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Zvika Neeman |
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- Office Address:
The
- Office: 231 Berglas
- Phone: 972-3-6409488
- Fax: 972-3-6409908
- E-mail: zvika@post.tau.ac.il
Vita
- Click vita.pdf to download a pdf version.
Working Papers
- “Renegotiation-Proof Mechanism Design” with Gregory Pavlov
- “Are Working Women Good for Marriage?” with Andy Newman and Claudia Olivetti
- “Markets Versus Negotiations: The Predominance of Centralized Markets,” with Nir Vulkan
- “Conspicuous Consumption, Human Capital, and Poverty,” with Omer Moav.
Published Papers (in reverse chronological order)
- “The Quality of Information and Incentives for Effort,” with Omer Moav, Journal of Industrial Economics, to appear.
- “A Political Economy Model of Corporate Governance,” with Lucian Bebchuk, Review of Financial Studies, to appear.
- “Corruption and Openness,” with Daniele Paserman and Avi Simhon, B.E. Journal in Economic Analysis & Policy 8 (2008), Vol 8: Iss. 1 (Contributions) Article 50.
- “Mechanism Design,” International
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 2nd edition, (2008) edited by William
A. Darity, Jr.
- “Civil Justice Reform: A Mechanism Design Framework,” with Alon Klement, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, to appear.
- “The Robustness of Scoring Rules Against Inefficient Manipulation,” with Eyal Baharad, Social Choice & Welfare 29 (2007), 55-67.
- “Vote-Trading as an Instrument of Corporate Governance,” with Gerhard Orosel, International Review of Law and Economics 26 (2006),536-556.
- “On the (Im)possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design,” with Aviad Heifetz, Econometrica 74 (2006), 213-233.
- “Markets Versus Negotiations: an Experimental Analysis," with Tamar Kugler and Nir Vulkan, Games and Economic Behavior 56 (2006), 121-134.
- “Against Compromise: A Mechanism Design Approach,” with Alon Klement, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 21 (2005), 285-314.
- “The Relevance of Private Information in Mechanism Design,” Journal of Economic Theory 117 (2004), 55-77.
- “Incentive Structures for Class Action Lawyers,” with Alon Klement, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 20 (2004), 102-124.
- “Contestable Licensing,” with Gerhard Orosel, Contributions to Economic Analysis & Policy 3 (2004), Vol. 3: No. 1, Article 1, http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/contributions/vol3/iss1/art1.
- “The Effectiveness of English Auctions,” Games and Economic Behavior 43 (2003), 214-238.
- “Optimal Siting of Waste Treatment Facilities,” with Deborah Minehart, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 43 (2002), 303-324.
- “Asymptotic Strategyproofness of Majority and Borda rules,” with Eyal Baharad, Review of Economic Design 7 (2002), 331-340.
- “Credits, Crises, and Capital Controls: A Microeconomic Analysis,” with Gerhard Orosel, Contributions to Economic Analysis & Policy 1 (2002), Vol. 1: No. 1, Article 6, http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/contributions/vol1/iss1/art6.
- “A Theory of Post-Civil War Democratization,” with Leonard Wantchekon, Journal of Theoretical Politics 14 (2002), 439-464.
- “The Scope of Voluntary Bargaining Under Asymmetric Information,” with Ehud Lehrer, Review of Economic Studies 67 (2000), 309-326.
- “Strategic Ambiguity in Electoral Competition,” with Enriqueta Aragones, Journal of Theoretical Politics 12 (2000), 183-204.
- “Property Rights and Efficiency of Voluntary Bargaining Under Asymmetric Information,” Review of Economic Studies 66 (1999), 679-691.
- “The Freedom to Contract and the Free Rider Problem,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 15 (1999), 685-703.
- “Herding and the winner's curse in markets with sequential bids,” with Gerhard Orosel, Journal of Economic Theory 85 (1999), 91-121.
- “Termination and Coordination in Partnerships,” with Deborah Minehart, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 8 (1999), 191-221.
- “Common Beliefs and the Existence of Speculative Trade,” Games and Economic Behavior 16 (1996), 77-96.
- “Approximating Agreeing to Disagree Results with Common p-Beliefs,” Games and Economic Behavior 12 (1996), 162-164.
- “On Determining the Importance of Attributes with a Stopping Problem,” Mathematical Social Sciences 29 (1995), 195-212.
Last Updated May 3rd, 2009. Please send comments to: zvika@post.tau.ac.il