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Quantum Cryptography Based on Orthogonal States

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All existing quantum cryptosystems use nonorthogonal states as the carriers of information. Nonorthogonal states cannot be cloned (duplicated) by an eavesdropper. As a result, any eavesdropping attempt must introduce errors in the transmission, and, therefore, can be detected by the legal users of the communication channel. Orthogonal states are not used in quantum cryptography, since they can be faithfully cloned without altering the transmitted data. We present a cryptographic scheme based on orthogonal states, which also assures the detection of any eavesdropper.

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A basic task in cryptography is exchanging a secret message between two users, traditionally called Alice and Bob, in a way that no other party can read it. The only known method to do this in a proven secure way is to use a “one-time pad,” which uses a previously shared secret information called a key. The key, a sequence of random bits, is used for encrypting the message. The encrypted message is completely confidential, even if transmitted via a public communication channel. Thus the security of any key-based cryptographic method depends ultimately on the secrecy of the key. All existing classical key-distribution cryptosystems are not proven to be secure; their secrecy is based on computational complexity assumptions which sometimes turn out to be false. In particular, some existing cryptosystems can be broken (in principle) due to new developments in quantum computation [1]. On the other hand, the secrecy of quantum cryptosystems is guaranteed by the fundamental laws of quantum mechanics. Any intervention of an eavesdropper, Eve, must leave some trace which can be detected by the legal users of the communication channel.

In the recent years many quantum cryptosystems have been suggested. All of these schemes use nonorthogonal states to encode the information. The first key-distribution scheme was presented by Bennett-Brassard [2] in 1984 (a variation of it has already been tested experimentally [3]). In this scheme Alice transmits single photons polarized along one of four possible directions,

\uparrow , \leftrightarrow , \nearrow , or \searrow . The first two are orthogonal in one basis and the other two are orthogonal in another basis. The encoding is as follows: Alice chooses, at random, one of the four states and sends it to Bob. It is agreed that the states \leftrightarrow and \searrow stand for bit value 0, and the states \uparrow and \nearrow stand for bit value 1. Bob chooses, also at random, a basis, \oplus or \otimes , and measures the polarization in that basis. If Alice and Bob choose the same basis, their results should be identical. If they choose different bases, their results are not correlated. By discussion over an insecure classical channel (which cannot be modified by an eavesdropper), Alice and Bob agree to discard all the cases where different bases were used (about half of the bits). The result should be two perfectly correlated strings, unless the transmission was disturbed. Any eavesdropping attempt must introduce errors in the transmission, since Eve does not know the polarization of each photon. Whenever Alice and Bob measure in one basis and Eve in the other basis, the correlation of the strings is destroyed.

The encoding in quantum cryptography was based on nonorthogonal states, since they cannot be cloned (duplicated) by an eavesdropper. Even an imperfect cloning attempt (intended to gain partial information) induces errors in the transmission, therefore, it is detectable. In general, any two nonorthogonal states can be used for quantum cryptography, as shown by Bennett [4]. On the other hand, orthogonal states can be faithfully cloned, so that Eve can copy the data without being noticed. For these

reasons it is generally believed that the use of nonorthogonal states is crucial in quantum cryptography. In this Letter we present a new quantum cryptosystem, in which data exchange between Alice and Bob is done using two orthogonal states, and yet, any eavesdropping attempt is detectable.

The security of our scheme is based on two novel ingredients. First, the orthogonal states sent by Alice are superpositions of two localized wave packets. The wave packets are not sent simultaneously towards Bob, but one of them is delayed for a fixed time and sent after the other. Second, the transmission time of each particle is random (and therefore unknown to Eve). The tests performed by the users at the end of the communication allow the detection of an eavesdropper.

Let $|a\rangle$ and $|b\rangle$ be two localized wave packets, which are sent from Alice to Bob along two separated channels. We shall take two orthogonal states $|\Psi_0\rangle$ and $|\Psi_1\rangle$, linear combinations of $|a\rangle$ and $|b\rangle$, to represent bit value "0" and bit value "1," respectively:

$$|\Psi_0\rangle = 1/\sqrt{2} (|a\rangle + |b\rangle), \quad (1)$$

$$|\Psi_1\rangle = 1/\sqrt{2} (|a\rangle - |b\rangle). \quad (2)$$

Alice sends to Bob either $|\Psi_0\rangle$ or $|\Psi_1\rangle$. The two localized wave packets, $|a\rangle$ and $|b\rangle$, are not sent together, but wave packet $|b\rangle$ is delayed for some time τ . For simplicity, we choose τ to be larger than the traveling time of the particles from Alice to Bob, θ . Thus $|b\rangle$ starts traveling towards Bob only when $|a\rangle$ already has reached Bob, such that the two wave packets are never found together in the transmission channels.

In order to explain the idea behind the protocol, we shall consider a particular implementation of our scheme (the discussion assumes a noise-free transmission). The setup (Fig. 1) consists of a Mach-Zehnder interferometer with two storage rings, SR_1 and SR_2 , of equal time delays. Alice can transmit a bit by sending a single particle either from the source S_0 (sending 0) or from the source S_1 (sending 1). The sending time t_s is random, and it

is registered by Alice for later use. The particle passes through the first beam splitter BS_1 and evolves into a superposition of two localized wave packets: $|a\rangle$, moving in the upper channel and $|b\rangle$, moving in the bottom channel. The particle coming from S_0 evolves into $|\Psi_0\rangle$ and the particle coming from S_1 evolves into $|\Psi_1\rangle$. The wave packet $|b\rangle$ is delayed in the storage ring SR_1 , while $|a\rangle$ is moving in the upper channel. When $|a\rangle$ arrives at the storage ring SR_2 at Bob's site, wave packet $|b\rangle$ starts moving on the bottom channel towards Bob. During the flight time of $|b\rangle$, wave packet $|a\rangle$ is delayed in SR_2 . Finally, the two wave packets arrive simultaneously to the second beam splitter BS_2 and interfere. A particle started in state $|\Psi_0\rangle$ emerges at the detector D_0 , and a particle started in state $|\Psi_1\rangle$ emerges at the detector D_1 . Bob, detecting the arriving particle, receives the bit sent by Alice: D_0 activated means 0 and D_1 activated means 1. In addition, he registers the receiving time of the particle t_r .

Alice and Bob perform two tests (using a classical channel) in order to detect possible eavesdropping. First, they compare the sending time t_s with the receiving time t_r for each particle. Since the traveling time is θ and the delay time is τ , we must have $t_r = t_s + \tau + \theta$. Second, they look for changes in the data by comparing a portion of the transmitted bits with the same portion of the received bits (this is the simplest test for detecting data errors; for more sophisticated techniques see [3]). If, for any checked bit, the timing is not respected or anticorrelated bits are found, the users learn about the intervention of Eve.

We will show that Eve, who has access to the channels but not to the sites of Alice and Bob, cannot extract any information without introducing detectable distortions in the transmission. The data are encoded in the relative phase between the two wave packets $|a\rangle$ and $|b\rangle$. Therefore the phase must be the same at t_s and at t_r . In addition, the two wave packets must arrive together at BS_2 at the correct time, otherwise a timing problem occurs.




FIG. 1. Cryptographic scheme based on a Mach-Zehnder interferometer. The device consists of two particle sources S_0 and S_1 , a beam splitter BS_1 , two mirrors, two storage rings SR_1 and SR_2 , a beam splitter BS_2 , and two detectors D_0 and D_1 . The device is tuned in such a way that, if no eavesdropper is present, a particle emitted by S_0 (S_1) is finally detected by D_0 (D_1).

Any operation performed by Eve must obey these two requirements, or she will be exposed by the legal users.

Let us consider two times, t_1 and t_2 . At t_1 the particle just left BS_1 , so it is solely at Alice's site. At t_2 the particle is just before passing through BS_2 at Bob's site. If the particle is emitted from S_0 , then at t_1 its state is $|\Psi_0(t_1)\rangle = 1/\sqrt{2} [|a(t_1)\rangle + |b(t_1)\rangle]$. If the particle is emitted from S_1 , then at t_1 its state is $|\Psi_1(t_1)\rangle = 1/\sqrt{2} [|a(t_1)\rangle - |b(t_1)\rangle]$. In the case that nothing disturbs the transmission (i.e., Eve is not present), the free time evolution is

$$|\Psi_0(t_1)\rangle \longrightarrow |\Psi_0(t_2)\rangle = 1/\sqrt{2} [|a(t_2)\rangle + |b(t_2)\rangle], \quad (3)$$

$$|\Psi_1(t_1)\rangle \longrightarrow |\Psi_1(t_2)\rangle = 1/\sqrt{2} [|a(t_2)\rangle - |b(t_2)\rangle]. \quad (4)$$

When Eve is present and she is trying to extract some information without being detected, the time evolution must be such that $|\Psi_0(t_1)\rangle$ evolves to $|\Psi_0(t_2)\rangle$ and $|\Psi_1(t_1)\rangle$ evolves to $|\Psi_1(t_2)\rangle$ (if not, Bob will have a nonzero probability to receive inverted bits or to receive particles at incorrect times). Thus the general form of the evolution from time t_1 to time t_2 must be

$$|\Psi_0(t_1)\rangle |\Phi(t_1)\rangle \longrightarrow |\Psi_0(t_2)\rangle |\Phi_0(t_2)\rangle, \quad (5)$$

$$|\Psi_1(t_1)\rangle |\Phi(t_1)\rangle \longrightarrow |\Psi_1(t_2)\rangle |\Phi_1(t_2)\rangle, \quad (6)$$

where $|\Phi(t)\rangle$ is the state of some auxiliary system used by Eve for extracting information. If $|\Phi_0(t_2)\rangle = |\Phi_1(t_2)\rangle$, no extraction of information is possible.

In protocols which use nonorthogonal quantum states for encryption, the time evolution under eavesdropping must have the same form as Eqs. (5) and (6). The security of these protocols, i.e., $|\Phi_0(t_2)\rangle = |\Phi_1(t_2)\rangle$, can be proven using the unitarity of quantum theory. When Eve is not present, from the free evolution [Eqs. (3) and (4)] we get $\langle \Psi_1(t_1) | \Psi_0(t_1) \rangle = \langle \Psi_1(t_2) | \Psi_0(t_2) \rangle$. When Eve is present, from Eqs. (5) and (6) we get $\langle \Psi_1(t_1) | \Psi_0(t_1) \rangle = \langle \Psi_1(t_2) | \Psi_0(t_2) \rangle \langle \Phi_1(t_2) | \Phi_0(t_2) \rangle$. Combining these two results we find $|\Phi_0(t_2)\rangle = |\Phi_1(t_2)\rangle$. With orthogonal states, however, this proof fails, since $\langle \Psi_1(t_1) | \Psi_0(t_1) \rangle = 0$. For this reason one might believe that quantum cryptography cannot rely on orthogonal states.

We shall prove now that our protocol is secure [5]. Using the linearity of quantum theory, we consider the evolution of a particular superposition of $|\Psi_0(t_1)\rangle$ and $|\Psi_1(t_1)\rangle$. Consider at time t_1 a particle in the state $|b(t_1)\rangle = 1/\sqrt{2} [|\Psi_0(t_1)\rangle - |\Psi_1(t_1)\rangle]$. The time evolution of $|b(t_1)\rangle |\Phi(t_1)\rangle$ is obtained from Eqs. (5) and (6) [using also Eqs. (3) and (4)]:

$$|b(t_1)\rangle |\Phi(t_1)\rangle \longrightarrow 1/2 \{ |a(t_2)\rangle [|\Phi_0(t_2)\rangle - |\Phi_1(t_2)\rangle] + |b(t_2)\rangle [|\Phi_0(t_2)\rangle + |\Phi_1(t_2)\rangle] \}. \quad (7)$$

The last equation shows that, unless $|\Phi_0(t_2)\rangle = |\Phi_1(t_2)\rangle$, there is a nonzero probability to find the particle in the final state $|a(t_2)\rangle$. This, however, is impossible. A

particle in the state $|a(t_2)\rangle$ is a particle which just emerged from the storage ring SR_2 (there is no other possibility). Since the delay time is τ , at an earlier time than $t \equiv t_2 - \tau$ the particle had to enter into Bob's site. At that time, a particle which started in the state $|b(t_1)\rangle$, as in Eq. (7), is still captured in SR_1 at Alice's site. Such a particle enters in the bottom channel after time t , and then it is too late for Eve to send a dummy particle on the upper channel. She cannot send that particle at the correct time, since she does not know it until the original wave packet arrives. Thus the state $|a(t_2)\rangle$ should not appear in the right-hand side of Eq. (7), and therefore $|\Phi_0(t_2)\rangle = |\Phi_1(t_2)\rangle$. This ends the proof.

We want to emphasize that the sending time cannot be publicly known, otherwise Eve could apply the following strategy: At the (known) arrival time of $|a\rangle$, she sends to Bob wave packet $|a\rangle$ of a dummy particle which she prepared in the state $|\Psi_0\rangle$. She stores wave packet $|a\rangle$ of Alice's particle and $|b\rangle$ of the dummy particle. When wave packet $|b\rangle$ of Alice's particle arrives she measures the original state. Then she sends to Bob wave packet $|b\rangle$ of the dummy particle, correcting its phase if the measurement yielded $|\Psi_1\rangle$. Assuming the time spent by Eve on measurements can be neglected, this procedure does not introduce any additional delay or any change in the state received by Bob, and therefore Eve can extract the complete information without being exposed.

Since $\tau > \theta$, Eve has no access to $|a\rangle$ and to $|b\rangle$ together at any time. This seems to be a necessary requirement for a secure protocol, but it is not. If the communication is based on particles moving at the speed of light, it is enough to demand $\tau > \Delta t$, where Δt is the accuracy of the time measurements of t_s and t_r (assuming very narrow wave packets). The security in this case is proven in the same way: The state $|a(t_2)\rangle$ should not appear in Eq. (7), since Eve gets wave packet $|b\rangle$ too late to send a dummy particle on the upper channel. Moreover, if we arrange a large distance between the two transmission channels (which requires large secure users' sites), we can use our procedure even without time delay. Any attempt by Eve to recombine the wave packets in order to measure the phase introduces an extra flight time which will be detected by the users. However, now the security requires that Eve cannot use faster-than-light particles for eavesdropping. Thus these versions of the protocol exceed the limits of nonrelativistic quantum mechanics; they might be classified as "quantum-relativistic protocols" with orthogonal states.

In the previous discussion we have assumed ideal transmission conditions. In practice, any communication system is restricted by the limited efficiency of its components. The transmission is distorted by the noise of the channel, the losses and dark counts of the detectors, etc. Since errors from different sources are not necessarily distinguishable, Eve may obtain some information

without being detected, as long as the amount of error she introduces does not exceed the noise. Known methods of error correction and privacy amplification techniques can be included in a practical version of our protocol. The problems caused by losses and dark counts are automatically solved, due to the comparison between t_s and t_r .

We shall raise some ideas related to the realization of our protocol in the laboratory. The first essential ingredient, random emission time, can be achieved very naturally using a down-conversion crystal source of pairs of photons. In this way, the sending time of the photon is registered with very high efficiency and precision by the detector of the “idler” photon. The second ingredient, the time delay, can be achieved using an optical fiber loop. Probably, the most difficult part of the proposal is to have a Mach-Zehnder interferometer with a stable phase difference between its two (very long) arms. This problem can be avoided using one arm (an optical fiber) and two orthogonal polarizations as two quantum channels [6]. In this setup, wave packet $|b\rangle$ leaves Alice’s site when it is spatially delayed relative to wave packet $|a\rangle$, and with a different polarization. In Bob’s site, wave packet $|a\rangle$ is delayed and its polarization direction is rotated, such that the two wave packets finally interfere correctly.

Since there are some difficulties in an experiment with two polarization channels, a better way is sending the states with the same polarization, i.e., using a single channel. A modification of the setup in Fig. 1 allows the transmission of the wave packets with the same polarization, but with the price of wasting some of the photons [7]. A mirror and a beam splitter added to Alice’s site (after SR_1) can partially recombine the two channels into a single one. A similar beam splitter and mirror added to Bob’s site (before SR_2) can recover the two channels. As before, the users consider only photons which respect the timing requirement, but now some of the sent photons are lost even if Eve is not present. Half of the photons are lost at Alice’s site, since they do not enter into the channel, and half of those which arrive to Bob’s site are lost, since they are detected at incorrect times. Thus only 25% of the photons are usable, but this is good enough for key distribution. The phase can be preserved more efficiently on a single channel, therefore this method might be practical for long-range transmission. One may be tempted to improve this proposal by introducing a setup which allows Bob to measure correctly all the transmitted photons. This can be done for the price of introducing uncertainty in the correlations between the sending and the receiving time of each photon, but then the method is not appropriate for our purpose (since Eve has time to get the signal and to resend it without being detected).

One might see an advantage in our protocol (with two channels) over some other protocols (for example, [8]) in

the fact that the bits are not random but chosen by Alice, and in the fact that all the bits sent can be used. Having these properties, the protocol is not restricted to key distribution only—it can be used for sending the message directly [9]. Of course, Eve can read the message, but in an error-free channel she will be detected in time if Alice and Bob test the transmission frequently enough. It seems that the direct message transmission is possible not only on an error-free channel [7]. In a practical case (when noise is present), Alice and Bob agree in advance on the tolerable error rate and on the degrees of accuracy and secrecy they want to achieve. In order to transmit a message of some length n , Alice builds a longer string: some extra bits are used for estimating the error rate (hence, the maximal information leaked to Eve) and some for redundancy, which is used—via block coding—to encode the n -bit message. The reliability of the n -bit message is assured by Shannon’s channel coding theorem (see [10]). At the end of the transmission, Alice tells Bob which bits were used for error estimation, and afterwards, the function used for block coding. If Bob, estimating the error rate, detects Eve, he prevents public announcement of the block-coding function by informing Alice. Thus the message is transmitted with an exponentially small probability of errors and exponentially small information leakage.

Let us conclude with a discussion of the title of our work. Strictly speaking, the set of all possible states sent by Alice is not a set of orthogonal states. Two states corresponding to identical bits, sent at two very close times, are not orthogonal. However, if the width of the wave packets $|a\rangle$ and $|b\rangle$ is small enough, then the measure of mutual nonorthogonality is negligible. Moreover, we can replace the random sending times by random discreet sending times, and then, all the possible sent states will be mutually orthogonal. The previous proof assures the security of this procedure too. Note also that in our basic method (with two channels) all the states corresponding to different bits are mutually orthogonal, and this is the relevant feature. Indeed, the issue of mutual orthogonality of just these states is essential for the security proof of protocols using nonorthogonal states.

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