ABSTRACTS - VOLUME 13.1/2
Spain On The Threshold Of A New Century:
Society and Politics before and after the Disaster of 1898
Octavio Ruiz
The military defeat of Spain at the hands of the United States in July 1898 has always been a reference point in the collective memory of Spaniards. It goes far beyond the actual consequences - military, economic, colonial and political - of a disaster which, to anyone with a modicum of information, always seemed inevitable, given the extraordinary inequality between the opponents and the diplomatic isolation of Spain. In fact, historical writings of recent years agree that, apart from the enormous symbolic significance of the loss of the last colonies of a once-great empire, the effects of the war, both economic and political, were relatively limited. At the same time, one writer has pointed out that, faithful to a tradition common to the European political culture of the time, the date 1898 was used as a rhetorical device to increase awareness of the need for a profound political transformation. French intellectuals had done the same after the defeat at Sedan in 1870. It is as well, therefore, to set out in greater detail the chronological framework of these reflections with which I will try to develop the idea that the colonial disaster of 1898, far beyond its intrinsic importance, serves to illustrate the disorder from which the Spanish political system was suffering at the end of the nineteenth century and the subsequent attempts to transform it and adapt it to new demands.
Between Europe and the Mediterranean: Spanish – Italian Relations, 1898-1922
Fernando García Sanz
The history of relations between Spain and Italy during the decisive period for both countries is here examined not simply from bilateral perspective but in terms of two external points of reference. The first is the influence of the strongest powers in Europe on their politics, ideology, economic and foreign policy, and the second is their perception of the Mediterranean area, their guarantees of each other's national interests, and the enduring link between developments in the Mediterranean and the evolution of international relations in the rest of the European continent. This analysis reveals the different answers given by Spain and Italy to a complex set of problems that is broadly European in nature: the crisis of the liberal system, the crisis represented by World War I, the economic crisis, and the crisis of the international role of the old European powers. These two countries' participation in Mediterranean affairs was the sole basis for their participation in the development of international relations during this period.
Spanish colonialism during Primo de Rivera's dictatorship
Susana Sueiro Seoane
In September 1923, when Miguel Primo de Rivera became dictator, the Moroccan problem was the crux of Spanish foreign policy and the catalyst for political and social domestic problems, as it had been for constitutional governments during the reign of Alfonso XIII. The gruelling Rif war against the traditionally warring tribes that in 1921 had come together under the leadership of Abd el-Krim was consuming the country's material and human resources and becoming a nightmare that aggravated all other conflicts. It was, however, Spain's presence in Morocco that provided its only chance of playing any sort of role in the international arena. This article tackles the complex process that led to the resolution of the Rif conflict, undoubtebly the greatest success achieved by the Primo de Rivera dictatorship.
The Mediterranean in the Foreign Policy of the Second Spanish Republic
Nuria Tabanera García
The principal reference points for the foreign policy of the Second Republic were the League of Nations and the Anglo-French axis. In both areas of policy-making, the conditioning factor was Spain's position geographically and strategically and its interest in the security of the western Mediterranean. Its participation in the successive plans to draw up a Mediterranean pact and in the Mediterranean conflicts of the period was characterized by its role as a secondary figure within that axis and by its policy of adaptation as a neutral country to the crisis of the system of collective security.
Spanish Morocco and the Second Republic: Consistency in Colonial Policy?
Shannon E. Fleming
This article discusses the evolution of the Second Republic's colonial policies in Spanish Morrocco from April 1931 to July 1936. It traces these through the administrations of three high commissioners: Luciano López Ferrer, Juan Moles Ormello and Manuel Rico Avello. It argues that despite the frequency of administrative and personnel changes in the protectorate during this period, the Second Republic's colonial policies remained fairly consistent. These included a commitment to the colonial ethos, the installation of a civil in place of a military administration, the introduction of administrative efficiencies and cost cutting measures, especially the reduction of military personnel and expenditures, the funding of concrete developmental programs and public works, and on going efforts to seal the protectorate off from the political and social issues that prevailed in the Peninsula.
Fascist Italy and Spain, 1922-45
Stanley G. Payne
A long and complex relationship developed between Fascist Italy and Spain. The first phase, from 1923 to 1930, produced friendly relations between two dictators, Mussolini and Primo de Rivera, but no decisive changes. The second phase, from 1930 to 1936, largely coincided with the years of the Second Republic. During this period the relationship was adversarial, but Mussolini was unable to intervene or significantly influence Spanish affairs. Which had a comparatively low priority for Italian diplomacy. The third phase was that of the Spanish Civil War, from 1939 to 1939, in which Mussolini intervened, providing more support to the Spanish Nationalists both absolutely and proportionately than did Hitler. During the forth phase, involving the main years of World War II, from 1939 to 1943, relations remained both close and very friendly and yet dwindled in importance compared with those between Spain and Nazi Germany. After the fall of Fascism, similarly close relations were not reestablished with the Italian Socialist Republic, the Spanish regime then initiated its own slow process of 'defascization'.
Fascism and Empire: Fascist Italy against Republican Spain
Ismael Saz
From 1931 onward, Fascist Italy tried to influence Spanish politics through a combination of formal diplomatic action and clandestine support for monarchist conspirators. Spain did not, however, become an axis of Italy's foreign affairs until the outbreak of the Civil War in 1936. Supporting Franco was a way of helping to destroy international communism and the democratic challenge and also served Mussolini's claims to Italian hegemony in the Mediterranean. From the point of view of domestic politics, helping fascism in Spain would help to maintain the mobilization of the Italian people. In Italy's participation in the Spanish Civil War imperial fascism, defined as foreign aggression, ideological imperialism, and domestic revolution, found its best expression.
The International Policy of the Second Republic during the Spanish Civil War
Ricardo Miralles
The Spanish Civil War, lasting from 1936 to 1939, awakened passions in its time as have few other conflicts. Concerned that events in Spain might drag France and Britain into an international war, successive French and British governments used what was known as 'non intervention' to try isolate their countries from the hostilities. The policy of non-intervention in Spanish affairs proved detrimental to the Republican regime. This article analyses the diplomatic moves made by the Spanish government to counteract its effect.
The Spanish Civil War and the Mediterranean
Michael Alpert
The Spanish Civil War occurred at a time when the British navy considered itself insufficiently strong to fight Italy in the Mediterranean at the same time as defending Britain's widespread empire. Italy was heavily rearming and resented Britain's refusal to consider Italian rights in the Mediterranean or to give total recognition to its conquest of Abyssinia. The Spanish Civil War gave Italy the chance to support a right wing regime which would comply with the Italian interests in the Mediterranean, to challenge the security of British and French sea routes, and to inflict damage on British power and prestige. Though Britain in the end did not permit the Italian navy to dominate the entire Mediterranean, it could not prevent the risk of such dominance in the Western part of the sea.
The Spanish Republican navy in the Mediterranean was unable to challenge the insurgents or to blockade their ports. The sea route carrying war materials and food to Republican Spain became increasingly hazardous. The navy of the USSR, the Republic's only friend had no presence in the Mediterranean. By 1938, insurgent warships strategically based at Palma (Majorca) and German and Italian aircraft were effectively blocking the Spanish Republic and would be an important factor in its defeat.
Franco's Bid for Empire:
Spain, Germany, and the Western Mediterranean in World War II
Norman J.W . Goda
Using German and Spanish records, this article argues that Spanish foreign policy during World War II must be understood within the context of Madrid's aims in the western Mediterranean, particularly in French Morrocco. Unwilling to enter the European war when it erupted in 1939, the Franco government changed its policy with the impending French defeat in June 1940. Franco's first attempts to gain French colonial territory were made without consulting the Germans or Italians. Only after attempts to negotiate with the new Vichy regime had failed did Madrid offer to enter the war on the Axis side. Confluent aims by in Northwest Africa, however, combined with the need not to support the temporary sanctity of the French Empire would keep Spain out of the war.
In Pursuit of Votes and Economic Treaties:
Francoist Spain and the Arab World, 1945-56
Raanan Rein
During the second half of the 1940's the Franco regime found itself isolated in the international arena and confronting severe economic distress. As a strategy for ending the diplomatic boycott imposed on it by the United Nations and expanding foreign trade, Spain began to cultivate close relations with the Arab world. This article examines Francoist Spain's systematic campaign to woo the Arab countries, in the course of which even the regime's failure to establish diplomatic relations with the Jewish State founded in 1948 became a vehicle for improving its ties with the Arabs. On balance, this campaign appears to have been successful with respect to the mustering of Arab support for Spain's admission to various international organizations. Franco was only partially successful, however, in his efforts to foster economic cooperation with theses Muslim countries. Finally, all his hopes that hostility towards Israel and political and economic relations with the Arab countries would allow him to maintain Spain's control over northern Morocco proved illusory. He did manage to achieve a temporary respite from Arab nationalists' criticizm concerning Spain's holdings in North Africa, but when the French decided to grant independence to their protectorate in Morocco he had no choice but to follow their example.
Spain's Input in Shaping the EU's Mediterranean Policies, 1986-1996
Alfred Tovias
The European Union's policies towards Mediterranean non member countries in the past decade have rapidly evolved from being based on unilateral trade preferences in favour of these countries to focusing on financial aid, reciprocity, and non economic items (political dialogue, cultural cooperation and so on). Spain is the UE member, which has contributed most to this evolution, and it has much to gain from it. However, other policies, such as the creation of a border free Europe call for actions which affect Spain's relations with those countries that it does not accept willingly, such as functioning as gatekeeper of the EU's southern borders.
Spanish Foreign and Security Policy in the Mediterranean
Antonio Marquina
The Mediterranean has long been a priority of Spanish foreign policy. Since achieving membership in the European Community Spain has tried to attract its attention to the Mediterranean and in particular to the importance of stability in the Maghreb. Over time, closer collaboration of Spain, France and Italy on the western Mediterranean has been established. With the end of the cold war Spain and Italy launched an initiative for a conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean without success, and a 4 +5 (later 5 + 5) initiative was frozen in 1993. At this point Spain, in collaboration with France and Italy, drew the attention of the EC to the Maghreb, and negotiations of free trade agreements were undertaken in Morocco and Tunisia. This initiative culminated in the Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Barcelona in November 1995. At the same time, Spain supported dialogue and confidence building between the Western European Union and the Meghreb states and made an effort to interest NATO in the South. Since 1996 the new Popular Party government has focused on NATO dialogue with the Mediterranean but maintained the priority of developing the content of the Barcelona declaration and keeping the Middle East peace process alive. From a bilateral point of view, Spain is still centered on the western Mediterranean, although it is increasingly opening itself to the east.
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