

Callipolis Revisited

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The author of this book is a professor of philosophy and of the classics; the book is a classicist literary history of sorts. Its novelty is in its author's invitation to readers to argue with him on the Internet through an e-link that he provides. The book's other novelty is its choice to view Plato more as a writer than as a philosopher—with a philosophical purpose in mind, of course. Until recently, discussions of the greatness of Plato as a philosopher eclipsed discussions of his artistic greatness as a writer. Thus, though his *Symposium* is a major literary masterpiece of almost unequalled loveliness, commentators on it discuss its aesthetics, tending to ignore it as art. The book at hand discusses some works of Plato as literary masterpieces while discussing a famous historical problem, namely, the Socratic problem: what part of Plato's output expresses the opinions of his teacher Socrates? Unfortunately, the book is apologetic, and so its value is more that of a pioneering work than of a serious contribution. Its apologetic aspect shows when it skirts the unpleasant fact that whereas Socrates was a staunch defender of democracy, Plato was an elitist who preferred meritocracy.

Taking up the Internet link and clicking the proper place leads to an encounter with Professor Long who discusses the book in a few minutes on a brief video clip. He reports there that Socrates says that he is the only true politician in Athens by virtue of his practicing the art of dialectic properly. He rightly explains this: Socrates asserts that dialectic exercises teach one to be an autonomous seeker of justice and thus a worthy politician.

One of the best science fiction classics is *The Black Cloud* by astronomer Fred Hoyle ([1957] 2010). It is written with an elegiac undertone that makes its reading very satisfying. It is also thought-provoking. Its major thesis is

political: the global communication system is politically so powerful (already in 1957!) that the experts who run it can replace the politicians with relative ease; come the next global crisis, they will do that and prevent calamity. Hoyle takes it for granted that the diverse experts also need the oversight of a coordination expert: he is the hero of the novel. That coordinator is traditionally designated philosopher king. Plato, who coined this expression, presented him as a superexpert. Karl Popper, Plato's severest critic to date, addressed this as his major target. We have to agree with Plato, he said, that our ruler is better knowledgeable than ignorant; Plato had considered only the fully knowledgeable qualified to rule, and Popper agreed on this too, adding that as we are all ignorant, no one is qualified to rule; democracy is the lesser evil. One might very well view Popper's support for democracy as a counsel of despair, like Winston Churchill's view of it.

Hoyle's fantasy is different. He did not seek the best but the best available. Following his method, we may hope for a democracy that elects the best available candidates. This we do attempt, but with little success. To improve the system, voters have to acquire better education. And indeed, better-educated populations usually elect better rulers. Regrettably, there are dreadful counterexamples to this: in the early 20th century, the relatively well-educated voters of some European democracies submitted to the worst governments imaginable. Hence, the fortune of having good government is insecure. And so, said Popper, a good regime is one that the nation can dismiss if its judgment that a certain government is good was an error. This, said Popper, is the minimal requirement for a democracy.

Oddly, both sponsors and adversaries of democracy use the (always valid) argument that the best regime is impossible. The question that Hoyle raises and that is under dispute is, "Is it reasonable to search for a viable regime better than democracy?" Already Plato devised his utopia, the very first utopia, in efforts to answer this question. Many science fiction works comprise attempts to improve upon it with the help of some futuristic gadgets. The question remains general: does a good blueprint for a utopia help supersede democracy? Plato's own answer to it is not known as he wrote dramatic dialogues. (His *Letters* should help, but they do not.¹) And so commentators can and do disagree about whether he approved of the fruit of his own imagination. This invites reading between the lines of his works.

The idea of reading between the lines took center stage in the mid-20th century: Leo Strauss said that persecution (both religious and political) often led to a self-censorship that made authors hint at what they intended to say;

¹Plato's *Letters* are deemed not genuine as they do not yield new information.

as all hints are highly context dependent and as contexts can alter quickly, the original meaning of a text tended to disappear after a short while as readers lost the ability to decipher it. This does not hold for Plato, who suffered no persecution. The challenge is different for readers of his texts, or of any other literary texts written in relative freedom. Their authors face a different difficulty, one that Dostoevsky raised (in all of his novels and in some of his essays): it is almost impossible to find the right words, especially for vital messages. This, too, scarcely applies to Plato, perhaps the most articulate writer ever. Popper said that Plato was inhibited by the profound awareness of how very hard it was for him to persuade the citizens of Athens of his day as they adhered to democracy.

Now the first and most important rule of historiography and of literary criticism is this. Do resist the urge to read your own views into the text that you appreciate (*eisegesis*). Many authors have reported that readers identified themselves (and even their locations) with their fictitious heroes (and locations). Vladimir Nabokov ([1962] 2010) poked fun at this in his delightful *Pale Fire*, in which an autobiographical text written by one person is misread by another self-centered person as about himself. Also, authors writing about historical heroes like Moses tend to project onto their heroes their own self-images. (Even the very sophisticated writer Sigmund Freud did that.) It is thus not surprising that most commentators on Plato throughout the ages, democratic or elitist, identified their political views with those of Plato. As in the modern world technocracy became a viable option, Plato appeared less as a cultural elitist and more as a technocrat (Henwood 1979).

Popper protested against using Plato as a rubberstamp of one's own views instead of trying to examine his texts to see what he meant. For this, Popper (1945, chap. 1, VII) added, we ought to "break with the habit of deference to great men." Arlene Saxonhouse (2009) tried to do just this. She writes,

I illustrate how paying attention to the narrative style enables us to see a democratic Socrates who undermines readings of *The Republic* famously offered by Karl Popper and Leo Strauss. Plato appears then as neither a defender of the "closed society" nor an advocate of the elite rule of the wise over the many. (Abstract)

Saxonhouse portrays life in Plato's Callipolis as living in the bosom of nature in a new-age style, with total uniformity maintained by an absolute censorship. This leads to a loss of passion, not at all in the new-age style. She then adds, "Plato the author—not living in the Callipolis and not censored by his character Socrates—does not let his dialogue suffer from such

loss of passion” (Saxonhouse 2009, 740). His character Socrates is the opposite of the historical Socrates. She thus reads Plato like Popper. This is a tension, she observes, between the content and the style of Plato’s work (Saxonhouse 2009, 741). (The same holds for Plato’s complex story of simplicity, she adds; see Saxonhouse 2009, 747.) This way, she concludes, Plato is educationally² a democrat—as the character Socrates speaks in many voices, thus playing the ideal democrat even while, particularly while, advocating an antidemocracy.

The tension that Saxonhouse notices is the greatest puzzle here, as is generally admitted. Unfortunately, however, pointing at this puzzle is no critique of Popper or of Strauss. In the debate about Plato’s own views, all this does not help move things forward.

The tools of historiography and of literary criticism have better use in efforts to find out what were Plato’s own political views. But wait! Does it matter for the choice between democracy, meritocracy, and technocracy? We want the best arguments for and against each option, and Plato does offer some superb arguments. He does help us reason dialectically, and this should do. Nevertheless, historians (rather than political philosophers) may want to know what his opinions were, especially as this matters for the study of the history of the tremendous influence that he had through the ages. And as our author Long notices, the problem at hand requires first a solution to the Socratic problem. So he opens this book (p. 1) by citing a private letter from Hannah Arendt to her old *Doktorvater* Karl Jaspers to say so, and he also cites a text of Leo Strauss (p. 2) that repeats the solution to it found in Plato’s *Second Letter* (p. 7; see below).

Before going into this specific problem, allow me to notice the general attitudes in the modern world toward dialectics. A general impression of studies in the 19th century will easily indicate that the literature about political history was very lively, and that discussions of the arts, especially literature, are strangely more openly critical than of the sciences proper, in which

²This raises the question, what does Plato say about education? Popper answers (1945, Ch. 7 V): “He demands that only those who are past their prime of life should be admitted. ‘When their bodily strength begins to fail, and when they are past the age of public and military duty then, and only then, should they be permitted to enter at will the sacred field ...’, namely, the field of the highest dialectical studies.” Popper refers (n. 18 there) to Republic, 498b that “‘forbids any young man to question which of the laws are right and which are wrong, and makes them all unanimous in proclaiming that the laws are all good’. Only an old man may criticize a law, adds the old writer; and even he may do so only when no young man can hear him.”

criticism was usually tacit (Agassi 2008a). This makes it possibly useful to discuss Plato within the tradition of literary criticism.

We learn from the principles of historiography and of literary criticism that it is advisable to avoid anachronism: what may be right in some circumstances may be wrong in others—not because there is no absolute imperative and valuation but because some imperatives and valuation are qualified. (Just notice that we tend to admire an original writer but not one who rediscovers what is public knowledge. Also notice that we nevertheless encourage rediscoverers if they are beginners but not otherwise.) It is also advisable to distance ourselves from the objects of our study. It is touching but useless to identify empathy with agreement: good scholars can show empathy to the objectionable. Here, historians of science are at a great disadvantage: they take it for granted that science is inductive and that induction is kosher only when it is applied with no prejudice. This is an error. As Bernard Shaw ([1895] 1908) has put it, “To understand a saint, you must hear the devil’s advocate; and the same is true of the artist” (p. 4).

Interest in the Socratic problem, to repeat, rekindled the study of Plato. As Long notices (p. 7) in this slim volume of his, the problem was already aired in antiquity, as it is answered, although cursorily, in Plato’s *Second Letter*—regardless of whether it is genuine or a forgery. Unfortunately, the answer is cryptic: “there is no writing of Plato, nor will there be; the present are the sayings of Socrates become beautiful and new”: this leaves open the controversial question “Is democracy more or less beautiful than meritocracy?” Yet it is more of a license to approach Plato’s writings as students of the fine art of literature.

In 1945, Popper sharpened the Socratic problem, viewing Socrates as a democrat and a skeptic, and Plato as an authoritarian and a scientific dogmatist—repeatedly contrasting the two. Although references to Popper in the current literature on it are still scant,³ it is clear that he is the one who has put the problem on the agenda of the current literature on Plato and by this

³As a conspicuous example for this wall of silence, let me cite Gorman Beauchamp, “Imperfect men in perfect societies: human nature in Utopia.” *Philosophy and Literature*, 31.2 (2007): 280-293, Note 7. “Plato, *The Republic*, trans. F. M. Cornford (New York: Oxford University Press, 1948), p. 201. Subsequent references are given parenthetically in the text. For Plato’s rejection of Socrates’ democratic philosophy, see, for example, Alexander Koyré (1945, 70): “Socrates . . . addressed the people, everybody, the masses. Plato addresses an elite that he tries to mold by scientific discipline”; see also F. M. Cornford (1950, 67): “Socrates held out . . . the gift of unlimited freedom and self-rule; and Plato had foreseen that mankind would not be able to bear it. So he devised this commonwealth [in *Laws*], that the few who

very contrast. Debra Nails (1995, 131) also barely mentions Popper,⁴ and Long barely mentions her, but the logical development is nevertheless clear. She rejects Popper's solution to the problem and advances a new solution of her own. First (contrary to Popper), she declares that neither Socrates nor Plato had endorsed any specific doctrine; in particular, they did not advance any theory of knowledge. Their aim, she explains, was only to advocate the view of learning as the practice of debating. This view of learning is the one Popper ([1935] 1959, §85) has advanced. Ascribing it to Plato is quite untraditional. Traditional Plato censured the sophists for having adopted the attitude that she ascribes to him, their indifference to the question "Which theory are we to endorse?" Nail's view is that both Socrates and Plato were equally guilty of this indifference as were the sophists. So be it.

The doctrinal agreement between Plato and Socrates, Nails adds, does not make all difference between them vanish, though; they practiced the craft—the same craft—quite differently: Socrates stuck to the oral tradition, and Plato wrote copiously. Is that much of a difference? Yes, says Long. Indeed, this is a central point in this charming volume: reading is much more complex than listening.

Reading differs from speech as it allows for reading between the lines. It is an idea, perhaps only a feel, that is not stated in a given text but seen as standing behind what is written. For this, we need good and sensitive authors and readers. This raises serious problems for commentators: do they have to respond to tacit messages, and, if so, how? Expert writers of book reviews often convey the feel of a text they review by emulating it. And indeed, in the book at hand, Long emulates the style of literary critics (and I follow suit). This manner of emulation has its great advantage (of conveying what one cannot convey by the mere use of words), yet it may cause serious trouble: when the feel of a text is a certain kind of malaise, a certain kind of discontent, the reviewer may emulate it in appreciation that reads as an expression of discontent. When a commentator describes the feel of a text rather than emulate it, a different problem arises. Reviewers, who report on what is said

we are wise might keep the conscience of the many who will never be wise." Cornford imagines Socrates arraigned before the Nocturnal Council with Plato as prosecutor; and T. A. Sinclair (1968, 145) is even more emphatic: "Socrates would have met his death sooner in the Platonic city than in the Athenian." Compare this with Popper's *The Open Society and Its Enemies* (1945, chap. 8, II): "Their souls are to be treated by a Nocturnal Council of inquisitors, and if they do not recant or if they repeat the offence, the charge of impiety means death. Has he forgotten that Socrates had fallen a victim to that very charge?"

⁴See my review of it in Agassi (2008b, chap. 10, Appendix 7).

between the lines, may meet with readers' disapproval. And then, they may run into trouble: by custom, readers may require evidence, and as the evidence is between the lines, there is none to produce but the whole text, the reading of which is under dispute. Indeed, many an author put their views in between the lines exactly to dodge critics. Suppose their text has a new idea. If the idea is endorsed, they may claim priority; otherwise, they leave the scene quietly. This is a common practice, and Michael Faraday protested against it well over a century ago, but to not much avail.⁵

Much of what Plato says is between the lines simply because he wrote dialogues exquisitely. Popper views him as an advocate of collectivism in a fairly individualist society trying to overcome unspoken popular objections to his views by wooing his readers. Query: do we have to be collectivists to enjoy collectivist texts that describe scenes around the proverbial campfire? No, says Popper (1945, chap. 10. VII), as we all are tribalists at heart: it is in our genetic stuff. This sounds strange to individualist, old-style philosophers, although it is ancient knowledge that some animals are social and some not, and that we are. And between the lines, Plato conveyed at times individualism and at times collectivism, and both as forcefully as a good artist will. Does this play a role in his philosophy? No. Is it therefore irrelevant to his ideas? Again, no. He successfully wrote between the lines much that seduces his individualist readers to switch to the collectivist camp. This is Popper's repeated contention. He was censured for it.

We need a sense of proportion here: it is reasonable to notice the text before noticing the intertext, especially when reading a learned text, and it is reasonable to examine the rules of reading between the lines, the so-called hermeneutic. And so, when approaching the book at hand, we may want to notice its enormous bibliography (11 out of 198 pages)⁶ and see who are the leading recent hermeneutic authorities it cites. These are Hannah Arendt, Richard Bernstein, Jacques Derrida, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Emmanuel Levinas, Karl Popper, Rainer-Maria Rilke, Leo Strauss, and Wallace Stevens. The odd authors who stand out here as individualists are Popper and Stevens. Popper gains mention only as "one of the most influential scholars" who advocates the view that the political philosophy of Plato's *Republic* is not Socratic. The reference to Stevens is but an embellishment on an embellishment: it has to do with poetic imagination, where Stevens "takes issue with

⁵See my *Faraday as a Natural Philosopher*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press (1971, 147).

⁶This bibliography includes a page and a half of references to Long's own articles, which have served as a basis for this book.

Plato's writing" of some metaphor in a speech whose import does not depend on metaphors. The rest of the writers are all collectivists and conservatives who have trimmed their hermeneutic to the collectivist winds.

Yes, I am dragging my feet. My apology. It is simply that this charming book is easy to read and hard to understand, and so I have trouble reviewing it—right off the bat. It begins by quoting the idea that a Plato dialogue is two tiered: between Socrates and an interlocutor, and between Plato and you, his reader. Hence, we have to make a distinction here between a topology and a topography. I have no trouble with this distinction between the -logy and the -graphy: Debra Nails has elaborated on the difference between speaking and writing. (It fits nicely with my Jewish background that puts great weight on the difference between the written—the prophetic Holy Script—and the spoken—the rabbinical Talmud.) But what has this to do with topos? Yes, "topos" means place. What place does Socrates or Plato occupy? No, it is not the place that each occupies, we learn; it is the space *between* Socrates and his interlocutor, as distinct from the space *between* Plato and you, his reader. This is an expanding space: there is the community of readers and, these days, also the digital community of readers (and writers). What is this space? No explanation for the two single new words appears here. This reminds me of Kurt Vonnegut's instrument that he uses for time travel, his chronosynclastic infundibulum. The word means a funnel, he explains. If you do not know what a funnel is, he adds, ask your mom to show you one. Star Trek technobabble writer Michael Okuda does the same: when asked, "How do the Heisenberg compensators work?" he replied, "They work just fine, thank you." This book also works just fine, thank you.

The book opens with a five-page presentation of the methodology it uses, "A Dialogue Hermeneutic." Quoting Hegel, the author says, philosophy is an activity (if replacing the words of Hegel with those of Wittgenstein is okay). The chapter promises methodology but offers none; it reminds us instead that reading a text is kaleidoscopic, yet the reader cannot converse with it. A text of Plato comes to support this. So does Borges in his comparison of, and a contrast between, a few lines from the original text of Quixote and the same lines that Pierre Menard once rewrote. I admit, it is nasty of me to observe that the quotation from Plato is redundant instead of simply savoring the lovely text. I plead mitigating circumstances. It is very unpleasant to read a chapter (chapter 2) that describes the dynamics of a dialogue—*Protagoras*, in which Socrates very uncharacteristically partakes in a debate most reluctantly—with a concluding paragraph that begins with, "Thus, the dialogue itself demonstrates the contours of the topology of Socratic politics" where there is no politics and no topology and thus no "Thus," let alone my inability to find out what topology is in this context.

The author's aim is to acquire "an expanded sense of politics" from Plato's political texts: *Gorgias*, *Phaedo*, *Protagoras*, *Apology*, and *Phaedrus* (p. xix). The chief lesson, we remember, is that a true politician is an autonomous justice seeker. I see nothing more here. The absence of the *Laws* and of *Statesman* is explained (p. 4) as uninformative about Socrates. Their being informative about Plato is ignored. As to the *Republic*, the author ignores it on the advice of Saxonhouse (p. 4n).

Enough feet shuffling. The book's thesis is this: "The Socratic political logos inhabits the erotic space between interlocutors as they seek together to speak truth toward justice," yet "justice is an erotic ideal, elusive to all who reach for it even if, in the very reaching, we bring something of the ideal into reality" (168). I repeat: this charming book is easy to read and hard to understand.

On second thoughts, perhaps the book is not all that charming. Plato's early dialogues have here and there some descriptions, like Socrates playing with the hair of a young interlocutor, that may be misread as erotic rather than as merely friendly. This misreading Plato's *Symposium* should correct. The purpose of the friendly remarks is repeatedly to convey a message stated explicitly in a few dialogues. It was evidently very important for Socrates.

It is this: for a dialogue we better choose a serious question, but we better conduct it not over seriously. Now viewing the friendly flavor that Plato repeatedly adds to his dialogues as erotic may be understandable given the easygoing attitude to homosexuality in ancient Greece. Yet here eroticism appears in a barely comprehensible context. The book ends (pp. 184-5) with a section labeled "Erotic Ideals". It asserts that "the inaccessibility of the erotic ideals" should not lead to cynicism but to efforts to approximate them. Why are these ideals erotic? This question is answered by reference to a paper by David Roochnik (Roochnik, 1987). In that paper Roochnik discusses Plato's *Symposium*. He insists that there the love of truth is sexual; his arguments seem to me to show the opposite.

Back to the Socratic problem. There is no escape from it. And so we learn that "however critical the differences are between Socratic speaking and Platonic writing, it does not decisively separate Plato from his teacher" (p. 172), for they share "a vision of politics rooted in the attempt to speak, write, and act toward the best and to empower others to empower their lives by a concern for the good." This, I think, is undeniably true: to echo Shakespeare, they all were honorable people. Or, as Bernard Shaw put it

It is what men do at their best, with good intentions, and what normal men and women find that they must and will do in spite of their intentions, that really concern us. The rascally . . . are as dull as pickpockets. (Shaw 1924).

As the conclusion of this book seems frustrating, let me say that it is not that obvious. In all social and political discourses, the world over, the conflict between individual and society is taken as unavoidable; it is at times (mis)described as the conflict between freedom and justice. Almost everywhere, it is taken for granted that individuals must yield, as society has priority over any specific individual. The exception is Plato, the citizens of whose Callipolis are positively happy. Only as late as a century ago, this idea was put more generally, and by H. G. Wells, known as an author and a publicist but regrettably not as a worthy philosopher (Parrinder 1995, 52): in utopia, he said, there is no conflict between individual and social interest so that the very problem does not arise to begin with (Wells 1923, chap. 5, §3). At about the same time, Georg Simmel, known as a sociologist but regrettably not as a worthy philosopher (Lemert 1978), said (Liebersohn 1988, 126ff.) that utopia is impossible as conflict is inevitable: it can and should be contained, it cannot possibly be totally eliminated. All this hardly gains attention in the literature, and only Popper ([1935] 1945, chap. 9, VIII) says—quite emphatically in defense of Plato—that Plato was concerned chiefly with the well-being of the individual citizens of Callipolis. Popper's critics and opponents did not notice this. Nevertheless, now our author joins him. He also says that it was Plato's wish to remedy the injustice done to Socrates, that was his major motive (p. 120). Compare this with the suggestion of Popper (1945, chap. 6, VI):

I think that Plato was moved to the depths of his soul by the new ideas, and especially by the great individualist Socrates and his martyrdom. And I think that he fought against this influence upon himself as well as upon others with all the might of his unequalled intelligence, though not always openly. This explains also why from time to time, amid all his totalitarianism, we find some humanitarian ideas. And it explains why it was possible for philosophers to represent Plato as a humanitarian.

It is regrettable that Long dodges the serious limitation to this thesis as posted by Popper (1945, Addenda to Volume 1, III. Replies to A Critic, 1961, B): in

the last speech made by the Athenian Stranger in book X of the *Laws* . . . The legislation there discussed is concerned with the type of crime of which Socrates was accused. . . . while Socrates had a way out (. . . he would probably have escaped death had he been willing to accept banishment), Plato's *Laws* do not make any such provision.

Let me add, it is one thing to have citizens blissfully happy (as in Shangri-La, *The Lost Horizon*) and quite another to feed them with

propaganda that makes them think they are (as in *Brave New World, 1984*, and *Fahrenheit 451*). Oh, there is an answer to this objection (there always is) and perhaps a rather good one: “One person’s food is another person’s poison”: what is sheer propaganda for one is learning experience for another. This is refuted by the fact that the better educated will reject propaganda quicker than the less educated.

And so we are at the importance of political education. Apart from the uninformative remark that education is for virtue, we read, “For Socrates the sign of an educated person is the capacity to speak in one’s own voice and to listen in good order” (p. 34), which means education is for autonomy, for caring more about what one thinks than about what others think of one (pp. 35, 357). This is indeed true of Plato’s early dialogues, not of the *Republic* and later ones (with the possible exception of *Phaedrus*): old man Plato expresses the preference for education for autonomy only for members of the elite. Even Saxonhouse admits, we must remember, that this is what Plato advocates, even though she suggests that he did not mean it as his dialectic writing style illustrates. Admittedly, then, Plato went further away from democracy than Fred Hoyle: both viewed citizens as mostly heteronomous, but Plato spoke of the ideal Callipolis, whereas Hoyle referred to our extant, imperfect society.

Long devotes three pages to the education of *Phaedrus* (134-36). (This dialogue is especially important in the present context as, in it, Socrates condemns writing and extols speech and memory.) Long says, it seems, that the aim of education is “understanding the deep connection between the true art of speaking (technology) and the erotic engagement with truth (philosophy)” (p. 136). Wow!

Yes, I scanned the book for an explanation of its key concept “topos,” especially in connection with politics, as the author says, “This book is thus in part an investigation of the enigmatic *contours* of the topology of the topology of Socratic politics” (p. x). The passage that seems to me to offer the result of this investigation is this:

thus, to discern the eloquence of the *Phaedo as a political dialogue*, the difference between the topology of Socratic politics and the topography of Platonic politics must be maintained . . . this difference is discernible in the distinction between the last words Socrates speaks and the last written words of the dialogue; for the last words of Socrates, enjoining, as they do, those present not to be careless, point to the very site of Socratic politics as the art of caring for the soul. His final words indicate the very *topos* of the Socratic political *logos*—its topology. The last written words of the text, pointing, as they do, to the figure of a Socrates remembered and framing the dialogue as a whole in terms of justice and the self, demarcate the very *topos* of Platonic political

writing—its topography. The difference between topology and topography is, in fact, written into the very structure of the dialogue itself. (pp. 69-70)

No comment. A few authors have told me that they did not recognize their own books when reading my reviews of them. If Professor Long were to say this, I should concede at once: he wrote a book for interacting with students, and I considered it a book written for readers of this *Journal*. My excuse is that few of these readers will take up Long's challenge and correspond with him. And yet they might all find some interest in its content. After all, discussions of the problems raised here are not limited to the welcome Internet experiment that stands behind this book.

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