|
דר' דורון אביטל
- אוניברסיטת קולומביה ואוניברסיטת תל-אביב
"The Standard Extended: Frege, Wittgenstein Frege
offers us a matrix of four possible elements: the sense and reference of
a singular term; the sense of reference of a predicate. The matrix
offers four possible accounts for the idea of the proposition: (1) the
proposition as a composition of senses (Frege's account); (2) the
proposition as a composition of referents; and two more heterogeneous
compositions, namely: (3) the proposition as a composition of the sense
of a predicate and the reference of a singular term; and its orthogonal
rotation: (4) the proposition as a composition of the sense of a
singular term and the reference of a predicate. I term the latter two
options de re
and
de dicto,
respectively, and argue at
length that this is the correct analysis for the idea of the
proposition. I suggest
two requirements that objects of belief (propositions) must satisfy: (i)
they must express a meaningful condition; and (ii) they must relate to
an object of the independent reality (the argument of the condition). I
argue that the two readings
de re
and
de dicto
are the only two options out of
the four listed that satisfy the two requirements. I use the suggested
structure to show that "The Paradox of Following a Rule" (I refer to it
as "The Paradox of the Intended Model") as presented by Wittgenstein
(and Kripke) as well as Kripke's "A Puzzle about Belief" are in fact
orthogonal equivalents of the same type of paradox, and have
de re
or
de dicto
(respectively) readings as
their logical underpinning. I draw a general conclusion by way of which
propositions reflect standards (or rules) that are materialized in the
form of a choice of representative objects (examples of the rules), and
show the mechanism by which the extension of the rules is thus
generated. In this, I show that the same logical mechanism is at work
both in "standard" and "non-standard" extensions of rules. In the life
of a rule, there may be a moment at which a choice or a judgment is
necessary on how to extend the rule. Rules are not "railroads to
infinity," but rather a concrete mechanism of extension which is open to
misuse as well as to extension that requires a choice or a judgment.
|
||