RECENT AND FORTHCOMING PUBLICATIONS

 

 

1.

Cukierman A. (Forthcoming), "The Impact of the Global Financial Crisis on Central Banking", in Mayes D., Siklos P. and J.E. Sturm (eds.), Oxford Handbook on the Economics of Central Banking, Oxford University Press.

 

 

2.

Cukierman A. (Forthcoming), "Central Banks", Thompson W. (ed.), Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, Oxford University Press

 

 

3.

Cukierman A. (Forthcoming), "The Behavior of the Money Multiplier During and after the Subprime Crisis: Implications for the Transmission Mechanism of Monetary Policy", in Eijffinger S. and D. Masciandaro (eds.), Doves and Hawks: Economics and Politics of Monetary policymaking, CEPR E-Book.

 

 

4.

Cukierman A (2017), "Bailout Uncertainty, US Banks' Behavior and Bond Issues after Lehman's Collapse: Empirical Evidence and some Lessons for the Euro Area Debt Crisis", in Beck G. and V. Wieland (eds.), IMFS Interdisciplinary Studies in Monetary and Financial Stability: Quantitative Easing in the Euro Area: Its Record and Future Prospects, Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability, Frankfurt.

 

 

5.

Cukierman A. (2017), "Money Growth and Inflation: Policy Lessons from a Comparison of the US since 2008 with Hyperinflation Germany in the 1920s", Economic Letters, 154, 109-112.

 

 

6.

Cukierman A. (2016), "Reflections on the Natural rate of Interest, its Measurement, Monetary Policy and the Zero Lower Bound", in Gnan E. and D. Masciandaro (eds.), Central Banking and Monetary Policy: Which will be the New Post-Crisis Normal? SUERF Conference Proceedings 2016/4.

 

 

7.

Beetsma R., A. Cukierman and M. Giuliodori (2016), "The Political Economy of Redistribution in the U.S. in the Aftermath of World War II - Evidence and Theory", American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 8(4), pp. 1-40, November.

 

 

8.

Cukierman A. & R. Melnick, (2015), “The Conquest of Israeli Inflation and Current Policy Dilemmas”, in Maintaining Price Stability: The Bank of Israel's Sixth Decade, Offenbacher A. (ed.), pp. 13-62.

 

 

9.

Cukierman A. (2015), “The Choice of Flexibility in Targeting Inflation during Normal Times and during Disinflations”, Research in Economics, vol. 69, 494-502.

 

 

10.

Cukierman A. (2015), “Will the Global Financial Crisis have a Lasting Impact on the Position of Major Currencies vis-à-vis the Renminbi?” in Bretton Woods:The Next Seventy Years, Uzan M. (ed.)

 

 

11.

Cukierman A. and Y. Izhakian (2015), "Bailout Uncertainty in a Microfounded General Equilibrium Model of the Financial System", Journal of Banking and Finance, vol. 52, pp. 160–179.

 

 

12.

Cukierman A., “Euro-Area and US Banks behavior, and ECB-Fed Monetary Policies during the Global Financial Crisis: A comparison”, in Money, Regulation & Growth: Financing New Growth in Europe, SUERF Studies, 2014/4, 73-90.

 

 

13.

A. Cukierman (2013), “Monetary Policy and Institutions Before, During and After the Global Financial Crisis”, Journal of Financial Stability, 9(3), 373-384, September.

 

 

14.

A. Cukierman (2013), “Regulatory Reforms and the Independence of Central Banks and Financial Supervisors”, SUERF Studies on States, Banks, and the Financing of the Economy, Issue 3, 121-134.

 

 

15.

A. Cukierman (2011), “Reflections on the Crisis and on its Lessons for Regulatory Reform and for Central Bank Policies”, Journal of Financial Stability, 7, 26-37.

 

 

16.

A. Cukierman (2011), The Great Depression, the Current Crisis and Old versus New Keynesian Thinking – What have we Learned and What Remains to be Learned?” Arnon A., J. Weinblatt and W. Young (eds.), Perspectives on Keynesian Economics, Springer.

 

 

17.

A. Cukierman (2011), "Central Bank Finances and Independence – How Much Capital Should a Central Bank Have?", The Capital Needs of Central Banks, S. Milton and P. Sinclair (eds.), Routledge Publishing House.

 

 

18.

A. Cukierman (2010), “The Roles of Ideology, Institutions, Politics and Economic Knowledge in Forecasting Macroeconomic Developments: Lessons from the Crisis”, CESifo Economic Studies, 56 (4), 575-595, December.

 

 

19.

A. Cukierman (2010), “How Would have Monetary Policy During the Great Inflation Differed if it had been Conducted in the Styles of Volcker and Greenspan and with Perfect Foresight?”, Comparative Economic Studies, 52, 159-179. 

 

 

20.

A. Cukierman (2009), "The Limits of Transparency”, Economic Notes, 38, Issue 1-2, pp. 1-37.

 

 

21.

A. Cukierman (2008), "Central Bank Independence and Monetary Policymaking Institutions - Past, Present and Future", European Journal of Political Economy, 24, 722-736.

 

A shorter version appeared in Spanish in Economia Chileana, V. 9, No. 1, April 2006, 5-23.

 

 

22.

Cukierman, Alex and Muscatelli, Anton (2008) "Nonlinear Taylor Rules and Asymmetric Preferences in Central Banking: Evidence from the United Kingdom and the United States", The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics: Vol. 8 : Iss. 1 (Contributions), Article 7.

 

 

23.

A. Cukierman , "De Jure, De Facto and Desired Independence: The Bank of Israel as a Case Study", in N. Liviatan and H. Barkai (eds), The Bank of Israel: Volume II, Selected Topics in Israel's Monetary Policy, 2007, Oxford University Press.

 

 

24.

R. Beetsma, A. Cukierman and M. Giuliodori, "On the Relationship between Defense and Non-Defense Spending in the U.S. during the World Wars", Economics Letters, 95, February 2007, 415-421.

 

 

25.

A. Cukierman, "Should the Bank of Israel Have a Growth Target? What are the Issues?", Israel Economic Review, V. 4, N. 2, April 2007, 1-18.

 

 

26.

A. Cukierman, "Central Bank Independence and Policy Results: Theory and Evidence" in Stabiltity and Economic Growth: The Role of the Central Bank - Proceedings of a Conference to commemorate the Eightieth Anniversary of Banco de Mexico, Published: November 2006, Banco de Mexico, 39-52.

 

 

27.

A. Cukierman and A. Dalmazzo, "Fiscal-Monetary Policy Interactions in the presence of Unionized Labor Markets", International Tax and Public Finance, 13, 2006, 411-435.

 

 

28.

F. Coricelli, A. Cukierman and A. Dalmazzo, "Monetary Institutions, Monopolistic Competition, Unionized Labor Markets and Economic Performance", Scandinavian Journal of Economics, V. 108, March 2006, 39-63.(Extended older version, January 2004).

 

 

29.

A. Cukierman,  "Keynesian Economics, Monetary Policy and the Business Cycle - New and Old", CESifo Economic Studies, Vol. 51, 4/2005, 697-728.

 

 

30.

A. Cukierman and F. Lippi, "Endogenous Monetary Policy with Unobserved Potential Output", Journal of Economics Dynamics and Control, V. 29, issue 11, November 2005, 1951-1983.

 

 

31.

A. Cukierman, I. Goldstein and Y. Spiegel, "The Choice of Exchange Rate Regime and Speculative Attacks", Journal of the European Economic Association, V. 2, issue 6, December 2004, 1206-1241.(Extended older version, July 2003).

 

 

32.

A. Cukierman, "Monetary Institutions, Monetary Union and Unionized Labor Markets - Some Recent Developments ", in: Beetsma R., C. Favero, A. Missale, V.A. Muscatelli, P. Natale and P. Tirelli (eds.), Monetary Policy, Fiscal Policies and Labour Markets: Key Aspects of Macroeconomic Policymaking in EMU ,2004, Cambridge University Press.

 

 

33.

A. Cukierman, "Non Linearities in Taylor Rules - Causes Consequences and Evidence", Revista de Economia, Banco Central del Uruguay, November 2004 (Spanish).

 

An earlier version was presented at the 19th Economic Annual Meeting of the Central Bank of Uruguay in August 2004.

 

 

 34.

A. Cukierman, Y. Spiegel and  L. Leiderman, "The Choice of Exchange Rate Bands: Balancing Credibility and Flexibility", Journal of International Economics , 62(2), March 2004, 379-408 .

 

 

 35.

F. Coricelli, A. Cukierman and A. Dalmazzo, "Economic Performance and Stabilization Policy in a Monetary Union with Imperfect Labor and Goods' Markets", in: Sinn H. W., M. Widgren and M. Kothenburger (eds.), European Monetary Integration, 2004, MIT Press.

 

 

 36.

A. Cukierman and Y. Spiegel, “When is the Median Voter Paradigm a Reasonable Guide for Policy Choices in a Representative Democracy?”, Economics and Politics, 15(3), November 2003, 247-284. 

 

 

 37.

A. Cukierman and S. Gerlach, "The Inflation Bias Revisited: Theory and Some International Evidence", The Manchester School, 71(5), September 2003, 541-565. 

 

 

 38.

A. Cukierman, "Does a Higher Sacrifice Ratio Mean that Central Bank Independence is Excessive?", Annals of Economics and Finance, 3,  2002.

 

 

 39.

A. Cukierman, "Are Contemporary Central Banks Transparent about Economic Models and Objectives and What Difference Does it Make?", Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review , 84(4), July - August 2002, 15-45.

 

 

 40.

A. Cukierman, G. P. Miller and B. Neyapti, “Central Bank Reform, Liberalization and Inflation in Transition Economies - An International Perspective”, Journal of Monetary Economics, 49, March  2002, 237-264.

 

 

41.

A. Cukierman, "Accountability, Credibility, Transparency and Stabilization Policy in the Eurosystem", in: Charles Wyplosz (ed.), The Impact of EMU on Europe and the Developing Countries, 2001, Oxford University Press, 40-75.

 

 

42.

A. Cukierman and F. Lippi, "Labor Markets and Monetary Union : A Strategic Analysis", Economic Journal, 111, July 2001, 541 - 565.

 

 

43.

A. Cukierman, "Establishing a Reputation for Dependability by Means of Inflation Targets", Economics of Governance , 1,  February 2000, 53-76.
Reprinted in Lavan Mahadeva and Gabriel Sterne (eds.), Monetary Frameworks in a Global Context,  Routledge, 2000.

 

 

44.

A. Cukierman and F. Lippi, "Central Bank Independence, Centralization of Wage Bargaining, Inflation and Unemployment - Theory and Some Evidence",  European Economic Review, 43, May 1999, 1395-1434.