

The Rise of the Ideas of the Welfare State

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*It is customarily assumed that welfare-state thinking can only appear as a product of the sharpening conflict between revolutionary socialists and the defenders of the status quo; the case of Tom Paine proves otherwise. Although he defended private enterprise (to the exclusion of large landed property), he developed a forgotten early version of a comprehensive system of public welfare in the second part of his *The Rights of Man* and in his *Agrarian Justice*, where he argued that the new revolutionary democratic government based on representation and universal suffrage has the duty and the means not only of relieving poverty but of preventing it by a system of universal allowances for marriage, childbirth, the raising of children, basic education, old age pensions and temporary housing and employment for the unemployed of the metropolis. This, he said, should be financed by a progressive inheritance tax levied especially on landed estates.*

Not much has been written on the intellectual antecedents of the welfare state. By some it is assumed that the idea appeared full-fledged during the Second World War in Great Britain. Others belittle the innovation of the idea and see in it simply a continuation of a series of measures of social insurance that had started in Britain between 1906 and 1916. Some German historians argue that the policy of public social insurance was invented by Bismark in the 1880s.

Social historians point out that until the end of the Middle Ages the idea of government having a policy for the prevention and abolition of poverty would have been an impossibility. As long as traditional Christian ideas were accepted, poverty was supposed to be arranged by God to permit Christians to fulfill their duty of charity, mainly in the form of giving alms. Any more systematic relief of the poor was not provided by the state but by the Church and especially the monasteries. At the end of the Middle Ages and the beginning of the age of the Reformation, much of this network of poor relief was destroyed in those countries where the monasteries were disbanded and Church property expropriated.

The new national governments changed the medieval, rather tolerant attitudes toward the poor and toward begging. There had been, of course, respectable voluntary beggars, the begging friars; interest-

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ingly, even poor students of Oxford University had at one time been officially granted the right to collect alms on their way from home to the university.

With the breakup of feudal relations, masses of rural people were uprooted. The new attitude considered these masses of the poor—especially the able-bodied poor who now were called “sturdy beggars”—a public nuisance and a menace to law and order. Consequently, in the sixteenth century, a period of punitive legislation and policies toward the poor began. In England, these policies, the Elizabethan Poor Laws, lasted until the early nineteenth century. By 1834, they were considered by those in power as too lenient and as totally inefficient; the Poor Law Amendment Act was designed to impose even stricter limits on public charity, and its cruelest features were increasingly criticized, both by the great surveyors of British poverty and by several early socialist thinkers, who claimed that poverty, especially poverty due to prolonged unemployment, was the result of the absurdities and the selfishness of the new economic system of industrial capitalism. Whereas Marxist socialists assume that concerted public social welfare policy to relieve and to prevent poverty is neither desirable nor feasible, the British radical liberals and the Fabians were convinced that such a system could and should be worked out. Eventually, the famous blueprint of the welfare state—the Beveridge Plan—was developed by a liberal in the midst of World War II, and many of its provisions were enacted by the Labor government of 1945-1949. Most Western industrialized and democratic nations followed suit, although not all accepted the term “welfare state.” West Germany, for instance, preferred the term *Sozialstaat*, or social state.

On a more philosophical plane, where did the idea of the citizen’s “right to welfare” or of the goal of “freedom from want”—as the Atlantic Charter phrased it in 1942—spring from? Gerhard A. Ritter (1989) in his monograph *Der Sozialstaat, Entstehung und Entwicklung im internationalen Vergleich*, mentions briefly the famous phrase of the American Declaration of Independence of 1776, “the right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness,” as an expression of natural rights philosophy; he also mentions that in France, some of the philosophical precursors of the Revolution used the principle of *fraternité* to argue for the existence of basic social rights of the citizen and that the Jacobins demanded the inclusion of basic social rights of the citizen into the Constitution of 1793. This stated that society owes its unfortunate citizens a living “either by giving them employment

or by granting those who are unable to work, the means of their livelihood." This formulation, however, did not grant the needy citizen any legal right to assistance. In practice, neither the revolutionary nor the postrevolutionary French governments developed public social services. Nevertheless, claims Ritter, these ideas influenced the early pre-1848 workers' movement in Germany.

My intention in this essay is to point to a forgotten early version of a comprehensive system of public welfare that was developed by Tom Paine, author of the famous pamphlet *Common Sense*, which defined the goal of national independence for the rebellious American colonists, and of the famous reply to Edmund Burke's attack on the French Revolution, *Reflections on the Revolution in France*—his *The Rights of Man* (Paine [1792] 1961). What is generally known is that the second part of *Rights of Man* is an extreme critique of monarchy and aristocracy and a defense of representative democratic government, based on universal suffrage. What has been overlooked is that the last pages of the second part of *Rights of Man* chapter 5, which start with a criticism of the oppressive and wasteful British system of taxation, especially of the poor rates, develop into a full-fledged scheme for the public funding of social welfare intended not only to relieve poverty but to prevent it. This train of thought was carried one step further in a short piece called *Agrarian Justice*, written in 1795 and 1796 and published in 1797 (see Conway [1902] 1969).

In *The Rights of Man*, Paine sees all present ills of the British government—"corruption" and "the abuses it protects"—as caused by monarchy and court government. Monarchy is unwise and wasteful. It causes enormous expenses—on unnecessary wars, on the monarch himself, and on numbers of courtiers and placemen. All foreign policy as carried out until his day in Britain appears to him as evil and benefiting only the monarchy and its hangers-on. The citizens are robbed of enormous sums in direct and indirect taxes in order to finance the monarchy, the army, and the navy. Neither the citizens nor the House of Commons have any control over the spending of these millions of pounds. The House of Lords is nonrepresentative and protects the unjustified privileges of a small class of aristocratic big landowners.

Although Paine condemns nearly all aspects of contemporary British government, and although in some places he expresses near-anarchist views (he describes his astonishment at the ease with which the Americans managed their affairs after the colonial government had completely broken down: "The instant formal government is

abolished, society begins to act. A general association takes place, and common interest produces common security" [p. 407]).¹ He definitely comes down in favor of "good government," as its "object is the happiness of a nation." Any properly constituted government (i.e., a government with a written constitution that can be amended, that is representative, and that is based on universal suffrage) should have hardly any foreign policy to deal with because such a government would naturally live in peace with all other nations, at least with all nations that have similar representative governments. (It should be noted that this was written before the Terror and the outbreak of war.) It should, however, have a lot to do in the field of internal policy. "Man, were he not corrupted by governments, is naturally the friend of man, and . . . human nature is not of itself vicious. That spirit of jealousy and ferocity . . . is now yielding to the dictates of reason, interest and humanity" (p. 453). Paine thought that this new proper government "ought to be as much open to improvement as anything which appertains to man. . . . It is too soon to determine to what extent of improvement government can yet be carried. . . . All Europe may form but one great republic" (p. 453).

Paine's declaration of the purpose of good government is that "it ought to have no other object than the *general* happiness. When, instead of this it operates to create and increase wretchedness in any of the parts of society, it is on a wrong system and reformation is of necessity" (p. 454).

As Paine sees it, "a great portion of mankind in what are called civilized countries are in a state of poverty and wretchedness, far below the condition of an Indian. . . . It is so all over Europe . . . a perpetual system of war and expense, that drains the country, and defeats the general felicity of which civilization is capable" (p. 454). "So far as those governments relate to each other, they are in the same condition as we conceive of savage, uncivilized life . . . like so many individuals in a state of nature" (p. 455). Government "draws . . . especially from the poor, a great portion of those earnings which should be applied to their own subsistence and comfort. . . . More than one fourth of the labor of mankind is annually consumed by this barbarous system" (p. 455).

In contrast with the old kind of government that he condemns, Paine advocates "civil government . . ., or the government of laws, [which] is not productive of pretenses for many taxes; it operates at home, directly under the eye of the country, and precludes the possibility of much imposition" (p. 455).

Before going into the details of Paine's provisions for the relief and prevention of poverty, we should notice that his attitude toward "public money," that is, the taxpayers' money, was the opposite of that attitude of easy spending found to be widespread in the modern welfare state. For Paine,

Public money ought to be touched with the most scrupulous consciousness of honor. It is not the produce of riches only, but of the hard earnings of Labor and poverty. It is drawn even from the bitterness of want and misery. Not a beggar passes, or perishes in the streets, whose mite is not in that mass. (pp. 481-82)

Paine's plan was gradually to abolish all those taxes that are a burden on the poor and on people with small or medium-sized incomes, starting with the poor rates, most of the indirect taxes, and other nonprogressive taxes. Instead, he proposed to introduce a progressive inheritance tax that, according to his calculations, would be sufficient to finance his entire scheme of public welfare.

It should be remembered that he assumed that the expenses of government would be greatly reduced not only by the abolition of the monarchy but by the gradual reduction and eventual abolition of the army as well as by a major reduction of the size of the navy. Yet he did not forget in his calculations the need for raising the miserable pay of soldiers and sailors and for providing for them after their demobilization; he also considered it essential to pay the excise officers a living wage.

Paine considered the English system of primogeniture, by which the aristocracy passed their large estates to eldest sons only, as especially harmful and immoral and demanded its abolition. His scheme of a steeply progressive inheritance tax would have, so he believed, the beneficial effect of causing the divisions of large estates between all those naturally entitled to inherit.

In his later pamphlet *Agrarian Justice*, published in 1797 in France, Paine takes his scheme for the funding of welfare one step further. The income from the progressive inheritance tax should go into a national fund from which the allowances that all citizens would be entitled to would be paid. He bases this scheme on the well-known claim that originally—in the "natural state"—all land had been common and not private property and that thus the citizens would only get back that which was theirs by right.

Before going into the details of his cradle-to-grave allowances, perhaps the greatest innovation of Paine should be mentioned:

namely, the principle of universality as we would call it today. All cash allowances and services would be the right of all citizens in the appropriate situation to claim; Paine definitely rules out any means test. On the other hand, Paine was sure that those citizens who did not really need the allowances or services, because they were well enough off, would not claim them, and he made his calculations of the cost of his plan accordingly.

Paine was not aware of the importance of the impending industrial revolution or of the effects of the malfunctioning of the economy as possible causes of mass poverty. He considered much of the poverty which he himself had suffered in his youth in Great Britain, and of which he was a keen and sensitive observer on his return to England from America, as caused by bad and corrupt government and by heavy taxation on the propertyless; he hoped that many of the poor would be able to manage on their own once monarchical government and its system of taxation were abolished. Yet he was realistic enough not to expect the automatic disappearance of poverty and misfortune. As he states in his attempt at an analysis of the causes of poverty, "It is easily seen, that the poor are generally composed of large families of children, and old people past their labour" (p. 485). On this analysis he based his plan for the relief and prevention of poverty.

The details of his plan as outlined on the closing pages of part 2 of *The Rights of Man* are as follows:

1. A family allowance to every poor family of

four pounds a year for every child under fourteen years of age; enjoining the parents of such children to send them to school, to learn reading, writing and common arithmetic; the minister of every parish, of every denomination, to certify jointly to an office, for this purpose, that the duty is performed. (p. 486)

"By adopting this method," Paine argues,

not only the poverty of the parent will be relieved, but ignorance will be banished from the rising generation, and the number of poor will hereafter become less, because their abilities, by the aid of education, will be greater. Many a youth, with good natural genius, who is apprenticed to a mechanical trade, such as a carpenter, joiner, millwright, blacksmith, etc., is prevented getting forward the whole of his life, from the want of a little common education when a boy. (pp. 486-87)

2. Old age pensions. Paine distinguishes two classes of old people needing support at different ages. The first is people working in outdoor occupations, needing physical effort or keen eyesight, who,

"though (their) mental faculties are in full vigor, the bodily powers for laborious life are on the decline," are likely to have difficulties performing their occupation with ease at age fifty. Paine considers that in the category of those entitled to what we would call early retirement would be

husbandmen, common laborers, journeymen of every trade and their wives, sailors, and disbanded soldiers, worn-out servants of both sexes, and poor widows . . . also a considerable number of middling tradesmen, . . . and . . . a number from every class of life connected with commerce and adventure" (pp. 487-88)

Paine describes the criterion of entitlement to an early pension thus: "Persons, who at one time or other of their lives, after fifty years of age, may feel it necessary or comfortable to be better supported, than they can support themselves, and that not as a matter of grace and favor, but of right" (p. 488). He estimates that about a third of the older population would need support, and of those, half would need it already at age fifty. He proposes "to pay to every such person of the age of fifty years, and until he shall arrive at the age of sixty, the sum of six pounds per annum" (p. 488).

The second group deserving pensions is all persons over age sixty who have difficulty supporting themselves. Paine argues that "at sixty, his labour ought to be over at least from direct necessity. It is painful to see old age working itself to death, in what are called civilized countries, for its daily bread" (p. 487). Paine proposes to pay all these persons—he estimated that a third of the older population of England would belong to this category—ten pounds per annum after the age of sixty during life.

3. After having thus provided for what he considered the two major causes of poverty—namely, many children and old age—Paine turns to other social problems and crucial junctures in the life cycle that if not attended may cause distress and future poverty: the first is the need to enable all children to receive a basic education. He realizes that to pay for the education of their children may not only be a problem for poor families but for families with small incomes: "There will still be a number of families," he writes, "who, though not properly of the class of poor, yet find it difficult to give education to their children, and such children, under such a case, would be in a worse condition than if their parents were actually poor" (p. 490). He pleads for what amounts to universal education as a duty of democratic government: "A nation under a well regulated government

should permit none to remain uninstructed. It is monarchical and aristocratical governments, only, that require ignorance for their support" (p. 490). Paine's plan for the provision of universal basic education sounds to us rather naive: "To allow for each of those children ten shillings a year for the expense of schooling, for six years each, which will give them six months schooling each year, and half a crown a year for paper and spelling books" (p. 490).

Nevertheless, Paine, who was always not only optimistic but pragmatic, worked out in a lengthy footnote a practical plan for the delivery of this new service:

Public schools do not answer the general purpose of the poor. They are chiefly in corporation-towns, from which the country towns and villages are excluded; or, if admitted, the distance occasions a great loss of time. Education, to be useful to the poor, should be on the spot; and the best method, I believe, to accomplish this, is to enable the parents to pay the expense themselves. There are always persons of both sexes to be found in every village, especially when growing into years, capable of such an undertaking. Twenty children, at ten shillings each (and that not more than six months in each year), would be as much as some livings amount to in the remote parts of England; and there are often distressed clergymen's widows to whom such an income would be acceptable. Whatever is given on this account to children answers two purposes: to them it is education, to those who educate them it is a livelihood. (p. 490n).

Now we come to what Paine called "a number of smaller cases, which it is good policy as well as beneficence in a nation to consider" (p. 491).

4. In the following words, Paine proposes a maternity allowance:

Were twenty shillings to be given to every woman immediately on the birth of a child, who should make the demand, and none will make it whose circumstances do not require it [Paine thought that not more than a fourth of mothers would claim this allowance], it might relieve a great deal of instant distress. (p. 491)

5. Paine needs less than two lines to propose a marriage allowance: "twenty shillings to every new-married couple who should claim in like manner" (p. 491).

6. From the cradle to the grave: Under the Poor Laws, each parish had to pay for the burial of persons without means who died within their boundaries; Paine wanted to abolish the indignities resulting from this law suffered by old and sick persons without means by instituting a funeral allowance: "twenty thousand pounds to be appropriated to defray the funeral expenses of persons, who, travelling for

work, may die at a distance from their friends. By relieving parishes from this charge, the sick stranger will be better treated" (p. 491).

It should be noted that Paine assumed that much of the relief of distress and poverty arising out of accident, illness, misfortune, or temporary unemployment should be provided by friends, neighbors, and "benefit clubs," that is, small organizations of mutual help, all within a person's local community. His plan calls on the state only when he realizes that the problem is too big for such help or that it occurs at a distance from friends, neighbors, and the local benefit club.

7. A large problem for Paine was unemployment and homelessness, especially of youngsters, but only in the metropolis of London and Westminster. Although it appears quaint to us that Paine considered unemployment elsewhere to be easily relieved by community help, he was quite pragmatic in his assessment of the dire consequences of unemployment in the large city, and he therefore formulated a detailed plan and its justification as a conclusion to his proposals. This was

a plan adapted to the particular condition of a metropolis, such as London. Cases are continually occurring in a metropolis different from those which occur in the country, and for which a different, or rather an additional mode of relief is necessary. In the country, even in large towns, people have a knowledge of each other and distress never rises to that extreme height it sometimes does in a metropolis. There is no such thing in the country as persons, in the literal sense of the word, starved to death, or dying with cold from the want of a lodging. Yet such cases, and others equally as miserable happen in London. Many a youth comes up to London full of expectations, and little or no money, and unless he gets employment he is already half undone; and boys bred up in London without any means of livelihood, and, as it often happens, of dissolute parents, are in a still worse condition, and servants long out of place are not much better off. In short, a world of little cases is continually arising, which busy or affluent life knows not of, to open the first door to distress. Hunger is not among the postponable wants, and a day, even a few hours, in such a condition, is often the crisis of a life of ruin. These circumstances, which are the general cause of the little thefts and pilferings that lead to greater, may be prevented. . . .

The plan then will be: First, to erect two or more buildings, or take some already erected, capable of containing at least six thousand persons, and to have in each of these places as many kinds of employment as can be contrived, so that every person who shall come, may find something which he or she can do. Secondly, to receive all who shall come, without inquiry who or what they are. The only condition to be, that for so much or so many hours work, each person shall receive so many meals of wholesome food, and a warm lodging, at least as good

as a barrack. That a certain portion of what each person's work shall be worth shall be reserved, and given to him, or her, on their going away; and that each person shall stay as long, or as short time, or come as often as he chooses on these conditions.

If each person staid three months, it would assist by rotation twenty-four thousand persons annually, though the real number, at all times, would be but six thousand. By establishing an asylum of this kind, such persons, to whom temporary distresses occur, would have an opportunity to recruit themselves, and be enabled to look out for better employment. Allowing that their labor paid but one-half the expense of supporting them, after reserving a portion of their earnings for themselves, the sum of forty thousand pounds additional would defray all other charges for even a greater number than six thousand. (pp. 491-92)

In his later work, *Agrarian Justice*, his last great pamphlet, which had as its subtitle "Argument for Improving the Condition of the Unpropertied," Paine adds an important additional allowance to establish the basis of economic independence. Out of the national fund established through a ten percent inheritance tax on all estates, all persons annually arriving at twenty-one years of age should be entitled to receive fifteen pounds sterling each. In this case, Paine expected only one-tenth of those entitled to decline.

In this later plan, which Paine considered suitable and necessary for France—indeed, for any country with a representative government—he also adds an annual allowance of ten pounds for the blind and the lame who are totally incapable of earning a livelihood and are under age sixty and thus not yet provided for under the provision for old age pensions (*Agrarian Justice*, 336-37; hereafter *AJ*).

What was Paine's stand on the two great problems connected with the welfare state, that of property (and the economy in general) and that of the proper limits of state activity? On both issues, Paine's stand appears somewhat paradoxical: He claimed property to be a citizen's right which should be protected, but he was severely critical of large property, which for him was identical with large-scale landed estates. In *The Rights of Man*, he expressly defends free trade. His objection to the fixing of laborers' (maximum) wages stands firmly on the principle of noninterference in free competition. He certainly believed that given a nonexploitative and peace-loving government, all able-bodied citizens should be able to earn a decent livelihood.

We have to remember that Paine was not aware of the consequences of the Industrial Revolution that was just beginning. For him, the glaring contrast between abject poverty and great luxury was a result of the vanishing bad form of government: monarchical, aristo-

cratic, warlike, and wasteful. In our language, we might reformulate his view to say that all these social evils survived from feudalism.

To justify his proposals to introduce a steeply progressive inheritance tax on British landed estates and to abolish the rule of primogeniture, he expresses the view that large landed estates had been acquired by force ever since the Norman conquest; the rule of primogeniture he criticized as an especially cruel and unnatural invention of the British aristocracy by which they abandoned all their younger children to poverty or forced society to maintain them in useless sinecures. By taxing large estates heavily, the process of their being divided between several members of the family would be hastened. Paine's harshest criticism of large property was directed at the monarchy, which spent one million pounds sterling that the British taxpayers had to pay annually to maintain its king and his court in style. Paine's *Agrarian Justice* no longer deals with the peculiar British conditions but was occasioned by the French debate on what to do with the estates of the émigrés from revolutionary France.

It was just after the conspiracy of Gracchus Babeuf, whose slogans were "All Property Is Theft" and "Expropriate the Expropriators," that Paine makes it clear that he is not opposed to property as such but is in favor of a certain redistribution of wealth: "Though I care as little about riches as any man, I am a friend to riches, because they are capable of good. I care not how affluent some may be, provided that none be miserable in consequence of it" (*AJ*, 337).

He now uses the argument of the philosophers that land originally and naturally belonged to everyone; in Paine's version of this view, this makes all landed estates—and especially large landed estates—both unnatural and illegal. He suggests that this longstanding evil can be remedied not by expropriation but by establishing a national fund to be created and replenished by a ten percent inheritance tax on all estates, to be used to grant every person twenty-one years old "a sum of Fifteen Pounds sterling, as a compensation in part for the loss of his or her natural inheritance by the introduction of the system of landed property" (*AJ*, 331). "With this aid they could buy a cow and implements to cultivate a few acres of land; and instead of becoming burdens upon society . . . they would be put in the way of becoming useful and profitable citizens" (*AJ*, 338). He also suggests that the French national domains should be offered to the public in small parcels instead of being sold in large portions to the new rich.

To sum up the issue of property, although Paine regarded the redistribution of excess property not as charity but as a right of

everyone, he definitely rejected early (Babouvian) communism.

As to the issue of the desirable limits of the state, I already mentioned his early (in *Common Sense*) nearly anarchist admiration of the ease with which the Americans managed their social affairs after the breakdown of the colonial government, and also his later (*The Rights of Man*) conviction that good government is feasible and indeed necessary to overcome the misery of large portions of the population. It is only monarchical/aristocratic/court government which is exploitative and warlike; not so representative government.

In spite of the long list of welfare measures that he proposes to establish (*The Rights of Man*, part 2), Paine is still convinced that his envisaged good government—certainly what we would call a welfare state—would be a minimal state, with no army and only a small navy, no wasteful monarchy with its crowd of courtiers and placemen, and no House of Lords. The members of Parliament would, of course, work without remuneration. The public schooling that he envisages will apparently not need any special administrative apparatus; he assumed that local clergymen could ascertain that the children of those poor receiving family allowances will be sent to school and that the distressed widows of clergymen and other elderly persons would be ready to teach all those children whose parents receive an education allowance for them. The only civilians employed directly by the state that he mentions are excise officers, that is, customs officials and perhaps also tax collectors. It remains unclear who is supposed to distribute marriage and birth allowances and pensions for the two large categories of early and of regular pensioners. Paine also did not envisage the need for administrators or for social workers for his large project of housing, feeding, and sheltered employment of the unemployed and the homeless of the metropolis.

To sum up, Paine certainly did not envisage the “Leviathan” of the modern welfare state; he was basically a rugged individualist and had he imagined that the provision of services and the distribution of allowances might result in a large and costly state apparatus and in considerable state intrusion into the privacy of the citizen, he certainly would have discussed the matter.

Was Paine’s social plan nothing but an exuberant idiosyncratic appendage to his defense of popular representative government, or was he a forerunner of modern welfare state theorists? It is hard to say, especially as welfare state theory is difficult to pin down. The better Marxist writers consider most welfare state literature merely pedestrian studies in public administration and not proper theoretical

works because they avoid the big questions of the causes and the limits of the readiness of the rich and mighty to redistribute wealth. Indeed, much of the welfare state literature comprises case studies of the different services of the welfare state. What are these studies to Tom Paine? Answer: The authors of these pedestrian studies take it for granted that the contrast of misery in the midst of plenty was an offense to the moral sense and that once a way had been discovered to eradicate it, it was inconceivable that one should give up on the duty of the state to implement it, even though it might call for far-reaching improvements. In this basic stand, Paine appears to have been their forerunner. In his apparent naïveté, he said repeatedly that the rich should approve of his scheme because it is to their advantage, as it is hard to enjoy riches in the presence of abject poverty.

Much of welfare state literature deals with questions such as the following: Should social services be based on contributions, with the result that they will be unequal, or should they be equal, universal allowances from the state purse, or should there be a mixture of both? Paine argued for universalism, and by this argument, he certainly was a forerunner. Yet most important was Paine's central idea: that governments should and could effect a sufficient redistribution of wealth to prevent abject poverty. It is greatly surprising that a plan of this sort was conceived before the advent of the Industrial Revolution, long before the workers could organize and demand of the government such a redistribution of wealth, before the threat of a socialist revolution was real. It is customary to assume that welfare state thinking can only appear as a product of the sharpening conflict between revolutionary socialists and the defenders of the status quo in the period dubbed by Marxists "late capitalism." Although the case of Paine refutes this, it may be noted that at the end of the eighteenth century, Paine expected representative government based on universal suffrage to reign supreme in the whole of the civilized world within a few years' time. Yet this process took another one hundred years or if one takes women into account as well, over a century and a quarter to be accomplished. One might conclude that the appearance of the welfare state was a result of the broadening of the base of democracy.

NOTE

1. Unless otherwise stated, page numbers for quotations are from part 2 of *The Rights of Man* (Conway [1902] 1969).

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