Two States: Not Only Possible, But Essential
By Asher Susser
July 15, 2002

It would be relatively easy for Israel to destroy the military forces of the
Palestinian Authority and reconquer all the territories. Yet not only would
this not decide the conflict with the Palestinians, it would clearly
endanger Israel's very existence as a democratic country with a solid
long-term Jewish majority. Israel would again find itself ruling over more
than three million Palestinians (in addition to more than one and a quarter
million inside the state), and embroiled in an accelerated process of losing
the Jewish majority in the territories under its control.

Within about a decade the Jews will lose their majority between the
Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River. Given this circumstance, Palestinian
leader Yasir Arafat assesses that time is working in favor of his people and
there is no pressing need for a settlement. On the contrary, in his view the
absence of a settlement serves the Palestinians' long-term interests, even
if in the short-term it involves great suffering. Hence, paradoxically, an
Israeli withdrawal, disengagement and the establishment of an independent
Palestinian state alongside Israel have become an overriding Israeli
interest and a desired solution--while for the Palestinians this is at best
a choice by default that in any event would be received with mixed emotions
and a sense of historic loss.

The Israeli-Palestinian confrontation differs from the Israel-Arab
inter-state conflict in several critical senses. One of these emerges from
the political connotations of communal identity. The crushing defeat that
Israel administered in 1967 to the Arabs, led by Abd al-Nasser, was more
than a typical military setback. The Six-Day War led to the demise of the
ideas that Nasser personified, and at their core his messianic pan-Arabism.
Simultaneously, the territorial Arab state became institutionalized and even
reinforced its public legitimacy. Arab politics became more pragmatic, with
the Arab states seeking to ensure their particular political interests
without too many ideological inhibitions. The Arab states on Israel's
borders have no interest in waging a perpetual war against a strong Israel.
Moreover, there is an international juridical foundation of inter-state
borders that can serve, at least in theory, as a basis for reaching peace
settlements that in effect embody finality.

Palestinian territorialism does not limit the conflict to known and
recognized international borders, because there are none. And Palestinian
territorial identity does not stop at the 1967 boundaries. Hence agreements
that embody finality with the Palestinians are much more difficult to
achieve, and may indeed be unattainable. Further, the Palestinians' very
communal identity was molded in the course of a bitter conflict between Jews
and Arabs over the fate of the Land of Israel. Their defeat in 1948 was a
traumatic formative experience. Defeat and refugeedom are the pillars of
Palestinian consciousness of a shared fate and national cohesion. In the
conflict between Israel and the Arab states it is possible to reach
agreements by solving the problems created in 1967, by withdrawing from
territories conquered then, without challenging the existence of the State
of Israel. But on the Palestinian track it is far more difficult, perhaps
impossible, to do so.

On the Palestinian track, apart from the "1967 questions" that await
solutions there are also "1948 questions" whose resolution is liable not
merely to detract from Israel's territorial dimensions, but to strike at its
very existence as the State of the Jewish people. At the top of the list of
"1948 questions" are two fundamental problems that Israel will be hard put
to solve in ways that satisfy Palestinian national demands: one is the 1948
refugee problem and the right of return, and the other is that of the
national identity of Palestinians who are Israeli citizens and who have
increasing difficulty coming to terms with Israel as the national state of
the Jewish people. Hence on the Palestinian track it is more realistic to
think only in terms of managing and controlling the conflict rather than
solving it with "finality."

Under these circumstances, Israel cannot allow itself to leave Arafat or any
other Palestinian leadership the right to veto fateful decision-making for
the State of Israel. They must not be permitted, in view of their avoidance
of a settlement, to lock Israel into a status quo that works to its
detriment. The establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel, even
as a consequence of unilateral disengagement, is thus specifically in the
Israeli interest. Disengagement in this sense means not only an enhancement
of Israel's near-term security through the construction of a security fence,
the dismantling of isolated settlements and a more rational military
deployment. It also means ensuring the very long-term existence of the State
of the Jewish people by guaranteeing its Jewish majority and creating a
controlled and restricted border.

Failure to take these steps will sooner or later lead Israel into the South
African model. No longer two states for two peoples, but rather one country
between the river and the sea where Palestinian Arabs are a growing
majority. At that point Israel will find itself struggling with a
Palestinian demand that is already being heard on both sides of the Green
Line, for majority rule in a single country. If the State of Israel wishes
to survive, it must do all in its power to avoid such a sorry reality of
tragic bloodshed for both sides, caused by their lack of awareness or
incapacity to make fateful decisions.

Originally published on www.bitterlemons.org