

(31)

FOUCAULT RECONSIDERED: THE CARTOGRAPHY OF KNOWLEDGE AND POWER

Adi Ophir

I. Introduction

A relatively neglected aspect of Foucault's work is his continuous concern with space, places, and the spatialization of power and knowledge. Commenting on his "obsession with space" Foucault clarified in a few interviews some of his ideas about the emplacement of knowledge and power that seemed less easy to grasp, adding new insights which call for further explication.<sup>1</sup> But nowhere in Foucault's texts or para-texts can one find a systematic account of the way spatial analysis is employed and spatial relations are to be understood. This lack of an explicit, unequivocal meaning characterizes, no doubt, Foucault's use of other concepts, most notably the concept of power. Yet whereas in some later interviews Foucault did try to spell out a coherent account of the way "power", and "subjectivity" were used,<sup>2</sup> space has remained an orphan notion. Spatial metaphors are mixed in Foucault's text with literal spatial descriptions;<sup>3</sup> different spatial frameworks or settings are distinguished as if space were a genus with its own species,<sup>4</sup> and no explicit distinction is made between space and place.

This apparent muddle is worth explicatory effort, however, only if more than the consistency or clarity of Foucault's writings is at stake. I will try to show that much more is at stake indeed, that the conceptual ambiguity is superficial, and that when that undeveloped aspect in Foucault's work is adequately elaborated not only does it provides new insights into Foucault's own philosophical project, but it also leads into a new domain of questions and problematizations: the spatial logic of power/knowledge, and more generally, the logic of social space. Foucault's contribution to theory in this domain may be closely linked to the pioneering work of a historian of science like Shapin, a social theorists like Giddens, or a

theorist of architecture and urban planning like Hillier; however, in what follows these links will only be hinted at. My reading will be limited to the Foucaultian corpus, but my argument will be general, hence somewhat speculative. I will argue that spatial conditions are constraining-enabling conditions in the production of knowledge and the exercise of power, and that it is no less crucial to articulate and understand the embodiment of discourse in social space than to spell out its historicity. The spatial aspect of Foucault's archaeology and genealogy of discourse should not be the exception in intellectual history but the rule. In general, studies in intellectual history, even when thoroughly contextualized, tend to subsume spatial analyses under the reconstruction of political or economic formations, structures of institutions of discourse and the like. I will try to show that the spatial factor, even though related to the economic, the political, and the institutional, cannot be reduced to any of these layers of analysis. To ignore the spatial factor is to ignore a crucial aspect in the history of discourse, and, more generally, of power-relations. In fact, I would like to suggest that the famous formula, "power/knowledge" should be amended and rewritten as "space/power/knowledge".

A sweeping generalization of this kind, if not obviously false is often all too trivial. Since I do not think it is easily falsifiable, I will try to show that it is not trivial either. I will do this by examining three aspects of my claim; three ways in which it must be tested: a. its merit with regard to our understanding of particular events in the history of discourse; b. its merits with regard to other components of the theory to which it is related; c. its status as a truth claim. Hence there will be three separate, yet related moves. 1. A historical move, inspired by Foucault's notion of *heterotopia*, in which I propose a contribution to a

(speculative) description of the emergence of modern science. The emergence of modern science may be told as a story of the transformation of "places of knowledge" in the West, of their inner spatial organization and their relation to social space.

2. A theoretical move, in which, inspired by some clues from the archaeology of the clinic, I propose a topology of social space that situates the above historical transformation of places of knowledge in a broader theoretical context. Within this framework it will be possible to reinterpret Foucault's dissemination of the modern subject as a series of spatializations. I will claim that the deconstructive genealogies of the subject can be read as reconstructions of the changing patterns and the different, interrelated dimensions of the spatialization of subjectivity.

3. A meta-theoretical move, in which I propose to understand the claims about spatialization of knowledge, power and the subject as transcendental hypotheses, that is, falsifiable claims about the limits of experience. I will start, however, with Foucault's own spatial analyses.

## II. The Clinic's Three Spaces

Foucault was first explicitly concerned with the relationship between space, knowledge and power in The Birth of the Clinic, "a book about space, about language, and about death; ... about the act of seeing, the gaze" (BC ix).<sup>5</sup> He distinguished there threespatial layers.<sup>6</sup> The first is the **phenomenal** field in which diseases are "localized" (hence "a space of localization"), the domain in which they appear to an observer (BC 3-10). Foucault's claim is that it was not always the case that this space was the space of the concrete human body; this occurred only after the emergence of medical clinic in the late 18th and early 19th century. In a second, different spatial setting the very **objects** of medical discourse are located; this is the space in which diseases, and later organic

pathological processes assume their specific form, are "configured" (hence "a space of configuration"). Before the emergence of the clinic, Foucault tells us, this space was constituted by nosological tables (BC 3-16). The third space is the one in which diseases are socially governed and controlled, epidemics are tackled, public health is taken care of, i.e., the social space (BC 16-20). Social space should be understood, as the examples of The Birth of the Clinic clearly show, as pertaining both to the territory under the control of a political regime and to specific demarcations inscribed within it, e.g., between public and private spheres, the ecclesiastical and the secular, etc..\*

Using this spatial language it is possible to reformulate Foucault's most general argument in his "archaeology of medical perception". Foucault actually gives a spatial twist to the description of the schism between theory and practice that characterized classical medicine. Before the birth of the modern clinic "the patient [was] a geometrically impossible spatial synthesis, but for this very reason unique, central, and irreplaceable" (15). The individual was so unique, indeed, that he could be an object of care, but not of knowledge. The transformation of relations between medical theory and practice meant overcoming the gap between, on the one hand academic charts and tables of diseases studied from ancient, authoritative texts and, on the other hand, practitioners' acquisition of direct knowledge of the human body through daily exposure to the sick and the dying. This required the reorganization of a large terrain within social space. It was not before a new privileged place of medicine, the clinic, was demarcated within social space and designated as a site in which the treatment of diseases and their scientific investigation are carried simultaneously, that doctors could systematically relate diseases' spaces of appearance ("localization") and formation ("configuration").

Only when it became possible to relate the two spaces within the framework of one discourse was it also possible to develop discursive practices that enabled and guided the controlled observation and the monitored, planned manipulation of the human body. The clinic allowed constant exchange between a curious gaze, carefully intervening, manipulative hands and an ongoing discourse that records, describes and guides the acts of both. Only within the environment created by the clinic could medical phenomena be related to the objects which they signify and at the same time be parte of those objects. The signifier, i.e., a pathological symptom, and its signified, e.g., a hidden organic process, presupposed an ontological continuity between the body's inner depth and its surface. This type of signification<sup>7</sup> was made possible only after the two separate surfaces were integrated into a three-dimensional space, an integration which was made possible in its turn by the emergence of the clinic as a relatively segregated, enclosed and designated region of social space.<sup>8</sup>

### III. Places of Knowledge

The reconstruction of Foucault's argument in the Birth of the Clinic in these spatial terms can be generalized, taking the archaeology of medical discourse as a special, paradigmatic case. Every discourse constitutes its own, unique "space of localization" for the phenomenal field it studies, a "surface of emergence", as Foucault calls it in his abstract discussion in the Archaeology (AK 41). Alongside the phenomenal space each discourse has its own "space of configuration" or, to use once again the language of the Archaeology, "a grid of specification" (AK 42), where phenomena are related to objects and objects are differentiated according to their related phenomena. The constitution of these two spaces and of the interrelations between them is part of various, ongoing discursive practices, but there is no

discourse from which it is lacking (cf. Ophir 1988). The discursive activity takes place within relatively well demarcated places in social space. In the Archaeology of Knowledge Foucault calls such places "institutional sites", e.g., the hospital, the monastery, the laboratory, or the library. The site of discourse, the institutionalized "where" from and within which one is allowed to speak and claim knowledge as of right, is one of several "modalities of enunciation", i.e., those discursive functions that define the position of the **authorized subject** of a discourse; e.g., as an authorized physician, lawyer, or physicist. Foucault mentions three such modalities: the institutional status, role, or position of the speaking subject (e.g., a practicing pediatrician); the institutional site (children's hospital); and the possible relations of the speaking subjects to various groups of objects that the speech situation allows (to nurses, patients, senior staff, experts in other sites/disciplines, etc: AK ch.4). It is clear that the spatial dimension is here subsumed under the analysis of discourse and presented as one of its dependent variables. But as the examples of medical discourse clearly demonstrate, the production and reproduction of knowledge through discursive practices cannot be confined to the designated site of knowledge. They are rather entangled in a double spatial interplay: A. the site itself, the architectonic of the place of knowledge, constrains and enables the interplay between the phenomenal field and the space of configuration; B. as a designated place of discursive activity the site is entangled in a web of inter-relations with other sites of its kind and with the rest of social space.

In order to understand the first interplay one has to study modes of signification, practices of representation, techniques employed for the production of phenomena, their observation and manipulation, conceptual "grid of

specification", and so forth. In order to understand the later one has to study mechanisms of demarcation, the constitution, activation and reactivation of spatial networks, coordination of encounters in space and so forth. Yet, at least three important links between the two types of spatial interplay have already been implied and should be made explicit. The first is the architectonic organization of the site of knowledge itself. Here access into and out of demarcated places, control over movement of social agents, distribution and chances of encounters constrained by the spatial syntax of a site.<sup>9</sup> The same spatial syntax constrains and enables the construction of a site as a place of observation, with access to privileged observational posts, the condition of being under the gaze of others, etc. The clinic is a perfect example, but it is not the only one; the panoptic institutions, archaeological sites, as well as the laboratories of the natural sciences are caught within a similar web of interrelations. A different link is established when the objects of knowledge (and of actions guided by knowledge claims) cannot be confined to a privileged place of power/ knowledge. This link, exemplified in cases of epidemics, from plague to AIDS, means that privileged places of knowledge are related to special access to social space at large, according to the dispersion of objects of knowledge within it. Another example for this kind of link is the "network of collection" any museum tries to weave around itself, placing itself at the center of practices of rarefaction of objects and their accumulation. The third link is established through the distribution of knowledge and its exchange within and over the entire social space or some of its privileged regions. The revolutionizing effects of printing on the networks of knowledge's distribution and exchange in the fifteenth and sixteenth century have been widely acknowledged and extensively studied; the precise effects of the information revolution in this century, (the computer, electronic mail, etc.), can only be guessed at the moment,

but it can hardly be denied that they have already transformed the ways knowledge is deployed and exchanged throughout social space.<sup>10</sup>

In order to make this general claim somewhat more concrete and demonstrate its fruitfulness beyond Foucault's particular genealogical studies, I will take now my first, historical move. It concerns the notion of *heterotopia*.

#### IV. Heterotopia<sup>11</sup>

In The Order of Things and again in a posthumously published 1967 lecture<sup>12</sup> Foucault introduced the concept of *heterotopia*. In his usage "heterotopia" is a relatively segregated site in which several, *heterogenic* spatial settings coexist simultaneously. The heterotopic site is clearly demarcated from its surrounding, with fixed and controlled boundaries, entrances and exits. Activities in the site are coordinated along special "time slices", and although they may change overtime, this occurs without affecting the mechanism that "doubles" the space at the site. There are at least two spatial grids that are at work at the site at the same time: one that governs social space in general and the "other[s]" peculiar to the site. The doubling effects of space allows agents to relate to objects and to each other in ways otherwise impossible *outside*, in social space at large, thus creating a gap between the site and its surrounding. The "other" space at the site always stands in some significant relation to the rest of ordinary social spaces, designating or marking them as illusionary or real, corrupted, normal, healthy, commonsensical, serious, dignified, "ours", etc.

Foucault argues in his lecture that every culture has its own heterotopic sites and its own way to use them: theaters and cemeteries, places for *rite de passage*, shelters and refuges, and places to take a holiday.<sup>13</sup> In the modern West—this observation may now be taken further—the sciences have been especially linked



to heterotopic sites. To be sure, since Plato's Academy at least, institutional production of knowledge has been **emplaced**, i.e., it has had a relatively demarcated place, set apart both socially and physically. Places of knowledge have changed along the ages regarding both their inner architectonics and their cultural emplacement. But only toward the turn of the sixteenth century some of these places have become heterotopic in Foucault's sense. A growing number of recent works in the history of science could be enlisted to support the claim that by the mid-seventeenth century several types of heterotopic sites of knowledge have been already institutionalized. One could point, for example, to the chemical laboratory and mechanical operator, the early observatories, the botanical garden,<sup>14</sup> and the room of curiosities<sup>15</sup> as institutionalized heterotopic sites.<sup>16</sup> In those early scientific heterotopias a special phenomenal field, a "space of appearances" was delineated, its systematic observation was made possible and it was interpreted in terms of a coordinated "space of configuration". The revolutionary aspect was not the existence of two separate spatial settings in discourse, but **that** and **how** the two resided within the confine of the same site. Phenomena "localized" in the site were observed, recorded, and carefully correlated with that which remained invisible. Seventeenth-century emphasis on observation and experimentation may have drawn attention away from a major function of these segregated places: forcing the invisible to manifest itself, to leave traces, to betray a hidden presence. Yet the invisible appears only to the eyes of those authorized to observe it and only when caught in the grid of that "other space". Two people looking at the same spot on the ground or at the same content of a glass receiver might construe two different objects, and might use two different spatial grids through which to pose and relate such objects, for one is an authorized and competent inhabitant of the site and the other is a visitor or a support worker. Like fish in water, the objects construed by

the competent inhabitant cannot live outside their special space, hence the question of their relocation, or, if that is impossible, their representation, becomes crucial.<sup>17</sup> A network of communication and exchange is gradually formed among heterotopic sites, but only privileged residents of already institutionalized sites can use it legitimately. The heterotopic site is therefore at one and the same time a mechanism of social exclusion and a set of conditions of visibility, which together constitute the double spatial grid at the site and create that gap between it and the social space that surrounds it.

A second wave of heterotopic sites emerged during the nineteenth century with the consolidation of the "disciplines", and this second wave is where most of Foucault's genealogical studies are concerned. The institutional frameworks in which men and women were taken care of--for they were sick or dangerous, for they needed education or support--have become sites in which Man has been "localized" as a cluster of human phenomena, and "configured" through the systematic interpretation of these phenomena. Since the end of the eighteenth century, so most of Foucault's stories go, those institutions of care became more and more associated with some discourses of the "human sciences", which, in their turn, became more and more interested in observation and manipulation. But the second wave expanded beyond the disciplines; it included zoological gardens, a rapidly growing networks of museums of natural history, anthropology, and later national and local history,<sup>18</sup> as well as archaeological and geological sites. Today, it may be safe to say, almost all empirical sciences are emplaced within heterotopic sites, or have special branches in such sites; when they are not thus emplaced, e.g., in economics, their status as empirical or scientific or both is constantly challenged. No doubt, the specific location, the levels and modes of segregation and interconnection with social space,

the inner spatial layout, and the patterns of correlation between the visible and the invisible in the heterotopic scientific site have all been continuously contested. Yet, at least since the mid-nineteenth century the fundamental heterotopic nature of those sites appears as a pervasive, constitutive feature of scientific activity.

In fact, the traditional, all too problematic distinction between the human and natural sciences (*Geisteswissenschaften* and *Naturwissenschaften*) can be partially reformulated on the basis of the distinction between heterotopic and nonheterotopic sites of knowledge. It might be argued that some intellectual practices, such as history, interpretative sociology, theoretical physics or geography are indeed culturally placed, i.e., they are located in culturally demarcated places, a university campus, or a research institute, but those sites serve them as regular workplaces, like the post office or the car factory.<sup>19</sup> The objects of those sciences appear elsewhere, in places that are only contingently linked to the sites of the discourses that articulate them. By contrast, experimental physics and molecular biology, but also philology, perhaps,<sup>20</sup> archaeology, and some branches of linguistic are largely set in heterotopias that constitute the spaces in which their objects appear, and are observed and manipulated. The networks of exchange and transmission of knowledge among non-heterotopic sites would radically differ from the one deployed among heterotopic ones. Since in heterotopic sites phenomena and their objects are so much dependent on the site itself, exchange among heterotopic sites must include "chunks" of place or precise instruction for its reproduction or for its accurate representation. Since in non-heterotopic sites the objects of discourse always lie elsewhere, only "representations" are about to be exchanged, and with the modern, sophisticated

means of communication they could be exchanged rapidly and efficiently, eliminating the last traces of site-dependent features of discourse. But this site-independence, it must be noted, is itself an effect of a certain spatial play in and among sites of knowledge. Furthermore, systematic and constitutive passages link heterotopic and nonheterotopic sites of knowledge. This may be clearly witnessed in interrelation between different zones of activity in theoretical and experimental physics, for example,<sup>21</sup> but also in interrelation between site and office in geology, archaeology and history, and anthropology.

Several provisional conclusions may be drawn from this historical digression, speculative as it may be. First of all, the clinic appears now not as an exception but as a paradigmatic example of the rule: the emergence of heterotopic sites of knowledge as a permanent feature of the modern sciences. This suggests that at least in the empirical sciences, and at least for the period of their institutionalization in culture, the site of intellectual activity was crucial in two respects: as a spatial expression of the cultural demarcation of the new kind of discourse; as a set of constraints, spatially anchored and articulated, over access to the site and conditions of visibility and manipulation of objects within it. Finally, the comparison with non-heterotopic sites of knowledge suggests that heterotopic sites of knowledge are linked to each other and related to their surrounding social space in radically different ways than non-heterotopic sites and this fact may have far reaching consequences. The spatial analysis of discourse cannot be exhausted at the level of the site; it must include an account of relationship between particular sites and the social space. But of course, a site is but a privileged intersection of barriers, restriction, and demarcation in social space. No site, not only a

discursive one, can be understood only in terms of the world encompassed within it, because the differentiation from, intersection within, and commerce across the boundaries are all modes of relation in social space. It is to social space itself that we should turn now. Once again, I take my first clues from Foucault.

#### V. The Three Dimensions of Social Space

Foucault's interest with problems related to social space was never systematic but it was continuous. It goes back to Histoire de la folie, to the story of the "great confinement", the imprisonment of the poor, the unemployed, of prostitutes and mad people in a rapidly growing network of "general hospitals" that was spread all over Europe within a few years (HF 1.II). Later, in The Birth of the Clinic, Foucault describes, as we have seen, the transformation of medical discourse and practice in and around the new clinic in terms of reorganization of spatial relations. Given the centrality of re-spatialization for the institutionalization of modern medicine it is not surprising that toward the end of the 18th century physicians became "specialists of space"; "along with the military [they] were the first managers of collective space" as Foucault later observed (P/K 150). When reflecting on the special interest those physicians had in space Foucault made, quite provisionally, so it seems, some new distinctions. Spatial interests, he told Michelle Perrot in a 1977 interview, were directed toward four different aspects of social space: local, environmental conditions; relations and conditions of co-existences (with others, with objects, with animals, and with the dead); residences; and displacement (i.e., movement across social space) (P/K 150-1).

These distinctions are certainly fuzzy and too narrowly linked to the case in point--medicine at the turn of the eighteenth century; we should not take them as

more than a starting point.<sup>22</sup> Here too we should try to go abstract, suspending the particular case in point in favor of a generalization. Local conditions and the vague notion of "residences" (i.e.: "the environment, urban problems)" are part of what I would like to call **emplacement**. Co-existences is clearly one possible effect of the **organization of sites** (and of entire regions) and displacement is one of the forms **spatial network** may function.<sup>23</sup> In the discussion of places of knowledge I have already made a tacit use of these distinctions, distinguishing between the cultural demarcation of a designated place for a type of intellectual activity, the architectonics of the site itself, and the network of relations among sites of different sorts. Let me make these explicit now.

Spatial networks are the ever changing patterns of dispersion and dissemination of bodies, objects, and relations over space, their transmission, distribution, exchange or communication, and, in general, all regular forms of transactions between sites and across space. Networks, and particular regions within them, varies according to their medium, objects, density, effectiveness or social function, but they are all anchored in physical space, constituting it as a meaningful social space. A power/knowledge complex is always already "networked", so to speak.

Emplacement has to do with the cultural demarcation of a privileged place for a particular set of practices, interactions, or functions of a power/knowledge complex. A place is a demarcated space in which practices--political, social, cultural, or more strictly discursive--assume relatively high degree of regularity, and in relation to which positions in cultural and political systems are defined (according to access to, freedom of movement within, and control over the demarcated place).<sup>24</sup> **Emplacement** refers to the fact that a social, cultural, or political set of practices resides somewhere in particular, not to the particular way its

residency is arranged. Some, but not all, privileged places may be constituted in well organized sites in which spatial arrangements embody, or better emplace, some of the regularities that govern the power/knowledge complex; this is the case of all heterotopias but also of a nonheterotopic site like an army camp, a legal court, or the a high-tech plant. Some clearly demarcated places, a modern university campus, for example, may be more or less indifferent to their inner spatial organization, or they may constitute a category that includes many different sites-patterns. Thus, the private sphere, for example, is spatially localized, but not necessarily organized in according to any particular spatial pattern.<sup>25</sup> And there may well be metaphorical places, i.e., places on a cultural, not necessarily geographical map, like tables, texts or photographs, in which some cultural function may be said to reside.<sup>26</sup>

The **Organization of a site** refers to the physical--yet always also symbolically loaded--arrangement of the inner space of a privileged place.<sup>27</sup> In an organized site more or less fixed values are ascribed to outer boundaries, points of access into the site itself and into particular regions within it, there are more or less fixed conditions of visibility, and there is an overall spatial system of constraints over sporadic and spontaneous encounters. The organization of the site differentiates positions and types of social agents, or perhaps inscribes such a differentiation unto space, though it is not at all clear that the differentiating scheme can exist apart of its spatial inscription.

Culture works and functions through complex combinations of sites, emplacements and networks, though the nature of those combinations and the relative weight each of the spatial factors assumes change among spheres of culture, societies, and historical periods. Taxation, for example, have always required

developed networks and clear sites in control, but not always did it involve clear emplacement of the economic or political activity; religious authority is usually emplaced and networked, but its reliance on particular architectonics of sites varies, the site was highly important in ancient Greece and is hardly of any relevance in a modern university campus or among modern protestant denominations; commercialized sport is highly networked, emplaced and linked to a definite and sophisticated architectonics of sites; in ancient Greece however, the olympic games were very clearly emplaced and linked to a planned site, but were only randomly networked through a larger social space; and modern theater is clearly linked to a planned site, more vaguely emplaced (e.g., street theater, country theater festivals, etc.) and hardly networked at all. When one of the spatial factors sinks to the background or diminished altogether, the two other are likely to emerge as more dominant, at least as long as a cultural sphere maintains its integrity. The dissolution of a cultural sphere may be described in terms of processes of spatial disintegration--there are no more sites dedicated to a particular cultural activity (e.g. no more site for teaching Hebrew in Soviet Russia) or no more networks for exchange of cultural products of a certain kind (e.g., ban on Hebrew books and presses) and no longer is cultural activity symbolically emplaced (e.g., artisanship in America is still emplaced in the countryside today but will soon lose even this backyard as new "mail-towns" are taking the place of villages). The opposite is true for the institutionalization of a culture sphere--as we have seen with regard to scientific heterotopia--involves a new spatial integration. The understanding of a culture must involve understanding of the way it is emplaced, networked and linked to sites with defined spatial syntax. It goes without saying that this includes the production of knowledge, but as Foucault used to say, it goes much better when said.



And it also includes that special web of power/knowledge/pleasure, namely sexuality.

#### VI. The Spatial Deployment of Sexuality

Foucault was usually reluctant to engage in an abstract methodological discussion that would explicate or justify distinctions of that kind, and one does not expect him to justify this type of grid over others--and there are, of course, some others, employed, for example, by social geographers like Henri Lefebvre or a social theorist like David Harvey.<sup>27</sup> My aim is not to prove that this grid is "valid" or to derive it from a more "fundamental" theoretical layer. My claim is rather that Foucault actually employed them in his genealogical work. The deployment of discourses of sexuality since the second half of the 18th century as described in the first volume of History of Sexuality may serve as an example both for each of the separate spatial dimensions and for their interrelations. Let me outline briefly the spatial interplay in that complex of knowledge-power-pleasure.

**Spatial Networks** - The emergence of a plethora of discourses of sexuality was closely related to a growing interest in populations. The attempts to gain demographic knowledge of and control over populations' growth and distribution entailed growing interest in knowledge of and control over patterns of reproduction and hence of sexual behavior. Demographic knowledge and management of population presupposed declaring an area as a territory and delineating its boundaries, coming to know its minutes details,<sup>28</sup> and deploying over that territory overlapping networks of communications, transportation of forces, transfer of money and goods, and transmission of knowledge. Several sexual discourses were woven into various such demographic and territorial networks. Somewhat more vaguely and without

specification, Foucault claims that the sites of power-knowledge-pleasure in which sexuality was shaped and reproduced served as knots in a network of power relations; anchors for acts of reproduction and extension of power/knowledge regimes; they were "sites where the intensity of pleasure and the persistency of power catch hold, only to spread elsewhere" (HS 49).

**Emplacement** - The discourse of sexuality had privileged places, e.g., the bourgeois house, the church, the boarding schools, and then gradually, and especially in the second half of the 19th century, medical and psychiatric clinics, police stations and prisons ("sexual crime"). These were spaces haunted by manifold sexualities (HS 47), "sites [that] radiated discourses [that] aimed at sex" (HS 31), in which scattered sexualities rigidified, became stuck to an age, a place, a type of practice," (HS 48), these were the places to which normal and (different types of) abnormal sexual behavior were assigned particular places. To these concrete places one may add the special space opened for sexuality by the 19th century novel, the canonic novel on the one hand (cf. Miller 1988) and the scandalous, confessional novel on the other hand (HS 21-4).

**Organization of the site** - Some places of sexuality came with their specific architectonic, which, in the case of the boarding school, for example, explicitly took into account children sexuality (HS 27-8). New spatial relations among individuals (as both subjects and objects in the emerging sexual discourses) were physically arranged and socially coded: new arrangements of rooms in the house, new plans for schools, and clinics, etc. (HS 44; cf. P/K 150). All these sites were radically different from an earlier organized site of sexual discourse, the confessional. The location of this cell within the church and its specific layout constituted irreversibility of gaze and speech, nonreciprocal relations of listening

and seeing, and a partial discreetness for the confessing person (not seen when he/she is confessing but may always be observed when going into or out of a confessional).

#### VII. The Spatialization of The Subject

The spatialization of sexuality may provide us with a privileged perspective upon Foucault's work as a whole. Looking backward from the vantage point of the History of Sexuality one may clearly see how Foucault deals, repeatedly and from different perspectives, with questions of self and subjectivity in a way that unifies his work, **malgré lui** (cf. AK 17; TS 15). This unifying interest in subjectivity has been widely acknowledged by Foucault's readers, following his own self-description. In one of his latest interviews Foucault described his project as consisting of three domains of genealogical investigation, three axes of "historical ontology" of the self: in relation to knowledge, power, and ethics ("On the Genealogy of Ethics" in Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983, 237).<sup>29</sup> The historical ontology of the self may be interpreted as an elaboration of an ongoing attempt to disseminate the modern subject.<sup>30</sup> Such an attempt was already alluded to in Foucault's first explicit, systematic reflection upon the course of his work and its dazzling itinerary, i.e., the AK. Referring to his three previous books (HF, BC, MC; the omission of the book on Roussel is significant) he describes his project as "an enterprise by which one tries to throw off the last anthropological constraints; an enterprise that wishes, in return, to reveal how these constraints could come about" (AK 15). He has gradually realized that his "studies of madness and the beginning of psychology, of illness and the beginning of clinical medicine, of the sciences of life, language and economics" were attempts to discover the "historical possibility" of the debate on humanism and anthropology (ibid.). Understood in its

proper context, this debate was the debate between structuralism and humanistic or "anthropologized" marxism, between Sartre of The Critique of Dialectical Reason and Levi Strauss of The Savage Mind, and it concerned the possibility and limits of subjectivity and of history as motivated and carried forward by the agency of free subjects.

For Foucault, that debate itself was still caught within the metaphysical framework of "traditional", "total" history, the kind of history that turns monuments into documents. Against this history he presents a "new", "general" history, one that turns documents into monuments (AK Introduction). "Traditional" (modern?) history in its various forms is associated with continuity, "the sovereignty of consciousness" and the idea of "the founding subject" (AK 12). Its rival, (postmodern?) Archaeology, is characterized by attention to disruptions, disparity, and discontinuities. But no less than that it is engaged in a constant act of "sacrifice", the sacrifice of the modern subject of knowledge ("Nietzsche, Genealogy, History", LCMF 162-64). The metaphysical, founding subject, whose presence in the realm of historical phenomena is always hidden yet whose reign over it is total and continuous, in now abandoned. Instead, one turns to a series of archaeological, then genealogical studies that try to disperse this subject (cf. e.g., AK 54), draw it back to the minute series of actions and reactions, exercise of forces over bodies, which constantly try to sanctify temporary relations of domination and inscribe them into bodies, institutions, and scriptures. The new kind of history pronounced in the Archaeology and which Foucault practices from Histoire de la Folie at least till the first volume of the History of Sexuality is constantly and inextricably linked to this historical ontology of the modern self. The deconstructive enterprise was

carried indeed along three axes: As a subject of knowledge the modern self was disseminated in Histoire de la folie, The Birth of the Clinic, and Les Mots et les Choses; as an agent of power it was taken apart in both Histoire de la folie and Discipline and Punish, and as a moral agent that shapes its own identity through action on itself and others the self was deconstructed in both Histoire de la folie and History of Sexuality (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983, p. 237).

This view of the Foucaultian enterprise as centered around the dissemination of the modern subject may be broadened and refined by the spatial analysis. It is my claim that the ongoing destructive genealogy of the subject can be read as the genealogical reconstruction of the changing patterns and the different, interrelated dimensions of spatialization of subjectivity.<sup>31</sup>

From the relatively narrow perspective of a single discourse or group of discourses, a spatialized subject is a function of discourse that associates a position and authority with specific spatial settings. The position and authority of the spatialized subject, (the structured fields in which her words, gaze and hands are enabled and constrained) are, at least in part, effects of the privileged place with which an individual is associated; the architectonic of the site from and in which she speaks and acts, and the various networks that allow her authority to transcend those privileged spaces which guarantee her subjectivity. From a broader perspective that does not tie subjectivity to a particular discourse, a spatialized subject is an individual whose various fields of possibilities (for action, production, reproduction, discourse, etc.) are structured, at least in part, by the complex interrelations between sites, places and networks. In his genealogical studies Foucault has given evidence for four such domains of structuration. 1. The confinement of the mad to mental hospitals, the observation of their behavior and

its manipulation within the shelter of the asylum, relate one's rationality to the spatialization of madness in a triple link: Rationality is related: a. to those sites in which the irrational is defined, classified and controlled; b. to the very emplacement of the division between the rational and the irrational; and c. to the various mechanisms that deploy networks of demarcation between the sane and the mad throughout social space. 2. The exposure of the body in the space of the hospital relates one's own body to the place where the deterioration of that body and its coming death is objectified, diagnosed and prognosticated. One's well-being, is an effect of one's position in a medical and para-medical network. Parts of that network rely on the hospital as a special knot, being a source of knowledge and a legitimator of control: other knots, to which Foucault alluded when talking about the Greek care of the self, rely on the "health centers" "nutrition centers", "athletic centers" and the like. 3. The institutionalization of the carceral penal system relates one's civility and political being (as well as the specific part one takes in civic-space) to the place in which illegality is demarcated, objectified, the place where its classifications are materialized and predictions verified. Like the hospital, prison too is hooked to various networks and sites of political, legal, and therapeutic discourses and power-relations, and is a necessary condition for their functioning. 4. Finally, sexuality, as we have seen traverses the entire social space; it is emplaced in asylums, clinics, and prisons, and in their (seemingly) perfect counter-place, the decent bourgeois house, and through them spatialized in details. In these four domains subjectivity is spatialized both as an object of various discourses as well as a function and effect of discourses, a pole of specific set of relations to statements and a constraint on their production (AK 92-6; "The Order of Discourse", Young 198x, 56-64).

In all four domains the three spatial interplays are at work, and none of them is self-evident. As far as the organization of the site is concerned, it is clear, and explicitly argued by Foucault, that the spatialization of the subject is a reason for and result of the heterotopic nature of disciplinary sites, and a condition for the possibility of the constitution of the modern subject *qua* "man". However, the role of the two other spatial interplays, hardly discussed by Foucault, needs further explication.

It is neither self-evident nor necessary, that a cultural division between, for example, madness and sanity would be emplaced; not always it has been and not all divisions that resemble it are. Thus, to give a counter-example, the division between poor and rich has never been quite successfully emplaced, despite repeated efforts of different regimes to do so: e.g., the Ancienne regime, by the confinement of the poor together with the mad; postmodern capitalist regimes, by throwing the poor to the streets or confining them to ghettos. Similarly, for ethnic or religious divisions in society, which are often, but not always, emplaced. Societies differ, it is important to note here, in the degree to which they tend to inscribe in space their main divisions (of gender, race, creed, etc.). It is often argued that ancient and primitive societies tend to do that more rigidly, systematically, and significantly than modern ones. But the examples above show that the difference is not in degree but in kind, and formation.<sup>53</sup> Lack of clear emplacement means deficient means of objectification, knowledge, and control. Societies would tend to emplace those they have interest to differentiate in order to know and control, and they would tend to differentiate and know better those they are capable of emplacing. But the poor, one may argue, are not differentiated and controlled by spatial mechanisms, but rather, it is obvious, by economic relations of production. Economic differences, however, require emplacement and reproduce it.<sup>54</sup> A mobile

working class is less easy to control than a strictly emplaced one, unless one can ship working hands wherever one wants, or manipulate demand and salaries over an entire social space. The last point may indicate also that the more efficient is the networking of social space, and the more that networked space is accessible to a dominating class, the less one needs to fall back on strategies of particular emplacement.<sup>25</sup>

From this general, cultural perspective the emplacement of modern subjectivity and its deployment through spatial networks should appear all the more striking. Cultures have always spatialized the self-identity of their members. Examples may be piled here.<sup>26</sup> Foucault's implied claim goes further. It is not self-identity of an individual as a member of a culture, an ethnic group, or a religious community which is at stake in the spatialization of modern subjectivity; but the very boundaries of a universal humanity, of the universally human in man. Modern, Western "Man" could not have come into being without these boundaries being first culturally emplaced, deployed over social space, and objectified in heterotopic sites of knowledge.

In Being and Time Heidegger wrote the following about the spatiality of *Dassein* and its relation to temporality: "*Dassein* can be spatial only as care in the sense of existing as factically falling ... Negatively this means that *Dassein* is never present at hand in space, not even proximally. *Dassein* does not fill up a bit of space as a real thing or item of equipment would... only on the basis of its ecstatico-horizontal temporality it is possible for *Dassein* to break into space" (BT #70). We can now turn this understanding on its head. Man came into being only when spatialized, and he was spatialized at the historical moment when care was



institutionalized through the disciplines and articulated through the discourses of the "human sciences". Positively this means that in the space prepared for him man has become present at hand in different degrees of proximity and that he does fill up bits of space of different sorts. And finally, it may be that only on the basis of specific forms of modern spatialization it has become possible for man to recognize his peculiar historicity.<sup>37</sup>

### III. Spatialization Is Transcendental

Now, however, after "the death of Man", the paradoxical nature of "man as a double" has been resolved into the three different axes through which the human self is constituted as a subject: knowledge (self as object, as a thing among things), power (self as a freedom among other free agents), and ethics (self as reflexive, capable of posing itself as the object of its own intention). In all three dimensions of relations both time and space lose their transcendental character, and different forms of temporality and spatiality are constructed, changing from one discursive formation to another and from one historical context to another.<sup>38</sup> But there is another sense in which spatialization, (and not only temporalization)<sup>39</sup>, remains transcendental: the spatialization of discourse, both within (spaces of appearance and object-formation) and without (social space) is a condition for the possibility of discourse, of discourse-power relations, and hence of the constitution of both subjects and objects. That subjectivity has been historicized means that spatialization may be said now to ground the very possibility of subjectification.<sup>40</sup>

The fact that we have been able to reach this somewhat surprising conclusion from the vantage point to the (postmodern) deconstruction of the (modern) subject

should not mislead us. The deconstruction of the subject does not mean its elimination but its systematic historicization (witnessed most clearly by the last two volumes of History of Sexuality) and its reconstruction as a function, an effect of, or a nucleus of resistance to this or that regime of discourse and power. This historicization obeys, however, a transcendental scheme, never to be articulated by Foucault, let alone justified (for grounding was never part of his job<sup>41</sup>). I am not able to spell out the entire layout of that scheme and what I am capable of saying is beyond the scope of this paper.<sup>42</sup> But the above reconstruction of the spatial dimension in Foucault's archaeological and genealogical analysis may support a more limited, yet by no means more modest claim regarding the transcendental role of spatialization.

Spatialization, not space. Note that spatialization cannot be reduced to space as a "container" in which things exist, and in which they relate to each other in relations of proximity, direction and containment. To reduce spatial relations to an Euclidian or a Kantian grid is but one of the possible materialization of spatiality in discourse. Spatialization is a dynamic, multidimensional "operation" of interrelations anywhere words relate to objects and power to freedom (or actions to other actions). Saying this is also not simply reiterating the trivial, i.e., that humans are creatures that exist in (a Kantian) space and therefore everything human can be described **sub specie geometrica**. My claim--or rather the claim implied by the Foucaultian project--is that an active, ongoing and ever changing constitution of spatial relations of different types is a condition for the possibility for human experience, both the experience of "things" and the experience of the self.

Foucault is often said, and rightly so, to be a Kantian of a sort.<sup>45</sup> It is therefore worth noting what happens to Kant's space and its constitutive role as a form of intuition at the basis of the transcendental subject. Most striking is the fact that the relation between space and subject has been inverted: the former is not part of the transcendental structure of the latter but a transcendental condition for the possibility of the subject's always **historical** constitution. Space remains, however, a transcendental form of experience, a condition of possibility for the constitution and recognition of objects. But in what sense precisely? Words and objects are mediated through discourse, in which both the gaze and the statement (**enonce**) have necessary spatial correlatives, and those cannot be reduced to each other but are inseparably linked (AK xx; Deleuze xx-xx). Discourse delineates a space of appearances, in which phenomena are spatially differentiated and related, as well as interpreted through certain, specific spatial and conceptual grids (cf. above xx).<sup>44</sup> However, thought through discourse, space is not merely the a-priori, **passive** form of external experience, which is given always already "in space"; it is neither a "container" in which every object must "have a place", nor a set of relations that must exist between material objects, though it may be all these as well. Discourse always consists of an **active** moment of **spatialization**, of setting objects in a network of spatial relation, of constituting the **specific** spatial grids through and in which objects are experienced, spoken of, observed, and manipulated. For no mute, single transcendental, never changing form of spatialization is pre-given as a condition for the possibility of discourse; rather, specific, ever changing forms of spatialization are historically constituted in and through discourse.<sup>45</sup> As an aspect of discourse, spatialization is indeed transcendental; but it is a transcendental always already historicized, always already embodied within a specific complex of power-knowledge regime.

This embodiment itself, however, presupposes another form of spatialization, the spatialization of discourse itself in social space. Above I have suggested three distinct yet linked spatial operations that relate discourse--in fact any regular form practice--to social space: organization of a site, demarcation of a place, deployment of a network. I would like to turn what may appear as the contingent, or provisional result of an interpretive analysis into a transcendental claim. My claim is that these three spatial mechanisms are always at work in the production and reproduction of discourse, that the specific forms of their constellation constitute the limit, hence the possibility, of discursive practices, hence of spatialization within discourse. No doubt, in different regimes of power-knowledge each of these spatial settings may assume different importance relative to the two others; this is but an aspect of the fact that the transcendental is always already historicized. For example, network was much more important in eighteenth century medical discourse than in its contemporary biological discourse; in theological discourse, then and now, place has been more significant than the two other factors; or, to take once again the example of sexuality, various sexual discourses have witnessed, since the end of the eighteenth century, the growing weight of the architectonics of the site of discourse. Sometimes, the significance of one of the spatial moments may seem reduced to nihil: e.g. site organization for modern philosophy; deployment of network for an esoteric cult. But this changing modes of interface among the three spatial mechanism should not blind us from seeing that a temporary annihilation of a spatial factor is one possibility of its materialization, and that in one form or another spatialization is always materialized along these three "axes". Moreover, the examples of the Foucaultian genealogies of the mental hospital, the clinic, prison and sexuality suggest that the specific form of the interface among the three "axes" accounts, in part, at least, for various aspects of the discursive activity

itself, its intellectual products as well as its cultural survival. Spatialization constitutes a set of enabling-restraining constraints over discursive activity, whose reconstruction is crucial for understanding what a discourse has produced, and how it was reproduced, transformed, or extinguished from the cultural sphere.

From this point of view both the heterotopic nature of modern sites of knowledge and the spatialization of modern subjectivity are specific historical configurations of the dynamic structure of transcendental spatialization of experience. In the modern west, the organization of knowledge and the constitution of subjectivity are made possible by, and in their turn reproduce, a very special, intensive, and quite revolutionary arrangement of social space. The syntax of that space--for both sites and networks--is more important than its symbolic contents, yet it is so effective precisely because its syntax is loaded with social meanings.<sup>46</sup> Due to the sophisticated interfaces between site and network, control in that space can be highly decentered, diffused and widespread over huge territories while highly centered in relatively few well-demarkated sites. The most fundamental cultural divisions are so well inscribed into those interfaces of sites and networks and so well concealed through their vast spatial dissemination that the effects of power-relations--with regard to the production of both knowledge and subjectivity--can be intensified and prolonged almost indefinitely. And along with it, disseminated and intensified, are the possibilities of resistance. It is this form of spatialization of power/knowledge that makes possible, I believe, what Foucault calls "bio-power", the power formation that characterizes modernity more than any other (HS part V).

The precise features of this spatial arrangement are very hard to grasp. Those who analyze social space in terms drawn from architecture tend to stop at the level

of the site; anthropologists would tend to overemphasize sites and emplacements; the networks that cross social space and gives it a unity and various degrees of density are usually studied by geographers. But from the point of view of the one interested in discourse, in power/knowledge complexes, all three spatial dimensions have to be considered at once, both with regard to each and to their peculiar interrelation. Only when such a comprehensive picture is attempted--the above was but a shaky sketch toward it--can one start delineating the peculiar presence of spatialization in modern institutions of power and knowledge. One can do this, however, only to the extent that one realizes the structure of what I have called "transcendental spatialization" and use it as a guide in the process of thinking.

What is the status of this claim? Not unlike the Kantian transcendental mind, concrete forms of spatialization are claimed to be possibility conditions for the existence of (concrete forms of) discursive (and non-discursive) practices. The thematization of these forms, however, their formulation and justification, are not transcendentially derived. The thematization of spatialization means genealogical reconstructions of historical forms of spatialization and their transformations. These empirical-historicist reconstructions are necessary to keep the transcendental argument alive and well, or refute it in due course. The extraction of a transcendental structure is a product of hermeneutic activity.<sup>47</sup> The transcendental argument is hermeneutically reconstructed, not transcendentially derived; it can exist only in and through historicization, in the archaeological studies that decipher regularities (orders or structures) of spatialization, and in the genealogical studies that follow the details of these structures' crystallization and deformations. Spatialization, from this point of view, construes a partial outline of the horizon for research in the history of discourse, social

history and social theory. Some social theorists, like Giddens and Hillier have realized this for social theory (Giddens 1984; Hillier 1984), a few others have taken first steps in the history and sociology of science (Shapin and Ophir 1990).<sup>49</sup> These historical and sociological studies are not only given here their "spatial" horizon; modest as they are so far, they are already capable of giving some support to the transcendental claim and are necessary in order to further refine and corroborate it.

However, in the context of geography and other social sciences interested in social space, space itself becomes the object that inhabit the "inner" spaces of a particular discourse and the proposed distinction between three spatial mechanisms is no more than the grid used--or one that might be used--in a particular discourse. After all which has been said and written about the historicity of discourse, how can such a grid claim a transcendental status? Note first, that the spatial grid is a product of an "Archaeology" or a "Genealogy", of discourses on other discourses, not particularly of the analysis of social or geographical space. Geography and social theory--to the extent that they are attuned at all to Foucaultian discourse--may borrow this grid from a discourse, which from their point of view is a kind of meta-discourse, a critical reflection on their own practices.<sup>49</sup> That Foucault's discourse claim the status of a meta-discourse is, I think, an inevitable result of the fact that discourse itself, discourse in general, has become the object of Foucault's thought, that after all Foucault too, or at least his philosophically minded readers, cannot escape the predicament of the philosopher, i.e., the one who tries "to think". Hence, even if the spatial distinctions I have proposed above indeed express no more than the shadow of an ephemeral grid employed by a current geographical discourse, they cannot be reduced to such a grid. They are not only an

quoted above he mentions a scheme, which, if not loaded with a transcendental claim, is useless: "practical systems", systems that determine what people do and how (what I have preferred calling regularities of practices) "stem from three broad areas: relations of control over things, relations of actions upon others, relations with oneself" (Ibid 48).<sup>91</sup> Such a conceptual scheme sets the horizon for Foucault's project, or at least this is what he claims. If such a scheme is important, it is not useless to try to amend it, complement it, or replace it altogether. This may take, of course, more transcendental claims. For, in fact, thinking, even in the way Foucault calls upon us to understand it, is not opposed to transcendental **working hypotheses**, only to transcendental **points of view**. The critique of the present is inextricably linked to historical research not only in order to introduce contingencies into what we have come to think as natural and necessary. It is from history that critique draws its transcendental horizon and guidelines, and it is through more work in the archive that it may come to shift these horizons and escape the burden of a dominating present. Historicization of the spatiality of discourse and of power-knowledge regimes is one, crucial form that a critique of discursive regimes may take. This critique becomes dogmatic if it does not thematize its transcendental horizon, refrains from problematizing it, hesitates to call it into question, in short, if it does not explicate its implied transcendental claims and does not take them as hypotheses.



1. See for example "Questions of Geography", "The Eye of Power" (both in Foucault 1980), and "Space Knowledge and Power" (Rabinow 1984).
2. See for example "The Subject and Power" and "On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Work in Progress" (both in Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983).
3. The distinction between metaphorical and literal language of space is problematic of course, and can be maintained only with regard to a fixed context of use. Spatial metaphors are employed and displayed throughout Foucault's work, but especially in his earlier writings in literary theory. See e.g., "Preface to Transgression" and "Fantasia in the Library" (Both in Foucault 1977) and Death and the Labyrinth: The World of Raymond Rousset (Foucault 1986). Foucault explains his use of spatial metaphors to speak about discourse by the need to bypass "the model of individual consciousness with its intrinsic temporality". Spatial metaphors are "strategic", they enable "one to grasp precisely the points at which discourse are transformed in, through and on the basis of relations of power" (Power/Knowledge, pp.69-70).
4. Most notably in the Birth of the Clinic, with its "primary", "secondary", and "tertiary spatialization[s]" but also spaces of "localization" and "configuration" (BC 3-16); and see below xx).
5. Alongside The Birth of The Clinic Foucault was writing his book on Raymond Rousset (Foucault 1986); both books were published in 1963. As Deleuze has convincingly argued (Deleuze 1986), Foucault's attention to visibility and its relation to the language of things on the hand and, on the other hand, the space in which they appear, relate to and differ from each other, pervades both books, which in so many respects are so different, and links them in a surprising way.

6. Cf., for example, Foucault's description of the deployment of "general hospitals" throughout France in the last hundred years of the **ancien regime**, (MC, ch. 2; and below xx). The general hospital was a place that inhabited "a strange power that the king establishes between the police and the courts, at the limits of the law", in which the bourgeoisie mingled with the monarchy to the exclusion of the church. This exclusion pushed the church to reorganize its own network of closed institutions and compete with the court over the right and power to confine and provide aid to those who deserved confinement.

7. Elsewhere (Ophir 1988) I have argued elsewhere that it is possible to reconstruct the fundamental difference between Foucault's three **epistemes** as a difference between three distinct modes to conceive or arrange the phenomenal domain as a system of signs, and accordingly a difference between three types of relations between signifier and signified. In the Renaissance signifieds could always appear on the phenomenal surface, becoming signifiers in their turn, but there was no fixed code or necessary ontological relation that linked the two *relata*. In the Classic **episteme** signifiers and signified are related through fixed codes yet they are ontologically separated; the signifieds, whether Platonic Forms or types in a table, remain invisible in principle, never to be perceived (and hence never to become signifiers in their turn). In the modern **episteme** the signified remains invisible, but it is ontologically related to its signifier. signification occurs precisely because the signifier is a part or aspect of the signified that "expresses" the signified's hidden nature, and because it is the nature of the signified to be overtly manifested through various, partial expressions.

8. Foucault later summarizes this point in the Archaeology of Knowledge. The constitution of the subject of medical discourse, the position of a doctor, who is at one and the same time the "direct questioner, the observing eye, the touching finger, the organ that decipher signs..." involves "a whole group of [spatial] relations" Those included: "relationship between the hospital space as a place of assistance, of purified, systematic observation, and of partially proved, partially experimental therapeutics, and a whole group of perceptual codes of the human body

... relations between the doctor therapeutic role, his pedagogic role, his role as an intermediary in the diffusion of medical knowledge, and his role as a responsible representative of public health in the social space" (AK 53). For more on Space in medicine, see e.g., Kelly & Sanchez, 1990.

9. Hillier and his colleagues at the University College, London, have been working for more than a decade on a sophisticated methodology for the articulation, formalization and quantification, but also generation, of spatial relations in social space. Their spatial syntax is based on three simple distinctions: between **closed** and **open** cells; between a space **distributed** among cells that shape its form and structure collectively and a **non-distributed** space enclosed within one cell; and between **symmetrical** and **non-symmetrical** spatial relations (Hillier and Hanson 1984).

10. Classifying these three types of links I have already presupposed a three dimensional conception of social space which I explicate below.

11. This section is based on my part in S. Shapin and A. Ophir, "The Place of Knowledge: A Methodological Survey", Science in Context 4:3-21 1991.

12. See Foucault's remarks on the heterotopic nature of the Chinese encyclopedia in Broges (OT xvi-xx) and "Of Other Spaces", Diacritics 16:22, 1986.

13. For a systematic survey of the (up to now not too extensive) literature concerning those early sites of knowledge see Shapin and Ophir 1990. An exemplary analysis of the site of a chemical laboratory is given in O.

Hannoway, "Laboratory design and the Aim of Science: Andreas Libavius versus Tycho Brahe", Isis 77:585-610, 1986. The mechanical operator of Robert Boyle is analyzed in details, with deep sociological insights in S. Shapin, "The House of Experiment in Seventeenth-Century England", Isis 79:373-404, 1988. To this study and to some fruitful conversations with its author I owe a great debt.

14. On representation of objects as a problem of displacement and transmutation see Latour 1987, ch.2, and Shapin and Schaeffer 1985, ch.2.

15. On the emergence of the museum of history see e.g., Bazin 1967 and Impey and MacGregor 1985.

16. It is plausible to expect, I think, that the more sophisticated a production process becomes, i.e., the more it involves the production and transmission of knowledge, the more heterotopic becomes the nature of its site. The high-tech plant may be a good example. (Kunda 1992).

17. At least in so far as philology deals with rare manuscripts. These can hardly be found today outside the archive, in which they are not simply stored but usually classified and arranged in ways that project on space divisions of time and genres, as well as genealogies of transcriptions. The library, according to Foucault, became really heterotopic, a site for the spatialization of history, only in the nineteenth century with the desire "to enclose in one place all times, all epochs, all forms, all tastes, and the idea of constituting a place for all time that is itself outside of time and inaccessible to its ravages" (Foucault 1986, 26).

18. On the exchange between heterotopic and non-heterotopic sites in physics see P. Gallison, "The Trading Zone: Coordination between Experiment and Theory in the Modern Laboratory", paper presented at the International Workshop on the Place of Knowledge, Tel Aviv and Jerusalem May 1988.

19. However, this attempt to differentiate aspects or dimensions of social space may be understood in terms of the two distinct spatial settings **within** discourse. What Foucault actually does here is trying to render social space itself into a "space of localization", the space in which social phenomena take place, and at the same time to understand that very same space as a "space of configuration" for a new group of objects. But whereas the theoretical aspects of social space are worthy a serious theoretical effort, I am concerned here mainly with its relation to the production of knowledge through discursive practices and complexes of power/knowledge.

20. Residences, so it seems, are but one form of coexistence (with neighbors, animals and objects, at least; P/K 150). Local environmental conditions are essential only if one believes that objects--of discursive or non-discursive practices--with which one is concerned are directly affected by them. Finally, displacement is but one aspect of one's concern with territory and the social space at large.

21. There are 'blocks', like the educational institution, Foucault observes, "in which the adjustment of abilities, the resources of communication, and power relations constitute regulated and concerted systems" (P/K 150). These "blocks" are the disciplines, each of them being a perfect example of my "privileged place". But privileged places do not necessarily inhabit disciplinary institutions, (e.g., the court, the temple, the place of the prophet), and unlike the disciplinary institutions, some blocks of power/knowledge are not enplaced in organized sites (e.g., the modern banking system, or the printed and electronic media).

22. Though the particular pattern chosen is significant. The differentiation of rooms in a house is always part of a certain form of power relations among its inhabitants (cf. P/K 148-49).
23. Barthes claims, for example, that photography has become the place of death in modern culture. Cf. R. Barthes, La Chambre claire, (Paris: Gallimard 1980). This suggestion should be taken literally, I think, meaning the metaphorization of certain cultural phenomena, the encounter with death in Barthes's case, the fact that direct experience becomes inaccessible, always mediated through its representations. But then too, those metaphorical places would always have a necessary material-spatial component, the tangible photograph, and a cultural agency distributes reproductions all over the social space.
24. Spatial syntax cannot be reduced to spatial semantics, even when the semantics of social space is utterly intelligible and the meaning of symbols created by spatial formations is obvious and evident. In fact, whenever social meaning is embodied in spatial elements there are more cells designated by a special mark that specifies them and makes them unchangeable vis-a-vis other cells in the same space. In other words, more semantics means more constrains on possible spatial relations, on movement and visibility. Cf. Hillier and Hanson 1984, pp. 9-18; 207-222.
25. Cf. e.g., the work of Jacques Revel, who reconstructs the growth transformations of the "knowledge of the territory" of the French state, from the beginning of the monarchy to the Third Republic (Revel 1991).

26. A somewhat different description of the "modes by which in our culture, human beings are made subjects" is given in another late interview, "The Subject and Power (also in Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983). Cf. Rabinow's presentation in his Introduction to *The Foucault Reader* (Rabinow 1984, 7-11).

27. It is usually acknowledged that "the most general theme of Foucault's work has been the problem of the subject" (Rabinow 1984, 12). But with the shifting of attention to self and self-formation it may seem that Foucault projects retrospectively a unifying theme on his work (e.g., McCarthy 1991). This is a mistake that results, I believe, from an overemphasis on Foucault's shift from the formation of the self by others to patterns of self-formation. The theme of the care of the self is not a return to the modern subject or to a modern concept of freedom but an attempt to examine ways the self did in the past and may in the present participate in its own formation and resist the forces of normalization.

28. The embodiment of the subject too, of course. However, the body in Foucault has received much attention, whereas the spatialization of embodiment has not. The body--of the condemned or the prisoner, of the homosexual that have come out of his closet, or of the woman constantly on (ever changing diet), as much as the soul--of the authentic self, of the criminal pervert, or of the neurotic mother, are constituted in and through mechanisms of spatialization. ?? Note also that by no means do I claim that Foucaultian genealogies may be reduced to or exhausted by this kind of spatial reconstruction.

29. The geographers have much to say about this; see, e.g., A. Kirby, *The Politics of Location*, (London: Methuen 1982); Harvey xxx.

