

# Deleuzian Futures

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## Abstracts

### **Ian Buchanan, Cardiff University | To Dwell as a Poet or an Assassin?**

To dwell as a poet or an assassin? What does this evocative question, which Deleuze and Guattari borrow from Virilio, actually mean? Why is it interesting and important? This question is interesting to me because it is premised on the fact that in this day and age it is extremely difficult to distinguish between the poets and assassins, between those who dwell in such a way that they open the world (not just themselves) to new modes of thought and those who condemn the world to remain as it is. I would argue that in a very real sense we have lost the capacity to differentiate between events that are life affirming (or just) and those that aren't because all too often the difference between the two is too marginal to begin with.

### **Patricia Pisters, Amsterdam University | *Flashforward*: The Future is Now**

In "The Future of the Image" Rancière argues that the end of images is behind us. Against the claim that the digital revolution or other mediatic catastrophes have put an end to the image or to the visual, he argues for an aesthetics of the image that acknowledges the continuing power of images as directly affecting interruptions, as educating documentations of traces of history and as an open-to- combining signs of the visible and the sayable *ad infinitum*. With this in mind, I will propose that after the Deleuzian movement-image and time-image, we now are surrounded by a third type images that speak "from the future". Based in the third synthesis of time, the time of the future that Deleuze develops in *Difference and Repetition*, I will argue that this type of images, which has its origins in the time-image, has developed in a new and impure regime of images that is typical for the digital age. By looking at two aesthetic images of catastrophe, Alain Resnais' *Hiroshima mon Amour* and the television series *Flashforward*, I will analyse some of the operations of the image of this third type, the image of and from the future that is now.

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**Adam Aboulafia, Tel Aviv University | When Deleuze Asked “What is X?”  
The Future of Thought in *What is Philosophy?***

In *Difference and Repetition* Gilles Deleuze claimed that “What is X?” is not the adequate philosophical question. He set out to show that “Once it is a question of determining the problem or the Idea as such, once it is a question of setting the dialectic in motion, the question 'What is X?' gives way to other questions, otherwise powerful and efficacious, otherwise imperative: 'How much, how and in what cases?'" (DR 188). This other set of questions was supposed to “dramatize” philosophy and give it an artistic dimension. What Deleuze called “the method of dramatization” combated the eternal thought of essence with the untimely thought of the event, engendered by the contingent sensuous encounter. It therefore might seem odd that Deleuze should choose to title his last book (co-authored with F. Guatari) *What is Philosophy?* Could it be that in his last days the aging philosopher decided to retreat from the more extreme pronouncements of his “youth”? In this short paper I propose to show that in fact *considerations of the future* were the real reason behind the return of the “What is X?” question at the end of Deleuze’s life. Not his own personal future of course, but the future of thought itself. *What is philosophy?* should be considered as a pedagogical project, a testament for future apprentices in philosophy. As such, it uses the question of essence as a propaedeutic for the initial grasp of the philosophical domain. It is this initial grasp that can now be re-engendered adequately, once the image of eternal truth was dethroned.

**Merav Amir, Tel Aviv University | Deleuze and the Familial Future:  
Regulating the Gendered Body in the Shift from Disciplinary to Control Societies**

In his "Postscript on Control Societies" Deleuze portrays a shift from disciplinary societies to societies of control. In control societies the enclaves that Michel Foucault described as constituting disciplinary societies can no longer sustain their spatial attributes, and can no longer operate as a means for social regulation. While in disciplinary societies one would enter and exit highly managed enclosed environments, in control societies the simulation of being outside no longer exists; the management has completely collapsed into the self and the body has become the locus of constant social regulation. Moreover, since enclaves can no longer maintain their distinctness, they can also no longer bestow meaning on time; no longer is the nature of time determined by spatial definitions; it is time which constructs space. The current paper follows Deleuze's articulation by examining one central social institution: the family. The paper claims that since the concrete institution of the family can no longer fulfill its traditional disciplinary role, our spatial relations to the

family in control societies is, therefore, one of proximity; it has turned into a temporal construct of what Deleuze calls a "coded configuration". Hence, families as sites of social regulation are displaced by 'The Family', the latter functioning as a dense ideological construct which can then operate in particular social situations as a moralistic and normalizing yard-stick loaded with social values. The current paper examines this shift in the context of concrete historical changes in the regulation of reproduction and gender roles as they relate to the family, claiming that in these circumstances, the familial future of the body becomes the organizing principle for regulating binary gendered distinctions.

**Neil Balan, University of Saskatchewan | Arts/Science/Philosophy:  
Overdetermined Counterinsurgency & Undermining War**

Contemporary forms of military violence, especially those manifested under the recycled rubric of counterinsurgency, effectively mix and modulate different forms of coercion to subdue enemies and adversaries or to persuade ambivalent populations. The coercive forms do not exist outside of their expressive, aesthetic, or communicative contexts. In effect, and as evidenced by a number of theorists and scholars, contemporary military methods enable a kind of environmentalism, territorializing and indefinite battlespace for war where boundaries have always blurred between overdrawn civilian-military, domestic-foreign, and war-peace distinction. The so-called mix of kinetic and non-kinetic forms of military power is less a mix of relative movement and more a mix of relative speeds, with fast and slow forms of violence mediating and producing environments.

Instead of drawing on the Nomadology of Deleuze (and Guattari) or on debates regarding the uptake of post-structural/ contemporary philosophy by military agents (Weizman, IDF, operational thinking, etc.), the core of this paper opts for somewhat of a more categorical approach and attempts to create a typology of counterinsurgency by using Deleuze's later work in *What is Philosophy* and writings published in the collection *Two Regimes of Madness*. Drawing on further work by Stephen Zagala, the paper plots counterinsurgency in its current North Atlantic form as a way of thinking with sensation (art), thinking with correlation (science), and thinking with concepts (philosophy). The essay concludes with a brief discussion of the implications for future thinking on matters of war, its environments and materials, and the work of Deleuze.

**Einat Bar-On Cohen, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem | Japanese Archery –  
*Kyūdo* – and the Dynamics of Resonance and the Folding of Time**

Both hitting the target and disregarding it are part of Japanese archery – *kyūdo* – and although the two are mutually exclusive, they co-habit in *kyūdo* without entertaining

paradoxical relations between them, because *kyūdo*, as other Japanese practices, generates and maintains porous borders between aiming at the target and disregarding it. This practice of non-duality also alters strict delineations between the physical and the non-physical parts of the body, between body and world and more. *Kyūdo* is performed meticulously, the shooter moves slowly, intently, in concerted form; throughout years of training the archers systematically exclude any unexpected rhizomic potentiality, meanwhile captivating the projectile energy of violence in-to the body, and out-to the world. *Kyūdo* captures the potentialities for multiplicity embedded in resonance – of the oscillating arrow and bowstring, and its repercussions within the archer's body – into ceremonial gestures. Meanwhile, time loses its linearity to become condensed, folded into the shot. The auspicious affect of shooting and arrow is captured in the brief moment of the arrow's flight to be transported into the future. The virtual template of this practice im-mediately travels through space and time to generate a concentrated intensity of past-present that can be carried into the future. Deleuzian thinking on resonance, fold and the relations between the virtual and the actual through time, can help decipher how shooting and arrow can coalesce the shooter's body, with the other shooters, with the shooting space, bow and arrow, and with the environment and cosmos, to become god-like, poetic and engender personal and cosmological growth.

**Frida Beckman, Uppsala University | The History of the Future: Deleuze, *Carnivàle*, and the Possibility of New Beginnings**

This paper shows how bringing together Deleuze's more widely acknowledged understanding of time with his less appreciated approach to historicism opens up important ways of thinking about political agency in a historical context. Responding to recent work done in Deleuze studies, the paper employs an example from contemporary visual culture to explore relationships between time, agency, and history. Showing how the HBO series *Carnivàle* offers a testing ground on which problems and possibilities recovered through Marx and Deleuze can be staged and developed, the paper argues that the series enables us to visualize and think through the radical potential of repetition. *Carnivàle* offers an intriguing use of history as well as a number of diverging forms of repetition which makes it possible to ask how the agency required to intervene in history may be related to repetition and, conversely, how repetition can be used to comprehend historical agency. It enables a discussion of how time and history as a matter of sad repetitions can be counteracted with an understanding of futurity and repetition in their revolutionary potential.

**Charles Blattberg, Université de Montréal | Deleuze on the Future: Creation *Ex Nihilo*?**

One thing that makes Deleuze's concept of the future so unique and powerful is its absence of subjectivity. To Deleuze, futural time is radically disjunctive, hence radically original. Of course this has political implications, and one of the things that I want to show in this paper is how it can help us respond to the challenges associated

with what Pierre Rosanvallon has described as modern democracy's inherently "myopic" nature. That said, the futural experience of pure difference that Deleuze favours is problematic because, even granting that it has a mystical dimension – for the *ekstasis* that is the mystic's aim is also, by definition, without subjectivity – it is hard, perhaps impossible, to conceive how such a future can be utterly disconnected from what Deleuze has called the "memorial" and "habitual" paradigms of time, that is, from the past and the present respectively. For is this not to assume a capacity to create *ex nihilo*, something that has, after all, been ascribed to God rather than to the human?

### **Ronald Bogue, University of Georgia | Deleuze-Guattari and the Future of Politics: Science Fiction, Protocols, and the People to Come**

From *Kafka* (1975) through *What Is Philosophy?* (1991), Deleuze and Deleuze-Guattari place increasing emphasis on the notion of a "people to come." In *Kafka*, Deleuze-Guattari argue that Kafka engages a collective assemblage of enunciation in order to make his literary machine the "relay for a revolutionary machine-to-come"; in *Cinema 1* and *2*, Deleuze ties the "people to come" to the concepts of fabulation, "legending *in flagrante delicto*," choosing to choose, and belief in this world; and in *What Is Philosophy?* Deleuze-Guattari argue that the common goal of philosophy, the sciences and the arts is to invent a people to come. Yet what Deleuze and Guattari mean by a people to come, both in literary and general terms, is unclear. A writer alone cannot create a people; only the writer and a collectivity may do so. Hence, the people to come cannot be specified in detail, only as a trajectory toward unforeseeable possibilities. However, in the concept of the "life plan" as "protocol of experimentation," which Deleuze-Guattari associate with Kafka and Kleist, we have a concept that would allow for a fictional portrayal of a collectivity as temporary demarcation of future experimentation. Science fiction often provides such protocols in visions of future socio-political configurations, and my object will be to consider a few of Octavia Butler's problematic "peoples to come" in the light of this complex of concerns.

### **Patrick Carmichael, Liverpool John Moores University | Deleuze and Design: Habit, Innovation and Change in Computer Software Design**

How can computer software applications be designed for use in an uncertain future, to support pedagogical, social and professional practices that are themselves emergent? The relevance of the work of Deleuze and Guattari for information systems and computer software has been explored, but to date this has been largely confined to 'geophilosophical' studies of existing technologies. Despite interest in Deleuzian perspectives on design, including computer aided design, in other fields; such explorations of how computer software itself is designed are largely absent. This paper will explore Deleuzian ideas about time, experience, habit and change, in relation to the design and development of computer software applications.

Much software design is conventionally couched in terms of understanding the working practices of potential users, and as such attempts to determine and generalize workflows, patterns and characteristics of users themselves; at the same time, the accompanying rhetoric is often of enhancement, transformation or innovation. Deleuzian theories of time provide a means of theorizing and synthesizing these apparent contradictions. The paper will draw on accounts of design activities in which teachers, students and technology designers, all of whom draw on past experiences, current discourses and practices, and imagined futures in the context of a research and development research project to explore the potential applications of emerging 'semantic web' technologies in a range of higher education and early professional settings. In these accounts, engagement in participatory design processes not only surfaces tacit knowledge and current practice, but also folds diverse pasts and imagined futures into complex and sometimes contested temporalities.

### **Iddo Dickmann, Bar-Ilan University | The Ontological Significance of *mise-en-abyme* in Deleuze's Thought**

In this study I discuss how Foucault and Deleuze invoked the concept of *mise-en-abyme*, a story embedding itself ad infinitum, to establish a new, non-Heideggerian ontology. Foucault, commenting on Blanchot, sets out explicitly to formulate an ontology of literature modeled on *mise en abyme*. Deleuze, as I will demonstrate, embraced Foucault's analysis, to model Vertical Repetition on *mise en abyme*. By using *mise en abyme* as an ontological paradigm, he distinguished himself from Derrida who used *mise en abyme* as a deconstructionist model, "almost synonymic from *differance* and supplementarity". Deleuze's Repetition overlaps with Eternal Return, and hence with the "synthesis of future". I interpret Deleuze's concept of future, and especially its "coexistence" with the past, as deriving from the phenomenology of *mise en abyme*. I particularly rely on Foucault's analysis of the temporality of *mise en abyme*, as derived from the latter's two basic modes: centrifugality and centripetality. Foucault also draws a historical implication, making a distinction between the language of antiquity (with its literary works of *mise en abyme*) and that of modernity. The first implies the "ontology of language", while the second implies a "disease of proliferation", "devoid of ontological density". I show that Deleuze's concept of future in fact corresponds to Foucault's analysis of antiquity. On the other hand modern, future-oriented, language rather corresponds to the Derridean concept of *mise en abyme*, as well as to the logic of "Negation" which Deleuze has denounced Derrida's philosophy of consisting.

### **Natanel Elfassy, Tel Aviv University | Architecture after Deleuze [Postscript]**

"Perhaps in every field but most of all in language, use is a polar gesture: on the one hand, appropriation and habit; on the other, expropriation and nonidentity. And 'usage' (in its whole semantic field, as both 'to use' and 'to be used to') is the



perpetual oscillation between a homeland and an exile – dwelling." (Giorgio Agamben, "Expropriated Manner", *The End of the Poem* [1996/1999]). When we think of a residential building, what comes to mind is a ramshackle set of unruly inhabitants each having their own positions – strengths and weakness, desires and psychotic disorders ... humeurs (From the Latin *umor*: liquid / From the Greek *thumos*: the passions / In medicine: fluid contained in the organism. This fluid can be real, like blood, lymph and bile, or supposedly real, or even hypothetical, like black bile. / In psychology, the original thymic state governing the emotions and affect. The four temperaments linked to the four "humeurs" (Hippocrates, 479-377 B.C.E.) Each humor corresponds to an element: phlegm corresponds to water / phlegmatic Blood corresponds to air / sanguine Yellow bile corresponds to fire / hot-tempered, bilious Black bile corresponds to the earth / melancholy [but also tense]). All of whom are united, however undisciplined and chaotic their life are, by their belonging to that building, by their belonging to a particular situation. Now, let us consider stripping a residential building of all its attributes, to the extent that even its identity and unity are removed; That is leaving all of a situation's properties aside and considering only the basic relations which holds throughout its multiplicity. An assemblage...like a multiplicity that contains many heterogeneous ends and establishes links, relationships of different kinds. The only thing holding the assemblage together is co-functioning, or in other words symbiosis, "sympathy" in the original sense. What matters are not filiations but alliances and alloys, not inheritance and descent but contagion and epidemics...An assemblage comprises two segments, one of content and the other of expression. On the one hand it is a mechanical assemblage of bodies, of actions and passions, an intermingling of bodies reacting to one another, on the other hand it is a collective assemblage of enunciation, of acts and statements, of incorporeal transformations attributed to bodies. Then on a vertical axis, the assemblage has both territorial sides, or reterritorialized sides, which stabilize it, and cutting edges of deterritorialization, which carry it away (following Deleuze and Guattari).

**Lyat Friedman, Bar-Ilan University | The Future of Schizoanalysis: From Freud's Moses to a Pack of Wolves**

**Boaz Hagin, Tel Aviv University | Inverted Identification: Bergson and Phenomenology in Deleuze's Cinema Books**

Within film studies, Deleuze's cinema books are often read as clearly opposed to a phenomenological approach. His tale of Bergson and Husserl's divergent paths in Chapter 4 of *Cinema 1* has been the basis of many attacks against a phenomenology of cinema, hostility toward Deleuze within phenomenological works, or disclaimers when the cinema books and phenomenology are used in tandem. This talk argues that conceptual bridges between phenomenology and the cinema books can be built. Acknowledging the role of phenomenology in the cinema books also brings into relief

one of their key assumptions, which calls into question the possibility of extending the books into other media. A “Cinema 3.0” will therefore have to create its own new concepts.

**Edyta Just and Marek M. Wojtaszek | Pantopia of Transference: Of Future and Sound. *The Soloist* and the Sonic Unconscious**

The paper is a critical-creative investigation of the sonic power of the unconscious as it is expressed through the narrative of Joe Wright’s film *The Soloist* (2009). Drawing on Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s idiosyncratic philosophy and schizoanalysis, the paper aims to critique the implicit negativity inscribed in the phantasmatic understanding of the unconscious functioning under the Phallus-Oedipus and offer a radical and affirmative alternative. In particular, the process of transference, constitutive of the psychotherapeutic practice and indispensable for its success, will be considered. Its dialectical and representational framework will simultaneously be critiqued as all too rigid and restrictive to account for ongoing uncanny generativity, consigning it to a mere negative of intentionally motivated consciousness. We will, therefore, focus on the relation “doctor – patient” and expose its limitations which inevitably make of the psychoanalytic praxis a systemic tool of coercive adaptation thus, in fact, castrating an event of shimmering transferential desire. De-cathecting it from the imperative of remembrance of things past as well as of speaking (of them), we rediscover and attempt an ethological analysis of its ongoing sonic production: *Ça sonne!* As the film demonstrates, its essence and function dwells not in replication (of pathological symptoms) but rather future-oriented, untimely, schizo-creation. Immanent unconscious production defies representation and brings up the issue of durability. We will thus emphasize the transformative – indeed, healing – potential music wields, especially when experienced collectively. Transference is purged of dialectical bounds and affirmed as an immanent and protean sound machine, an affective process of en-during, i.e., forever future-driven experiencing.

**Inbar Kaminsky, Tel Aviv University | The Deleuzian Simulacra and Mythical Time: The Future Body of the City**

This talk strives to redefine the body in futuristic urban novels by maintaining that the representation of characters' corporeality is Deleuzian Simulacra, conceptualized in *The Logic of Sense* as “an image without resemblance”(295), and as such, it is inevitably entangled with the corporeality of the city, creating what Deleuze referred to in *The Logic of Sense* as “the world of simulacra...the world itself as phantasm”(299). Detached from the corporeality of the human body, which no longer serves as the image, the protagonist often finds himself identifying and even merging with the characteristics of the city. The article also draws a comparison between the Deleuzian Simulacra and the Baudrillardian Simulacra of science fiction through the analysis of *Veniss Underground* by Jeff Vandermeer (2005), a science fiction novel which follows the lives of three different protagonists, living in the far-future of



multi-leveled cities in the decadent city of Veniss, with its technologically enhanced upper level and hellish underground maze. The multi-leveled spatiality of *Veniss Underground* also emphasizes the temporal dimension of the plot – "...the city is the only infinite – a maze...a palate of undigested time"(66), which corresponds to what Deleuze referred to as circular time in *Difference and Repetition*; the linking of past and present in such a way that "the pure past which defines them [ideas] is itself still necessarily expressed in terms of present, an ancient *mythical* present"(110).

**Nir Kedem, Tel Aviv University | The Queer is (Un)Dead: Memories of Futures Past**

**Meyrav Koren-Kuik, Tel Aviv University | Deleuze, Simulacra and the Narratives of Disneyland and IKEA**

Space features prominently in the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze. Both in his individual projects and in the work accomplished together with Félix Guattari. From the model of 'any-space-whatever' suggested in Deleuze' exploration of the cinema to the concepts of deterritorialization and reterritorialization constructed by Deleuze and Guattari in *Anti-Oedipus*, the question of perception in the experience of space stands central. This paper will attempt to connect Deleuzian spatial thinking with the concepts of desire and simulacra by looking at how these concepts interplay with perception to generate a narrative within spaces that may be termed as 'mass-culture' spaces. Places have narratives. These narratives, like fictional narratives, have a temporal and a spatial dimension. These 'spatial narratives' are born of and sustained by historicity - the compounded layers of memory that are represented in a space by its aesthetics. The conception and the sustained existence of such 'spatial narratives' is connected to sentimentality and nostalgia as a reaction to the condition of postmodernity. However, what happens to perception when the space in question is what Rem Koolhaas terms "junk space" or a 'mass-culture' space? The paper will examine two 'mass-culture' spaces: an amusement park and a furniture store - Disneyland and IKEA. Both Disneyland and IKEA as narrative spaces subscribe to the principle of simulacra to enable the physical manifestation of desire. It will be argued that while the production of Disneyland's and IKEA's spatial narratives is directly connected to what Peter Brook terms 'narrative desire', the desire that prompted their creation and sustains them represents a desire for completeness and connection – desire in its Deleuzian sense and one that defies the inevitable disconnect with reality such manufactured spaces represent. The paper will demonstrate the connection between this desire and simulacra, as it pertains to Disneyland and IKEA, by using Deleuzian thinking – productive desire and a positive perception of simulacra as a necessity of postmodern reality and its projected future. Furthermore, a connection will be established between how these spaces of 'desire and simulacra' are experienced and perceived and the mechanism which allows this

type of perception to successfully exist despite the 'schizophrenic' disconnect with reality it promotes.

**Hsien-hao Sebastian Liao, National Taiwan University | Dao and Its Mysterious Ways: The Workings of the (Deleuzian) Outside in *God, Man, Dog***

The Deleuzian Outside is one of the most important concepts that underlie his whole philosophical system and yet it defies all attempts to circumscribe it. It pervades all self-autopoietic systems but is never exhausted by the sum of all these systems. Although it is definitely not a transcendental realm where platonic truth resides, everything derives its vitality from the materiality of the Outside as it instigates everything to self-organize with its forces. And that is the moment one grasps "truth" by means of creativity. That is, by finding the "wormhole" as it were in the inside, one configures new solutions to existing problems. The above process therefore is very close to the Chinese Daoist "quasi-mystical" intimation of the immanence of Dao in everyday life, some fundamental differences between the two notwithstanding. It thus helps elucidate how the Taiwanese film *God, Man, Dog* dramatizes this particular grasp of truth in the chance encounters of all the characters through a man whose livelihood relies on transporting Buddhist-Daoist deities to temple fairs to earn small money. Having formed a habit to collect abandoned figures of deities, the man seems to have developed some kind of ability to communicate with the supernatural world but does not himself realize that it could ameliorate people's life through his kind acts. In other words, the Outside seems to seep via him into the lives of all the downcast people and renew them. Nevertheless, through this exegesis, this paper would also try to bring out some of the major differences between the two schools and propose tentative ways of integrating them.

**Aïm Deüelle Lüski, Tel Aviv University | The Future of Philosophy: Difference, Repetition and Representantation**

To Deleuze art looks like an open, chaotic, organic and boundless world, by means of which he intends to place tools in the hands of the philosopher of the future. The latter will be able to assess the degree of metaphysical immanence of the event of thought (his) and create a new form for it each time as if he were a master of abstract painting, which is the ideal of Deleuze's philosophy. Deleuze's thought wants to achieve a form that describes the way in which it seeks to overcome, from a metaphysical aspect, the obligation to exist in an image taken from a particular philosophical language which immediately brands the user. It seems that this movement of his thought is also aimed toward overcoming its own basic assumptions, especially the images by means of which the existing language of philosophy functions, as it has until now been manifested in the idealist-rationalist tradition (Plato, Descartes, Kant, Hegel), in the phenomenological tradition (Hegel, Husserl, Levinas), and in the

existentialist tradition (Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Sartre). In my lecture, I will present a retrospective presentation of the thought investigating the idea of the "image of thought", and of the future of thinking which might be devoid of image, from the perspectives arising from Deleuze's thought. But, as opposed to Deleuze himself, who presents this thesis in terms of repetition and difference (Deleuze couldn't think beyond dichotomic logocentric tradition), I suggest a reading of his system through the problem of representation. I begin with Deleuzian critique of Kantian's third critique, that of judgment, and subsequently with the critique of the concept of the ideal. Together with the discussion of Kant, I will discuss his critique of Nietzsche, moving between the historical level, which connects Nietzsche with the critique of dialectics (from the book on Nietzsche written by Deleuze in 1962), to a discussion of the question of eternal repetition, time and return, taken from the relevant chapters of *Difference and Repetition*. I will trace Deleuze's basic definitions in his argument with Kant's very well-formulated positions on space, time and especially the ideal, an argument in which Deleuze avails himself mainly of the thinking of Shlomo Maimon, whom he highly esteems. An understanding of the development which took place in Deleuze's intellectual history at the peak of the pre-chaotic stage may allow us to understand the formulation Deleuze gives to thought which seeks to be devoid of a "dogmatic image of thought"; at the end of his discussion of Kant and the question of the image, Deleuze breaks free of the entire conceptual network constructed at such great labor in *Difference and Repetition*, relinquishes the desire to find a language that would replace dialectical language and abandon the "monstrous" difference, and continues from another place, in many respects unexpected—with recourse to art as a metaphysical horizon.

### **Vered Maion, Tel Aviv University | The People are *still* Missing**

In his cinema books Deleuze points out that in modern cinema "the people no longer exist or not yet...*the people are missing*." With this statement Deleuze emphasizes the urgent necessity of finding a new model for political cinema in which "the people" will not be "represented" but invented, a cinema which struggles to articulate collective utterances that address a people who don't yet exist or whose existence is precisely what is at stake, that is, a cinema of *becoming-other*. In this kind of cinema the role of the filmmaker will be not to "document" the people, but to bring about "intercessors," real characters who are put in the condition of "making up fiction," and of "story telling." My paper will examine Deleuze's concept of the people as a still not actualized subject, "the people to come," in relation to the works of filmmakers such as Pedro Costa and Abbas Kiarostami, who through the use of new digital media intentionally challenge the distinction between a documentary mode of filmmaking and a fictional one. In their films characters, who often belong to marginalized groups, play themselves rather than simply being themselves. Their films thus demonstrate the necessity to create virtual forms of representation that address the violent and highly contested political and economic context of

globalization. Modes of representation which, on the one hand, aesthetically and epistemologically defy prevalent notions of “authenticity” and “truth”; and on the other suggest that once the problem of the people is presented in the *future* tense: “the people to come,” the “becoming-people,” then a new concept of politics emerges which is not concerned with identities, but with the invention of new collective *and* conflicted forms of belonging and affiliation.

### **Betti Marenko, Central Saint Martins College of Art & Design | Designing Futures: a Deleuzian Take on Design as Embodiment of Virtuality**

My paper intends to investigate ideas of radical design as manifestation of possible virtual future(s) by drawing on Deleuze’s philosophy. The notion of speculative design is amply articulated in the work of current practitioners and theorists and it will be addressed by using Deleuze’s ideas on virtuality and becoming as main theoretical backdrop, as well as articulated through pertinent case studies. Moreover, another aspect of Deleuze’s *oeuvre* will be addressed: the centrality of affects in the constitution of subjectivity, which is increasingly relevant to contemporary critical theory (see also Patricia Clough’s notion of ‘affective turn’). This is explored in order to address its relevance for an object-based notion of future. Drawing from a Spinozist notion of affect, “*the trace of one body upon another*”, I intend to examine the affects emerging, and circulating, in the triangulation of future-*ing*, subjectivities and the materiality of designed objects. Hence, this paper looks at the network and circulation of affects engaged in, and emerging from, a practice of future-designing that is potentially liberating as well as constitutive of new forms of subjectivities. Can speculative design be seen as a material interrogation into, and embodiment of, a Deleuzian-inspired ontology of becoming? Where can evidence of this be found in the work of current practitioners? Can design play this role?

### **John Neil McGinness, University of Dundee | Pathos and the Three Syntheses (An Analysis)**

When considering how to read and use Deleuze’s thought, we might reflect upon Alberto Toscano’s ultimatum: *either* read Deleuze according to his uptake of Bergson’s paradoxes of time *or* according to the ‘generation of divergent and heterogeneous individuations with their correlative rhythms and space-times.’ I claim that we must reject this ultimatum and think *both*. We can do so only by situating Deleuze’s thought through the lens of the third synthesis, the synthesis of the future. I make the following, accompanying claims. (1). Individuation/actualization (1<sup>st</sup>) and temporal co-existence (2<sup>nd</sup>) each operate according to their own logic or, perhaps better, *pathos*. The first is an *actual pathos*, operative in the first synthesis of time (present) and the second a *virtual pathos*, operative in the second synthesis (past). The *conjunction* (rather than connection or disjunction) of these two different *pathos* (or differences) constitutes the *pathos* of the third synthesis (future). This is the key to

reconciling the Deleuzian dualisms and the splits in Deleuze scholarship - materialists vs. idealists, actualists vs. virtualists, etc. (2) Generally speaking, readers have situated themselves either at the level of actual pathos (where the above split is ‘more real’) or at the level of virtual pathos (where the split is ‘less real’). My wager is that there has been only limited and sporadic success in situating thought at the level of the third synthesis. A ‘third-wave’ of Deleuze scholarship beckons, where the first and second pathos interpretations, having been taken to their limit, are left ‘in the wake of’ third pathos readings.

### **Kitty Millet, San Francisco State University | A Rhizome instead of a Tree, an Exile instead of a Temple, a Job-Abraham instead of a Tanna: Jewish History in Deleuze’s Philosophy of Repetition**

In the Deleuzian oeuvre, Jewish signifiers and references barely register as critical topoi for the rhizomatic scholar. With the exception of Laurence Silberstein and Adrian Parr’s respective texts, “Jews” and Judaism have remained outside the canon of Deleuzian scholarly projects. The significant points for Deleuze appear to be Kant, Hegel, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche, but for each of these thinkers, Deleuze also concerns himself with Maimon, Spinoza, Kafka, and Bergson. Thus Deleuze suggests discrete Jewish figures in intellectual history as intersections of *puissance* when the stakes of human history appear to be up for grabs, when human history appears in its becoming potential. Likewise, Deleuze also associates prominent concepts both of his work with Guattari and his own respective texts, with key dates in Jewish history. For example, the question becomes then how or why are the dates of the destruction of the two Jewish Temples—586 bce and 70 ce—important to his understanding of “the regime of signs” (111-148). Why is the span between 587 bce and 70 ce, significant for Deleuze’s rhizomatic trajectory? This paper will take up Deleuze’s theory of “becoming-Jewish” to get at the stakes of Deleuze’s investment in the Job-Abraham figure and other pre-Halakhic notations of Jewish becomings so that we will see how foundational narratives of Judaism become deterritorialized in Deleuzian thinking through the figure of the rhizome.

### **Catarina Pombo Nabais, University of Lisbon | Deleuze and Agamben: Is the Impossible a Condition of Creation?**

In what way is the concept of impossible a condition of creation? This is the question that organizes my paper on Deleuze’s and Agamben’s opposed interpretations of Melville’s *Bartleby*. According to Agamben, Bartleby is the extreme experiment of the condition, not of possibility, but of impossibility of creation, which is the possibility of non-creation. For Agamben, Bartleby is not a creator. On the contrary, he is the one who obsessively settles in the condition of creation, i.e in a state previous to creation. In this sense, he is not suspending but expanding the non-action.

He does not write any more, not because he lacks the power to write nor because he indefinitely prolongs his power to write; rather he prefers the power of non-writing. Contrary to Agamben, for Deleuze it is not a question of affirming the absolute autonomy of pure power prior to any preference. If, for Agamben, Bartleby is a thinker of pure power, for Deleuze he is rather the experiment of impossibility. Deleuze sees in Bartleby another access to the condition of creation. For him, the new is never the product of a pure power or a power of nothing which comes to reality, which is carried out like unique or inaugural. The impossible which is present in the act of creation is of another nature. It is the production of a falsifying narration, it is the position of a universe where impossible worlds are present. And in this universe, the character who poses the impossible is in flagrant act of confabulating, he has visions and auditions. Thus, according to Deleuze, Bartleby's impossibility is the condition of people to come.

**María Luisa Bacarlett Pérez and Ángeles Ma. Del Rosario Pérez Bernal,  
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México | Deleuze: From Biopolitics to the  
Larvarian Community**

When Deleuze recognizes in the foucaultian work a set of vitalist arguments that make life a privileged place to stand and face biopolitics, he was also characterizing his own intellectual work that could also be typified as vitalist. While Deleuze's philosophy is not just a mere biophilosophy, it is clear that life is expressed as a major element to think not only how to resist the power, but also to rethink an *individual* and a *community* that do not respond to a substantial model, finite and finished. We believe that there are two central concepts that serve to question those categories; it is "larval subject" and "body without organs" (CSO). In both cases, these entities are characterized by their state of undifferentiation, its ability to avoid being exhausted in any final way and to be open to all kinds of kinks and folds. In the case of the community, if it has a future, it would be a future larvae, in the manner of an impersonal haecceity, pure becoming and differentiation without any purpose or origin. This future community could also be the touchstone to resist the biopolitical game, especially for his undifferentiated character and his machinic future. Certainly, in this area Deleuze proposals intersect and complement the ideas about the "coming community" of Giorgio Agamben.

**Yoel Regev, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem | The Future of the Perversion:  
Deleuze and the Speculative Turn**

This paper questions the relevance of Deleuze's thought in the current philosophical situation, and especially concentrates on its relations with the philosophy of "Speculative Realism". While regarding the conflict between the two ways of immanentizing of the impossible (the "sadistic" and the "masochistic" ones) as the inner core of Deleuze's thought, the paper tries to show the way in which the same



dialectic of perversion animates the central conflict into the field of the speculative thought: the confrontation between different ways of accessing the "inhuman" (sadistic inhuman in Meilassou's "hyper-chaos" and Brassier's ontology of extinction versus masochistic inhuman in Harman's Object Oriented Philosophy).

The paper proceeds further to distinguishing between two different meanings of the "masochistic liberation": the liberation of the future and of the new and the liberation of the non-perverted logics of the "quasi-causality". Such a distinction enables to clarify the meaning of the struggle for the emancipation of the inhuman, leaded by the Speculative Realism (while paying a special attention to the question of capitalism and necrocracy, as treated by Resa Negarestani), and to show that the question of the eliminating of the "correlationism" is only a particular case of a more general task of overcoming the logics of the perversion as such.

### **Miri Rozmarin, Tel Aviv University | On Becoming and Vulnerability**

Many of the interpreters of Deleuze closely associate between Deleuzian ethics of becoming and Nitzschian thought. Based on this association, these interpreters stress the centrality of affirmation and difference as the heart of Deleuzian ethics. One representative of this line of interpretation is Rosi Braidotti, who presents a clear distinction between two philosophical tendencies in post-liberal ethics. The first is the ethics of affirmation in which Deleuze is a central contributor, and the other is a Heideggarian and Levinasian ethics of vulnerability. The purpose of this paper is to explore the role of vulnerability in Deleuzian ethics. More specifically, I will argue that the unique temporality of becoming produce kinds of vulnerability that are productive aspects of ethical subjectivity. To argue for this point I offer a reading of pregnancy as a site of becoming. I argue that the temporality of pregnancy introduce kinds of vulnerability that are inherent to this dynamics, and may have a productive role in constituting pregnancy as a site of ethics of becoming. I conclude by arguing that the example of pregnancy put into question the distinction, made by Braidotti, between vulnerability and ethics of becoming. Moreover, it suggests that a further attention should be given to the role of vulnerability in the ethics of becoming.

### **Anne Sauvagnargues, Université Paris Ouest Nanterre | Becoming-Impersonal, Capture of Forces, and Variation of Power**

Art and literature are capture of forces, says Deleuze ; this explains the importance of literature and cinema in Deleuze's philosophy, as experimenting a new kind of experience, not a personal, individual or common one, but an intensive encounter with signs, or images. My paper will try to explain this very singular link between philosophy and the arts: arts as transcendental empiricism, transforming our ordinary experience as well as our categories. Therefore, images have to be seen as a new way of creating concepts, percepts and affects as well.

### **Itay Snir, Tel Aviv University | Time Beyond Common-sense: Deleuze and the Possibility of Political action**

My paper discusses the Deleuzian concepts of common-sense and good-sense, and examines the political implications these concepts have in Deleuze's thought. By exploring the temporal dimension Deleuze ascribes to common-sense and good-sense, I demonstrate the hierarchical domination implied by "the dogmatic image of thought", and discuss the problems as well as the possibilities of political action that undermines common-sense. In the first part of the paper I present the concepts of sense, common-sense and good-sense that Deleuze developed following the philosophical tradition—most notably Plato, Descartes and Kant—and elaborate on the way these concepts link the structure of thought to the direction of time. The discussion will demonstrate that the function of common-sense and good-sense in the "dogmatic image of thought" is to generate three unities: the unity of the object (or the world), the unity of the subject (or the self), and the unity of the political community. This leads to the conclusion that common-sensical actions are anti-political, that is to say – that every action or proposition which remain within the boundaries of common-sense and good-sense cannot be genuinely political. In the second part of the paper I address the problem of reconciling the political demand to break from the order of common-sense and good-sense, with the need of political action to be performed in public, in front of many, that is—to be communicable. A possible answer, I suggest, lies in an understanding of a political event as one that happens both inside and outside the time dictated by good-sense, and is thus able to generate a break in it without being absolutely meaningless from the common-sensical point of view.

### **Marcelo Svirsky, Cardiff University | Renewing the Research Agenda on Israel/Palestine**

‘When we challenge the model of the State apparatus...we do not, however, fall into the grotesque alternatives: either that of appealing to a state of nature, to a spontaneous dynamic, or that of becoming the self-styled lucid thinker of an impossible revolution’ (Deleuze and Parnet, *Dialogues II*, 145). As an object of critical study, Israel's systems of oppression have sustained a strong scholarly tradition. Notwithstanding the benefits of this critical tradition, we should oppose the idea that descending into darkness *is* the only critical alternative to mainstream discourse. In this paper I call for a new symptomatology of Israel/Palestine: a political study needs to look both for the signs of disease hindering life – those emphasising the ways in which practices of oppression appear and are maintained – as well as for the signs of life themselves – those emphasising resistance, creativity and change. Moving away from the pessimism of incorruptible thinkers, the paper stresses the urgency to investigate resistance by looking for the political efforts setting free from devices of power vis-à-vis those movements that partially recapture life.

### **Amir Vodka, Amsterdam University | The Futures of Philip K. Dick**

My talk will be dedicated to the work of the science fiction writer Philip K. Dick. I will ask to discuss K. Dick's perception of the future(s) through three major themes that appear in his work – drugs, schizophrenia and the virtual – themes or concepts that also appear in the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze, which will supply the theoretical framework of my talk. I will argue that in K. Dick's work the virtual and the actual become indistinguishable through the use of drugs which produce states of schizophrenic delirium. Deleuze and Guattari's drug assemblage in *A Thousand Plateaus* describes such a state as the perception of the imperceptible, which is understood not necessarily as a false perception of reality, perceiving what is not there, but what can be (under the right conditions) a perception of what is (virtually) there, that is, a perception of imperceptible durations that are not of our time and haecceities that are no longer of this world. In this non ordinary state of mind a dismantling of the self occurs, and a potential creation of a body without organs that actualizes a multiplicity of possible futures which are the forces of the virtual. Yet in both K. Dick and Deleuze this state has a negative pole in possible false perceptions, in falling into a reterritorialization or in becoming a full body of death. The talk will be accompanied by clips from various film adaptations to K. Dick's novels.

### **Vojin Saša Vukadinović, University of Basel | Escapisms: Queer Theory's Ventures Into and Against the Future**

In recent years, notions surrounding 'the future' have turned into one of Queer Theory's prime areas of inquiry. Whether empathically embraced, as in José Muñoz's *Cruising Utopia* (2009), or utterly rejected, as in Lee Edelman's *No Future* (2004), the analysis of what the future might or might not open up for queer(s) has become a prominent point for the re-thinking of normative registers which the political present holds for sexuality and gender. But whereas this attention towards 'the future' might suggest a growing interest in the work of Gilles Deleuze by Queer Theorists, gaps between Deleuzian and Queer approaches towards sexuality, but also towards the Political, remain largely uncontested in the aforementioned works. Less interested in the very possibilities which a queering of the future might enable, they rather obstruct an immanent focus on the matter and its promise of the yet imperceptible. The presentation will highlight how some of Queer Theory's current analytical parameters still depend upon essentialized usages of concepts that it claims to undo (emphasizing "the" future), and that it is precisely this escapist usage which prevents a queering of the future that would at the same time coincide with a Deleuzian crack in the normativity of time: an unbound temporal opening towards the unexpected, becoming, and new, unknown intensities. The critique will be unfolded in a closer examination of a work that has paradoxically come to be known as Queer Theory's major venture into the field of Deleuzian philosophy: *Terrorist Assemblages* by Jasbir Puar (2007).

### **Roy Wagner, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem | The Future of Ancient Greek Geometry**

Historic research into Greek geometry was traditionally preformed within a history of ideas framework, and adopted modern and renaissance algebraic points of view (e.g. Zeuten and van der Waerden). In recent decades algebraic points of view were discarded in favour of more geometric interpretations, which are sensitive to the role of diagrams in Greek proof practices. Recent research has also exceeded the ideational point of view and started to look into the practices of Greek geometers (e.g. S. Unguru and R. Netz). This newer research tradition, however, is bound for the most part to a modular-cognitive framework. In order to integrate the written text and drawn diagram into well justified arrays of proof, most recent research assumes a neat linear form of production, a stable abstract conceptual framework, and rational forms of rigorous analysis, which look suspiciously close to modern algorithmic reasoning. In order to counter these views, and to make the history of ancient mathematics relevant for present and future mathematical practices, I will present a Deleuzian reading of Greek geometry. I draw mainly on Deleuze's analysis of Francis Bacon's practice of drawing in *Francis bacon: The Logic of Sensation*. The main elements of the analysis are the role of 'catastrophes' that intervene in the embodied material process of drawing (either in painting or in producing diagrams), and the role of the 'haptic eye' that integrates the embodied aspects of drawing and seeing into a pre-rational network of significations emerging from material processes. This point of view highlights the mechanisms that operate within mathematical practice to produce novelty.

### **Jing Wu, Nanjing University | Deleuze's Image of Future in a Rhizome**

Deleuze's concept of a rhizome indicates a mode of production of the new. Contrary to the mode of root-tree or of radicle's "spiritual reality" of binary logic, a rhizome as an open-ended system emphasizes the nomadic character of knowledge and life. Such a changing system describes an image of future that liberates desire from the given. In this sense, it can be seen as following a Marxian critique, advocating the role of relations in the becoming of a being. In a rhizome, future keeps penetrating the established reality by opening a possible space towards the outside. Internet as a successful model of rhizome challenges Habermas' opposition between the communication paradigm and the production paradigm which is built upon the Enlightenment subject-centered reason. It creates conditions and passages to produce difference as the outside because the moments within the map of relations, which are dominated by all-directional forces, provide the virtual power to transcend these limits.

### **Dror Yinon, Bar-Ilan University | Determining Time – Future and Experience in Deleuze's Thought**

In *Différence et répétition* Deleuze writes with regard to the future that "Time is the most radical form of change, but the form of change does not change" (DR, 120 [89]). How should this claim be understood? In my paper I argue that the future plays a constitutive role in Deleuze's transcendental theory of experience, in particular, in determining the subject and its fundamental relation to experience. My main claim is that the subject is determined by the future, yet only the subject can have a future. This means that the form of time, or time as formal, is applicable only to the subject. Thus, while not being the source of temporality, it is only the subject which can be determined by the future, the form of time. From this analysis some conclusions are drawn as to the distinctive features of Deleuze's notion of the future compared to Heidegger's and Derrida's: the future is not accessible (through death) and does not function as a horizon. These features enable us to see the bearing of the future upon experience as a whole: neither providing a privileged point of view from which the meaning of existence can be captured, nor an orientation, the Deleuzian future renders experience systematically open and accounts for the new.

### **Ohad Zehavi, Tel Aviv University | Becoming-Child and the Future of Politics**

Children are the future. But what is in store for them? Nothing but transcendence, apparently, for according to Deleuze transcendence is a quintessential Western malady (shall we call it a *global* disease nowadays?). But how does it come about? Is it innate? Is it genetic? What I would like to propose in my paper is that transcendence is produced *politically*, and that the child is its proper subject. In other words, I suggest we see transcendence as a political fabrication imposed on an immanent life, predominantly embodied by the child. Perhaps, then, some kind of cure can be found – one that is political in nature. It would require us, in the first place, to acknowledge children, theoretically, as political subjects, turning them from a *subjugated group* into a proper *subject group*. We would then have to apply to them, in practice, innovative *minoritarian* politics. Such a politics would entail, among other things, making *becoming-child* an effective relational (that is, political, perhaps even ethical) tool, rather than merely a self-liberating one. Becoming-child of the so-called adult – as performance of the unforeseen future of the next instant, and in immediate relation to the actual child – might fracture the all-pervasive mechanisms of transcendence-production that children must bear. This just might better the prospects of relieving the growing child of this human, all too human affliction of maturity. But once the child becomes a true subject of politics, and once becoming-child becomes a common practice, the very political status of children, as well as their well-being, should also alter immediately, regardless of their envisioned future.