E.~Anshelevich, A.~Dasgupta, J.~Kleinberg, E.~Tardos, T.~Wexler, and
  T.~Roughgarden. [PART OF LECTURE 4]
 The price of stability for network design with fair cost allocation.
In {\em 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer
  Science}, pages 295--304, 2004.


Elliot Anshelevich, Anirban Dasgupta, Eva Tardos, and Tom Wexler.
 Near-optimal network design with selfish agents.
 In {\em STOC '03: Proceedings of the thirty-fifth annual ACM
  symposium on Theory of computing}, pages 511--520, New York, NY, USA, 2003.
  ACM Press.


Venkatesh Bala and Sanjeev Goyal.
 A non-cooperative theory of network formation.
 {\em Econometrica}, 68(5):1181--1229, 2000.

Jacomo Corbo and David~C. Parkes.
 The price of selfish behavior in bilateral network formation.
 In {\em Proc. 24rd ACM Symp. on Principles of Distributed Computing
  (PODC'05)}, 2005.


J.R. Correa, A.S. Schulz, and N.E.~Stier Moses.
 Selfish routing in capacitated networks.
 {\em Mathematics of Operations Research}, 29(4):961--976, 2004.


A.~Czumaj, P.~Krysta, and B.~Vocking.
 Selfish traffic allocation for server farms.
 In {\em Proceedings of the 34th Symposium on Theory of Computing},
  pages 287--296, 2002.


A.~Czumaj and B.~Vocking. [DONE IN LECTURE 2]
 Tight bounds on worse case equilibria.
 In {\em Proceedings of the Thirteenth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on
  Discrete Algorithms}, pages 413--420, 2002.


Alex Fabrikant, Ankur Luthra, Elitza Maneva, Christos~H. Papadimitriou, and
  Scott Shenker.
 On a network creation game.
 In {\em PODC '03: Proceedings of the twenty-second annual symposium
  on Principles of distributed computing}, pages 347--351. ACM Press, 2003.


D.~Fotakis, S.~Kontogiannis, E.~Koutsoupias, M.~Mavronicolas, and P.~Spirakis.
 The structure and complexity of nash equilibria for a selfish routing
  game.
 In {\em Proceedings of the 29th ICALP}, pages 123--134, 2002.

A.~Gupta, A.~Srinivasan, and E.~Tardos.
 Cost-sharing mechanisms for network design.
 In {\em Proc. 7th International Workshop on Approximation Algorithms
  for Combinatorial Optimization Problems (APPROX)}, pages 139--150, 2004.

K.~Jain and V.~Vazirani.
 Applications of approximation algorithms to cooperative games.
 In {\em Proc. 33rd Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing},
  pages 364--372, 2001.


Ramesh Johari, Shie Mannor, and John~N. Tsitsiklis.
 A contract-based model for directed network formation, 2003.

\bibitem{KP+99} [DONE IN LECTURE 2]
E.~Koutsoupias and C.~H. Papadimitriou.
\newblock Worst-case equilibria.
\newblock In {\em Proceedings of 16th STACS}, pages 404--413, 1999.

M.~Pal and E.~Tardos.
 Strategy proof mechanisms via primal-dual algorithms.
 In {\em Proc. 44th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer
  Science}, pages 584--593, 2003.

T.~Roughgarden and Tardos E. [MOST OF LECTURE 3]
 How bad is selfish routing?
 {\em Journal of the ACM}, 49(2):236--259, 2002.


S. Albers, S. Eilts, E. Even-Dar, Y. Mansour and L. Roditty.
On Nash Equilibria for a Network Creation Game.
Seventeenth ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA), 2006

Nir Andelman, Yishay Mansour
A Sufficient Condition for Truthfulness with Single Parameter Agents
ACM EC 2006