woman in a housecoat. "They get dressed up, they go out together. I don't want people saying, 'Well, where were her parents?' Her parents were here. Her mother was home, her father was home. *You can't keep your kids in a tube. They go out. Kids are kids. You have to show them you trust them. Then they go out the door and who knows, really, what can happen?* You tell them to walk in groups. You tell them to walk where it's light. You tell them never to talk to strangers. And they did everything they were told." (Philadelphia Inquirer, 15 February 85; noted by M. Pollack; cited in Ward & Hirschberg, 1991)

Example (4) highlights the similarities between children, regardless of where they live and where they are educated (as suggested by the italicized part of the title of the example):

**(4) A child is a child, *no matter where you find yourself in the world***

Before this trip, when I thought of my near travel to India, I anticipated everything in the country to be very different. When we were preparing our lesson plans for our teaching sessions at Vidya, *the school at which we instruct, I was expecting the children to be unlike American children.*

What I quickly learned, after only a few days at Vidya, is that **a child is a child, no matter where you find yourself in the world.** *The children at Vidya school love to play, they love to laugh, and they love to be engaged . . . If one was blind, they would be unable to tell the difference between a child of Vidya and a child from any school in the United States.* <https://ace.duke.edu/a-kid-is-a-kid/>

As shown by examples (1–4) above, each speaker has in mind a different, unique interpretation of the very same tautology. By detailing and clarifying their intended interpretation via resonating with it, they disclose their assumption that the interpretations of tautologies are not self-evident. Hence, addressees should be informed about the speaker's specific intent. Tautologies, then, are not tautologies. Instead, they convey a novel message, regardless of their repetitiveness. The examples below will further elaborate on and highlight the novelty inherent in tautologies.

Example (5) – **death or death** – is an ironic tautology, which is also critical, suggesting no real choice for the weak, (see the italicized part of the title, in bold, and also the italicized part of the example), while pretending there is a choice (by using "or"):

**(5) Death or death – *the bitter end that Israel has to offer the weak***

. . . So here it is: The Palestinian girls from Qalandiyah and the Ethiopian-Israeli girl from Kfar Sava arrived at their death wish – they almost like her, and she almost like them – *from the very bottom of the human-social-gender-economic-class ladder of the State of Israel, which grinds them into the dust and makes them despair, to the point where the only hope they have left is to kill and to die. Because that's the only choice we have to offer the weakest among us, those who are below us – death or death.*



<http://www.haaretz.com/opinion/.premium-1.690366>

Example (6) explicitly indicates the discrimination and humiliation of Arab citizens practiced by the state of Israel:

**(6) Arabs Are Arabs, *whether or not they're citizens of Israel***

*Humiliation in guise of security questioning has been the norm for many non-Jews at the crossings for years ... Arabs Are Arabs, whether or not they're citizens of Israel.* <https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/.premium-what-happens-at-israel-s-border-crossings-is-calculated-humiliation-1.6414924>

No wonder, the speaker in (7), openly rejects racial discrimination (of those who are not us) while further disengaging from any justification of murder:

**(7) Murder is murder. *There is no justification and no atonement for murder***

Rachel Fraenkel did not wait a moment. As soon as she discovered that an Arab youth had been abducted in East Jerusalem, and that his body had been found burned in the Jerusalem Forest, she released a statement. "If a young Arab really was murdered for nationalist reasons, this is a horrifying and shocking act," she wrote. *"There is no difference between blood and blood. Murder is murder. There is no justification and no atonement for murder."* <http://www.haaretz.com/opinion/.premium-1.602939>

Example (8) warns Israelis that, if Lieberman becomes Israel's Defense Minister, Israel will no longer be what it is – i.e., Israel:

**(8) If Lieberman will be Lieberman, *Israel will not be Israel***

**If Lieberman will be Lieberman, *we will miss Benjamin Netanyahu. If Lieberman will be Lieberman, the territories will burn like they've never burned before. If Lieberman will be Lieberman, all Israeli Arabs will become enemies. If Lieberman will be Lieberman, no one will be able to complain about Maj. Gen. Yair Golan's comparison with dark times. They will be here and now.*** However, **if Lieberman will be Lieberman, Golan will not be Golan and Israel will not be Israel. If Lieberman will be Lieberman, this op-ed would not even be published.**

I was always for tearing off the masks off the face of Israel. On Wednesday, they were torn off finally. However, the price is liable to be too hard to bear. *We should prepare the bomb shelters, for we are liable to need them soon.* <http://www.haaretz.com/opinion/.premium-1.720373>

In example (9), Roger Waters, the English rock musician, songwriter, and composer, urges the Canadian singer, songwriter and rock star musician, Neil Young, to "Rock Against Racism" rather than entertain it (see the italicized part below); Young is thus urged to protest against the illegal colonization of the Palestinian land and the systematic oppression of its indigenous people:

**(9) "Enough is enough"**

Roger Waters, Facebook, July 11, 2014.

In January this year I wrote a private letter to Neil Young, it was sent via his manager Elliot Roberts' e-mail, I never received a reply of any kind ... I am publishing that letter now. Here it is (sic). Dear Neil Young. There are rumors flying about that you are considering doing shows in Tel Aviv this year. ... *I find it hard to believe that you would turn your back on the indigenous people of Palestine. That you would lend support to, and encourage and legitimize, with your presence, a colonial apartheid regime, largely settled from Europe, that seeks to confine the native people of the land, either in exile or in second class status in reservations and ghettos ... It is time for "Rock Against Racism" to show some of it's [sic] muscle by refusing to lend our names to the whitewashing of the illegal colonization of Palestinian land and the systematic oppression of its indigenous people ...*

*Neil, we're talking about the occupation, subjugation, dispossession, eviction, ghettoization and possible eventual eradication of a nation.*

*You, more than most should find this, taboo, story, more than a little disquieting.* <https://www.facebook.com/notes/roger-waters-the-wall/a-note-from-roger-july-11-2014/894349527246165>

In example (10), Ehud Barak, former Israeli Prime Minister, although exclaiming he is not really “keen on a ‘major offensive’ in Gaza”, reassures us he will not hesitate to wage a war if “necessary” (see italicized parts below):

**(10) In War as in War ... *if a ground operation is necessary, our minister of war will not back down from what needs to be done***

Israel's minister of defense has become a minister of war, says my colleague Gideon Levy. He condemns Ehud Barak's actions and expresses his bitter disappointment in the man. Sadly, Israel is not Switzerland.

**Ehud Barak is not talking about “victory” in Gaza**, to use the populist rhetoric of Benjamin Netanyahu. All he wants is to end the rocket fire from Gaza. He is not keen on a “major offensive” in Gaza, but *if a ground operation is necessary, our minister of war will not back down from what needs to be done. In war as in war, as they say.*

<http://www.haaretz.com/in-war-as-in-war-1.241742>

Example (11) highlights the weakness of negation, arguing, instead, in favor of explicit consent in sexual relations (in italics):

**(11) Only “yes” is yes. *Explicit consent to having sex? No, it won't kill the sex***

*Some men haven't yet internalized the fact that “no” means “no”* and then a new law was, meanwhile, enacted in California, and ruled that this is not enough. One should also hear *an explicit consent ...* (Originally in Hebrew). <https://www.haaretz.co.il/gallery/mejunderet/premium-1.2451053>

In example (12), “A man's got to do what a man's got to do” is intended as a kind of self-mockery, given that the speaker teases himself for *enjoying* watching “good westerns”:

**(12) A man's got to do what a man's got to do**

But today's column isn't about America's gun laws. It's about the *pleasure I got from watching plenty of good westerns last month*. To quote the Duke – John Wayne, not the Duke of Luxembourg, – “**A man's got to do what a man's got to do**”.

<https://luxtimes.lu/archives/15287-a-man-s-gotta-do-what-a-man-s-gotta-do-in-Luxembourg>

In Example (13), the speaker rejects what others are attributing to her, while adhering to how she perceives of herself:

**(13) I am who I am. *Not who you think I am. Not who you want me to be. I am me.***

Example (14) contends that chocolate *is always comforting*:

**(14) Chocolate is a Chocolate.**

*And is always a winner always comforting.* <http://the-sweetest-th.blogspot.com/2016/08/twice-chocolate-balls.html> (originally in Hebrew).

Consider now negated examples (15–19)<sup>4</sup>:

<sup>4</sup>On the accessibility of negated concepts, showing that negative comparisons are comparisons, see e.g., Giora (2007); Giora et al. (2008).

Example (15) contends that *one can't be what one can't see*:

(15) **I Am Not What I Think I Am ... *You can't be what you can't see.***

[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2nzBWfjdHcI&list=RD2nzBWfjdHcI&start\\_radio=1&t=119](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2nzBWfjdHcI&list=RD2nzBWfjdHcI&start_radio=1&t=119)

Example (16) intensifies the negative claim that things that don't exist ***absolutely don't exist*** (further indicating the weakness of negation):

(16) **Things that don't exist *absolutely don't exist***

The Greek philosopher, Parmenides, held the view that **things that don't exist *absolutely don't exist***, following which he stated, that *motion is impossible* (i.e., that motion is nothing but an illusion). (Translated, based on HeTenTen; see also Zeno's paradoxes). [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zeno%27s\\_paradoxes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zeno%27s_paradoxes)).

In example (17), Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister (falsely) denies that the occupation is an occupation, given "*a biblical right*":

(17) **The occupation is not an occupation**

Deputy Foreign Minister Tzipi Hotovely has drafted the new line, following Netanyahu. "**The occupation is not an occupation,**" she said in all seriousness to Yossi Verter this weekend, *adding something about a biblical right*. <http://www.haaretz.com/opinion/.premium-1.05799>

Example (18) contends that everything is possible, even if *unexpected*:

(18) **Final is not final**

Despite statements on the part of the heads of the organization, once again it became clear that **final is not final** and that *the unexpected can always happen*. (Originally in Hebrew; see HeTenTen<sup>5</sup>)

The opposite is claimed by example (19):

(19) **What was impossible was impossible and therefore *we should enjoy what we are having now, which is what we have***

*There were no promises for a future* and it was deeply acknowledged that **what was impossible was impossible** – *that all that we have is what we are having now, and that this present state is a paradise, a shelter, a safe haven*. (Originally in Hebrew; see HeTenTen).

Examples (20–27), taken from Smarandache (2000, pp. 129–130), further show that, although tautologies are repetitive, some tautologies are actually not tautologies. Instead, they convey different, "deeper meanings" and even change the sense, regardless of (metalinguistic) negation:

(20) **The best of the best.**

(21) **Worst of the worst.**

(22) **Mother of the mother of the mother.**

(23) **Practice makes you practice**

(24) **Sufficient is not enough sufficient.**

(25) **This is not me, this is I.**

(26) **More real than real.**

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<sup>5</sup>HeTenTen is a Hebrew web-corpus compiled using a web-crawler. It contains approximately  $1.2 \times 10^6$  web documents which were mined, filtered, and processed using a generic algorithm suggested by Baroni et al. (2009).

**(27) I am happy because I am happy** (*there's no reason for my happiness*).

In all, tautologies may not be tautological, as they often send novel, informative messages, mostly elaborated and mulled on by their speaker or author. Indeed, unlike logical tautologies, tautologies in language use are informative, in spite of their apparent redundancy. This is also true of negated tautologies, as in example (18) above, which contends that “final is not final”, since *the unexpected can always happen*. To make sense of such negated tautologies, we need to retain the negated concept in the same way we retain the affirmative one, as in “Final” is final, *nothing can be changed*<sup>6</sup> (Giora, 2007, p. 136).

In what follows, we report on two experiments, aiming to provide supportive, experiment-based evidence as to the nature of verbal, discourse-based tautologies. In the first experiment, items were presented in isolation, allowing participants to come up with their immediate, default meaning of the tautology. In the second experiment, tautologies were presented in their natural environment, allowing comprehenders to rely on context and select the speakers' intended, even if nondefault, non-coded interpretation that they might have come up with.

## Experimental studies

### Experiment 1

The aim of this experiment was to find out whether the interpretations of tautologies, found in natural language use (Section 2) are indeed nondefault. To do that, we first tested such tautological items, as in Section 2, when out of context.

### Method

**Participants.** Twenty undergraduate students (2 males), aged 23–57, mean age 35.5, participated in the study. They were all healthy, right handed, native speakers of Hebrew, with no cognitive disabilities, and with normal or corrected-to-normal vision.

**Stimuli.** Stimuli included 20 tautologies displayed in isolation.<sup>7</sup> They were followed by 3 optional outputs, as in (28) below, which is based on example (3) above, and (29) below, which is based on example (19) above. Two of the outputs were always default and nondefault interpretations, while the third varied between a less default or an irrelevant interpretation.<sup>8</sup> For instance, option (1) in example (28) is a default interpretation; option (2) in this example, is a less default interpretation; and option (3) in this example, is a nondefault interpretation. In example (29), option (1) provides a default interpretation; option (2) involves an interpretation that is irrelevant to the meaning of the tautology; and option (3) conveys a nondefault interpretation:

**(28) Kids are kids**

- (1) They are young.
- (2) They need to go to bed early.
- (3) You have to show them you trust them.

**(29) What was impossible was impossible**

- (1) It can't be materialized.

<sup>6</sup><https://boardgamegeek.com/thread/867434/final-combat-strength>.

<sup>7</sup>For the full list of items, see Appendix A.

<sup>8</sup>The third option was included so as to allow us to tell whether the participants performed their task seriously or just opted arbitrarily for any kind of choice. This would allow us to determine whether to exclude them or include them in the statistical analyses. (Eventually, no participant was excluded from the analysis).

- (2) We should therefore enjoy what we are having now.
- (3) You are a shame!

**Procedure.** Participants were asked to circle one interpretation of the three provided for each of the stimuli. They were told they should select the one that is most prominent, most frequent, or most familiar.

## Results

Since we were interested only in two options – the default and the nondefault interpretations, we calculated the percentage of selecting the nondefault alternative (compared to the default counterpart). Results show that the percentage of opting for the nondefault interpretations was 35% ( $SD = 9\%$ ), significantly lower than 50% (which would be expected if there was no preference),  $t_1(19) = 6.99$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $t_2(19) = 2.67$ ,  $p < .01$ . Outside of a specific context, then, the interpretations of tautologies, found in natural language use, are rarely considered nondefault. Instead, it is the default interpretation that prevails.

## Experiment 2

The aim of this experiment was to find out whether tautologies, when in their natural environment, would give rise to default interpretations or focus instead on nondefault counterparts. To do that, we tested tautological items embedded in their natural discourse.

## Method

**Participants.** Twenty undergraduate students (6 males), aged 20–44, mean age 30, participated in the study. They were all healthy, right handed, native speakers of Hebrew, with no cognitive disabilities, and with normal or corrected-to-normal vision.

**Stimuli.** Stimuli included the 20 tautologies of Experiment 1, embedded here in contexts, extracted from naturally occurring discourses (see examples 30–31 below).<sup>9</sup> The options of these tautologies varied between default interpretations (in italics, below) and nondefault counterparts (in boldface below, for convenience):

### (30) Politics is politics

My position in the municipality is in the opposition . . . Many of *my supporters wanted to see me in the coalition, leading the activities, as I have done so far*, but politics is politics, and **public life is not a “request program”**.<sup>10</sup>

### (31) Her home is not a home

For a German Jew that had to flee her home, *a (literal) home* is not a (metaphorical) home, **given that it does not provide a sense of security related to the concept of home**. In fact, her home is not a home.

**Procedure.** Participants were asked to underline one utterance in the context that best reflects the speaker’s intended interpretation of the (tautological<sup>11</sup>) title.

<sup>9</sup>For the full list of items, see Appendix B.

<sup>10</sup>A *request program* is a radio broadcast program that allows audiences to request the broadcasting of a specific song or track.

<sup>11</sup>In the questionnaire, the instructions did not mention anything related to “tautology”, “tautologies”, or “tautological”.

## Results

To find out which of the two alternatives, relevant to our study of tautologies – the default or the nondefault interpretation – is the most favored one, we calculated the percentage of opting for the nondefault interpretations. Results show that this percentage was 94% ( $SD = 4\%$ ), significantly higher than 50%,  $t_1(19) = 50.63$ ,  $p < .0001$ ,  $t_2(19) = 14.67$ ,  $p < .0001$ .

When in context, then, it is the **nondefault** interpretation that prevails. This is further established when comparing the percentage of choosing the nondefault interpretation in Experiment 1 (35%) and Experiment 2 (94%),  $t_1(38) = 25.90$ ,  $p < .0001$ ,  $t_2(19) = 10.4$ ,  $p < .0001$ .

## Discussion

When in isolation (see Experiment 1 above), comprehenders come up with the default, most immediate interpretation of a tautology, as there is no reason to “invent” a different alternative. However, when a tautology is presented in its natural environment, the oncoming utterances focus on explicating what the speaker had mind, as it is often an unexpected nondefault interpretation that is intended. Enlarging on the unexpected renders nondefault options informative, thus shedding a new interpretative light on what seems repetitive. Indeed, speakers/authors expand on what they intend to convey when what they mean is not the obvious, but instead, an innovative aspect of what is seemingly non-informative.

Experiment 2 lends empirical support to our hypothesis that tautologies are not tautologies; they are not simply a vacuous repetition. Instead, they send a novel message which has to be made explicit, as shown by the significant difference between Experiment 1, which focuses on the default, non-informative output, and Experiment 2, which is rich in various innovative interpretations. Experiment 2 further provides experimental support for our intuitive analyses of examples (1–19) above, whereby speakers always enlarge on the nondefault innovative rather than the default non-informative outputs, coded in the mental lexicon.

But are tautologies only verbal? As shown by the following sections, tautologies are not limited to the verbal mode of communication.

## Whether visual or pictorial – tautologies are not tautologies

In this section, we look into pictorial tautologies. We show that they do not differ much from linguistic tautologies. Although they seem to be circular and repetitive in that they exhibit a duplication of an image, they nonetheless convey much more. Given that they exhibit juxtaposition and similarity that imply sameness and more, they do replicate the linguistic tautologies displayed here, involving the same structure and outcome. Like linguistic tautologies, visual and/or pictorial tautologies are also not tautologies, even when the two parts of the image or artwork are very similar or almost identical.


For instance, in example (32), by Michal Na’aman (1997),<sup>12</sup> the emphasis is on different colors (dark and light) of homelands (Palestine and Israel). Despite the great similarity between the two sides of this “diptych”, which seem almost identical, this pictorial tautology is not a tautology. Given that the left side of the diptych (32a), referring to Palestine, is dark, yet displaying the colors of the Palestinian flag (including black, but also white, red, and green), and its right side (32b), referring to Israel, is brighter, further reflecting the colors of the Israeli flag (i.e., blue and white), these differences distinguish between the otherwise almost identical artistic manifestations:

<sup>12</sup>Michal Na’aman granted us permission to publish all her artworks in this article.



(32) *Remarks on color* Michal Na'aman (1997)


(32a)



(32b)



Example (33) by Na'aman (1991), titled *The Affliction of Being Two*, involves similar artworks which seem basically identical. Still, they aren't. Divided in the middle by the same visual relation between the duck and the rabbit, suggests that tautologies are not tautologies, as indicated in the art's title:

(33) *The Affliction of Being Two* Michal Na'aman (1991)



However, example (34) by Na'aman (1995), titled *What Can Look at Itself Is Not One*, makes it clear that this artwork does not display a tautology. Although both sides of the artwork in (34) are almost identical, the rabbit at the right end of the artwork can be taken to be “looking” at itself, shown on the left end of that work. As such, it cannot be ‘one’, namely, the artwork cannot be a tautology:


**(34) *What Can Look at Itself Is Not One* Michal Na'aman (1995)**



In Example (35) below, Mira Maylor (2016) allows 2 barbed wires to face, as if to confront each other. The one on the left, displayed against a dark background, is made of transparent crystal glass and lead; its lucidity is further highlighted by its contrastive black background. The other, on the right, displayed on a light gray background, is made of cast bronze and lead; its silvery background further helps to emphasize the dark color of this wire. Whereas the crystal glass wire is transparent, looking delicate and fragile, the bronze and lead version is a lot more intimidating – looking resilient and threatening.

Is this installation a pictorial tautology? Although not in the pure sense of the word, it is still a version of a tautological representation, given that it displays the same kind of objects, only not in an entirely identical manner. What, then, do the differences and similarities convey? In fact, as shown above, even identical stimuli do not convey the same interpretations.

Given that the images, although mostly repetitive, are also different, conveying distinct messages, the Barbed Wire, in example (35), does not quite make up a tautology. This, however, is not a surprise, given that all the visual tautologies, examined so far, are not really tautologies, as they convey a new message despite their uniformity and their (kind of) repetitiveness.

(35) *Barbed Wire* Mira Maylor (2016)<sup>13</sup>

In Example (36), “Warhol found in Monroe a fusion of two of his consistent themes: death and the cult of celebrity. By **repeating the image**, he evokes her ubiquitous presence in the media. The contrast of vivid color with black and white, and the effect of fading in the right panel are suggestive of the star’s mortality”. <https://www.tate.org.uk/art/artworks/warhol-marilyn-diptych-t03093> (Gallery label, February 2016).

Despite the explicit repetitions, this artwork is also not a tautology, as there are differences between all the various images. “While Warhol’s silkscreened **repetitions** *flatten Monroe’s identity*, they also complicate his own identity as the artist of this work. The silkscreen process allowed Warhol (or his assistants) to **reproduce the same image over and over again**, using *multiple colors*. Once the screens are manufactured and the colors are chosen, the artist simply spreads inks evenly over the screens using a wide squeegee. Though *there are differences from one face to the next*, these appear to be the accidental byproducts of a quasi-mechanical process, rather than the product of the artist’s judgment. Warhol’s **rote painting technique** is echoed by the rigid composition of the work, a five-by-five grid of faces, **repeated** across the two halves of its surface.”

<sup>13</sup>Mira Maylor granted us permission to publish her artwork in this article.

(36) *Marilyn Diptych* Andy Warhol (1962)<sup>14</sup>

In all, then, tautologies are not tautologies. Even those that look like tautologies (while overtly breaching Grice's (1975) informativeness requirement), whether verbal or pictorial, affirmative or negative, allow speakers and comprehenders to attribute to the repeated a different, novel message than the default one they might have initially come up with.

### Optimally innovative tautologies in language and in art

The Optimal Innovation Hypothesis (Giora, Fein, Kotler, & Shuval, 2015a; Giora et al., 2004), following from the Graded Salience Hypothesis (Giora, 2003; Givoni & Giora, 2018), focuses on default, salient *meanings* – meanings listed in the mental lexicon and foremost on our mind. Such coded meanings spring to mind unconditionally when encountering a familiar stimulus (e.g., a word, a phrase, or a picture). They, however, might become Optimally Innovative once they are deautomatized and rendered creative. For instance, the novel “Know Hope” (the pseudonym of an Israeli street artist) deautomatizes the familiar “No hope”, thus allowing despair to be associated and mingled with hope; similarly, the novel phrase “Curl up and dye” – the title of a hairdresser's salon, deautomatizes the familiar – “Curl up and die” (related to depression and despair). Such innovations, which deautomatize the familiar, while retaining it, will be more pleasing than non-deautomatized counterparts (“No hope”; “Curl up and die”), as the deautomatized familiar now entertains both, the familiar and the novel, while weighing them against each other.

The Revised Optimal Innovation Hypothesis (Giora, Givoni, Heruti, & Fein, 2017), further posits that, on top of default coded meanings, default constructed interpretations (e.g., “Don't leave without a good bye”) might also be qualifiable for Optimal Innovation when deautomatized by a novel (nondefault), often context-dependent counterpart (“Don't leave without a good buy” – an advertisement in an airport; or “Beauty is in the eye of the beer holder”,<sup>15</sup> which deautomatizes the familiar “Beauty is in the eye of the beholder”). Such nondefault Optimal Innovations will be pleasing, more pleasing than default and nondefault counterparts, not qualifiable for Optimal Innovation (as shown by Giora et al., 2015a, 2017).


<sup>14</sup>We got copyrights permission to publish *Marilyn Diptych* from Tate Images.

<sup>15</sup><https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23560668>.

Consider, for instance, example (37) below by Michal Na'aman (2000). The visual repetition of ASHKENAZIM (referring in this artwork to European Jews) is indeed a tautology. Still, highlighting (in red) parts of the words, renders this artwork Optimally Innovative (and hence, informative). Specifically, in the word at the top, the ASH part, highlighted (in red), is reminiscent of the holocaust, whereby European Jews were burnt and their ashes buried or trashed. The word at the bottom highlights NAZI (in red), alluding to the Israelis' treatment of Arabs and Palestinians, both in Israel and in the occupied territory, which is also reminiscent of the holocaust.


Taking a broader perspective, given that the word **ASHKENAZIM** is repeated twice, with different parts being highlighted – ASH in the first and Nazi in the second – allows **ASHKENAZIM** to have novel interpretations. Indeed, the repetitiveness of the 2 words, rendered Optimally Innovative by their highlighted segments, conveys informative options, implying possible relations between the ruler and the ruled, the one in power (the Israelis) and the powerless (the Palestinians), while further referring to the possibility of additional victims.

(37) **ASHKENAZIM**, *The word within a word* Michal Na'aman (2000)



Example (38) by Michal Na'aman (1998), **A ROSE IS A ROSE (MARY'S BABY)** deautomatizes Gertrude Stein's (1922) "Rose is a rose is a rose is a rose" line, taken from her poem, titled Sacred Emily. Stein's "Rose is a rose ..." and Na'aman's "A ROSE IS A ROSE (MARY'S BABY)" are both tautological. Regardless, both are also metaphorical. In Stein's example, the woman named Rose is termed "a rose", i.e., a flower; in Na'aman's tautology, **A ROSE IS A ROSE**, itself a well-known version of Stein's, is deautomatized and rendered innovative by "IS A ROSE (MARY'S BABY)", the latter further portrays the baby as a metaphorical flower, but also echoes Rosemary's Baby – the horror film written and directed by Roman Polanski (1986). Furthermore, **ROSEMARY'S BABY** is innovative in terms of uniting 2 distinguishable words (ROSE MARY) into one meaningful word/name (ROSEMARY). Tautologies, then, are not really tautological, as also stated by Blanchot (1993, p. 341, see above).

(38) **A ROSE IS A (ROSEMARY'S BABY)** Michal Na'aman (1998)





Example (39) is another Optimally Innovative tautological artwork by Na'aman (1998), optimally innovating the familiar “(A) rose is a rose ...” dealt with above (see example 38). Here, however, the Optimally Innovative metaphorical “A rose” in “A rose Is Zalman Shoshana” refers to a transgender by that name. Indeed, “Shoshana” (“a rose” in Hebrew) is a first name in Hebrew of girls and women. Hence, both, the English “Rose” and the Hebrew “Shoshana” versions may interact and activate an interplay that is intriguing and entertaining. Zalman Shoshana, failing to look like a woman, is described by Rabina (1999, p. 34), as “the one who is always two”, failing to fully integrate and unite his different identities into one whole.

(39) *A rose Is A Rose Is Zalman Shoshana* Michal Na'aman (1998)




Example (40) is the well-known image, highlighting the ambiguity between the figure and ground, here between a goblet/jar and/or faces. The question that arises (in the literature) is, which we perceive first – the figure (the jar) or the background (the 2 faces on the sides). Since this image is highly familiar, it is susceptible to deautomatization and hence to Optimal Innovativeness (as shown by the following examples below):

(40) *A jar or faces?*



As in (40) above, artwork (see 41 below), albeit a tautology (termed Geranium in Hebrew, displayed on both sides of the artwork), is made up of two faces looking at each other. This, in fact, deautomatizes the figure in (40 above). Specifically, the faces on the sides of this artwork in (41), looking at each other, deautomatize the faces of the figure in (40) as a whole (including the jar), adding only the hair on the forehead, so as to allow us to detect its meaning, thus rendering this artwork an Optimal Innovation:

(41) Untitled, Raffi Lavie (2003)<sup>16</sup>



Example (42) is also an optimally innovative tautology by René Magritte (1996), titled *La Décalcomanie* (meaning “Transfer”). It allows the man on the left to have a reflection of himself on the right, which is a transparent part of the curtain looking out at the background – the sky and the sea. Still, despite the similarities between the two images of the men, the differences between them suggest that this “tautology” isn’t really a tautology, given that the figure on the right end (being also a void on the curtain) adds unpredictable innovative information to that on the left:


(42) *La Décalcomanie*, René Magritte (1966) (c/o Pictoright Amsterdam 2020)



Example (43) below, deautomatizes Magritte’s *La Décalcomanie* by adding the word “Head” (“ראש” in Hebrew), both on the top and at the bottom of the left side of the artwork (while “caged” in specific borders). And, as in *Geranium* (see example 41 above), he also inserts two facial contours, facing each other, here, however, in different colors. Additionally, the eyes of the man on the right are now colored in light red, which makes it feasible that he is looking at the viewer rather than at the sea.

<sup>16</sup>Noemi Givon, a director of Givon Gallery, granted us permission to publish Lavie’s artworks in this paper.

(43) Untitled, Raffi Lavie (1997)




Optimal Innovations are definitely not tautologies in the pure sense of the word. Still, given the “uninformativeness” of tautologies, Optimal Innovations, deautomatizing such familiar tautologies, are a deautomatized, novel version of tautologies, which are still **accessible** when interpreting these innovations. Weighing the familiar against the novel, renders such artworks a pleasing experience.

### Figurative (metaphorical and sarcastic) tautologies in art and language

According to the literature, metaphorical tautologies flout Grice’s (1975) maxim of quality, in addition to flouting the maxim of quantity. “Hence, in contrast with literal tautologies, metaphorical tautologies flout two rather than one maxim of conversation” (Owens & Elgibali, 2013; Ch. 4). This however is not quite the case with Magritte’s (1935) “The red model”, which displays a pair of shoes, ending in human toes (see example 44 below). Although the shoes are not identical in that one fits the left foot and the other – the right foot, they make up a tautology in that they look identical, while suggesting that “a shoe is a shoe, no matter what it looks like”. However, what renders them metaphorical is the “semantic anomaly” (see Beardsley, 1958) involved in the artwork. This work incorporates artificial material (i.e., leather) with a live part of the human body – the toes part of the feet – which now are an integral part of the shoes themselves, making up a metaphorical whole. This tautology indicates that the shoes are so comfortable that one may feel like walking in bare feet when wearing them. They might further indicate that “inside” and “outside” options interact so that they are rendered into one. Being highly informative, this metaphorical artwork flouts Grice’s maxim of quality and only that maxim.


(44) *The red model*, René Magritte (1935) (c/o Pictoright Amsterdam 2020)





Example (45) is also a surrealistic, metaphorical tautology, involving semantic anomaly: It allows the person looking at himself in the mirror to actually see himself from behind. The reflection of the book in that mirror (placed next to the mirror) is “natural” though, which suggests that the mirror is a regular one, not reflecting another mirror. But, in fact, the viewer is creating a new version of that person from behind, envisioning him as looking at himself from behind, while facing the mirror. Although this is not realistic, it is still highly creative and informative, while being uninformative (as per Grice, 1975), but, at the same time, also not “true”, flouting Grice’s quality maxim:

(45) *Portrait of Edward James*, René Magritte (1937) (c/o Pictoright Amsterdam 2020)



The artwork in (46) below, by Frida Kahlo (1939), which depicts the *two Fridas*, tightly clasping hands, is a metaphor of harmony of two souls. According to Doris Maria-Reina Bravo, “this bond is echoed by the vein that unites them. Where one is weakened by an exposed heart, the other is strong; where one still pines for her lost love – as underscored by the vein feeding Rivera’s [Frida’s husband] miniature portrait – the other clamps down on that **figurative and literal tie** with a hemostat”. <https://www.khanacademy.org/humanities/ap-art-history/later-europe-and-americas/modernity-ap/a/kahlo-the-two-fridas-las-dos-fridas>

Indeed, these two Fridas are emotionally attached to each other, as reflected, for example, by their tightly clasped hands; although two, they figuratively represent the various inward facets of **one** person – Frida herself – which renders the artwork a metaphorical tautology.<sup>17,18</sup>

(46) *The Two Fridas* – Frida Kahlo (1939) (c/o Pictoright Amsterdam 2020)



<sup>17</sup>Note that this is conveyed even more strongly in an artwork by de Sebastian Perez & Benjamin Lacombe (2016), in which the Two Fridas are literally one, sharing the same heart and body. [https://www.pinterest.com/josefine\\_table/personajes/frida-kahlo/](https://www.pinterest.com/josefine_table/personajes/frida-kahlo/).

<sup>18</sup>Note further that, as suggested by Colston (2019), even some surrealist artworks indicate a similarity relation between two unrelated living creatures, such as birds and fish, that seem to share some features or evolve into each other and therefore might resemble a tautology, as in *Sky and Water* by M. C. Escher (1938). <https://www.imj.org.il/en/collections/506589> and M. C. Escher (2011) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D32XQLIUcgl>.

Example (47), a verbal ad on (U.K.) TV, is also a metaphorical tautology. While contending that a car is a car, it also argues that a car is not **just** a car. It's "a statement":

(47) **A car isn't just a car, a car is a statement**

"We know a car isn't just a car, a car is a *statement*, a *statement of your CHARACTER*, a *statement of your CONFIDENCE*, a *statement of your TASTES*."

(For a similar version, see: <https://www.facebook.com/people/Halfords-Dial-A-Wash/100005030057567>)

In example (48), the verbal tautology – **we are as we are** – gets across as informative, once you have read the whole text, which allows one to grasp that it is clearly ironical, conveying the opposite. Indeed, the description of the speaker's "perfect" community cannot but be interpreted sarcastically. In fact, the ongoing self-applause is actually a show of pretense, made most obvious when it becomes an extreme hyperbole, "parodying a narrow-minded, highly-conservative attitude" (Berntsen & Kennedy, 1996, p. 25). This is clearly unveiled at the end of the poem, where the exaggeration cannot be true (as in the last 3 lines), which suggests that the bragging is an ironic self-denigration (*italics added*):

(48) Velbegavet (Gifted/Intelligent), Niels Hausgaard (1991)

Us from this part of the country, **we are as we are**.  
That's what we tell one another so often, **we are as we are**.  
That's also the way we would like to continue to be.  
We don't think there is anything unnatural about that.  
Our sky is so deep and blue. and the air is so clean.  
We speak the *most correct language of the world*.  
Our children are nice and our women are pretty.  
And then *we are so extremely intelligent*.<sup>19</sup>

Example (49) is also a humorous, if not an ironic tautology. It contends that "Death is death. *Once your [sic] dead, that's it, it's over*". Still, the author who cites that speaker, derides the conclusion that "it's all over" when you are dead, noting that this was "said by the man who died twice", thus rendering the text highly sarcastic:

(49) **Death is death. Once your [sic] dead, that's it, it's over**

"All I want to accomplish in life is to have fun and make other people's lives better as best as I can.

"No personal achievement will matter to me once I'm dead, the only thing that will live on after my death will be my impact on the people that are still alive. And hopefully my impact will be positive!"

In summary:

**"Death is death. Once your dead, that's it, it's over."**

... said the man who died twice."<sup>20</sup>

<https://www.qt.com.au/news/how-it-feels-die-man-who-has-died-twice/2557079/>

In example (50), Hilde Domin, a German Jew, is an example that juxtaposes " $q = q$ " and " $q = \sim q$ ", thus comparing an affirmative and a negative tautology:

(50) **A rose is a rose**

**But a home**

**Is not a home**<sup>21</sup>

These affirmative (e.g., "A rose is a rose") and negative (e.g., "But a home Is not a home") tautologies suggest that both indeed make sense in a similar way. The affirmative "A rose is a rose" alludes to Gertrude Stein's "Rose is a rose is a rose", which is often interpreted metaphorically as "things are what they are". "In Stein's view, the sentence expresses the fact that simply using the name

<sup>19</sup>Translated by Dorte Berntsen and John M. Kennedy (1996).

<sup>20</sup>On metaphorical and ironic tautologies, see also Engström (1996).

<sup>21</sup>A negated tautology by Hilde Domin, translated to English. <http://www.new-books-in-german.com/hilde-domin>.

of a thing already *invokes the imagery*".<sup>22</sup> This suggests that "(for a German Jew who had to flee her home), a (literal) home is not a (metaphorical) home, in that it does not provide for *the sense of security associated with the notion of home*. To make sense of this negated tautology, we need to retain the negated concept in the same way we retain the affirmative one" (Giora, 2007: 136; for more examples and references, attesting to the weakness of negation and the accessibility of negated concepts, see, Giora, 2006, 2007; Giora, Zimmerman, & Fein, 2008).

## Conclusions

Tautologies are considered redundant statements in literature and rhetoric.<sup>23</sup> However, when speakers spell out their intended meaning or interpretation, their utterances seem highly informative (see Section 2). Indeed, this has also been established here by Experiment 2. Unlike participants' preferences in Experiment 1, where items were presented in isolation, which allowed participants to opt for the default interpretations, in Experiment 2, participants preferred unpredictable, nondefault interpretations over default predictable ones. Note, further, that tautologies are not used only in language, but also in visual art (see Section 3). And when they deautomatize familiar outputs, they render them Optimally Innovative, and therefore pleasing (on Optimal Innovation, see Giora et al., 2004, 2015a; See also Section 4). Section 5 discusses metaphorical and sarcastic tautologies in art and language, showing, again, that tautologies are highly informative and even entertaining.

In sum, then, tautologies are not tautologies. Neither in language, nor in art, do they convey a redundant message. Instead, they are innovative and intriguing, even when addressees have to come up with their own implicatures while encountering such "non-informative" messages. As Michal Na'aman (1999, p. 23) stated: "What replicates itself is always the other".

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<sup>22</sup><https://www.flickr.com/photos/luigire/5794312521>.

<sup>23</sup><https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tautology>

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## Appendix A.

### Experiment 1 – Stimuli (translated to English)

#### 1. Kids are kids

- (1) They are very young
- (2) They have to go to bed early
- (3) you have to show them that you trust them

#### 2. In war as in war

- (1) He will not back down from what needs to be done.
- (2) They visit their relatives' grave.
- (3) They shoot.

#### 3. A surgical operation is a surgical operation

- (1) A surgical operation involves a risk.
- (2) There is no way a surgical operation won't be painful.
- (3) A cesarean section.

#### 4. Green is green

- (1) Does green go well with yellow?
- (2) Today it's dollars.
- (3) It's a color.

#### 5. Her home is not a home

- (1) It's a stable
- (2) It doesn't provide her with a sense of security.
- (3) It's not exactly the place one can live in.

#### 6. Only "yes" is "yes"

- (1) Only "yes" is an explicit consent to having sex.
- (2) "Yes" is a short reply.
- (3) "Yes" is "no".

#### 7. A performance is a performance

- (1) A performance is conducted in the presence of audiences.
- (2) A performance has to be treated seriously.
- (3) Yael performs very frequently.

#### 8. As long as it doesn't succeed it doesn't succeed.

- (1) Only when it is successful it is successful.
- (2) Even though everyone loved it, that doesn't mean much.
- (3) We don't have an assignment.

#### 9. Coffee is coffee

- (1) Coffee always feels good.
- (2) I never went to a coffee shop.
- (3) Coffee is an energizing drink.

#### 10. Freedom is freedom

- (1) When you are on vacation you can do whatever you like.
- (2) A ticket for free, absolutely free.
- (3) You don't get to do homework during the vacation.

**11. Occupation is an occupation is an occupation**

- (1) Control your urge/impulse.
- (2) Oppression.
- (3) The state abuse of another people

**12. What is impossible is impossible**

- (1) It cannot be carried out.
- (2) We should enjoy what we are having now.
- (3) You are a shameful disgrace.

**13. Final is not final**

- (1) It is temporary.
- (2) The unexpected can happen.
- (3) Bizarre.

**14. I am happy because I am happy**

- (1) There is no reason for my happiness.
- (2) Is there an explanation for emotions?
- (3) I am simply happy.

**15. Warranty is a warranty**

- (1) Refund service.
- (2) It's emotional.
- (3) Irresponsible.

**16. A present is a present**

- (1) A check could be a present.
- (2) At the end of the event you can open the presents.
- (3) A present is something that feels good to give and receive.

**17. Chocolate is a chocolate**

- (1) Milk chocolate
- (2) Chocolate is a sweet.
- (3) It's the love of all of us, not just kids'.

**18. Music is music**

- (1) violin.
- (2) Music is a work of tunes and sounds.
- (3) Music suits everyone, regardless of their origin.

**19. A competition is competition**

- (1) In a competition there is only one winner.
- (2) The friends competed each other.
- (3) In a competition you have to do your best.

**20. Politics is politics**

- (1) Politics is dubious/unreliable.
- (2) I can always entertain you.
- (3) Public life is not a request program.

**Appendix B.****Experiment 2 – Stimuli (translated to English)****1. Kids are kids.**

Kids are kids. You have to show them you trust them. Then they go out the door and who knows, really, what can happen.

**2. In war as in war**

... if a ground operation is necessary, our minister of war will not back down from what needs to be done. In war as in war as they say.

**3. A surgical operation is a surgical operation**

A surgical operation involves a risk. There is no such thing as a surgical operation that is not painful. Even when you are anesthetized.

**4. Green is Green**

Green is Green. Once it was related to the quality of the environment. Today it's already dollars.

**5. Her home is not a home**

For a German Jew that had to flee her home, a (*literal*) home is not a (metaphorical) home, given that it does not provide a sense of security related to the concept of home. In fact, her home is not a home.

**6. Only "yes" is yes**

Some men haven't yet internalized the fact that "no means no" and then a new law was, meanwhile, enacted in California, and ruled that this is not enough. One should also hear an explicit consent.

**7. A performance is a performance**

Treat any performance seriously, even if it does not cost you or costs you very little. A performance is a performance and your name/fame is very delicate and very dynamic. Take care of it.

**8. As long as it doesn't succeed it doesn't succeed.**

Before the series was broadcasted, I used to tell Hannan and Guy: "Listen, it's a trial. We gambled big time. In Hot everybody loved it immensely. But that doesn't mean anything. As long as it doesn't succeed it doesn't succeed.

**9. Coffee is coffee**

To begin or end the day with coffee? Coffee is coffee. And it always feels good. Especially with pastry. And only for 10 NIS.

**10. A Vacation is a vacation**

In the school in which I was working there was an agreed on practice – no homework was assigned during the vacation.  
**A Vacation is a vacation**

**11. An Occupation is an occupation is an occupation**

Our state keeps on holding another people under an occupation regime, executing thousands of administrative detentions, eliminating, bullying, abusing, preventing, silencing threatening . . . An occupation is an occupation.

**12. What was impossible was impossible**

What was impossible was impossible – and all we are having now is what we are having now, and this state of affairs is a paradise, a shelter, a safe haven.

**13. Final is not final**

Once again it became clear that what is final is not final and the unexpected can always happen.

**14. I am happy because I am happy**

I am happy because I am happy there is no reason for my happiness.

**15. Warranty is a warranty**

With us you are in good hands, and we will take back the products and fix them and return them. Warranty is a warranty! No matter where you are in the country, once you have shopped anything in our place will get a perfect service.

**16. A present is a present**

Whatever happens, a present is a present. And it's worth noting that if you intend to go to the party of the new born babe, maybe the check could be a present for that event.



**17. A chocolate is a chocolate**

A chocolate is a chocolate. A chocolate is what we all love, not just the kids, don't leave this experience without the adults since you will also enjoy it tremendously.

**18. Music is music**

Didn't you fear that they will look at you differently since your look is unusual?" No, I didn't worry about that at all. Music is music, it's not particular but suits all ethnic groups."

**19. A competition is a competition**

A competition is a competition and one has to make the best of what he can. I aim at the highest I can.

**20. Politics is politics**

My seat in the municipality will be in the opposition' on the other side of the fence. Many of my supporters and activists wanted to see me in the coalition, leading the activities and being effective as I have been so far, but politics is politics and public life is not a "request program".