A self versus other point of view in language: redefining femininity and masculinity

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Abstract

Current feminist theories consider femininity and masculinity distinct and inherent properties (Chodorow 1978; Dinnerstein 1976; Gilligan 1982). Likewise, contemporary research into female and male linguistic behavior holds that women's and men's speech practices are "different but equal" (e.g. Tannen 1990). Women are found to be cooperative, employing addressee-oriented speech behavior, and men are found to be dominant, employing speaker-oriented speech behavior (e.g. Maltz and Borker 1982; Cameron 1985; Coates 1986; Tannen 1990; James and Drakich 1993; James and Clarke 1993; West 1995). Findings, however, do not always support this essentialist hypothesis (e.g. James and Drakich 1993; James and Clarke 1993; Uchida 1992; Ariel and Giora 1992a, 1992b).

On the assumption that language usage reflects the speaker's point of view, we define femininity as adopting women's viewpoint and masculinity as adopting men's viewpoint. We propose a notion of Self and of Other points of view in language. We argue that while men can fully adopt a Self, masculine point of view, being the dominant group, women, as a powerless group, may find it difficult to identify with their group's objectives. Traditional women, are, therefore, expected to adopt the point of view of the Other, projecting a masculine point of view: their language is expected to pattern like men's. Feminist awareness, however, may override social constraints and should, therefore, enable feminists to exhibit a genuine femininity, adopting a Self (feminine) point of view. Our findings indeed show that traditional women and men writers' speech behavior is similar. In contrast, the speech behavior of feminists and traditional female writers is different. These findings cannot be accounted for by an essentialist hypothesis, which predicts that differences should cluster around the gender dichotomy.

Introduction

A few years ago, a bus driver in West (Israeli) Jerusalem was attacked by one of the passengers. He managed to save the bus. The investigation later revealed that what was automatically taken to be a terrorist's attack was in fact an act of a mentally disturbed person. The aggressor was an Arab, as was the driver. In an interview, the driver later said that although he was an Arab, he was against terrorism.

What was he implying about Arabs, his own group members? He was voicing a stereotypical view shared by the majority of Jewish Israelis, which automatically associates Arabs with terrorist activity. The Arab driver got positive coverage in the (Jewish) Israeli press. He was portrayed as a hero and as a "good" Arab. How would we describe his social identity? Is he an Arab, or is he a "Jewish" Arab, one that has given up his authentic identity and conformed to the expectations of the dominating group? In our view, this "good" Arab has assumed a false identity, adopting the Jewish point of view regarding Arabs, probably out of little or no choice. Had he been a "proud" Arab, he would not have presented his group as negative and inferior.

What chance do minorities have to form a positive identity of their own? A few options come to mind. Consider the example of the Orthodox Jewish community in the US, who have maintained a separatist ideology and developed a sense of superiority over the non-Jewish community among which they live. Their strategy is guided by the "different but superior" principle. The African-Americans in the US, on the other hand, adopted a different strategy. They aimed at equality: The "Black is beautiful" slogan was guided by the "different but equal" principle, suggesting that black is as beautiful as white. These minorities adopted the divergence strategy, which enabled them to preserve a distinct, positive self-identity (Giles 1984).

Most minorities, however, opt for a convergence strategy. They give up their distinct identity and, like the "good" Arab or Uncle Tom, try to assimilate (Tajfel 1978). The white-looking Black Miss America manifests the tendency of nonwhite groups to internalize the standards of Whites; the Jews who immigrated to Palestine after the second immigration wave (after 1905) manifested a tendency to fully adapt to the dictates of the dominating ideology there: they all became the "new Jew," an antithesis to the European religious Jew. The convergence or assimilation strategy entails that minority members accept what the majority attributes to them and adapt their perception of themselves to it. It may also result in speech accommodation toward the dominant addressee (e.g. Sachdev and Bourhis 1984, 1985, 1987; Simon and Brown 1987; Hinkle and Brown

1990). Similar tendencies were also found for women, who model their speech after men when talking to them. Men, on the other hand, were found to adopt a divergence strategy when talking to women (e.g. Hogg 1985).

Given the definition of a group as a number of people who share similar social status or role, similar values, sentiments, goals, and aspirations (Turner and Giles 1981), we define an authentic social identity (e.g. Spanish, Arab, Black, female) as identifying with the point of view of one's own group, that is, attributing positive values to the objectives, attitudes, social status, etc., of one's group. On this view, we define femininity as adopting a feminine viewpoint, and masculinity as adopting a masculine viewpoint. Given the group relation theories mentioned above, it is interesting to examine which minority strategy women opt for. Do they adopt a convergence strategy, or do they resort to a divergent behavior? In view of feminist and nonfeminist approaches, we expect that nonfeminist women will adapt to the worldview of the male dominating group. We predict that feminists, on the other hand, will diverge from the norms of men, identifying with the objectives of women rather than those of men. We will therefore argue that nonfeminist women are actually "masculine," identifying with males' rather than with females' objectives. Feminist consciousness suggests a feminine identity, which entails the adoption of a genuine feminine point of view.

Methodology

In order to check for a point of view, we examine here various linguistic manifestations of social identity in women's and men's writings (as reflected in Israeli literature). Our goal is to find out to what extent females and males adopt a Self rather than Other point of view, that is, to what extent men's writings reflect a masculine point of view, and women's writings a feminine point of view. To test these hypotheses, we start by proposing the parameters that, in this study, comprise a Self point of view (1–7 below). These parameters constitute a general framework of Self point of view. However, they are made manifest in language use. To measure the extent to which an individual writer adopts a Self as opposed to an Other point of view in language, we propose a set of linguistic tests, which make manifest these parameters and which can attest to a point of view in language use (Tests [1] and [3] below).

Parameters of self point of view

1.   *Focus on the Self rather than on the Other*

Assuming that the members of each group (e.g. women, men) are more interested in their own group members than in outgroup members, we should expect more female characters in women's writings and more male characters in men's writings.[1]

2.   *The Self as a point of reference to the Other*

Ingroup members should be foremost on one's mind. Hence, following Kuno (1976), we assume that when anchoring one character onto another (X is the anchor in *X's friend*, and "friend" is anchored), members of each group should favor their ingroup members as the anchors. Outgroup members should outnumber ingroup members in the role of anchored, dependent characters. Hence, we should expect female writers to have more male than female characters as anchored, and more female than male characters in the role of anchors. The reverse should hold true for the men writers.

3.   *Individuation of the Self*[2]

For the Self, all the Others are alike, while the Self's ingroup members are each distinct (e.g. Secord et al. 1956; Tajfel et al. 1964; Malpass and Kravitz 1969; Chance and Goldstein 1975; Brigham and Barkowitz 1978; Stephen 1985). Individuality can most effectively be achieved via naming (as opposed to the other descriptions, which can potentially refer to more than one character). Of named characters, we expect women writers to name more female than male characters. Men writers are expected to name more males. In addition, we should take into consideration the type of name granted to the character. Last names individuate characters much more effectively than first names, because there are many more last than first names (at least in Western culture; see Weitman 1987). Recall that for the Self, ingroup members constitute a variety of characters, that is, the various representations of the Self are less alike — they are distinct individuals. The Other, by contrast, is unidimensional, reducible to one attribute. Outgroup members are conceived of as homogeneous (Linville and Jones 1980). Thus, ingroup members are expected to be described by those categories of description that have numerous values (e.g.

professions), while outgroup members are expected to be described by less-varied categories (e.g. sex-based descriptions and family descriptions, of which there is only a limited number of values: male/female; mother/daughter/wife; etc.).[3]

4.   *Portraying the Self as independent*

Ingroup members are not expected to be dependent on others, for dependency implies lack of control over one's life in Western culture, at least. Rather, they are expected to be autonomous and self-supportive. Hence, we expect women writers, especially fiction writers (who are not necessarily constrained by reality), to portray more women than men as functional. Men writers should do just the opposite. On the other hand, we expect that family descriptions, which portray an individual as part of a larger whole rather than as a self-sufficient entity, will be assigned to outgroup rather than ingroup members. Hence we expect women writers to portray more men than women in terms of family relations. Men writers are expected to practice just the opposite.

5.   *Objectification of the Other*

For the Self, the Other may be conceived of as a means to the Self's end: an object. Among the sexes we would therefore expect each sex to treat the Other as an object. Specifically, we expect women writers to employ more external descriptions (i.e. those based on outward physical characteristics) for male than for female characters and to use more sex-based definitions for males (e.g. *male*, as opposed to *person*).[4] Men writers are expected to do just the opposite.

6.   *Exerting power on the Other*

Being in power is considered a positive state in our culture.[5] The Self, it should be recalled, is supposed to take a favorable view of her/himself. Hence, between the alternatives of being either in control or under control of others, especially of outgroup members, the Self should prefer the former. This means that the Self should be portrayed as powerful, and as exerting power on Others, for example by trying to affect the Other's behavior, as in commands, or more generally by using what Green (1975) has termed impositive speech acts (i.e. speech acts that impose the

speaker's will on the addressee). Moreover, an actual compliance of the addressee with the speaker's wish testifies to the speaker's power. Hence, we expect Others to comply with the Self more than the other way around. Women writers are then expected to portray more female than male characters as powerful, that is, as attempting to impose their will on male characters. Also, in women's writings, we expect more male than female characters to comply with the will of female characters. Men writers are expected to reverse the pattern.

7.   *Cooperating with the Self*

Cooperation involves acting in the best interest of another person. Since the Self is supposed to identify with ingroup members, we expect the Self to cooperate with ingroup rather than with outgroup members (Tajfel 1978; Doise 1976; Dion 1979; Wyer and Gordon 1984). In this study we consider as cooperative those speech acts that are addressee-oriented, (e.g. offer, advice). Cooperation with the Self also predicts that one should preferably obey ingroup rather than outgroup members' impositive speech acts. Women writers are therefore expected to portray female characters who cooperate with or obey female rather than male characters. Men writers are expected to practice the opposite.

The linguistic tests

The linguistic tests used here to measure Self as opposed to Other points of view are of two types: introductory patterns and impositive speech acts. The tests were applied to texts of different genres and periods.[6] Note that the tests do not stand in a one-to-one relation to the parameters above. Rather, one test may derive from more than one parameter (e.g. anchoring descriptions, [1g] below, attest to both independence, 4 above, and focus on the Self, 1 above), and one parameter may be checked by more than one test (e.g. individuation, 3 above, by naming, [1h] below, or by family, [1k] below, as opposed to functional descriptions, [1b] below).

Introductory patterns

When writing, as when speaking, a speaker must introduce her characters to her reader. Normally, especially if the character is not familiar to the

reader, the writer should include a few identifying descriptions, so that the reader is supplied with some background against which to evaluate oncoming information. Introductory information was selected for this study since such information is crucial in forming an impression of characters. It has been shown that the effect of initial information on impression formation is almost irreversible (Asch 1946; Luchins 1957; Perry 1979). This first impression serves as a tool for predicting and limiting the reader's interpretation of oncoming events and scenarios.

Ariel (1988) found that although writers are ostensibly free to choose any description for introducing characters, in fact they select out of a very limited variety of categories — the stereotypes. For the purpose of this research, the first three descriptions that appeared within the first five sentences of the first mention of the character were analyzed (as illustrated in [2] below). In (1) we list those relevant tests of introductory patterns, which attest to a point of view (the relevant point-of-view parameter indicated in parentheses):

(1)   Tests of introductory patterns
    a.   The number of characters (parameter 1).
    b.   A functional description (parameter 4).
    c.   A family description (parameters 3,4).
    d.   An external description (parameter 5).
    e.   A sex-based definition (parameters 3,5).
    f.   An anchored description (parameters 2,4).
    g.   An anchoring description (parameters 2,4).
    h.   A name (any name) (parameter 3).
    i.   A first name (parameter 3).

The examples in (2) below illustrate the above tests:

(2)   a.   His [anchoring] sister [family+anchored] Bilha [first name], who works with him, an architect [functional] too, a woman [sex-based] divorced three times [family] (Hareven 1982: 14).
    b.   An ugly and noisy [external] woman [sex-based] (Oz 1965: 45).
    c.   A woman [sex-based] to receive customers [functional]. An assistant [functional] (Cahana-Carmon 1966: 115).

Impositive speech acts: power and cooperation

Impositive speech acts encode power and cooperation (e.g. threaten, command, demand, request, warn, reprimand, suggest, advise, instruct, indirectly command, indirectly request, indirectly suggest, mutually command, order, soothe, mutually suggest, mutually advise, invite, offer, ask

for permission, remind, beg). A command indicates a relatively powerful speaker. Begging indicates that the speaker is relatively powerless. Giving advice or offering something to the addressee shows some concern for him and are thus indicators of the speaker's cooperation with the addressee. Note that power and cooperation are not necessarily in contrast with each other. Begging implies a powerless speaker, but not a cooperative one, while suggesting, which implies a more powerful speaker, is a cooperative speech act. All the impositive speech acts in seven movie scripts were examined for manifestations of a Self point of view in speakers' attempts to impose their will on others.[7] The total length of the four scripts written by women equalled that of the three written by men. In (3) we list the relevant tests of impositive speech acts:

(3) Tests of impositives
  a. Power relations between the speaker and the addressee.
      The speaker may be superior, equal, or inferior in status to the addressee.
  b. Amount of talk.
      Who holds the floor and issues more impositive speech acts?
  c. Power of speech act.
      The speech-act power is a function of linguistic components measured against the context, with the understanding that the very same act can be perceived as less or more powerful, depending on the context. The linguistic components include (i) strength of illocutionary force (e.g. command versus suggest), (ii) the presence of mitigators (e.g. *please*) or intensifiers (e.g. *come on*), which either weaken or strengthen the speech-act power, (iii) repetition and/or (iv) justification of the speech act, which imply lack of compliance and hence speaker's powerlessness.

Partly following suggestions made by Brown and Levinson (1987), we take the relevant contextual aspects to include (i) the speaker's relative status vis-à-vis the addressee (the power of the speech act depends on whether it is uttered by a superior to an inferior or vice versa), (ii) the relative intimacy/distance between them (a command issued to an intimate is less powerful than when the recipient is a stranger), (iii) the extent to which it is necessary to perform the act (extinguishing a fire, as opposed to closing the door), and (iv) the degree of imposition required in order to comply with the impositive speech act (e.g. bringing some water in the desert as opposed to bringing it from the kitchen).

(3) d. Rate of compliance by the addressee.
      Who obeys whom by actually performing the act requested?

  e. Rate of cooperation with addressee.
      Who issues to whom more cooperative speech acts?

The translated examples in (4) below illustrate how we analyzed impositive speech acts:

(4) a. Rosy to Eli: Enough already [command], ass hole [intensifier] (Gabison and Aroch 1989: 27).
  b. Frieda to Simcha: You know what? Go lie down [suggestion]. We'll continue some other time [justification] (Zvi-Riklis 1984: 73).
  c. Tmira to Elit: Tell her again that I'm sorry ... [request] Elit, tell her I'm sorry [request + repetition] (Yaron-Grunich 1987: 26).

Most of the evidence adduced to establish the notion of Self point of view comes from previous empirical works. For the data on introductory patterns we use Ariel (1986), whose sources are short stories by Israeli women and men writers, both modern (1965–1982) and early, prestate (1928–1940).[8] For data on introductory patterns in feminist writings, we use a contemporary feminist magazine, *Noga* (1992), edited and written by feminist writers to a primarily female readership. As a nonfeminist counterpart to *Noga* we chose the most popular women's magazine, *Laisha* (1992: 5–56; 109–112). The data on impositive speech acts was compiled for Ariel and Giora (1992b) from contemporary women and men script writers.

Whose point of view: findings

Given the notion of Self point of view, we first examine the extent to which men writers adopt a masculine point of view and women writers a feminine point of view, as defined earlier. We then further examine feminist and nonfeminist women's writings, comparing the extent to which they adopt a Self (feminine) as opposed to Other (masculine) point of view.

Men's versus women's language

The analysis of men's writings reveals a consistent adoption of a masculine point of view: men manifest a male bias along all the parameters examined. Women, on the other hand, tend to refrain from adopting a feminine point of view. We compare below early women and men writers

and modern women and men writers, both with respect to introductory patterns, and modern women and men script-writers with respect to impositive speech acts.

Early writers (1928–1940): introductory patterns

The examination of a point of view through introductory patterns consists of a number of tests, described earlier. Our findings show that early writers of both sexes adopt a masculine point of view (cf. Table A in the Appendix). With regard to focus on the Self (parameter 1), early men writers adopt a clearly masculine viewpoint: male characters outnumber female characters ([1a]) by a factor of 2.2.[9] Early women writers also present 1.4 times more male than female characters, indicating a masculine point of view. Men writers mostly make males their point of reference to others (parameter 2) and thus choose 2.9 times more males than females as anchors ([1g]) for the introduction of another character — a masculine point of view. Early women writers in our sample are exactly balanced in assigning the category of anchors to females and males.

Names (of all types) mark the character as an individual (parameter 3). Early men writers name 1.7 times more male than female characters ([1h]), adopting a masculine point of view. The women writers too tend toward a masculine point of view, naming 1.2 times more male than female characters. First names ([1i]), which individuate less effectively, are assigned 3.1 times more to females by the men writers — a masculine point of view. The women writers are even more extreme in adopting this masculine point of view: they assign first names 3.7 times more to females than to males.

Another effective means for individuation is the choice of a category of description, which includes a large variety of alternatives (e.g. functional description) as opposed to a limited category (family description). Hence, the choice of these categories in the introduction of females and males was examined. Men writers were found to assign more functional (rich — [1b]) than family (poor — [1c]) descriptions to males: 2.4 times more — a masculine point of view. Female characters, on the other hand, are introduced by family descriptions much more often than by functional descriptions: 3.6 times more — a masculine point of view. Women writers are less extreme in adopting a masculine point of view here: they assign 1.9 times more functional than family descriptions to males. They are slightly less male-oriented with regard to female characters, to whom they assign 1.4 times more family than functional descriptions. For the

prevalence of sex-based definitions (poor category) for females rather than for males, see below.

Functional descriptions ([1b]) are also an indication of independence (parameter 4). Indeed, men writers introduce 3.5 times more males than females by functional descriptions, adopting a masculine point of view. Women writers introduce 1.4 times more males than females, suggesting a weaker masculine point of view. Another measure of independence is the anchoring description. As shown above, while women writers are balanced in this category of description, showing no difference between the sexes, men writers adopt a strongly masculine point of view.

Since being introduced by an anchored description ([1f]) implies dependence on others, it is expected that each sex will prefer to assign this role to the other sex. Indeed, men writers choose to introduce females in the dependent role (1.9 times more than males), adopting a masculine point of view. Women writers behave quite similarly, introducing females in the dependent role 1.7 times more than males, thereby adopting a masculine point of view. Similarly, family descriptions ([1c]) are assigned by the men writers to women 2.4 times more than to men — a masculine point of view. Women writers assume a masculine point of view to a lesser degree in this category: family descriptions are assigned 1.9 times more to females than to males.

Objectification of characters (parameter 5) is primarily achieved by external descriptions ([1d]). Early men writers describe females' appearance twice as often as males', adopting a masculine point of view. Women writers are even more male-oriented in this category: they describe females' appearance 2.7 times as often as males'. Attributing a sex-based description (over and above grammatical gender; [1e]) is another means of objectification. Men writers use such descriptions for females 6.3 times more than for males — a masculine point of view. Women writers are somewhat less extreme in adopting a masculine point of view here: 3.65 times more females than males are assigned sex-based descriptions.

All in all, early writers, both men and women, take a masculine point of view (see Table 1). The women writers never adopt a feminine point of view, although they adopt a balanced view in one case. However, we should point out that the extent to which men writers exercise a masculine

Table 1.   *The gendered point of view (PoV) of early writers (percentages in parentheses)*

Writers	Masculine PoV	Balanced PoV	Feminine PoV
Men	11 (100)	0	0
Women	10 (90.9)	1 (9.09)	0

point of view far exceeds that of the women writers. The average male-oriented difference for the early men writers is a factor of 2.9, which means that the differentiation between the sexes is close to 200% in favor of males. However, the average male-oriented difference for the early women writers is a factor of 2.08, approximately a 100% differentiation (these figures were determined by dividing the sum of all the quotients by the number of tests). Women writers, then, rather than adopting a feminine point of view, exhibit a style that is only a mitigated version of the extreme masculine point of view of their male counterparts.

Modern writers (1965–1982): introductory patterns

The modern women and men writers, like their predecessors, adopt a masculine point of view. We summarize the findings for the modern writers in Table 2.

All in all, modern writers, both men and women, take a masculine point of view (see Table 3). However, just as with the early writers, the extent to which men writers adopt a masculine point of view — averaging a factor of 3.05 difference — is much greater than the women's, whose average factor difference is 2.27. However, unlike the early women writers,

Table 2.   *Introductory patterns of the modern writers (percentages in parentheses)*

Tests	Modern female writers		Modern male writers	
	Females	Males	Females	Males
a. Characters	174 (33.9)	340 (66.1)	89 (27.6)	233 (72.4)
b. Function	39 (22.4)	156 (45.9)	12 (13.5)	108 (46.4)
c. Family	47 (27)	49 (14.4)	26 (29.2)	22 (9.4)
d. External	32 (18.4)	36 (10.6)	23 (25.8)	27 (11.6)
e. Sex	49 (28.2)	19 (5.6)	22 (24.7)	11 (4.7)
f. Anchored	45 (25.9)	59 (17.4)	23 (25.8)	21 (9)
g. Anchoring	49 (54.4)	41 (45.6)	9 (23.1)	30 (76.9)
h. Names	50 (28.7)	89 (26.2)	38 (42.7)	118 (50.6)
i. 1st names	20 (48.7)	21 (51.2)	32 (84.2)	39 (33.9)

Table 3.   *The gendered point of view (PoV) of modern writers (percentages in parentheses)*

Writers	Masculine PoV	Balanced PoV	Feminine PoV
Men	11 (100)	0	0
Women	9 (81.81)	0	2 (18.18)

the modern women writers adopt a feminine point of view in two categories, averaging a 1.15 factor difference.

Modern script writers: impositive speech acts

Apart from checking linguistic devices for the introduction of various (sex-differentiated) characters to the text, it is interesting to see how the various characters use language in speech. For that purpose, we checked the speech of characters in drama (i.e. films), which further discloses a point of view (as suggested by parameters 6 and 7).

A search for a Self point of view, using impositive speech acts as criteria, reveals that men writers strongly adopt a Self point of view. Women writers, on the other hand, adopt an Other point of view (cf. Table B in the Appendix). Examining the status ([3a], parameter 6) assigned by men script writers to male speakers addressing females, as opposed to female speakers addressing males, we see a clear adoption of a masculine point of view: there are no female speakers in superior positions at all. Only male speakers are assigned a superior status over female addresses. The difference is therefore infinite, but will be taken to be 37.7 (the result of dividing 37.7 by 1 instead of by 0). While the women script writers do have powerful female speakers over male addressees, they still present 1.5 times more males superior to females than the other way around, thus adopting a masculine point of view.[10]

An examination of which sex controls the floor (i.e. using more impositives) reveals that men script writers assign 5.8 times more impositive speech acts ([3b]) to males than to females — a clearly masculine point of view. Women script writers adopt a balanced point of view here, assigning 1.02 more impositives to male speakers than to female speakers. However, the power of the speech acts employed by male speakers addressing females in men script writers is not significantly stronger than that employed by female speakers addressing males. While the men writers are balanced here, the women writers adopt a weak masculine point of view: 1.14 times more male speakers employ a relatively powerful impositive when addressing females than the other way around. When examining the extent to which Others obey the Self ([3d]), we see that in men's writings, female addressees obey male speakers 1.3 times more than male addressees obey them — a masculine point of view. Similarly, in women's writings, female speakers are obeyed by females 1.3 times more than by males, adopting a masculine point of view.

Parameter 7 predicts that in men's writings, males will cooperate ([3e]) with males more often than with females. This is indeed the case: males

cooperate with males 1.4 times more than with females — a masculine point of view. In women's writings we find a feminine point of view: females cooperate with females 1.45 times more than with males. Cooperation with the Self also predicts that in men's writings, males should obey males more often than they should obey females. However, the difference found does not reach significance. The same result repeats itself for the women writers. In other words no bias is found in the tendency to obey one's own sex.

All in all, both women and men script writers exhibit a masculine point of view. However, the men writers exercise a radical Self point of view, their average bias being a factor of 14.96. Women script writers differ from the men script writers in that they exhibit a feminine viewpoint in one test, the difference being a factor of 1.45. In addition, they manifest two balanced views and three masculine points of view, averaging a 1.21 factor difference (see Table 4).

Feminist versus nonfeminist women's language (1992): introductory patterns

We have thus far diagnosed mainly manifestations of a masculine point of view. All the women writers reviewed so far hardly exhibit feminine points of view, although the strength of their male-oriented point of view is considerably weaker than that of the men writers'. In order to test our hypothesis that feminist writing reflects a feminine point of view, and in the absence of Israeli feminist fiction writers, we used Israel's only feminist magazine, *Noga*, as a source for data with respect to introductory patterns. As a nonfeminist counterpart to *Noga*, we checked *Laisha*, a nonfeminist women's magazine. Most of the writers in both magazines are women, and so are the readers.

Table C (see Appendix) summarizes our findings. Our expectation that feminists will focus on the Self more than on the Other (parameter 1) is indeed confirmed for *Noga*: *Noga* mentions 1.2 times more female than male characters ([1a]) — a feminine point of view. *Laisha* adopts a masculine point of view here, mentioning 1.3 times more males than

Table 4. *The gendered point of view (PoV) of script writers (percentages in parentheses)*

Writers	Masculine PoV	Balanced PoV	Feminine PoV
Men	4 (66.6)	2 (33.3)	0
Women	3 (50)	2 (33.3)	1 (16.6)

females. *Noga* further adopts a feminine point of view by presenting 1.2 times more women than men as anchors ([1g], parameter 2). *Laisha* is similarly female-oriented here, assigning 1.5 times more females than males the anchoring role. An examination of the individuation of the Self (parameter 3) shows that *Noga* takes a balanced view: 1.03 more women than men are named ([1h]). *Laisha* is also balanced in this category: 1.04 times more males than females are named. However, once the usage of first names ([1i]) is checked, *Noga* is male-oriented: 1.5 more females than males are introduced by their first name. *Laisha* is more male-oriented in this category, assigning 1.8 times more first names to females. *Noga* assigns 3.3 times more functional ([1b]) than family ([1c]) descriptions to females — a feminine point of view. *Laisha* is male-oriented here, family descriptions of female characters outnumbering functional descriptions by a factor of 1.6. Although *Noga* also introduces males by functional descriptions more often than by family descriptions — 2.9 times more, exhibiting a masculine point of view — the difference for the female characters suggests a feminine point of view: 1.1 times more functional than family descriptions are assigned to females. *Laisha* assigns males functional descriptions 2.35 times more than family descriptions, adopting a masculine point of view.

Parameter 4 checks the degree of independence of the characters. *Noga* is not biased in favor of any sex here, assigning functional descriptions only 1.06 times more to males than to females. *Laisha* is male-oriented, males receiving 2.9 times more functional descriptions than females. Recall that *Noga* takes a feminine point of view in assigning more anchoring descriptions to females than to males. The same feminine point of view has been found for *Laisha*. *Noga*'s male and female characters are equally introduced as dependent, via anchored descriptions, with only 1.03 times more males than females. The data for *Laisha* show a balanced view as well, although the difference being a factor of 1.096 is very close to a significant masculine point of view. Last, *Noga* introduces 2.0 times more males than females via family descriptions, a clear feminine viewpoint. *Laisha* adopts a masculine point of view here, assigning family descriptions 1.6 times more to females than to males.

Noga hardly ever uses external descriptions ([1d]), which serve to objectify characters (parameter 5). In fact, only one woman and three men were thus introduced. This results in a feminine point of view, the difference being a factor of 3.6 in favor of female characters. *Laisha* is male-oriented here, assigning external descriptions to females 1.4 times more than to males. Regarding sex-based descriptions ([1c]), *Noga* seemingly takes a masculine point of view, presenting twice as many women as men via sex-based descriptions. However, we interpret this finding (as

proposed in Ariel 1988) as part of the feminist insistence on using feminine gender terms in an attempt to cleanse them from their negative and sexual connotations, making a "woman is beautiful" claim. However, this result was nonetheless calculated as a male bias of *Noga*. *Laisha* is male-biased in this category, females outnumbering males by a factor of 2.[11]

In sum, *Noga* and *Laisha* differ drastically (cf. Table 5 and Table C in the Appendix for the full data). *Noga* exhibits a predominantly feminine point of view, while *Laisha* exhibits a predominantly masculine point of view: 72.7 percent of its points of view are masculine. *Noga* is the only source examined for which the number of feminine points of view (five) exceeds that of masculine points of view (three and possibly two under our interpretation). In addition, *Noga* manifests three balanced views. Note also that the average factor difference of 2.0 of the female-oriented views is virtually identical to the average factor difference of the male-oriented views in *Noga* — 1.9. Table 5 presents the number of gendered points of view in *Noga* and *Laisha*.

Discussion

We now summarize all the results presented above in terms of Self, Other, and balanced points of view (cf. Table 6). Recall that with regard to women writers, taking a Self point of view means adopting a feminine point of view, while taking an Other point of view means adopting a masculine point of view. For men it is the other way around: a Self point of view entails the adoption of a masculine point of view, while adopting a feminine point of view means taking the point of view of the Other. For both sexes, lack of preference for any gendered point of view entails a balanced view.

The listing of the findings in Table 6 represents the gradual descent from a most to a least Self point of view. Note that for the most part it also correlates with a complementary shift from a least to a most Other point of view:

Table 5.   *The gendered points of view (PoV) of feminist and nonfeminist writings (percentages in parentheses)*

	Masculine PoV	Balanced PoV	Feminine PoV
Noga	3 (27.3)	3 (27.3)	5 (45.4)
Laisha	8 (72.7)	2 (18.2)	1 (9)

Table 6.   *Self, Other and balanced points of view (PoV): descending order of Self PoV as opposed to ascending order of Other PoV (percentages in parentheses)*

Writers	Self PoV	Other PoV	Balanced PoV
Early men	11 (100)	0	0
Modern men	11 (100)	0	0
Men's scripts	4 (66.6)	0	2 (33.3)
Feminist *Noga*	5 (45.4)	3 (27.3)	3 (27.3)
Women's scripts	1 (16.6)	3 (50)	2 (33.3)
Modern women	2 (18.2)	9 (81.8)	0
Nonfeminist *Laisha*	1 (9)	8 (72.7)	2 (18.2)
Early women	0	10 (90.9)	1 (9.09)

Our findings show that men writers of all genres and periods and women feminist writers adopt a Self point of view. In fact, the early and modern men writers manifest only Self points of view, showing no balanced or Other points of view whatsoever. The men script writers are less extreme in this respect. Though they too refrain from any Other point of view, they at least entertain some balanced points of view. The feminist writers of *Noga* clearly adopt a feminine point of view: they exhibit Self points of view in half of the cases. Moreover, *Noga* manifests rather strong feminine points of view. The rest of the linguistic findings for *Noga* show some preference for a balanced over an Other point of view. Table 6 shows that *Noga* is closer to men's writings than to women's writings in manifesting Self points of view.

Nonfeminist women writers mostly adopt an Other point of view. The women script writers favor a masculine point of view 1.5 times more than a feminine point of view. More extreme are the women writers (of both early and modern fiction) and *Laisha*, who hardly deviate from a masculine point of view. Although they occasionally adopt a feminine point of view, they are only marginally different from the men writers. In fact, the nonfeminist female sources adopt a masculine point of view more often than the men script writers.

These findings show that both men writers and nonfeminist women writers adopt a masculine style, while the feminist writers of *Noga* adopt a feminine style. This suggests that when both sexes adopt the same strategy, for example a Self point of view, the result is speech divergence for the sexes; in the cases studied here, this means different styles for feminist and men writers. However, opting for a different strategy, such as a Self point of view versus an Other point of view, results in speech convergence, as exemplified by the similar styles of nonfeminist women and men writers (a masculine point of view).

Conclusions

Our working hypothesis was that language usage reflects the speaker/writer's point of view. We focused on that aspect of point of view in language that relates to gender identity (femininity and masculinity). We argued that while men can fully adopt a masculine point of view, being the dominant group, women, as a powerless group, may find it difficult to identify with women's objectives. However, we expected feminist awareness to override social constraints and enable feminists to exhibit a genuine femininity, adopting a feminine point of view.

Our hypotheses have been confirmed. First, men writers consistently adhere to their own point of view, to the extent of ignoring almost entirely women's point of view. Second, nonfeminist women writers refrain from identifying with their own group members. They opt for the assimilation/convergence strategy, which involves the adoption of the dominant, that is, masculine point of view. Like the "good" Arab, they assume a false identity, presenting ingroup members in terms of the outgroup (men's) values.

Feminist consciousness, on the other hand, results in speech divergence. This strategy allows writers to preserve a distinct, positive self-identity in speech. Given our definition of femininity as adopting a feminine point of view, our findings show that, contrary to stereotypic views regarding feminists as masculine, it is the feminist rather than the nonfeminist/traditional women writers who are closest to manifesting femininity.

The effect of feminist awareness on the style of *Noga* is of particular interest. *Noga*, being a magazine, is obviously more constrained by the male-dominated social reality than fiction is. Hence, one would have expected to detect more traces of a masculine point of view in *Noga* than in the fiction examined. However, results show that ideology overrides reality. Indeed, a comparison between Ariel's (1988) findings for *Noga* (1985) and ours for *Noga* (1992) shows that once feminist awareness has been more deeply internalized, the linguistic change is much more noticeable. While *Noga* (1985) was marginally male-oriented, *Noga* (1992) adopts a predominantly feminine point of view.

Paradoxically, this adoption of a Self point of view may account for the stereotype of feminists as masculine. It seems that adopting a Self point of view is considered the prerogative of the dominant group (men). Note, however, that *Noga* is not as Self-oriented as the men's writings (see again the different ratios as presented in Table 6). As shown in previous studies, adopting one's own point of view is no trivial matter for nondominant groups. On the other hand, it is not at all clear to us that the extreme adoption of a Self point of view manifested by the men

writers is a norm one should emulate. Perhaps *Noga* provides an example of a more balanced approach.

Our account drastically diverges from current feminist theories concerning women's and men's speech. Such theories insist that there are distinct and inherent feminine and masculine patterns of behavior in general (Chodorow 1978; Dinnerstein 1976; Gilligan 1982), and of speech patterns in particular (e.g. Tannen 1990). The consensual finding concerning speech is that women are cooperative, employing addressee-oriented speech behavior, and that men are dominant, employing speaker-oriented speech behavior (e.g. Maltz and Borker 1982; Cameron 1985; Coates 1986; Tannen 1990; James and Drakich 1993; James and Clarke 1993; West 1995). Findings, however, do not always support this hypothesis. French (1985:86) in effect argues against an essentialist assumption, noting that even mothers can "treat their children with cruelty and ... injure or kill them ... There are cultures in which the women are more aggressive than the men." Fuchs Epstein (1988), for example, questions many of the findings regarding differences between feminine and masculine behavior in general.[12] James and Drakich (1993) and James and Clarke (1993), who surveyed numerous speech-dominance studies, depict a nonmonolithic picture, according to which men are not always dominant speakers, and women are not always cooperative ones. Greenwood and Freed (1992:206) found that "neither sex nor age alone can account for the distinct variations" in using questions in conversation. Even highly "feminine" behavior such as polite speech is not uniquely feminine. In Javanese, for instance, women have been observed to behave more politely than men within family circles, but in public, it is men who behave more politely (Smith-Hefner 1988). Note further that women and men can be very much alike: Wetzel (1988) found that Japanese men speak very much like Western women. In fact, Freed (1992) accused Tannen (1990) of misrepresenting Maltz and Borker's (1982) and Goodwin's (1980) findings, presenting them as attesting to a "difference" theory, while the researchers themselves emphasized the similarity between the sexes. Also, as Uchida (1992) notes, Tannen (1984, 1986) herself showed that gender was not a significant factor in conversations between two ethnic groups. For an extensive review and critique of the essentialist approach to sex differences in speech, see Uchida (1992).

An essentialist view is of course entirely inconsistent with O'Barr and Atkins's (1980) pioneering findings, which attest that the speech differences are better accounted for in terms of dominance, power, and status relations. Indeed, Singh and Lele (1990), Troemel-Ploetz (1991), Freed (1992), and Uchida (1992) argue against Tannen's and others' "different but equal" characterization of women and men, precisely along these

lines. They claim that such a characterization ignores the extent to which these speech patterns are related to an unequal power structure between the sexes. They are then better motivated by social factors, which, in turn, render the essentialist/cultural approach to femininity and masculinity superfluous (see also Cameron et al. 1988; Freed 1992; Uchida 1992).

Note that our findings constitute a direct counterexample to the essentialist hypothesis concerning the sexes. A "different but equal" hypothesis predicts a different verbal behavior for women and men across the board. It therefore cannot account for the similarities we found in speech behavior between traditional women and men writers, both of whom adopt a predominantly masculine point of view. Similarly, the differences found between the feminist and the traditional women writers cannot be accounted for. Recall that the former adopt a feminine point of view, while the latter adopt a masculine point of view.

This interpretation of the findings, then, which takes feminine versus masculine points of view as a classifying criterion, is certainly problematic for the essentialist view of gender. Equally problematic for this view is the analysis of our sources in terms of Self versus Other points of view. This classification categorizes feminists, traditional women, and men quite differently, but still in a manner inconsistent with the essentialist view. Both men and feminists behave alike in that they adopt a Self point of view. In contrast, traditional women adopt an Other point of view. As illustrated by (5), these two classifications cannot be reconciled with an essentialist hypothesis that predicts that differences should cluster around the gender dichotomy:

(5)

Feminist writers

Self PoV

Men writers

Masculine PoV

Traditional women writers

(5) reflects the fact that women (feminist and nonfeminist women writers) never pattern together, whereas men pattern with traditional women under one classification, and with feminists under the other. This suggests that the difference between the two groups of women is never reduced, whereas that between men and women is sometimes neutralized, although men's linguistic behavior always exhibits a more extreme version of the point of view examined than that of the women classified with them.

We propose that the dominance theory combined with group relations theories explain the linguistic patterns observed. Thus, women do not manifest a feminine point of view, not because it is an inherently feminine trait to defer to men, but because they are simply deprived of the social status necessary to exercise their point of view often enough. Yet, when they find it possible, they do, as when they cooperate with women more often than with men.

The case of cooperation is particularly difficult for the essentialist theory to account for. Our findings show that female characters are indeed cooperative, but they cooperate with ingroup rather than with outgroup members. Moreover, as predicted by our theory, but contrary to the predictions of the essentialist view, male characters are also cooperative. Adopting a Self point of view, they cooperate with ingroup members (see Ariel and Giora 1992b for further discussion).

Across the board, then, our findings regarding the relevance of Self versus Other points of view are inconsistent with mainstream feminist claims. Nevertheless, they gain support from previous research, which argued that women do, at times, set out from a genuinely feminine (Self) point of view. For example, Frable and Bem (1985) found that individuation of ingroup members of the same sex and homogeneity of outgroup members of the opposite sex obtain for both women and men. Brown and Smith (1989) found that it is sometimes the case that women adopt a Self point of view even when men do not: the women in their study showed ingroup favoritism in evaluating the academic productivity and communicative skills of women, whereas men did not differentiate significantly between the gender groups. Park and Rothbarth (1982) and Smith (1985) found that women stereotype men's speech just as much as men stereotype women's. Risch (1987) showed that when interviewed by women researchers, women had no problem producing a large variety of "unladylike" derogatory names for men, thus taking their own point of view.

The differences found between feminist and nonfeminist women writers echo similar findings: Ariel and Giora (1992a) and Giora (1992, n.d.) reveal that feminist awareness triggers a narrative change toward adopting a more Self point of view. Hershey and Werner (1975) found that feminists speaking to their spouses spoke for a greater length of time than nonfeminists. Our comparison between the 1985 and 1992 issues of feminist *Noga* shows that feminist awareness induces linguistic change in the same direction. Such findings attest that despite our powerless social position, women can rid themselves of the internalized masculine point of view and gain an emancipated cognitive status.

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Table A.   *Introductory patterns of the early writers (percentages in parentheses)*

Tests[a]	Early women writers		Early men writers	
	Females	Males	Female	Males
a. Characters	147 (41.8)	205 (58.2)	152 (30.8)	341 (69.2)
b. Function	46 (31.3)	91 (44.4)	23 (15.1)	182 (53.4)
c. Family	63 (42.8)	47 (22.9)	83 (54.6)	77 (22.6)
d. External	21 (14.3)	11 (5.4)	44 (28.9)	50 (14.7)
e. Sex	29 (19.7)	11 (5.4)	48 (31.6)	17 (5)
f. Anchored	60 (40.8)	50 (24.4)	52 (34.2)	62 (18.2)
g. Anchoring	49 (50)	49 (50)	27 (25.7)	78 (74.3)
h. Names	40 (27.2)	65 (31.7)	24 (15.8)	90 (26.4)
g. 1st names	22 (61.1)	8 (14.8)	13 (72.2)	16 (23.2)

a. As listed in (1)

Table B.   *Impositive speech acts (SA) of script writers (percentages in parentheses)*

Tests[a]	Women script writers		Men script writers	
	Females	Males	Females	Males
a. Superior speaker	11 (12.4)	18 (18.6)	0	23 (37.7)
b. Impositives	180 (49)	187 (51)	45 (14.7)	261 (85.3)
c. Mean power of SA[b]	2.48	2.82	3.3	3.1
d. Obeying				
by males	35 (39.3)		25 (61)	99 (57.9)
by females	45 (51.7)	54 (56.8)		43 (75)
e. Cooperation				
with males	24 (20.2)			52 (29.4)
with females	26 (29.2)			13 (21.3)

a. As listed in (3)
b. The linguistic aspects weighted against the context yielded mean results, calculated by unbalanced analysis of variance and covariance with repeated measures

Table C.   *Introductory patterns of* Noga *(1992) and* Laisha *(percentages in parentheses)*

Tests[a]	Noga		Laisha	
	Females	Males	Females	Males
a. Characters	186 (54.5)	155 (45.5)	200 (43.2)	263 (56.8)
b. Function	88 (47.3)	69 (44.5)	42 (21)	160 (60.8)
c. Family	29 (15.6)	29 (18.7)	84 (42)	68 (25.9)
d. External	1 (0.5)	3 (1.9)	13 (6.5)	12 (4.6)
e. Sex	19 (10.2)	8 (5.2)	18 (9)	12 (4.6)
f. Anchored	28 (15.1)	24 (15.5)	50 (25)	60 (22.8)
g. Anchoring	32 (17.2)	23 (14.8)	56 (28)	49 (18.6)
h. Names	138 (74.2)	112 (72.3)	157 (78.5)	214 (81.4)
i. 1st names	25 (13.4)	14 (9)	50 (25)	37 (14.1)

a. Taken from example (1)

Notes

1. Under such an egocentric view, the Self is to be taken also as representing a universal (unmarked) norm. Such is the case of the ambiguity between masculine and neutral gender forms prevalent in natural languages (the so-called false generics). Since we cannot expect women writers to use the counterpart ambiguity (the grammar would not allow it), we should at least expect them to use the generics for males less often than men writers. This, of course, is only possible in those languages that have separate forms for masculine and for neutral-gender humans (e.g., Hebrew *gever* "male" versus *adam* "man"). However, this test, as well as other potential tests for Self point of view (e.g. attributing positive features such as richness, health, etc., to the Self), were not used in this research.
2. Note that individuation may seem to be incompatible with the tendency to universalize the Self (see note 1). However, in practice, interpreters (e.g. literary critics) do not see a contradiction between a highly individuated character and her/his potential to represent a universal being.
3. There are other limited categories we haven't checked here, e.g. national identity. Similarly we haven't checked the limited selection of descriptions of a rich category, usually assigned to outgroup members, as opposed to the variety of descriptions of that category, usually assigned to ingroup members. For instance, females in mens' writing are usually assigned a small number of professions. By contrast, males in mens' writings are assigned a large variety of professions.
4. Hebrew nouns are all inflected for gender, hence making equally redundant such definitions as *isha* "woman" and *gever* "man (masculine only)". Such an overt redundant reference to a person's sex signifies focus on the character's sex rather than on other properties s/he may have.
5. It is possible to envisage other alternative cultures in which power is not a positive state. However, in the culture we know, being in power constitutes an advantage, which we would rather assign to ingroup members if we take our own point of view.
6. Despite apparent differences between the various genres to be compared below (short stories, scripts, and magazines), previous findings (Ariel 1988) attest that fiction and

nonfiction writing are not consistently differentiated from each other with respect to the topic under examination here.

7. The women script writers are Menahemi (1987), Troppe (1986), Yaron-Grunich (1987), and Zvi-Riklis (1984). The men script writers are Gabison and Aroch (1989), Heller (1986), and Waxman et al. (1987).

8. The early women writers are Baron (1943), Bichovsky (1976), and Puchachevsky (1930: 59–168). The modern women writers are Cahana-Carmon (1966: the first eleven stories), Almog (1969, 1971: 7–19), and Hareven (1982). The early men writers are Shoffman (1942: 11–170), Smilansky (1934, 1955: 117–137), and Steinberg (1957: 219–263). The modern men writers are Oz (1965: the first seven stories), Yehoshua (1972: the first five stories), and Ben-Ner (1979). The year of publication of the early writers usually documents the collected writings of the author rather than the original date of publication.

9. We consider any difference of 10% (a 1.1 difference) or more significant, since the whole population of character introductions/impositive speech acts was examined. Any smaller gap was considered a balanced result, but for the overall calculation of biases, even these small differences were taken into consideration. The reader is advised that though the results in the text were rounded off, the calculations of the gaps were made on the basis of the non-rounded-off figures.

10. But see Uchida (1992) for a critique of the possibility of equal relationship between females and males.

11. Many of the sex-based descriptions for females as well as males in *Laisha* refer to their sexual preferences (lesbians and homosexuals), presenting them as exceptional characters. Therefore, there is no reason to view *Laisha*'s sex-based descriptions as driven by a cleansing motivation.

12. Even aggression is not always uniquely masculine according to Fuchs Epstein (1988).

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