
YAACOV SHAVIT

The question of how ideology influenced the national policy of the Likud governments is one that touches on a fundamental Israeli controversy: namely, the future of the territories occupied since 1967. This article analyzes the internal composition of the Israeli right’s ideology, and focuses on the seven-year period of Likud rule as a test case of ideology confronting the constraints of practical reality.

In the summer of 1977 the heirs of Revisionist Zionism and its proponents were given their first opportunity to turn their ideology into operative policy. This came about after more than fifty years in the opposition (since 1925), where their direct influence on Zionist policy was marginal or nil.\(^1\) This dramatic change in the political status of the Zionist “right” (I use the term “right” here only for convenience) made for a fundamental and major historical case within the context of the history of Zionism and the state of Israel. No one had any doubts about the Likud—or its main component, the Herut movement—having a clear, firm nationalist ideology. It was therefore quite reasonable to assume that this ideology would provide the direction for its policies or that the Likud would at least make a concerted effort to provide historical justification for its...
basic outlook. Many of the acts of the Likud governments from the elections of 1977 through the 1984 elections have been rightly judged in the light of their relevance to Likud's ideology and principles.

What was the impact of ideology on the "reality"? Was Herzog able to change "reality" to accord with its basic beliefs, or was it forced to adjust those beliefs? In other words, how did Revisionist ideology (and, again, I use the term "Revisionist" only for convenience and brevity) shape the national policy of the Likud governments? By "national policy" I am referring to the rather unique combination within the Zionist- Israeli context of national-historical concepts, foreign and security policy, and settlement policy. There is no intention here of making any comparative study of the relation between ideology and policy within the "right" versus the "left." It should also be noted that the use of terms such as "pragmatism," "moderation," "radicalism," and so forth is not derived from any "external" system of judgment or evaluation. Instead, they are used in the way in which these concepts were applied within the political and ideological system of the Zionist right itself.

IDEOLOGY, WORLD VIEW, POLICY

A historian trying to evaluate the status and function of ideology in shaping national policy—especially at a time of sharp political transition in which a long-time opposition party becomes the ruling party—faces several problems.

First of all, the historian must identify the "authentic ideology." That is, he must decide which texts express the main political tenets and which are simply of a rhetorical, apologetic, propagandistic, or tactical nature; and how to discern between the strategic and the tactical dimension in political declarations or statements of principle. We cannot be satisfied with a mere description of deeds and results, if we assume that those deeds were performed with some predetermined aim. We must, therefore, examine the relation between the intent and the deed—and between the act and the result.5

Second, it is difficult to distinguish between the ideological dimension and other elements in action, that is, throughout the decisionmaking process and the stage of practical execution. The ideological basis is seemingly easy to locate, since it is openly expressed and declared; yet it cannot be forecast nor followed up. Its functioning and relative strength vary during any given time period. It is not always easy to evaluate when a declaration that seems to be of an ideological nature is being used to grant legitimacy—in advance or after the fact—to an act that had a "hidden" nonideological purpose.

Thus we must deal with ideology both as a determinative element before the fact, and as a rationalizing element after the fact.

As for the various claims concerning the impossibility of uncovering the "authentic ideology" or about the marginal status of the collective ideology in determining national policy and its goals, the answer here is that we are dealing not only with ideology but with ideology plus Weltanschauung or world view.6 Let us clarify what these concepts mean. By ideology we refer to certain declared political and social opinions, to a well-defined, formulated, systematic group of goals and aims (the value dimension) as well as the means and methods for attaining them (the operative dimension). World view is what nurtures and influences ideology, providing a comprehensive view of man, society, and history as a totality; a system of symbols and values; a depiction of the historical past, visions of the future, and so on. This system organizes reality and the image of reality in the collective consciousness and determines "mechanistic" a priori responses to various events. Ideology is supposed to "translate" that view of the world into an operative, defined ideological language. At times it is quite close to world view; in other instances it gives only partial expression to it. People can draw the same ideological conclusion and arrive at a similar policy from the same view of the world, but the opposite can also occur. The same world view can also be expressed variously by different people—politicians, thinkers, writers, and so on; whereas ideology is generally formulated at more precisely defined forums. World view can be a reasoned systematization of an anthropological or historiosophical outlook, and may also be an expression of collective sentiment, that is, a "popular" view of the world that reveals the mentality of the group. A few highly distinctive, individual figures are always chosen as representative of the world view.

Policy is how ideology (among other factors) is carried out in "reality": it is the practical translation of ideology. Thus ideology is not only a systematic set of goals that is supposed to determine
operative policy; it is also the intermediary link between the intertwined "perception of the world" and the actual policy, between subjective images and a system of considerations and constraints that exists in "objective" reality. It is that which is necessary in order to determine what elements of the world view can be transformed into concrete policy at any given time. Ideology is to be found not only in the motives or justifications for actions but also in the patterns by which "reality" is organized after the "action" and in the way this "reality" is construed.

THE EMERGENCE OF LIKUD

The first Likud government came to power under conditions that were very amenable for it, with a national situation that it had not created. The Likud acceded to office at the height of the new "ideological era" in Israeli political culture that had begun in June 1967. It was born by the great surge of a widely held world view, to aspects of which it gave expression. After 1967 there was a commingling of national "perception of the world" of a large part of the national-religious, the Zionist-socialist-activistic, and the conservative and messianic "right-wing" camps. At the same time there were also important immanent changes in the factors involved in creating the common world view, and new factors appeared as well. Themes that had been peripheral or even nonlegitimate before 1967 became dominant and legitimate after 1967, and vice versa.

In the period from 1948 to 1967 the Herut Party had not known any real conflict between ideology and world view, despite clear manifestations of moderation and pragmatization. The reason is simple: it was in the opposition and did not have to implement its ideology. After 1967, within the framework of a national-unity government, and especially following 1977, Herut was for the first time since 1948 faced with a situation that aroused real internal tension between ideology and policy, that is, between values and their realization.

As an opposition party, the Herut-Revisionist political approach had been expressed in sharp criticism of the lack of political and military activism by the Labor governments. Yet in any political or military crisis the party supported the government, while urging it to react more aggressively. It is difficult to evaluate how a Likud-led government would have acted in any hypothetical situation before 1967. It seems very doubtful, however, that it would have initiated a military offensive, or used a serious border incident to do so, in order to "liberate areas of the occupied homeland." But in the 1948-1967 period the chasm between ideology and rhetoric on the one hand and political-territorial reality on the other was neither noticeable nor relevant, as Herut's ideology was not put to any test.

Let us now look more closely at Herut's ideology and national world view.

That all of the streams in Revisionism (or, as it prefers to call itself, "the national movement") share a number of basic premises and a certain political mentality—particularly the fact that they all have a similar territorial map (at least in regard to its heartland: all of the Land of Israel west of the Jordan; Revisionism at one time spoke of Transjordan, and Revisionist radicalism had an even greater map)—need not obscure the fact that there did develop within the movement a tension concerning the sources of legitimacy for that territorial map and the claim to sovereignty over it, as well as over the type of national-political-judicial program that would develop and become established in it. This tension was between the messianic trend on the one hand, and a more political trend associated with Jabotinsky on the other.

Indeed, it is from within Revisionism that Israeli political-national messianism arose and not from national-religious Zionism! The messianic (or predestined) trend had a mythos, a world view, and rhetoric of its own. Great Britain, rather than being an ally, was "Edom" (the symbol for Rome or Byzantium). Power was not only an imperative means in certain circumstances, but an immanent expression of the existential revolution of the Jewish people. The Arabs were seen not only as a political enemy but as a metaphysical, existential one. The messianic trend not only rejected the desire to be recognized by the other nations, it even considered such recognition an insult to the "national subjective will"; whereas Jabotinsky's Revisionism spoke of "state" and "sovereignty," the messianic trend spoke of "kingdom" and "lordship." Jabotinsky's Revisionism wished to be accepted by international law and norms; messianic nationalism conceived of Jewish history as an eternal revolt against universal history and as a metahistorical (hence metaphysical) phenomenon. (Indeed, in a unique political case of a prime minister acting against his party's ideology, Begin would have to mobilize all of his personal authority in order to quell some
of these more extreme beliefs.)

Up to 1967 and even 1977, any tension between the two trends was marginal and latent; it is seen generally in ideological periodicals of very limited readership. The tension did, however, begin to emerge after the Six Day War when it ceased to be simply theoretical and intellectual.

Let us look briefly at the psychological dimension of the world view of the right, especially of the radical right, which has bearing on this discussion.

1. In the 1930s and 1940s there was a tremendous gap between the messianic aims and rhetoric of the radical right and its actual strength. We can thus see in the visions of national redemption a type of compensatory fantasy that is typical of peripheral messianic groups. Yet these visions, once they become ideology as the group moves from the periphery to the center, can no longer be regarded as "compensation" or "utopian consolation" but are translated into program and policy (and not only of these groups but of the governmental framework as well).

2. As for the mentality of the right as a collective consciousness, it is marked by a political and eschatological, pendulum-like tension between two conflicting tendencies. On the one hand, there is a very deep sense of being the victim, the pursued, who must defend his life day by day, hour by hour. Thus the right comes to its first conclusion: namely, that the one being pursued must determine his behavior by the rules of a war for survival. On the other hand, there is a sense that Israel (and the Jewish people) has a historical (and transcendental) mission and has all the potential power at hand to design a new order in Erez Israel, in the Middle East, indeed in the entire world. This consciousness also grants legitimation to special rules of behavior.

3. This split-level consciousness turns every political or security event into a symbolic—an event that does not stand for itself, but instead signifies the eternal Jewish war for survival.

4. The mentality of the right does not tend to recognize "objective" obstacles or failure. Nonrealization of potential, or the nonattainment or incomplete attainment of goals, is always attributed to some internal or external factor that interfered with the establishment of the harmonious, perfect, "ultimate aim."

LIKUD'S APPROACH TO THE WEST BANK

The world view and ideology of the Herut Party have unequivocally determined that Judea and Samaria are, for various reasons, an integral part of the area of Jewish sovereignty.

One must remember that during the 1950s the Herut Party did not stop at the delegitimization of the partition of Western Eretz Israel. Its spokesmen stated that Transjordan also "constitutes and remains forever an inseparable part of the Hebrew homeland." They considered Hashemite Jordan an artificial British protectorate that would someday be eliminated in a hoped-for war. The enemy was Hashemite Jordan, and the Albion treachery that stood behind it.

From the mid-1950s, however, and particularly after 1967, there was a complete turnaround. The Hashemite Kingdom was now recognized as a sovereign one, and even became acceptable as a party to political negotiations concerning the West Bank. As the enemy, the Hashemite dynasty was replaced by the Arabs of Eretz Israel and the Palestinian terror organizations; in this manner Transjordan was wiped off the operative map of the official ideology of the right.

The first Likud government seemed called upon to actuate the world view of the Revisionist movement, and to carry out its ideology according to a declared political policy. That is, it appeared obligated to immediately apply Israeli sovereignty to Judea and Samaria ("the territories"); indeed, under different circumstances, it later did this in the Golan Heights and East Jerusalem. Yet despite the fact that Judea and Samaria occupied a much more central position in Revisionist ideology than the Golan Heights, the logical, natural move—from the point of view of Herut and its associates—was not made.

Abstention from such an act was actually given the status of formal statement. In the Likud platform for the elections to the Ninth Knesset (Adar/March 1977), there are already allusions to the formulation in the guidelines of the government of 20.7.77 (paragraph 10). It says there that "the right of the Jewish people to Eretz Israel is an eternal, inalienable right," but there is no positive statement about applying Israeli sovereignty. The phrasing is of a distinctly negative nature: 1) Judea and Samaria will not be handed over to any foreign rule; 2) Between the Mediterranean and the
Jordan River there will be only Israeli sovereignty" (with no reference to specific application of sovereignty to as-yet contested area). That is, from an ideological point of view there is a definite "softening" for tactical purposes; and, as mentioned earlier, the tactics turned into policy. In the negotiations about Moshe Dayan's inclusion in the first Likud cabinet as foreign minister, Begin stipulated that Israel would maintain its right to extend Jewish sovereignty to Judea and Samaria, but would not proceed to do so as long as negotiations with Arab countries continued. It is not stated with which countries these negotiations would be conducted, nor until when they would be permissible to proceed. Even in the Knesset, Begin announced (e.g., on 28 December 1977) that Israel recognized there were other claims of sovereignty over the West Bank, and was therefore leaving the matter open. In the Camp David documents there is even agreement in principle to conduct negotiations over sovereignty with Jordanian and Palestinian representatives.

We must understand the meaning of such "pragmatism" for a movement such as Herut. There was no realization here of its "authentic ideology." Instead, it chose not to act, even though conditions were much more favorable than during the controversy over the "ultimate aim" in the 1930s or at the time of the declaration of statehood in May 1948. In fact, Herut opted to follow the path of classical Zionism—that very route it had opposed so vehemently all along. In any event, the fact that the world view and the ideology were so emotionally forceful created tension between them and the political concepts (as well as actual policy). It is no surprise that the radical right leveled deadly criticism against the "realism" of the Likud government; it was described as "captive" in the hands of aliens, lacking the will to carry out its program, retreating to "Weizmanism" and passing up the chance for redemption. The disappointment even led to studies in retrospect of the accusations made against "official Zionism" during the Mandate period.

The argument of the critics was not that Herut had relinquished the "ultimate aim" at the ideological level, but rather that for tactical reasons it had forgone immediate realization of the final goal, and thereby seriously endangered the very chance of attaining it. Because in the Herut Party there was a deep identification of the movement with its leader, the discussion focused on whether personal weakness had undermined ideological steadfastness.

To be sure, Begin was now in an uncomfortable position. His world view and ideology were clear; his style was often close to that of the messianic trend. But he also brought with him a Jabotinskyan political heritage and unequivocally refused to define his movement as a messianic one. Any claim whatsoever that he had retreated from his firm ideological approach met with a furious sarcastic rebuff. Since most of the Herut members were confident that Begin was well aware of both the tactical and strategic dimensions of his policy and knew what he was up to, Begin's authority remained supreme, even when openly or behind the scenes there were doubts or flare-ups of displeasure.

From Begin's point of view, any agreement over "administrative autonomy" (not only cultural autonomy) for the Arabs of the West Bank was merely a document of a tactical nature. Even if it included elements from the liberal formulations of Jabotinsky (which had also been of a tactical nature at the time), Begin's basic intention in his formula of autonomy was to extricate himself temporarily from the bonds of ideology so that he could implement his political approach.

The autonomy plan drew criticism from two directions. There were those who saw it as a wide opening for future annexation, and those who saw it as leading toward a Palestinian state in the long run. The recognition of another claim to sovereignty over Judea and Samaria was regarded by the right not just as acknowledgment of a fait accompli, but as a fundamental and potentially destructive error. But in contrast to this recognition in principle, Begin set forth a declaration of "ultimate aim," that is, a statement as to the future intention to extend Israeli sovereignty to those areas. The crucial point is that Begin's autonomy program was not to be a permanent arrangement, but rather a temporary one that after a limited period (five years) could be totally invalidated.

From a purely ideological point of view this was a concession involving both tactics and principles; yet it was one that kept all options open. A right-wing fundamentalist cannot agree to such a concession; a right-wing "pragmatist" judges it according to the ulterior motives he discerns behind it and the actions carried out in reality in the light of those intentions, and according to the chances and dangers in leaving the options theoretically open for both sides.
Thus the Likud policy, which was pragmatic in relation to its ideology and world view, created a situation resembling the one that existed in Eretz Israel during the Mandatory period. That is, on the West Bank there is actually no formal political sovereignty; in theory it is recognized that the area is destined for a binational struggle, and the question of ultimate sovereignty has been pushed off for some undefined period. Thus Revisionism has done a complete turnabout and gone back to the patterns of Zionist policy at the time of the Yishuv, a policy of establishing political facts through settlement and physical presence. Gradually the spokesmen for the Herut movement began to glose over their opposition to the settlement policy in the Yishuv period and started to glorify agricultural settlement. At the same time, pressure began to mount from more activist and radical groups. Since there were various political and legal limitations on Herut, it even gave direct or indirect—and even tacit—approval for settlement activities carried out in opposition to much of government opinion. Various other groups began to accuse the Likud that it not only did not do enough for settlement but was unable to guarantee the security of the civilians in the territories—the very same accusations that had been made against the Mandatory authorities by the Yishuv.

Yet it is clear that the Likud did manage to give Israel a wide, relatively free scope for activity in Judea and Samaria. Even if it did not succeed—despite claims to the contrary—in laying a basis for the legitimacy of the claim for Jewish sovereignty in that area in Western public opinion (excluding Fundamentalist, right-wing circles), it did manage to substantially increase the Jewish physical presence there. On this issue, the Likud did not change its political aims as dictated by ideology, but clearly altered the political means for achieving them.

In summary, from its own point of view Revisionism came to power in most congenial circumstances. It did not have to initiate a war in order to put an end to an anomalous situation (according to its outlook) in Eretz Israel. The desired territorial map had been achieved by a different government, and all the options for creating an Israeli presence in the territories—by direct and indirect means—had also been set up in the previous period. All that had to be done now was to expand these options without equivocating, in accordance with a wider, more comprehensive concept of the "ultimate aim." From the point of view of Revisionism, it was impossible to even consider that these opportunities would not be exploited. And fortunately for it, additional forces with a strong activist orientation were waiting in the wings to join it in the settlement endeavor.

The Likud governments had to navigate between their own desire, as well as pressures, to massively settle and annex the territories on the one hand, and the knowledge that there was domestic and foreign opposition to such a policy on the other. An evaluation of the ratio between ideology and policy in this context must ask not whether Israeli sovereignty in Judea and Samaria is "desirable" or "realistic," but rather how much the Likud's policy contributed to squelching other options and to reinforcing the course it preferred. From this perspective it seems that the Likud left several options open in theory but actually worked to close them off, not only by virtue of actual presence in the territories but also through success in delegitimizing other options for much of the public. The Begin government acted as if it were in the days of the tower-and-stockade settlements, the struggle over the "partition map," of the 1930s and 1940s—despite Revisionism's traditional antisettlement philosophy. From Begin's own point of view, the fact that he did not bring about congruence between the state of Israel and the Land of Israel with respect to sovereignty was a serious flaw in his political biography.

THE PEACE TREATY WITH EGYPT

The treaty with Egypt brought about a new phenomenon in Israeli political culture, namely, division and factionalism within the right and its periphery. Ideologically, Revisionism had never regarded the Sinai Peninsula as part of the "historical homeland." This was true of the platforms of both the prestate Irgun terrorist movement and the Herut Party. It was only from 1967 on that there gradually developed a set of strategic, economic, and even historical arguments for a claim of Israeli sovereignty in Sinai. Begin, however, never asserted such a claim, not in any official declaration nor in his newspaper articles nor anywhere else. When Begin argued against concessions in the Sinai, he was not making an ideological argument but rather one that derived from his political evaluations.
The nationalist world view, of course, affected the way Egypt was perceived; Sadat was referred to as the Egyptian dictator from the banks of the Nile,” and he and his predecessor Nasser were described as “a cruel enemy aspiring to destroy us.” Begin, at least until 1977, depicted Sadat as a sly dictator (stressing his former support of Nazism) whose secret motive of the destruction of Israel was actually in full view. He compared Egypt to totalitarian, imperialistic states whose high talk of peace is really a cover for their true intentions of war; and he suspected that all Sadat wanted to achieve through negotiations was the first stage of his plan to destroy Israel. “If the sword is not needed, why remove it from its sheath; using it is always dangerous, lest it break,” he wrote. In short, any offer of peace would be simply a tactical move of deception.

In 1977 this basic suspicion disappeared, in effect, from Begin’s thinking and behavior. What happened? In essence, Sadat acted in harmony with Begin’s political-conceptual model. According to that model Israel would be willing to make concessions to Egypt, but only after Egyptian recognition of Israeli sovereignty over Eretz Israel and in return for a peace treaty. There is no doubt that the intensive diplomatic dynamics led Begin to relinquish more than he wanted to at the outset of negotiations. But if a concession had been required on any firm ideological principle concerning Eretz Israel, then Begin would not have given in at Camp David. And in actual fact he not only did not give in there, but the agreement reached even seemed to justify the basic elements of his political approach, which he had reiterated consistently since 1967. At the same time he also succeeded, as we have said, in leaving all the political options open regarding the West Bank. Begin was not a captive of his senior ministers, nor was he swayed by personal weaknesses as some critics (e.g., Shmuel Katz) in his own camp as well as supporters of the peace treaty have claimed. At Camp David Begin acted basically within a framework and under rules that were the fundamentals of his political approach toward peace with Arab states.

With this peace treaty, however, Begin seriously offended the ideology of a large part of his camp. As noted earlier, Begin needed all of his personal authority to act against the basic beliefs of his movement, which constituted a unique historical example of an ideological leader acting against his own party. As a result, a crisis ensued over the withdrawal from Sinai in which the national ideology on one side and the sovereignty of the state on the other were put to the test. The sovereignty of the state, and the desire to put the political approach into action, won out. From this, however, we can draw no analogy concerning Judea and Samaria—whether Begin himself or one of his heirs be in power. On this subject the bonds between the three elements of world view, ideology, and policy are far stronger and deeper.

THE LEBANON WAR

Here we shall consider only how the Lebanon War and the military moves involved were legitimized. It may well be that Begin took the aims to be limited military ones, and that his political conceptions were what led him to agree to the invasion of Lebanon. But his world view and ideology—both their content and style—made it very easy for him to be drawn into a war of much more ambitious aims. Begin perceived the war in Lebanon in terms of historical symbols of the traumatic type (Masada, Munich, the Holocaust, etc.). The symbols and the rhetoric fused with the complex reality and became one entity. Thus the PLO was seen as an existential enemy against whom all-out war must be waged. The fighting in Beirut was depicted in terms of World War II, that is, a total war in which the bombing of civilian populations is legitimate and ethical. There is great similarity between the reasons given in a 1938 article by Jabotinsky (“Amen”) in favor of reprisals that injure civilians (an atypical article for him that was apparently written under the pressure of events he found most difficult) and the words of Begin on the legitimacy of bombing Beirut with artillery and from the air in 1982. For Begin the war in Lebanon could be explained in terms of the demands he made in June 1967: “Why didn’t they move up the weaponry”—that is, why didn’t Israel open a preventive war with Egypt? Begin did open a preventive war against a border enemy that he considered a combination of Syria, the PLO, and Communism.

It was ideology that provided the props for the strategic-aggressive approach, and it was a world view in which political life is a constant battle for survival that lent justification to a war and its aims that were on a much greater scale than anticipated beforehand. The yielding of the relatively moderate Begin ap-
proach to an overzealous ideology that pushed for grander, more decisive results was such that the result was deeply painful for anyone whose basic ideology was founded not only on political might but on moral and ethical concepts as well.

CONCLUSION

We have not discussed here the relations between ideology and “reality.” Such a discussion would necessitate also establishing a position concerning the nature of “reality” in order to decide whether the ideology being studied is “imaginary” or “realistic.” A description of the internal logic of ideology and policy is one thing, while evaluating them according to any external criteria is another. The former has been the aim of this article; the latter is a matter of subjective evaluation based on world view, ideology, and politics.

NOTES

1. We shall not address here the claim frequently made in Revisionist circles about their indirect influence, i.e., the claim that it was Jabotinsky who was the first to declare and establish the methods and means that “official Zionism” accepted later on. On the whole the claim is unfounded.

2. It is much more difficult to establish that the Labor governments from June 1967 on were guided by ideology or clear-cut, commonly agreed aims; the definition of their “ideology” is therefore a complex issue.

3. Clearly, one must always keep in mind with any system of judgment and evaluation that ideology may not be realized, not only because of its weaknesses or erroneousness but also because of strong counterforces that may obstruct its realization.


5. Much has been written about the trivialization and banalization caused by Begin’s use of historical symbols and apocalyptic rhetoric. Thus, for example, he wrote that a Palestinian state was liable to bring about “a war of destruction and bloodiness of which there had been no crueller in the history of mankind” (Ma’ariv, 12 August 1970).

6. We shall not discuss here when and why the claim for sovereignty over Transjordan was dropped not only from the Revisionist platform but from its rhetoric as well.


11. The strategic assumption behind the war in Lebanon was that in all the other wars—forced on it or initiated by it—Israel had no predetermined aim and did not use all the means at its disposal; for that very reason each military victory had ended in full or partial political defeat. Therefore in this case the ultimate aim would be predetermined, and all necessary military means would be employed to achieve it.

12. This is at the root of the debate of Y. Harkabi with Jabotinskyism (e.g., “Estrategia le-ma’avak ba-liuk,” Davar, 25 July 1983). The characterization of Jabotinskyism here is actually made in order to contrast it with “realism” and “reality.”