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\begin{document}
\title{Growth Effects of the Exchange-Rate Regime and the Capital-Account
Openness in A Crises-Prone World Market: A Nuanced View\thanks{%
We acknowledge comments from Alex Cukierman, Allan Drazen and Alejandro
Izquierdo, and helpful advice from Ady Pauzner. We are in debt to Gian Maria
Milesi Ferretti for providing us data.}}
\author{Assaf Razin\thanks{%
Mario Henrique Simonsen Professor of Public Economics, Tel-Aviv University
and Friedman Professor of International Economics, Cornell University, CEPR
Research Fellow and NBER Research Associate. \ E-mail address:
razin@post.tau.ac.il.} and Yona Rubinstein\thanks{%
Tel-Aviv University and CEPR. E-mail: yonar@post.tau.ac.il}}
\date{May 20, 2004}
\maketitle
\begin{abstract}
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It has been a remarkably difficult empirical task to identify clear-cut real
effects of exchange-rate regimes on the open economy. Similarly, no
definitive view emerges as to the aggregate effects of capital account
liberalizations. The main hypothesis of the paper is that a direct and an
indirect effect of balance-of-payments policies, geared toward exchange rate
regimes and capital account openness, exert a confounding overall influence
on output growth, in the presence of sudden-stop crises. A direct channel
works through the trade and financial sectors, akin to the optimal currency
area arguments. An indirect channel works through the probability of a
sudden-stop crisis. The empirical analysis disentagles these conflicting
effects and demonstrates that: (i) the balance-of-payments policies
significantly affect the probability of crises, and the crisis probability,
in turn, negatively affects output growth; (ii) controlling for the crisis
probability in the growth equation, the direct effect of balance-of-payments
policies is large. Domestic price crises (high inflation above a 20 percent
threshold) affect growth only indirectly; through their positive effect on
the probability of sudden-stop crises.
\end{abstract}
\section{Introduction}
Every major international economic crisis of the past 15 years (save Brazil
in 2002) has been rooted in rigid exchange rate regimes.\footnote{%
Stanley Fischer (2001) observes that: \textquotedblleft Each of the major
international capital market-related crises since 1994-Mexico, in 1994,
Thailand, Indonesia and Korea in 1997, Russia and Brazil in 1998, and
Argentina and Turkey in 2000-has in some way involved a fixed or pegged
exchange rate regime. At the same time, countries that did not have pegged
rates-among them South Africa, Israel in 1998, Mexico in 1998, and Turkey in
1998-avoided crises of the type that afflicted emerging market countries
with pegged rates.\textquotedblright
\par
Among the ecent papers on the vulnerability of fixed exchange rate regimes
for developing countries, see Calvo (2000), Calvo, Reinhart and Vegh (1995),
Chang and Velasco (2000), Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf (2000), Obstfeld and Rogoff
(1995) and Williamson (2000).} Indeed, there has been a long-standing view
that an emerging economy under a peg, with government budget imbalances,
trade deficits, and the presence of free-market policies that facilitate the
outflow of capital, is likely to become vulnerable to sudden stops of
capital inflows; hence, to balance of payments crises. This is also the
familiar logic of every fundamentals-driven currency crises models in the
literature.
A more nuanced view of growth effects of a peg recognizes that by fixing
their currencies to international moneys (the Dollar or the Euro),
fiscally-disciplined emerging economies, that are rapidly accumulating
exchange reserves through export growth, are able to maintain a high saving
ratio, provide certainty to business, and profit margins to investors, based
on a low and stable country specific rate of interest. Under this
macroeconomic environment, an emerging economy could retain the confidence
of the international investors, and the peg leads to a good economic
performance in the long run: output growth is high, and inflation is low. In
other words, switching from a float to a peg presents the economy with a
trade-off: on the one hand, the risk of a currency crisis is aggravated;
but, on the other hand, if a currency crisis is avoided, the economy may
actually perform better than what it would have been under a float.\footnote{%
Trade-offs concerning the choice of exchange rate regimes are faced by
policy makers when developing countries struggled with bouts of high
inflation. A switch from float to peg typically serves as an anchor of the
stabilization package. Examples are Israel (in 1985), and Argentina in
(1991), underpinned the anti- inflation policy package by an exchange rate
targeting. Argentina adopted a hard peg (a currency board), with a
comprehensive capital market liberalization package, while Israel adopted a
soft peg (crawling peg), with only a phased out process towards capital
market liberalization. As might have been expected, given the world economy
recession after Israel's stabilization and the world economy boom that
followed the Argentine's inflation stabilization, Argentina grew faster than
Israel in the immediate aftermath of the float-peg policy switch. However,
eventually, Argentina underwent a catastrophic currency and liquidity
crisis. As Paul Krugman puts it: \textquotedblleft Argentina, once a
showpiece for the new world order, quickly became a byword for economic
catastrophe\textquotedblright\ (The New York Times, January 6, 2004). In
contrast, Israel has avoided a major crisis. Ten years after the float-peg
policy switch, the accumulated growth in Argentina was negative, while the
trend growth in Israel has been significant. See Fischer and Orsmond (2002).}
It has been conspicuously difficult, however, to identify clear-cut
empirical real effect of exchange-rate regimes on the real side of the open
economy, for two main reasons. The endogeneity of policy tools with respect
to macroeconomic performance, and the confounding effect of policy. Most
studies focus on the first issue, typically by instrumenting the policy
variables, but ignored the later issue. The purpose of this paper is to
tackle both issues, namely, to delineate the \textquotedblleft
good\textquotedblright\ and the \textquotedblleft bad\textquotedblright\
effects, arising from a \ policy switch. Specifically, we introduce the
effect of the policy on the probability of sudden stops of capital inflows,
and incorporates this projected balance-of-payments crisis probability into
the growth equation.
The Asian crisis of 1997-1998 could be viewed as a watershed in the
international economics thinking concerning exchange rate regimes, the
international contagion \ of macroeconomic instability from one country to
another, and the deregulation of international capital flows. One of the
lessons is that, in the presence of weak financial and fiscal institutions,
balance-of-payments crises often follow up capital account liberalizations.
Accordingly, the paper also pursues an analysis of capital-account openness
policies, in parallel to the\ analysis of the policy switch between a peg
and a float. Specifically, we analyze the two possibly conflicting channels
through which a switch from a regime of capital controls to a regime of
capital-account liberalization affect growth, in the presence of
crisis-prone financial market. The de-regulation of international capital
flows, working through cross-country interest parities, constrain domestic
growth by enhancing the probability of financial crises.\footnote{%
Many economists, who, on trade matters, take a complete free-market
position, nevertheless are cautious about complete capital account
liberalization. Kaushik Basu (2003) puts this issue succinctly: ''For one,
the capital market (unlike the market for goods) seldom takes the form in
which an agent can borrow as much as she wishes at the going interest rate.
Moreover, a person demanding capital is, typically, asked by the lender to
explain why she needs the money. The greengrocer, on the other hand, does
not ask you why you want oranges before he agrees to sell you some.''
\par
{}}
We also propose a re-examination of discrete high inflation crises.
Typically, growth falls sharply during discrete high inflation crises. By
introducing a probability of \emph{domestic} (high inflation) crises, along
with the probability of \emph{external} (balance-of-payments) crisis that
depends on the exchange rate system, we are able to further discern the
non-linear effect of the exchange rate system, or capital account openness,
on growth.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In the next section we briefly
survey the relevant literature. In section 3 we describe the data. Section 4
develops the econometric approach. In section 5 we report our findings using
the IMF exchange-rate-regime classification. In section 6, we use the new
Reinhart and Rogoff classification, incorporate domestic price crises into
the empirical analysis and report our findings. The paper concludes in
section 7.
\section{Literature}
Recall that it has been a difficult empirical task to identify clear-cut
real effects of exchange-rate regimes on the open economy. Indeed, Marianne
Baxter and Alan Stockman (1989) and Robert Flood and Andy Rose (1995) find
that there are no significant differences in business cycles across exchange
rate regimes.\footnote{%
An exception is Rose (2000). In the paper, Rose uses evidence from existing
currency unions in the world economy, to estimate the effect of currency
unions on international trade. Rose finds that a currency union (which is an
extreme form of a peg) expands bilateral trade between two average member
countries by a huge proportion (200\%, and more). Rose's analysis was
challenged by Persson (2001). But he also finds significant, albeit a more
modest, effect of currency unions. See also a recent study by Levy-Yeyati
and Sturzenneger (2000), who find real effects of exchange-rate regime in
cross-country data.}
Similarly, no definitive view emerges as to the aggregate effects of capital
account liberalizations. Eichengreen (2001) overviews the literature,
pointing to the lack of the profession's understanding of the policies.
Rodrik (1998) finds no significant statistical association between capital
account openness and growth. A more definite view concerning positives
effects of capital account liberalization on output, which is advanced by
Fischer (1998), is supported by some evidence, provided by Quinn (1997). The
role of preexisting policies, and of trade-account-capital-account
sequencing, in determining the effects of capital control liberalization on
growth and investment, is examined by Arteta, Eichengreen and Wyplosz
(2001), Chinn and Ito (2002), and Tornell, Westermann, and Martinez (2004).%
\footnote{%
See also Ariyoshi \textit{et al} (2000), Bhagwati (1998), Edwards (1999,
2000) and Kaplan and Rodrik (2000). Note that the Chinese Renminbi has been
pegged to the US Dollar throughout the the Asian crisis, and also after the
crisis. At the same time, China went through a gradual process of removing
the constraints on its closed capital account, while maintaining the rigid
fixed exchange rate. Its high growth performance, since 1978, is by now well
established. East Asia is moving currently towards closer cooperation on
trade, bonds markets, currencies, and the management of foreign exchange
reserves, which may eventually lead to a common Asian currency.}
\allowbreak
\subsection{Crisis Probability: A Model}
\bigskip The multiple-equilibrium financial crises theory does not provide a
clear guide as to the role played by self-fulfilling expectations in
financial crises. This is because in the theory the \emph{probability} of a
crisis is loosely related to the fundamentals.\footnote{%
The 1992 EMS currency crisis inspired the second-generation models, as in
Obstfeld (1994). He explained crises as a consequence of a conflict between
fixed exchange rate and the central bank desire to pursue more expansionary
monetary policy, than what is consistent with the exchange rate and capital
market regimes. The resulting pressure, in the foreign exchange market, can
lead to multiple self-fulfilling expectations equilibria. The emerging
market currency crises of 1997-8 inspired the third generation model of
currency crises, generating subtle mechanisms with multiple self-fulfilling
expectations equilibria.} Thus, it leaves as an open question whether
observed fundamentals, such as government deficits, are sufficient to
explain crisis outcomes; or whether there is a large unexplained component,
that is attributed to self-fulfilling expectations. This feature of the
theory runs counter to the intuition that bad fundamentals are more likely
to trigger a currency crisis. Indeed, the more recent financial-crisis
theory demonstrates that, in the presence of asymmetric information, even a
small amount of uncertainty with respect to the fundamentals, transforms the
equilibrium set into a unique fundamentals-driven equilibrium.\footnote{%
See, for example, Goldstein and Pauzner (forthcoming, 2004).
\par
In still another branch of literature on bank runs, (e.g., Peck and Shell
(2003)) there is assumed to be a sun spot driven exogenous trigger of a run.
For low level of the trigger, the optimal deposit contract tolerates runs.
Beyond a critical trigger, the optimal deposit contract is immune to runs.
The way to avoid runs is to tighten the deposit contract in the direction of
strengthening future returns. Therefore, emerging market countries (with bad
financial history), which have a low equilibrium probability of bank runs,
will also adopt policy which favors growth, because bank run- immune deposit
contracts are associated with bank loans' policy that favors pro-growth
investment projects.}
Consider the "third-generation" model that Paul Krugman (2000) proposes to
make sense of the number and nature of the emerging market crises of
1997-98. The most distinct characteristic that captured the violence of the
shock to the real side of the economy in the presence of crisis is,
arguably, the reversal in the current account and the corresponding massive
real depreciation. We describe in this section briefly the role of noisy
signals in the model, using Morris and Shin (2000) approach.
There are N domestic entrepreneurs, who are single mindfully engaged in
wealth accumulation, and N foreign creditors, who supply the credit
necessary for domestic investment. As we will see, a foreign creditor's
incentive to withhold a loan to her domestic entrepreneur counterpart is
highest when all other N-1 foreign creditors do so, and vice versa.
Foreign lenders impose a limit on leverage:
$I_{t}^{a}\leq (1+\lambda )W_{t}$ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \
\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \
\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \
where, I stand for investment in capacity by an individual entrepreneur, and
the leverage is $\lambda $ times \ the entrepreneur's net worth, W. The
latter is given by:
$W_{t}=\alpha y_{t}-p_{t}F_{t-1},$
and y, F and p denote domestic output, produced by a Cobb-Douglas technology
with a capital input income share $\alpha ,$net initial debt indexed to
foreign goods, and the relative price of foreign goods in terms of domestic
goods (the real exchange rate), respectively.
The market clearing condition from which the equilibrium real exchange rate
can be solved is:
$p_{t}=\frac{[1-(1-\alpha )(1-\upsilon )]y_{t}-(1-\upsilon )I_{t}}{\overset{%
\symbol{126}}{X_{t}}},$
where, I=N$I^{a,}Y=Ny,$are aggregate domestic investment and output,
respectively. The coeeficient $\upsilon $ denotes the marginal propensity to
import, and $\overset{\symbol{126}}{X_{t}}$ is the stochastic value of
domestic exports in terms of foreign goods. Observe that Note that I which
is financed, in part, by capital inflows, triggers real appreciation,
through a ''transfer problem'' mechanism. That is, due to differences in the
marginal propensities to spend on domestic and foreign goods, between the
domestic economy and the rest of the world, a transfer of purchasing power
from the rest of the world to the domestic economy results in an excess
demand for the domestic good; hence the real appreciation.
Exports (or, alternatively the ratio of exports to foreign-goods denominated
debt) plays the role of the fundamental which will determine whether there
will be a low-output ( no-credit) equilibrium or a high-output equilibrium.
The offer of credit depends on what the foreign creditor thinks will be the
value of the borrower collateral. \ However, because the debt is denominated
in foreign goods, the value of borrowers' collateral depends, on the real
exchange rate. The real exchange rate in turn depends on aggregate
investment, which is determined by foreign creditors' incentive to lend.
Every foreign creditor has to guess what the rest of the foreign creditors
are going to do. \ A rational-expectations equilibrium of this global game
will be a set of self fulfilling guesses so that the level of domestic
investment implicit in the credit offers must match the actual level of
investment that takes place given those offers.
A foreign creditor will finance domestic investment if
(1+r$_{t})\frac{p_{t}}{p_{t+1}}\geq (1+r\ast ),$
where, r and r* denote the marginal productivity of capital and the foreign
interest rate, respectively.
Each foreign creditor i receives a private signal $\theta _{i}$ regarding $%
\overset{\symbol{126}}{X_{t}};\theta _{i}=$ $\overset{\symbol{126}}{X_{t}}%
+\varepsilon _{ti}.$
The error term $\varepsilon _{ti}$ is independently and uniformly
distributed over [-$\varepsilon ,\varepsilon $]. The signal can be viewed as
private information of the foreign creditor.
The foreign creditor's decision whether to extend credit to the domestic
entrepreneur depends on her signal. The signal provides information not only
about $\overset{\symbol{126}}{X_{t}}$, but also about the actions that the
rest of foreign creditor will take. Under common knowledge about the
fundamental, $\overset{\symbol{126}}{X_{t}},$so that $\theta _{i}=$ $\overset%
{\symbol{126}}{X_{t},}$and $\varepsilon _{ti}=0$, we are back to the Krugman
model. \ There are three possible ranges for the realizations of $\overset{%
\symbol{126}}{X_{t}}$ which corespond to different resolutions to the
coordination game. When realizations of the fundamental , $\overset{\symbol{%
126}}{X_{t}},$ are in the high-exports range, there is a unique equilibrium
where the credit constraint is non binding and domest investment is
reltively high. When the realizations of the fundamental are in the
low-exports range, the unique equilibrium is with zero domestic investment.
When the realizations of the fundamental are in the intermediate-exports
range, there are three equilibria: zero, intermediate and high domestic
investment, due to expectations-coordination failures (for anaytical
details, see the Appendix).
Observe that in the private-knowledge coordination game the equilibrium p$_{t%
\text{ \ }}$ is a decreasing function of $\overset{\symbol{126}}{N}_{t},$
the number of foreign creditors that\ decide to extend credit to domestic
enterpreneurs, and a decreasing function in $\overset{\symbol{126}}{X_{t}}$
, the fundamental. \ Therefore there exists a cut-off signal \ $\theta
_{i}^{\ast }=$ $\overset{\symbol{126}}{X_{t}^{\ast }}+\varepsilon
_{ti}^{\ast }$, so that
$\underset{N\symbol{126}U[0,1]}{E}[(1+r_{t})\frac{p_{(}\overset{\symbol{126}}%
{N}_{t}^{\ast },\overset{\symbol{126}}{X_{t}^{\ast }})}{p_{t+1}}]-(1+r\ast
)=0,$
for the marginal foreign creditor, who is indifferent when faced by the
signal $\theta _{i}^{\ast }=$ $\overset{\symbol{126}}{X_{t}^{\ast }}%
+\varepsilon _{ti}^{\ast },$ between withholding her credit , or extending
it, to the domestic entrepreneur.
One can see that the cumulative distribution function, denoted by G(X),
determines the ex-ante probability of a balance-of-payments crisis. The
probability of balance of payments crisis is then given by
Prob (I$_{t}=0)=$G$(\overset{\symbol{126}}{X_{t}^{\ast }}).$
Thus the higher is the level of the fundamental, $X_{t}$, the lower will be
the ex-ante probability of a balance-of-payments crisis. At the same time
the higher will be the expected value of domestic investment,
$(\overset{\_}{I})(1-G(\overset{\symbol{126}}{X_{t}^{\ast }}))$,
where $\overset{\_}{I}$ is the investment level determined by rate-of-return
considerations, not being bound by the credit constraint.
In the private-knowledge version of the Krugman model, the fundamentals and
the crisis-driven outcomes are indeed \emph{correlated}. Importantly, self
fulfilling beliefs can be summarized by a unique probability of crisis,
which, in turn, is a function of observed fundamentals. Specifically, when
the fundamentals are weak, the probability is large, and vice versa. The
asymmetric -equilibrium setup implies that fundamentals-driven market
expectations determine ultimately the observed performance of the economy.
This yields a compelling interpretation to our econometric approach in this
paper, where the probability of balance-of-payments crisis is at the center
of the analysis.
\bigskip
\section{Data}
Our original data set consists of 106 low-and middle-income countries (48
African countries, 26 Asian countries, 26 countries from Latin America and
the Caribbean, and 5 European countries). A subset of 100 countries, for
which we have complete data, is listed in Table 1. The main source of data
is the World Bank (World Development Indicators and Global Development
Finance). The annual data ranges from 1971 to 1996. The data on 100
countries over the period 1971-1997 is assembled by Gian Maria
Milesi-Ferretti and Assaf Razin (2000).
The IMF standard official classification of exchange rate regimes prior to
1997, as described in the various issues of the IMF's Annual Report on
Exchange Rate Arrangements and Exchange Rate Restrictions, was completely
revamped by the pioneering work of Reinhart and Rogoff (2004).
Capital-account openness data are based on a weighted- average index of
several categories restrictions on capital account transactions, reported in
the IMF \textit{Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange
Restrictions}\textbf{.\footnote{%
These are rule-based, but not quantitative measures. For alternative
measures, see also Edison et al (2004).} }Data on GDP per capita is taken
from Summers and Heston Penn Tables 5.6. Real Exchange Rate, Fiscal Balance
are taken from the World Bank World Tables.
In this paper we take advantage of both the IMF and the Reinhart-Rogoff
classifications of exchange-rate regimes. We start with the IMF
classification, for which we have the complete sample of countries. We then
repeat the analysis, using the Reinhart-Rogoff classification using a
sub-sample of 58 countries.
\subsection{Sudden stop crises and policy switches}
Our objective is to explain empirically the effects of balance-of-payments
policies on output growth, for economies where balance-of-payments crises
are probable. Policy switch and a balance-of-payments crisis state are
indicated by a binary variable.
Sudden stop crises are defines by a sharp depreciation in the real exchange
rate. In doing so we attempt to capture the effects of the crisis on the
real side of the economy.\footnote{%
Typically in the currency crisis literature sudden stops are measured by
free falls in the nominal exchange rate. However, this does not distinguish
between domestic price crises and balance-of-payments crises. In our
indicator, crisis episodes do not include, therefore, countries which suffer
from bouts of high inflation and currency depreciation, but with a
relatively stable real exchange rate, because they do not qualify to be
classified as balanced-of-payments crises. Evidently, the real exchange rate
measure for crisis is strongly correlated with sharp reversals in the
current-account balance. See Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (2000). See also
Calvo, Izquierdo and Majia (2004) on sudden stops and real exchange rate
fluctuations.} Specifically, we think of the channel which emphasizes the
role of the firm's balance sheet in determining its ability to invest; and
the way the firm reacts to large and unexpected real depreciations.\footnote{%
Using a sample of 32 developing countries to analyze the empirical
characteristics of sudden stops in capital flows and their relations to
balance sheet effects , Calvo, Izquierdo, and Mejia (2004) find that real
exchange rate fluctuations coming hand in hand with Sudden Stops are
basically an emerging market phenomenon.} Evidently, unexpected fluctuations
in the real exchange rate, rather than the fluctuations in the nominal
exchange rate, are the ones which are likely to have significant
balance-sheet effects.\footnote{%
See Bacchetta, Aghion and Banerjee (2001), Krugman (2000), Allen, Rosenberg,
Keller, Sester, and Roubini (2002), and Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999).}
Concretely, the balance-of-payments crisis is defined by sharp changes of
the \emph{real exchange rate}, with a 15 percent-per-year threshold.
Table 2 describes the frequency of sudden-stop crises, exchange-rate regime,
and capital-account policy switches. Overall, about 22\% of the observations
are associated with balance-of-payments crises; an average of 1\% to 4\%\ of
the observations indicate a float-to-peg, peg-to-float,
liberalization-to-capital-controls, or capital-controls-to-liberalization
policy switches.
\section{The Econometric Framework}
To evaluate the \emph{cyclical} and the \emph{persistent} growth effects of
the exchange-rate-regime policy switch and a capital-account-openness policy
switch, we address two econometric issues. First, the potentially
confounding effect on growth of the policy switch, working through the two
conflicting channels. Second, the potential endogeneity of policy.
\subsection{The statistical model}
Let $Y_{1,j,t}$ denote the growth rate of country $j$ in time $t$ as
measured in terms of GDP per capita. Let $Y_{2,j,t}^{\ast }$ denote a \emph{%
latent} variable indicating the crisis prone state of the economy. That is,
if $Y_{2,j,t}^{\ast }\geq 0,$ a sudden stop crisis occurs, whereas if $%
Y_{2,j,t}^{\ast }<0$, a sudden stop crisis does not occur. That is:
\begin{equation}
Y_{2,j,t}=\left\{
\begin{tabular}{ll}
$1$ & $if$ $Y_{2,j,t}^{\ast }\geq 0$ \\
$0$ & otherwise%
\end{tabular}%
\ \right. ,
\end{equation}%
where, $Y_{2,j,t}$ is a binary variable, which equals $1$ if sudden stop
crisis occurs in country $j$\ at time $t$, and $0$ otherwise.
Consider two policies: (i) a float-peg policy and (ii) a
liberalization-controls policy. To simplify, assume that a policy is binary.
Denote by $D_{1}$ the float-peg policy and by $D_{2}$ the
liberalization-controls policy:
\begin{equation}
D_{1,j,t}=\left\{
\begin{tabular}{ll}
$1$ & if peg \\
$0$ & if float%
\end{tabular}
\right. ,
\end{equation}
and:
\begin{equation}
D_{2,j,t}=\left\{
\begin{tabular}{ll}
$1$ & if capital controls \\
$0$ & if liberalization%
\end{tabular}
\right. .
\end{equation}
To simplify let us assume that both $Y_{1,j,t}$ and $Y_{2,j,t}^{\ast }$\ can
be expressed as a \emph{linear} function of policy variables $\left(
D_{1,}~D_{2}\right) $, standard controls $\left( X\right) $. The growth
equation is as follows.
\begin{equation}
Y_{1,j,t}=\beta _{1}X_{j,t}+\gamma _{1}D_{1,j,t}+\delta _{1}D_{2,j,t}+\phi
_{1}\hat{Y}_{2,j,t}^{\ast }+\varepsilon _{1,j,t}, \label{growth1}
\end{equation}%
where, $\varepsilon _{1,j,t}$ is a country specific time variant $i.i.d.$\
random shock and $\hat{Y}_{2,j,t}^{\ast }$ is the best predictor by the
market participants of $Y_{2,j,t}^{\ast }$. Similarly the latent variable
equation is a linear function of policy variables $\left(
D_{1,}~D_{2}\right) $ and standard controls $\left( Z\right) $:
\begin{equation}
Y_{2,j,t}^{\ast }=\beta _{2}Z_{j,t}+\gamma _{2}D_{1,j,t}+\delta
_{2}D_{1,j,t}+\phi _{2}Y_{1,j,t}+\varepsilon _{2,j,t}, \label{latent1}
\end{equation}
where, $\varepsilon _{2,j,t}$ is a country specific time variant $i.i.d.$\
random shock. Latent variables are common in econometric analysis. Usually
the adjective\ \emph{latent} means that the variable is by unobserved by the
economterician but it is known to the decision makers. This is not however
the case here. Both the economterican and market participants do not observe
the "true" $Y_{2,j,t}^{\ast }$. Both assume that the right hand side of
Equation $\left( \ref{latent1}\right) $\ determines $Y_{2,j,t}^{\ast }$.
Let $P_{j,t}$ be the conditional probability that country $j$\ will face
currency crisis in period $t,$ that is $P_{j,t}=\Pr (Y_{2,j,t}=1\mid \cdot
). $ Given our assumption,
\begin{equation}
P_{j,t}=\Pr (\beta _{2}Z_{j,t}+\gamma _{2}D_{1,j,t}+\delta
_{2}D_{2,j,t}+\phi _{2}Y_{1,j,t}>-\varepsilon _{2,j,t})
\end{equation}
Assuming that $\varepsilon _{2,j,t}\sim N\left( 0,1\right) $ then:
\begin{equation}
P_{j,t}=\Phi \left( \beta _{2}Z_{j,t}+\gamma _{2}D_{1,j,t}+\delta
_{2}D_{2,j,t}+\phi _{2}Y_{1,j,t}\right) \label{D_1}
\end{equation}
where $\Phi $ is the cdf of the unit normal distribution (above).
Note that we can identify the parameters of the \textquotedblleft
crisis-selection" equation by estimating the Probit equation $\left( \ref%
{D_1}\right) ,$where the projected likelihood is:
\begin{equation}
\hat{P}_{j,t}=\Phi \left( \hat{\beta}Z_{j,t}+\hat{\gamma}_{2}D_{1,j,t}+\hat{%
\delta}_{2}D_{1,j,t}+\hat{\phi}_{2}Y_{1,j,t}\right) \label{phat1}
\end{equation}
Assuming momentarily that policy is exogenous\footnote{%
Typically, policy action is endogenous. Thus obviously we cannot identify
the parameters of interest using the OLS estimators for equations $\left( %
\ref{growth1}\right) $\ and $\left( \ref{D_1}\right) $. Therefore, we use
lag variables to instrument policy variables $D_{1,j,t}$\ and $D_{2,j,t}$.}
we could recover the parameters of interest in the growth equation by
estimating the following equation:
\begin{equation}
Y_{1,j,t}=\beta _{1}X_{j,t}+\gamma _{1}D_{1,j,t}+\delta _{1}D_{2,j,t}+\phi
_{1}\Phi ^{-1}\left( \hat{Y}_{2,j,t}^{\ast }\right) +\varepsilon _{1,j,t},
\label{growth2}
\end{equation}%
Equation $\left( \ref{growth2}\right) $\ provides consistent estimates for
the parameters of interest both for the economterican and the market
participants. It is worth noticing that the term $\Phi ^{-1}\left( \hat{Y}%
_{2,j,t}^{\ast }\right) $ is not a first stage estimate of what is being
used by market participants, but rather the actual variable they use in
their decisions.\footnote{%
This is in contrast with the case when the decision makers \emph{observe}
the \emph{latent} variable but the econometrician \emph{does not}. In this
case, assuming we have the correct model and that both the econometrician as
well as market participants share the same set of data, the variable is not
an econometric proxy for the correct variable, and therefore we do not need
to correct the standard errors in the 2nd stage of the estimation procedure.}
\subsection{The confounding effect of policies}
To illustrate the importance of incorporating crises state into the
empirical analysis assume that the standard growth equation is estimated
using valid instrument for policy variables. Consider the confounding of the
direct and indirect effects of balance-of-payments policies on growth.
The estimated growth effect of $D_{1}$ and $D_{2}$ when the likelihood of a
currency crisis is ignored are:
\begin{equation}
E\left( \hat{\gamma}_{1}^{IV}\right) =\frac{\partial E\left( Y_{1,j,t}\mid
X_{j,t},~D_{1,j,t}^{IV},~D_{1,j,t}^{IV}\right) }{\partial D_{1,j,t}}=\frac{1%
}{1-\phi _{1}\phi _{2}}\left( \gamma _{1}+\phi _{1}\frac{\partial \Phi
^{-1}\left( \hat{P}_{j,t}\right) }{\partial D_{1,j,t}}\right)
\end{equation}
and:
\begin{equation}
E\left( \hat{\delta}_{1}^{IV}\right) =\frac{\partial E\left( Y_{1,j,t}\mid
X_{j,t},~D_{1,j,t}^{IV},~D_{1,j,t}^{IV}\right) }{\partial D_{2,j,t}}=\frac{1%
}{1-\phi _{1}\phi _{2}}\left( \delta _{1}+\phi _{1}\frac{\partial \Phi
^{-1}\left( \hat{P}_{j,t}\right) }{\partial D_{2,j,t}}\right)
\end{equation}
where $D_{1,j,t}^{IV},~D_{1,j,t}^{IV}$ are the instrumented policy variables.
It is common wisdom that the likelihood of currency crisis has a negative
effect on growth:
\begin{equation}
\phi _{1}<0,\phi _{1}\phi _{2}<1
\end{equation}
It is also common to assume that a peg exchange rate increases the
likelihood of a currency crisis (all other things equal), and that capital
controls reduce the probability of such a crisis:
\begin{eqnarray}
\frac{\partial \Phi ^{-1}\left( \hat{P}_{j,t}\right) }{\partial D_{2,j,t}}
&>&0 \\
\frac{\partial \Phi ^{-1}\left( \hat{P}_{j,t}\right) }{\partial D_{2,j,t}}
&<&0 \notag
\end{eqnarray}
Therefore, the IV estimate for the effect of exchange-rate regime on growth
equals to:
\begin{equation}
\left( 1-\phi _{1}\phi _{2}\right) E\left( \hat{\gamma}_{1}^{IV}\right)
=\gamma _{1}+\phi _{1}\frac{\partial E\left( \Phi ^{-1}\right) }{\partial
D_{1,j,t}}<\gamma _{1}>0,
\end{equation}
where the IV estimate for the effect of capital controls on growth is:
\begin{equation}
\left( 1-\phi _{1}\phi _{2}\right) E\left( \hat{\delta}_{1}^{IV}\right)
=\delta _{1}+\phi _{1}\frac{\partial E\left( \Phi ^{-1}\right) }{\partial
D_{2,j,t}}>\delta _{1}<0.
\end{equation}
Note that the $\partial E\left( \Phi ^{-1}\right) /\partial D_{1,j,t}$ and $%
\partial E\left( \Phi ^{-1}\right) /\partial D_{1,j,t}$\ are the the
(sample) average effect of the policy on the probability of facing a crisis.
As long as the shocks are not uniformly distributed, $\frac{\partial E\left(
\Phi ^{-1}\right) }{\partial D_{2,j,t}}>\frac{\partial \left( \Phi
^{-1}\right) }{\partial D_{2,j,t}}$ for countries with strong fundamentals,
and $\frac{\partial E\left( \Phi ^{-1}\right) }{\partial D_{2,j,t}}<\frac{%
\partial \left( \Phi ^{-1}\right) }{\partial D_{2,j,t}}$ for country with
weak fundamentals. Moreover, by ignoring the likelihood of a sudden stops
crisis, in evaluating the effect of peg-float or liberalization-controls
policies on growth, one understates the direct effect of each one of these
policies. Namely, the ceteris paribus positive effect of a peg policy on
growth is biased downwardly to zero and the ceteris paribus negative effect
of capital controls on growth is upwardly biased toward zero.
Why should a policy maker care about the ceteris paribus effect of a policy
rather than the reduced form effect?
Our model makes clear that the overall effect of policy $\left( D_{1}\text{
and }D_{2}\right) ,$ via the crisis-probability channel,\ is intrinsically
\emph{non-linear}. There is a range of values of the determinant variables
in which the effect of policy on the likelihood of a crisis is large, and
another where it is small. Accordingly, the overall effect of the policy on
growth depends on the values of determinants of the the crisis probability.
\section{IMF classification: findings}
We estimate both the cyclical as well as the persistent effects of
exchange-rate and capital-controls regimes on growth, controlling for their
effect on the likelihood of a sudden-stop crisis. We report out findings in
Table 3 and Table 4.
We start with the effects of float-peg and capital-controls-liberalizations
switches. We do so, with, and without country fixed effects. To underscore
the role of policy on growth via its indirect effect on the probability of a
crisis, we estimate each specification twice, including and excluding the
probability of a crisis.
The main findings of Table 3 are: (i) Confounding the direct and indirect
effects, if the crisis probability is absent from the growth equation, we
find negligible effects of policy switches; (ii) Policy switches do affect
the likelihood of a crisis: a switch from float to peg increases the
probability of a crisis by approximately 30 percent; similarly, capital
controls reduce the likelihood of a crisis by the same order of magnitude;
(iii) Controlling for the crisis probability in the growth equation, we find
a substantial positive effect of the switch from a float to a peg and a
substantial negative effect of imposing capital controls, with about the
same order of magnitude.
Turning to the effects in the short and the long run, Table 4 demonstrates
that: (i) While policy switches do affect the crisis probability, policy
levels do not; (ii) Controlling for the crisis probability in the growth
equation, the two policy switches, as well as the two policy levels, affect
growth; (iii) However, conditioning out the country (time) invariant
heterogeneity, policy switches, but not policy levels, affect growth; (iv)
Controlling for country fixed effect, we find that the long run effects of
policies are insignificant. The latter is due to the fact that it is hard to
distinguish between country fixed effects and the permanent effects of
exchange rate regime and capital controls on growth.\newpage
\section{The Reinhart-Rogoff classification and the role of domestic price
crises}
Calvo and Reinhart (2002) have emphasized that many countries that claim to
have floating exchange rates do not allow the exchange rate to float freely,
but rather deploy interest rate and intervention policy to affect its
behavior. From this point they appear to draw two conclusions: first, that
the claim that countries are moving away from adjustable peg exchange rate
systems is incorrect; and second, that countries for good reasons hanker
after fixed exchange rates, which they can best obtain through hard pegs.
This idea prompted an interest in a new classification of exchange rate
regimes. Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) attempt to measure the implications of
the "fear of floating" problem.
The IMF standard official classification of exchange rate regimes prior to
1997, as described in the various issues of the IMF's Annual Report on
Exchange Rate Arrangements and Exchange Rate Restrictions, was thereby
completely revamped by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004). They classify the regimes
in a range from free falling to a hard peg like in the CFA franc zone in
Africa.
In line with Reinhart and Rogoff our findings in the previous section that
exchange-rate policy switches, rather than policy levels, affect growth, may
reflect some miss-classifications.
Domestic price crises have been also the subject of growth research. For the
empirical literature that looks at the relationships between inflation and
growth, Bruno and Easterly (1998) propose a method which is based on
discrete high inflation crises. That is, periods when inflation is above
some threshold, say 40 percent a year. They find that growth falls sharply
during discrete high inflation crises, then recovers quickly after inflation
falls below the threshold. Their approach, however, implies that growth is
negatively affected by inflation only above the threshold. In other words,
inflation affects growth only when a domestic crisis prices in fact occurs.
In contrast, our approach points to the role of the fundamentals as
reflected in the probability of a crisis on growth, even if the crisis
episode is not realized.
One way to model the effect of the fundamentals underlying a domestic price
crisis on growth is by adding the probability of the domestic price crises
as an argument in the growth equation (see equation $\left( \ref{growth1}%
\right) $). Another way is to incorporate these fundamentals directly as an
argument in the sudden stop probability equation $\left( \ref{latent1}%
\right) $.
We preview the estimation of the model with basic statistics about float-peg
switches, external and domestic crises. Table 5a describes the frequency of
currency and price crises in the sub-sample for which we have the
Reinhart-Rogoff classification. Table 5b describes the frequency of
exchange-rate regime switches. Comparing the table 5a and 5b to Table 1, we
see that in the new classification of exchange rate regimes the frequency of
exchange rate policy switches is significantly larger.
In Table 6 we report our estimates for the growth equation using the
Reinhart-Rogoff classification.
We find, like in the IMF classification, that the probability of sudden
stops is a major factors in explaining the variation in the persistent
growth of countries. Classifying into float and peg using the Reinhst-rogoff
classification we find that the policy level, rather than policy switch,
affect significantly growth. Now turn to the effect of domestic nominal
prices on growth. When domestic price crises are excluded as a determinant
of real exchange rate crisis probability, the latter has a significant
negative effect on growth. Similarly, when domestic price crises are
included as a determinant of a sudden stop crisis probability, the latter
has a significant negative effect on growth. But, when both the sudden stop
crisis probability, which includes nominal price crises, and the sudden stop
crisis probability, which excludes nominal price crisis, appear in the
growth equation, only the former has a significant negative effect. This
means that a nominal price crisis affects growth only via its affect on
sudden stop crises.
\section{\textbf{Conclusion}}
Our model makes clear that the overall effect of balance-of-payments policy\
is intrinsically \emph{non-linear}, via the \emph{crisis-probability channel}%
. There is a range of the explanatory variables in which the effect of
policy on the likelihood of a crisis is substantial, whereas there are other
ranges where it is not. The expected ceteris paribus effect of a policy
switch varies with the magnitude of the \emph{crisis-probability}.
Accordingly, exogenous shocks to the underlying economy affect the
desirability of policies such as exchange-rate regime and capital-account
liberalization.
Many developing countries, which have switched from float to peg, did so as
a means of stabilizing inflation.\footnote{%
For an integrated analysis see Calvo and Vegh (1999).} Nonetheless they
experienced different growth rates. For instance, consider the switched from
float to peg in Israel ( 1985) and in Argentina (1991). Israel managed the
probability of sudden stops by gradual liberalization and a more flexible
exchange-rate policy. In contrast, Argentina hankered around a currency
board system and fully liberalized its capital account, both increasing the
probability of sudden stops. This may explain the different growth
performances of these two countries.
Future research can address also the issue of dollarization. Conventional
wisdom suggests that a switch from a float to a peg reinforces
dollarization. Currency crises in dollarized economies are expected to be
triggered by self-fulfilling expectations, and have adverse output effects
through a balance-sheet-crisis mechanism (as in Paul Krugman (2000)).
Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2004) find that dollarization appear to
increase exchange rate pass-through. This mechanism may reinforce the claim
that \textquotedblleft fear of floating\textquotedblright\ is a greater
problem for highly dollarized developing economies.\footnote{%
See \ also Calvo and Reinhart (2000).}
Our approach should not be limited to the study of sudden stops crises,
balance-of-payments policies and growth. In fact, this framework is
potentially useful for the evaluation of policies, when the fundamentals of
a crisis affect the desired outcomes, yet their realizations are not very
frequent. For example, monetary and fiscal policies may often affect the
fundamentals behind banks and stock market crises. Proper evaluation of
these policies should not ignore their effect on the probability of a
crisis, although actual crises are not very frequent.\newpage
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\bibitem{APPENDIX}
There are N domestic entrepreneurs, who save but not consume, and N foreign
creditors, who supply the credit necessary for domestic investment. Workers,
to the tune of L, consume but not save.
\end{thebibliography}
Foreign lenders impose a limit on leverage:
$I_{t}^{a}\leq (1+\lambda )W_{t}$ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \
\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \
\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \
where, I$^{a}$ stands for investment in capacity by an individual
entrepreneur, and the leverage is $\lambda $ times \ the entrepreneur's net
worth, W. The latter is given by:
$W_{t}=\alpha y_{t}-p_{t}F_{t-1},$
where, y, F, and p denote domestic output, produced by a Cobb-Douglas
technology with a capital input income share $\alpha ,$net initial debt
indexed to foreign goods, and the relative price of foreign goods in terms
of domestic goods (the real exchange rate), respectively. Capital fully
depreciates within one period.
The market clearing condition from which the equilibrium real exchange rate
can be solved is:
$p_{t}=\frac{[1-(1-\alpha )(1-\upsilon )]Y_{t}-(1-\upsilon )I_{t}}{\overset{%
\symbol{126}}{X_{t}}},$
where, $Y=Ny,I=NI^{a},$denote aggregate output and investment, respectively.
The coeeficient $\upsilon $ denotes the marginal propensity to import, and $%
\overset{\symbol{126}}{X_{t}}$ is the stochastic value of domestic exports
in terms of foreign goods.
A foreign creditor will finance domestic investment made by its coresponding
enterpreneur if
(1+r$_{t})\frac{p_{t}}{p_{t+1}}\geq (1+r\ast ),$
where, r and r* denote the marginal productivity of capital and the foreign
interest rate, respectively.
Each foreign creditor i receives a private signal $\theta _{i}$ regarding $%
\overset{\symbol{126}}{X_{t}};\theta _{i}=$ $\overset{\symbol{126}}{X_{t}}%
+\varepsilon _{ti}.$
The error term $\varepsilon _{ti}$ is independently and uniformly
distributed over [-$\varepsilon ,\varepsilon $]. The signal can be viewed as
private information of the foreign creditor.
The foreign creditor's decision whether to extend credit to the domestic
entrepreneur depends on the private-knowledge signal. The signal provides
information not only about $\overset{\symbol{126}}{X_{t}}$, but also about
the actions that the rest of foreign creditor will take. Under common
knowledge about the fundamental, $\overset{\symbol{126}}{X_{t}},$so that $%
\theta _{i}=$ $\overset{\symbol{126}}{X_{t},}$and $\varepsilon _{ti}=0$, we
are back to the Krugman model.
Figure 1 illustrates three possible ranges for the realizations of $\overset{%
\symbol{126}}{X_{t}}$ which corespond to different resolutions to the
coordination game.Cutoff levels of X that separate the three regions are: $%
\overset{\_}{X}$ , where the kinked I-scheduleoriginates from the origin of
the coordinates, and \b{X}, where the kinked I-schedule marginally touches
the 45 degree line at point H$.$ If realizations of the fundamental , $%
\overset{\symbol{126}}{X_{t}},$ are in the high-exports range, there is a
unique equilibrium, point H, where the credit constraint is non binding and
domest investment is reltively high. If the realizations of the fundamental
are in the low-export range, the unique equilibrium is at point L, with a
zero level of domestic investment. If the realizations of the fundamental
are in the intermediate-export range, there are three equilibria: L, U, H,
with a zero, intermediate and high domestic level of investment. In this
region we get multiple equilibria due to expectations-coordination failures.
Observe that in the private-knowledge coordination game the equilibrium p$_{t%
\text{ \ }}$ is a decreasing function of $\overset{\symbol{126}}{N}_{t},$
the number of foreign creditors that\ decide to extend credit to domestic
enterpreneurs, and a decreasing function in $\overset{\symbol{126}}{X_{t}}$
, the fundamental. \ Therefore there exists a cut-off signal \ $\theta
_{i}^{\ast }=$ $\overset{\symbol{126}}{X_{t}^{\ast }}+\varepsilon
_{ti}^{\ast }$, so that
$\underset{N\symbol{126}U[0,1]}{E}[(1+r_{t})\frac{p_{(}\overset{\symbol{126}}%
{N}_{t}^{\ast },\overset{\symbol{126}}{X_{t}^{\ast }})}{p_{t+1}}]-(1+r\ast
)=0,$
for the marginal foreign creditor, who is indifferent when faced by the
signal $\theta _{i}^{\ast }=$ $\overset{\symbol{126}}{X_{t}^{\ast }}%
+\varepsilon _{ti}^{\ast },$ between withholding her credit , or extending
it, to the domestic entrepreneur.
One can see that the cumulative distribution function, denoted by G(X),
determines the ex-ante probability of a balance-of-payments crisis. The
probability of balance of payments crisis is then given by
Prob (I$_{t}N=0)=$G$(\overset{\symbol{126}}{X_{t}^{\ast }}).$
Thus the higher is the fundamental, $X_{t}$, the lower will be the ex-ante
probability of a balance-of-payments crisis. At the same time the higher
will be the expected value of domestic investment,
$(\overset{\_}{I})(1-G(\overset{\symbol{126}}{X_{t}^{\ast }}))$,
where $\overset{\_}{I}_{t}$the investment level determined by rate-of-return
considerations, not by the credit constraint.
\end{document}