Contested Identities: Berbers, 'Berberism' and the State in North Africa

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The emergence of the Berber/Amazigh culture movement, in Morocco, Algeria and in the Berber diaspora poses important questions for North African regimes and societies as they enter the twenty-first century. Moreover, it provides fertile ground for students of nationalism, collective memory and identity. The Berber experiences in Algeria and Morocco have been quite different from one another, and thus pose different sets of questions to the respective regimes, societies and Berber communities. None the less, these experiences have resulted in an increasing self-consciousness among Berbers as Berbers in both places, which increasingly includes a more explicit political dimension. The Kabylian Amazigh coexist uneasily with state authorities within a situation of overall uncertaianty as to the future nature of the State. The Moroccan case is more amorphous, and less overtly political, but is no less part of the new Berber 'imagining'. The process of reshaping and redefining the meaning of Moroccan and Algerian collective identities has already begun and will surely be fraught with tension and difficulties. The way in which growing Berber collective self-consciousness interacts with the Moroccan and Algerian states, and with other segments of their societies will do much to determine the future course of North African affairs.

Ostensibly, one of the most surprising developments after nearly a half-century of independence in Algeria and Morocco is the emergence of a self-conscious cultural-linguistic movement among their Berber-speaking populations (20 to 30 per cent of Algeria's 31 million persons; 40 to 45 per cent of Morocco's 30 million persons). To be sure, its activities do not challenge the primacy of the state *per se*. Nor does it have an explicit political agenda, although in Algeria's case, it has begun to evolve in that direction. At the same time, while 'Berberists' are oriented primarily toward their specific national – territorial states, the Berber culture movement also postulates the existence of a transnational 'Amazigh people', drawing strength and inspiration from intellectual and cultural activities in the Berber/Amazigh[1] Diaspora, particularly France. More recently, steps have even been taken to reach across state boundaries in an institutional way, with the establishment of a 'pan'-Berber organisation, the World Amazigh Congress (WAC).

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The Journal of North African Studies, Vol.6, No.3 (Autumn 2001) pp.23–47
PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON

It was perhaps understandable that even long time observers of North Africa were caught off guard by the emergence of the Berber culture movement. After all, French colonial attempts to 'divide and rule' Algeria and Morocco – by emphasising Berber distinctiveness *vis à vis* the Arabic-speaking populations and the Berbers' supposedly tenuous attachment to Islam – had been discredited and rendered unsuccessful. Thus, it was widely expected that upon achieving independence, the new states of Morocco (1956) and Algeria (1962) would successfully incorporate and subsume the heterogeneous, tribal-oriented speakers of unwritten Berber dialects under the rubric of a homogeneous 'national' identity – based on a common Islamic faith and praxis (Sunni, of the Malikite school); the Arabic language, thanks to both its status as the sacred written language of the Qur'an and the need for a unifying, standardised idiom for building a modern society and political community; and the legacy of the struggle for independence.

The number of Berber speakers declined in the decades after independence,[2] generating, ironically enough, a gradual increase in the self-conscious manifestations of Berber culture and the demands of Berber groups. This could be explained, in part, by the threat factor: the concern with preserving a cultural and linguistic tradition perceived as being under siege. No less important was the poor performance of the state in satisfying both material and social–psychological needs, leaving an ideological vacuum . Thus, Algeria was shaken by the 'Berber Spring', a significant outburst of renewed 'Berberism' in the face of official opposition, 18 years after achieving independence. The implosion of the Algerian state, beginning at the end of the 1980s and continuing throughout much of the 1990s, posed new and more immediate challenges for the core of the Algerian Berber community and its leadership. Who was the greater enemy – the noxious and unresponsive *pouvoir* (authorities), the source of decades of repression of Berber identity and culture, or the Islamist opposition, perceived as promoting the ultimate expression of Arab-Islamism's totalitarian tendency[3] at the expense of Berber identity, language and culture? What were the Berbers' options – politically, as well as culturally? In contrast to Algeria, the independent state of Morocco, which inherited the centuries-old political traditions of the Moroccan *makhzen* (literally, storehouse; in traditional parlance, the Moroccan sultan's regime), did better in achieving practical arrangements and accommodations with its Berber groupings. In fact, the alliances forged between the king and various rural, mostly Berber notables, were crucial in enabling the monarchy to achieve hegemony over Moroccan political life, and particularly over rival, urban-based, mostly Arab political parties. In retrospect, Morocco's system of absolute monarchy at the apex of a fragmented, pluralist social and

political structure was undoubtedly better able to manage social tensions and cleavages, including the Berber-Arab one, than was Algeria's model of a revolutionary party mobilising society for development along a single axis. But Morocco, too, at the end of the twentieth century faced new challenges that required a rethinking of state–society relations, including those related to its Berber population.

This article will explore the nature of the Berber revival in Morocco and Algeria against the background of regime behaviour in these places and in light of the challenges facing both countries.

Collective Identities and Competing Narratives

Ironically, perhaps, it has been non-Berbers who have written the Berbers into the historical record as a collective, first the conquering Arabs in the seventh century, followed centuries later by Ibn Khaldun, who enshrined their history and social organisation, and then the French colonial administrators. It is only in recent decades that a self-conscious, pan-Berber identity has been asserted from within. This is not to say that modern Berber/Amazigh identity has been constructed, 'imagined' or 'invented' out of whole cloth,[4] just as the nation in general can no longer be seen as wholly modern, a 'nervous tic of capitalism', or simply the necessary form of culture in an industrial society.[5] On the contrary, the numerous manifestations of being 'Berber', ranging from various forms of a single language, social organisation, territorial cores, and daily praxis, proved to quite durable, allowing them to be included (certainly in the plural) within the broad category of pre-modern *ethnies* as expounded by one of the leading authorities on nationalism, Anthony Smith. However, Berbers rate not a mention in Smith's works.

The Amazigh revival has focused primarily on linguistic and cultural matters. But history has not been entirely neglected. Amazigh activists speak of *Tamazgha*, the land of the Amazigh, which stretches from the Siwa oasis in Egypt's Western Desert across North Africa to the Canary Islands, and as far south as Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali (some of these places no longer contain Berber-language speakers). Implicit, and sometimes explicit in their narrative is that the Arab conquest of North Africa was at Berber expense and ever since the time of Berber tribal resistance to the conquerors, they have been fighting an uphill battle to preserve their identity – the fact that they were rapidly Islamised, thus making them part of the victorious *umma,* notwithstanding. The renewed popularity among Berber-conscious families of the names of pre-Islamic Berber historical figures such as Jugurtha, Juba, and Kahina attest to their increased collective self-consciousness and historical interest, however skewed. One activist expressed himself thus:

> When will [North African governments] admit that Islam was not spread peacefully in North Africa and that many Imazighen were murdered, their houses burned, and their women taken captives as war bounty to the caliphs in the Middle East? When will they stop their Arabisation program and let North Africans speak, write and sing in Tamazight?...Before that...[they] should first allow the history [to] be known in its entirety. Today, the selective teaching of history in North Africa is such that no school child is able to relate events of the Arab invasions, even less the atrocities and other wrongdoing, which the local Amazigh population endured. No documentation on the history of wrongdoings and inhumane treatment of Imazighen exists in North Africa. The North African governments excel only in one thing: suppressing any criticism or damaging argument of the Arab-Islamic ideology.[6]

Whereas the Berberists speak of the Arab 'invasion' *(ghazw),* Arab nationalists and Muslim writers and activists of various stripes speak of Islam's 'triumph' or 'conquest' *(fath),* pointing to the benefits which the Arabs brought to North Africa, first and foremost Islam. Thus, they say, Berbers were fortunate in being allowed to subsume their tribal loyalties and become 'full and equal participants in one of the greatest civilisations in human history'. Sheikh El Bachir El-Ibrahimi, the head of the Algerian ulema in 1948, declared that the Islamisation of North Africa had brought the Berbers out of the 'dark ages', liberating them from an imposed misfortune. The submission of the Berbers to the Arabs was, he said, brotherly and respectful, and not a criminal or violent one.[7] Short shrift is given to Berber resistance, with emphasis instead placed on the instances of Arab–Berber alliances, mutual recognition and, according to one Algerian writer, an ultimate 'osmosis between Arab and Berber, creating a new and specifically North African blend of culture'. It was the discarded French-prepared history textbooks, she said, which emphasised the foreign, 'Asiatic' nature of Arab tribes that menaced a terrified population. Renewed Western interest in things Berber, she concluded, is an indication 'that the old demons of colonialism and colonial historiography are returning to the scene of their crimes'.[8]

An approximation of the truth is more elusive than either of the competing narratives. The historical interactions between Arabs and Berbers included all the above features – accommodation, acculturation, rejection, resistance, and more – depending on the time and place. The commander of the Muslim forces that initiated the conquest of Spain in 711 was Tariq bin Ziyad, a Berber from the Djerid of southern Tunisia, after whom Gibraltar is named (Jabal Tariq). Ibn Khaldun celebrated the

grandeur of the Berbers as a great nation, recording the history of their great dynasties which are inseparable from the very notion of a distinct territorial and historical Moroccan entity. At the same time, the Berbers are for him the significant Other of settled Maghribi society, noting how Berber tribes continued to rebel and apostatise at times, and often adopted dissident religious opinions. Thus, Ibn Khaldun's views of the Berber tribes were at bottom negative; he saw them as the source of repeated threats to civilised society. Indeed, in subsequent centuries, the Berbers of the Atlas mountains and Rif highlands (Morocco) retreated into relative isolation and suffered an eclipse similar to that of their counterparts in the highlands of Kabylia (Algeria).[9]

Further complicating the efforts to fashion a convincing Berber 'grand narrative' is the fact that Berbers, past and present alike, are not a homogeneous group. They constitute a 'bewildering number of cultures, economies and physical characteristics', and can at best be defined as 'Mediterranean'. Nor are they culturally immutable or immobile.[10] As for their orally-transmitted collective memory, it too was bound up primarily with local factors: clan, village, tribe, and religious order. Nonetheless, what seems to be clear is that at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the '*ideal* of Berber culture has become a major political and cultural fact' in both Algeria and Morocco, and among significant portions of the Berber diaspora as well (as a rule, diaspora populations tend toward greater cultural militancy, as part of their efforts to anchor themselves in their newer, and often unfriendly surroundings).[11] Indeed, since the whole question of collective memory is very much related to the political and cultural agendas of the present,[12] the contemporary context – the near implosion of the Algerian state and the challenges facing a post-Hasan Morocco where civil space is increasingly contested by various social forces – influences the various narratives of the Berber–Arab past. The unfolding of events in both countries will undoubtedly help to determine whether a specific 'Berber' narrative can be disseminated and internalised beyond narrow intellectual circles and can thus concretely actualise the ideal.

'Scratch a Moroccan, Find a Berber'

In the words of anthropologist David Hart, the Berber element in the Maghrib, far from being a residue, as had long been assumed by earlier generations of 'modernist' theoreticians and Maghreb and Mashreq Arab activists alike, forms the base of 'the whole North African edifice'.[13] For various historical, geographical, and sociological reasons, Morocco contains the largest Berber concentrations. The generally accepted estimate for Moroccan Berber speakers, 40–45 per cent, is considered too low by

some, who place the figure at over 50 per cent, and too high by others. Even if Arabic is currently spoken as a native language by 60 per cent of Morocco's 30 million people, there is no question that the ratio of Arabic to Berber native speakers during the period of the French Protectorate and earlier favoured the latter. Berberophones are traditionally concentrated in three distinct regions in Morocco, each with its own particular 'dialect' – Tarifit speakers in the northern and north-eastern Rif mountains and some adjacent valleys, Tamazight speakers in the mountains and valleys of the Middle Atlas region (Tamazight is also the term used to describe the language as a whole, in all of its various manifestations), and Tashelhit speakers (alternatively, Shluh) in the High Atlas and anti-Atlas mountains in south-western Morocco, extending from Ifni to Agadir along the coast, and as far east as the Draa region, including the Souss Valley. Each region contains roughly the same number of Berber speakers, five to six million according to one scholar.[14]

More recently, with the accelerated pace of urbanisation and economic integration, the medium of commerce and education for Berbers, both in their 'home' regions and in urban areas, is increasingly Arabic, along with French. Berber is thus being progressively reduced to the language of the home and intimate social gatherings, causing many Berbers to see it as an inferior, inadequate tool for communication and advancement in the modern world.[15] Already in the first decades of independence, the extension of the *makhzen* to the mostly Berber, illiterate, and desperately poor rural areas added new layers of tension to the Berbers' already difficult lives, contributing to a heightened self-awareness, on the one hand, and despair and further misery on the other.[16] When combined with Tamazight's built-in disadvantages of being neither a written language (notwithstanding the considerable efforts being made in that direction) nor the vehicle of revealed religion, it is not surprising that the very existence of Berberophone communities is considered to be at risk. At the same time, and not surprisingly, the sense of stigma is being replaced by cultural and ethnic pride in being Berber among a portion of educated Berbers, namely those who are already bi- or trilingual and whose social status is already secure.

The Berbers and the *Makhzen*

Although Berber society and 'tribalism' are by no means coterminous,[17] Berbers have been widely associated in Moroccan history with *bilad-al-siba'*, the 'lands of dissidence' often beyond the reach of the central authorities. Even for the French, subduing these areas proved to be no mean feat. Ironically, once this was accomplished, the French Protectorate regime immediately sought to cultivate the Berbers and solidify its rule *vis à vis* the

more troublesome urban Arabs. But in issuing the *dahir (zahir*: administrative edict) of 1930, which stipulated that Berber customary law would apply in Berber areas, and not Islamic law, the French sparked a sharp reaction on behalf of Berber–Arab solidarity against colonial rule that echoed throughout the Arab world.[18] At bottom, according to anthropologist Lawrence Rosen, France's error was one of 'misplaced concreteness' – that is, France gave 'reified and primary status to a distinction (Berber/Arab) which, in actual operation, is one of more ambiguous and subsidiary importance'.[19] The application of anthropological insights to political policy matters surely enriches the discourse. Still, one must be careful not to to go overboard in the other direction. Generalising from Berber–Arab interactions at a particular time and place may be appropriate in certain instances and less appropriate in others. Contemporary Berber–Arab realities may be even more different from those examined by Rosen 30 years ago than the realities of 1930 were. Indeed, even in 1930, France did succeed in forging alliances with some of the grand Berber caids, and in temporarily distancing large parts of the Berber areas from the influence of the nationalists. Jacques Berque scornfully characterised French policy as an attempt to create a *'parque Berbère'*, ostensibly in the name of preserving 'authentic' native culture. But French policy also had unintended consequences. In the Middle Atlas, for example, Berbers were progressively integrated through military service into the wider world, and exposed to Moroccan nationalism, beginning with Moroccan Arabic. The experience, which included the placing of Berber troops from different tribes together, thus weakening their particular tribal ties, contributed significantly to their eventual incorporation into the post-colonial state.[20] Eventually, Berber grand caids and bands of rebels known as the Moroccan Army of Liberation chose, for a variety of reasons ranging from sheer opportunism to genuine identification, to side with the Moroccan nationalists, headed by Sultan Muhammad V, actions which proved to be decisive in the closing stage of Morocco's struggle for independence.

Independence brought a new set of challenges to relations between Morocco's Berbers and the central authority. A number of tribal revolts during the first four years constituted not so much a challenge to the new state as, for the most part, an assertion of Berber tribal prerogatives against the domineering, patronising ways of a 'modern', Istiqlal party-dominated administration.[21] Crown Prince Hasan, as commander of the new royal armed forces, put down one of the revolts in the Rif. Among the population there are those who still remember some of the acts of brutality associated with the repression of the revolt, and throughout the long reign of Hasan as king (1961–2000), he avoided visiting the Rif region, which remained one of the country's poorest and most problematic areas.[22]

Outside the Rif, however, the story was a different one. One of the key elements of the monarchy's attainment of hegemony *vis à vis* the Istiqlal and other parties on the left was its durable alliance with rural, mostly Berber notables. This was complemented by a fragmented, pluralist political system in which a predominantly Berber political party, the Mouvement Populaire (MP), representing the rural sector, was encouraged to share in the patronage/spoils of power. As a result, rural Berbers constituted an important component of pro-monarchy political forces which acted as a check on the Istiqlal, the more-leftist Istiqlal breakaway party, the UNFP. and others, and allowed the monarchy to consolidate its position at the apex of the system as the supreme, infallible authority and arbiter of conflict.[23] The Istiqlal's pronounced anti-Berberism, which welcomed Berbers only to the extent that they had put aside their particularist identity as a relic of the colonial past, also benefited the MP,[24] whose founding congress in 1959 was marked by an unabashed defence of the *blad* (countryside) and Berberism.[25] The monarchy's heavy reliance on military officers of Berber background, at least until the *coups manqués* of the early 1970s, further reinforced the Berbers' standing with the kingdom.

Hasan's way of addressing the whole matter of the relationship between the Berber communities and the state's authority was far more subtle than the approach taken in neighbouring Algeria. Whereas Algeria's national 'project' was dominated by a single, revolutionary ideology and party, the Moroccan monarchy's slogan of 'God, Homeland and King' was based on a more inclusive, and conservative notion of Moroccan national identity under the rubric of the monarch's persona, the *amir al-mu'minin* (commander of the faithful), a position of both religious and temporal significance, which carried great resonance, in rural, less educated areas, in particular. The Berbers could easily be included within this large 'tent', and to reinforce the message of inclusion, Hasan continued the family tradition of marrying a Berber woman. However, there were important limitations. Explicit articulation of Berber identity was considered threatening and was thus forbidden. Berber political groupings, while supporting school programmes to teach Berber dialects, rarely displayed militancy in encouraging Berber cultural projects. As early as 1967, an association to promote Berber culture was allowed to operate quietly, although judging by its name – the *Association de Recherche et d'Echange Culturel* – one would could hardly guess what its agenda might be. The combination of a partly inclusive, corporatist–pluralist model of state–society relations, the ever-present hand of repression, and Berber geographic diversity resulted in public quietude throughout the 1980s on Berber-related matters, as opposed to the convulsions of the 1980 Algerian 'Berber Spring', described below.

The last decade of Hasan's rule was marked by important incremental political, social, and economic changes, from both 'above' and 'below', which significantly altered the Moroccan public landscape. In essence, Hasan sought to remake himself into a more benevolent, albeit still autocratic reformer, controlling the pace of change and thus maintaining societal and regime stability. Concurrently, he reached out to the historic opposition political parties to entice them into a power-sharing arrangement grounded in constitutional reform, encouraged the opening of Morocco to the global economy, and allowed for the expansion of civil society.

To be sure, transforming Morocco into a 'state of law', one of Hasan's declared goals, was a Herculean task in which the real work still lay ahead. Nonetheless, a new atmosphere gradually evolved. Hasan's incremental approach, in which obstacles to change remained salient, were reflected in the Berber-state nexus during the 1990s, this at a time when the implosion of the Algerian state and the increasing politicisation of the Kabylian Berber community served as a warning light. The first move toward renewed Berberist activities came in August 1991, with the issue of the Charter of Agadir by six different Berber culture associations, subsequently joined by five others. The charter denounced 'the systematic marginalisation of the Amazigh language and culture', and declared the intent to promote the constitutional establishment of Tamazight as an official language alongside Arabic, the 'integration of the Amazigh language and cultures in various areas of cultural and educational activities, as well as in teaching programmes', and the 'right to coverage in the written, audio and visual mass media'.[26]

The year 1994 proved to be a turning point of sorts. In March, a number of Amazigh activists addressed a letter to Morocco's prime minister asking for official recognition of the Amazigh language. On 1 May, seven members of Tilelli (Freedom), a Berber cultural association, were arrested in the town of Goulmima in south-east Morocco and charged with disturbing public order and threatening the 'sanctity of the state' after they unfurled banners calling for Tamazight to be recognised. They were also reportedly abused physically while in detention. Four of the seven, all teachers, were released on 17 May. The other three were sentenced to prison terms (two for two years, and the third for one) and fined 10,000 dirhams each. The harshness of the authorities' action was quickly tempered, however. Following widespread publicity, with 400 Moroccan attorneys volunteering to defend the teachers, their sentences and fines were reduced, allowing them to go free four days after their 29 June appeal.[27]

One could evaluate the episode in any number of ways. The authoritarian state apparatus had moved swiftly to punish the deviants, sending a clear message to all political and social forces. It had then

demonstrated its benevolent mercy in reducing the sentences. At the same time, the Berberists had been willing to take risks for their cause, and won considerable publicity and sympathy. At a time when Morocco was keenly interested in improving its international image, particularly in the area of human rights, as well as promoting a greater measure of political pluralism at home, it was clear that the old rules of the political game in the country were being modified. Sensitivity to the manifestations of Berberist self-consciousness was demonstrated at the top, even before the appeal against the trial, when Prime Minister 'Abdellatif Fillali announced the government's intention to initiate television news broadcasts in the Moroccan Berber dialects. These in fact began soon afterward – short news bulletins in each of the three main Berber dialects. Radio broadcasts in the three dialects were expanded considerably in subsequent years.

King Hasan's annual Throne Day speech on 20 August1994, marked a major shift in the Moroccan public discourse regarding Amazigh identity. Framing the subject in terms of Morocco's 'historical deep-rootedness', he declared that Morocco's 'dialects' (*lahjat*) were 'one of the components of the authenticity of our history'. To be sure, he declared, 'we have to hold to the language of the Qur'an but not at the expense of our authenticity and dialects, especially since there is not one of us who cannot be sure that there is in his dynasty, blood or body a small or large amount of cells which came from an origin which speaks one of Morocco's dialects.' Moreover, he stated, the use of Amazhighi dialects, together with Moroccan spoken Arabic and classical Arabic, was imminently preferable to the current mixing of Arabic with Spanish and French (and soon even English, he warned) in everyday speech, and would provide 'immunity for the future'. 'We are thinking of introducing the teaching of dialects in our education curricula', he said, 'knowing that those dialects have contributed with Arabic to building our history and glory.'

There was surely no small irony, and perhaps no small amount of cynicism in the worldly, French-educated Hasan's call for Moroccans to 'reject foreign languages in our homes and in the upbringing of our offspring'.[28] But by framing the Tamazight–Arabic question in terms of a common Moroccan identity which needed bolstering against Western intrusion, Hasan had wrapped himself in the cloak of Moroccan nationalism in a way which he hoped would help manage the increasingly public divisions and tension over the issue. In doing so, he provided crucial legitimacy and encouragement for the Berber culture movement, even though the authorities remained ambivalent toward it.

Hasan's subsequent speeches over the next five years periodically reiterated that Berber was one of the three main components of the Moroccan identity, the others being Arab and Sahrawi (to emphasise the

Moroccan links to the contested Western Sahara). In 1995 he issued a royal decree authorising the necessary curriculum changes to permit the teaching of Berber languages in the school. Years later, however, changes still had not been implemented, even as Berber associations petitioned ever more publicly for recognition of Tamazight as an official language and acknowledgment of the legitimacy of Amazigh culture as a integral part of Moroccan society. Particularly irksome was the intensification of the authorities' Arabisation campaign. A new *dahir*, proclaimed in November 1996, attempted to block parents from giving their offspring names in Tamazight, or any other language. Accompanied by an official list of Arabic names, it stipulated that 'the first name shall be an original Moroccan first name. It must not be of foreign origin...[it] shall not be based on the name of a city, a village, or a tribe. It shall not create a threat against the society's customs or national security.' Moroccans living abroad were required to receive permission from the Moroccan authorities to use a foreign first name.[29] Moroccan Amazigh associations also complained about the acceleration of Arabisation of names of towns, villages, and geographical landmarks, which in Morocco are overwhelmingly of Berber origin. Ironically, the acceleration of Arabisation came at a time when space for autonomous political and cultural action in Morocco was increasing, pointing to the profound tensions and contradictions that continued to characterise Moroccan society.

The loosening of the *makhzen*'s reins and the expansion of civil space during the second half of the 1990s opened the door to discussions regarding the nature of Moroccan national identity. For Amazigh activists, it was essential that Moroccan ethnic and cultural identity be framed in terms of an Amazigho–Arab personality. Abandoning or neglecting the Amazigh aspects of Moroccan identity, they declared, 'would be a veritable outrage against ourselves, an intolerable mutilation of our personality, an amputation of our patrimony, and a denial of history'.[30] Their battle was not merely against the recalcitrant or hesitant authorities. They were also aware of the need to engage in both dialogue and competition with other cultural identity orientations, such as Islamism and Arab nationalism.[31] Indeed, far more than the Berberists, Islamist movements were increasingly making their impact in the Moroccan public sphere, and they perceived the Berber culture movement to be a threat to their own programme to Islamise Moroccan society. In 1997, the leading Islamist thinker and spiritual leader of the officially banned *Harakat al 'Adl wal-Ihsan* (justice and charity movement), Shaykh 'Abd al-Salam Yasin, published a book entitled *Dialogue with an Amazigh Friend (Hiwar ma 'a Sadiq Amazigh)*, in which he laid out his objections to the Berberist revival. To be sure, Yasin wrote, he did not reject the revival of Amazigh tradition or the discussion of its

glorious history. Indeed, Amazigh history was filled with praise for the Islamic message, and it included active participation in waging *jihad* against tyranny and imperialism. The problem, he said, was that Amazigh cultural revival had taken on a political dimension, and was being promoted as part of the Western efforts to foster a new world order aimed at debasing and fragmenting Islam and keeping it weak through the cultivation of ethnic differences. Moreover, he claimed, the rejection of the primacy of Arabic, embodied in the demand for constitutional change to recognise Tamazight as an official language, and the efforts to revive the ancient Tifinigh script were not only a service to francophone imperialism but also tantamount to blasphemy against the Qur'an and Allah.[32]

Berberists responded in kind. Ahmad 'Asid used Shaykh Yasin's statement that the modern Arabic used in the daily media was 'weak' and 'rotten', and could in no way be compared to the majesty of the Arabic of the Qur'an, to attack the Islamists and the proponents of Arabisation. Language in the modern age, 'Asid declared, needs to be both open to foreign influences and stem from one's own society in order to be able to deal with changing situations.[33] Moreover, 'Asid claimed, the insistence on Arabism and the nobility of the Arabic language as being the combined product of religious and national feeling had no basis either in religious texts or in the conduct of the Prophet's companions or the '*ulama* (men of religion) in early Islamic times. Berberists, he emphasised, were not inherently hostile to the Arabic language, but rejected the notion that its protection required that Tamazight be sacrificed.[34] As for the traditional accusation that a 'foreign hand' was behind the Amazigh movement, Berberists responded by pointing to the various forms of involvement on the part of Iran, Afghanistan, and Saudi Arabia on behalf of Islamist movements.[35]

Tensions between the two groups took a new turn in 1999, as plans went forward to publish a translation of the Qur'an into Tamazight, a project which had been ten years in the making. Berber intellectuals were said to believe that it would shake up Islam the way translations into vernacular languages helped to undermine the hegemony of the Catholic Church in medieval Europe. The translator, a high school history teacher in Casablanca, Johadi Lhoucine, was dubbed a Muslim Martin Luther. Ironically, the Qur'an had already been translated into more than 40 languages. However, Moroccan Islamists viewed a Tamazight translation as posing a real threat to the primacy of Islam as they understood it, and called Berberists the 'new Barghawatists', referring to a ninth century Berber heretic who promoted himself as a prophet and wrote an imitation Qur'an in Berber.[36] The publication by Berber activists of studies of the Barghawata and pre-Islamic Berber culture seemed to confirm their fears.[37] In this

particular instance, the authorities blocked the publication of the translation, showing their ambivalence toward the promotion of Tamazight and their concern with maintaining social order.

At the same time, many people within Morocco's government of *alternance*, established in March 1998 under the prime ministership of `Abderrrahmane al-Youssoufi of the historic left-of-centre USFP party (whose supporters included a small number of mostly urban, educated Berbers) supported the Amazigh movement as part of their advocacy of greater democratisation, the promotion of civil society and, no less important, as a counterweight to the Islamist movement. One practical manifestation of the left's sympathies was the fact the USFP's French daily paper, *El Bayane*, published a weekly page in Tamazight with Latin characters.[38] No doubt both King Hasan and his son Muhammad, who succeeded him in July 1999, also shared the secular left's understanding of the need to counterbalance the Islamist trend, even if they were less committed to the values of democracy and human rights *per se*.

This trend within the government found favour among Berberists; democracy was a basic prerequisite for the development of Amazigh culture.[39] Nor was this merely a matter of importance to intellectuals; as one activist noted, what really counted was how this affected matters of daily living – for example, whether, when a Berber went to a hospital and was unable to understand anyone, he was called an 'idiot'.[40]

While not formally challenging the legacy of his father, King Muhammad VI quickly sought to put his own stamp on Moroccan affairs as a kinder, gentler monarch attuned to the needs of his people. In October 1999, less than three months into his reign, he made a historic journey to the northern provinces, the area his father had studiously avoided visiting. The trip, and the outpouring of the goodwill wherever he went, was especially poignant on a number of accounts. Historically, the northern Rif region was often outside the *makhzen*, and its integration into independent Morocco remained only partial, socially and economically. As noted earlier, the forceful suppression of a Rifian revolt in January 1959 by the newly independent royal armed forces (FAR), commanded by the then Crown Prince Hasan, had not been forgotten. Moreover, during January 1984 riots Hasan had issued a stern reminder that he would repeat his actions of 1959, if necessary. Thus, the tumultuous welcoming of Muhammad – in Tetouan, for example, the site of a particularly brutal massacre carried out by his father, he was greeted with rose petals – spoke volumes about the feelings of hope generated by his ascent to the throne.[41] In addition to the promotion of social and economic development and the alleviation of poverty, Muhammad also used his trip to promote explicitly Berber–Arab reconciliation in a highly symbolic fashion. The son of Muhammad bin

'Abd al-Karim al-Khattabi, the mythical Berber Muslim leader of the Rifian rebellion against Spain and France and the short-lived Rif Republic between 1921 and 1926, journeyed from Cairo at the king's invitation to meet him during his visit to the Rif. The son received a pledge to restore the neglected ruins of his father's headquarters in Ajdir.[42]

Interestingly, the visit pointed again to the multiple ways in which symbols and the legacies of individuals can be appropriated and reworked in contested ways for specific purposes. For young Rifians, 'Abd al-Karim had become a symbol of Berber pride, defiance, and independence, and the flag adopted by the Amazigh movement was visible everywhere the king went, even being engraved into trees and telegraph posts.[43] The king himself, by honouring 'Abd al-Karim, was obviously looking to emphasise that the Berbers were an integral part of the Moroccan fabric. The Islamists, for their part, emphasised 'Abd al-Karim's Islamic credentials as an 'alim seeking to unite the Berber tribes under Islam in resistance to colonial powers.[44] Similarly there is contention with regard to the mythical Berber queen Kahina (priestess) who initially resisted the Arab conquests and who, according to an Algerian feminist writer, is claimed by three religions but remains nameless and is idealised by contemporary Berbers.[45]

Algeria: Berberism Defiant[46]

In some respects, the Algerian Berber experience resembles that in Morocco: the division into distinct geographical areas – four in Algeria's case; the tribal nature of traditional society; the importance of Islamic 'orders' in social and religious life; strong resistance, but also accommodation at times to the French colonial power, which sought to play the 'Berber card' against the 'Arabs' to strengthen their rule; and active participation in the nationalist struggle for independence. Both communities faced the pressures of state policies promoting modernisation and homogenisation, including large-scale Arabisation campaigns that reduced the number of Berber speakers. At the same time, the Algerian experience differs in significant ways, both historically and socially, resulting in a far more adversarial relationship between the post-independent Algerian state and significant portions of its Berber community.

One fundamental difference relates to the broader history of the region. Morocco, apart from Egypt, has the longest history of 'stateness' among Arab countries, in which the early Berber Muslim dynasties played central roles. Moreover, Morocco never came under Ottoman rule, unlike Algeria; no less important was its relatively 'light' experience under colonial rule. Algeria, by contrast, experienced 132 years of direct and often brutal French rule, which heavily shaped both the state as a whole and its Berber

communities in particular. Algeria's bloody war of independence is in sharp contrast to Morocco as well. Most important, perhaps, were the differences in regime policies toward the Berber populations. The post-colonial Algerian state, unlike the Moroccan kingdom, had an explicit, revolutionary creed which sought, Jacobin-like, to forcibly mould society under a single state socialist Arab-Islamic banner.

The social–demographic–geographic profile of Algerian Berbers differed from that of Morocco in significant ways as well. Whereas the three Berber-speaking communities of Morocco are roughly equal in size, Algeria's Kabylian Berbers, from the Kabylia mountainous region south-east of Algiers, constitute approximately two-thirds of Algeria's Berber population. The second largest group are the Chaouias, from the Aures mountains further east, south of Constantine. The two remaining groups are insignificant in national terms – the Mzab (Ibadi Muslims) in the south around Ghardaia, and the Touareg nomads of the Sahara Desert. The Kabylians are unique among the Berbers in that they have a long history of corporate identity and have been intimately involved in major developments throughout Algerian history, since the time of the French conquest – from their fierce resistance to French rule, to being the subject of sustained French attention in an effort to wean them away from Algeria's Arab Muslims (far more so than in Morocco), to their over-representation among both immigrant workers in France and in the Algerian state apparatus, to their essential role in the struggle for independence, at both the elite and mass levels. No less significant, from a contemporary perspective, is the fact that from the late 1940s, Kabylian intellectuals tendered an alternative, minority view to the dominant stream promoting an Arab-Muslim Algeria. They instead emphasised the need for an 'Algerian Algeria', whose identity was, and should remain, intimately linked with the population's employment of Berber dialects and Algerian colloquial Arabic, and not the modern standard Arabic being imported from the Arab East. Although their ideas fell on deaf ears, they served as a precursor to post-independence developments.

To be sure, as William Quandt has pointed out, a Kabylian leadership group with close ties to the Kabylian population at large never developed during the 1950s, and Berber-Arab distinctions were never as important as other factors in explaining intra-elite cleavages. Still, as Quandt notes, there was a Kabylian dimension to the power struggles that engulfed the Algerian elite in the aftermath of independence.[47] Attempts to oppose the emerging hegemony of the Front de Libération National (FLN) were led by the Tizi-Ouzou group, and eventually centred around the personality of Hocine Ait Ahmad, a Kabylian of noble background and one of the 'historic chiefs' of the Algerian revolution. Operating under the banner of the newly formed

Forces des Fronts Socialistes (FFS), Ait Ahmad led an abortive armed revolt, not on behalf of Kabylian separatism but in support of greater participation and integration in the new Algerian state.[48] Its utter failure, and Ait Ahmad's exile to Europe, encouraged the authorities to maintain an uncompromising attitude toward all manifestations of a distinct Kabylian identity, only to have it rebound in their faces.

Throughout the 1970s, the regime's efforts to centralise authority and promote national integration, while running roughshod over Kabylian sensibilities in the cultural sphere, produced a simmering backlash. Ideological guidance came from an amorphous Berber Cultural Movement (MCB), made up largely of Kabylian students and supported by Berber intellectuals in France. Its agenda was both particular and national: opposition to compulsory Arabisation, insistence on official recognition of the Amazigh language and culture, and a demand for Western-style liberalisation and democratisation, which these Kabylians viewed as the only way to guarantee their cultural and ethnic rights within the Algerian state.[49]

The open confrontation between Kabylian Berbers and the authorities in March–April 1980 came to be known as *le printemps Berbère* (the Berber spring), an evocation of the cultural flowering in Prague in 1968 before the Soviet crackdown. The regime's determination to accelerate the process of Arabisation in the educational system, from primary schools to university, its increasingly Islamic coloration, in order to compete with Islamist societal currents, and its repression of Berber particularism, had all led to the sharper drawing of Berber/Arab-Islamic cultural and linguistic battle lines. The result was the death of 30 to 50 persons and the wounding of hundreds in the police crackdown on striking students and workers in Kabylia's provincial capital of Tizi Ouzou. The police crackdown constituted another heavy-handed effort by the authorities to put the Berber genie back in the bottle. But the event had the opposite effect, helping to further consolidate Kabylian identity and society and making its activists well placed to take advantage of the sudden opening up of Algerian political life in 1989, following the *intifada* of October 1988.

The implosion of the Algerian state in the early 1990s confronted the Kabylians with new challenges and opportunities. Alone among Algeria's provinces, Kabylians overwhelmingly opposed the Islamist *Front Islamique du Salut* (FIS) in the 1991 general elections, giving the bulk of their support to the FFS, which advocated a neutral position between the FIS and the government, and a small percentage to the more militantly secular *Rassemblement pour la Culture et la Démocratie* (RCD), headed by one of the leading MCB activists, Dr. Sa'id Sa'di. The FFS's agenda was more 'national', the RCD's more strictly communal/ethnic. Nonetheless, their

common vision of modern Algerian culture, combining an attenuated Islam, Taqbaylit (Kabylian Berber), homage to Kabylian village customs and traditions, and French-centred modernity, was deeply at risk as the Algerian state slid into civil war in 1992. Islamist physical attacks on Kabylian Berber artists as symbols of a decadent evil culture, including the murder of Tahar Djaout, a Kabylian writer and polemicist, and the kidnapping of the singer and poet Lounes Matoub, drove home the sense of communal vulnerability.

Throughout the first years of the civil war, the FFS had continued to speak in 'national' terms, calling for a 'dialogue for historic reconciliation'. The RCD, on the other hand, emphasised the priority of defeating the Islamist forces, while also opposing the regime. Increasingly, this message fell on receptive ears. What was needed, said Sa'di, was comprehensive resistance by all forces in Algerian society opposed to both the government and the fundamentalists, to be implemented by strikes, school boycotts and armed self-defence militias.[50] Three widely observed general strikes during the fall of 1994, in support of the demand for official recognition of Tamazight and Berber culture, and a concurrent extended school strike, marked a turning point.

Broad recognition of the Berber aspect of Algeria's existential crisis now came from two different directions. In January 1995 a joint declaration of eight opposition parties, including the FFS, stated that 'the components of the Algerian character are Islam, Arabism, Tamazight, and the two cultures and languages contributing to the development of that character. They should have their place and should be strengthened in the institutions, without any exclusion or marginalisation.'[51] Three months later, and just days after massive demonstrations in Kabylia commemorating the fifteenth anniversary of the Berber Spring, the Algerian *pouvoir* acknowledged the legitimacy of Tamazight as well, announcing that it would create Le Haut Commissariat à L'Amazighité (HCA), to be attached to the president's office and 'charged with the rehabilitation of Tamazight [culture]...one of the foundations of the national identity, and the introduction of the Tamazight language in the systems of education and communication'.[52] As in the case of Hasan's statement in Morocco the previous year, Berber culture had now been legitimised by the authorities, while falling short of enshrining Berberist demands in law. Unlike in Morocco, Kabylian-regime dynamics remained fraught with tension, even though the authorities in Algeria, as in Morocco, viewed the Berbers as useful in helping to counteract the Islamists.

Kabylian oppositionist tendencies were expressed on many levels. In November 1995 the RCD's Sa'di received over one million votes (9.3 per cent) in the presidential election (the FFS, boycotting the vote, did not

tender a candidate). Subsequently, the RCD renewed its strident opposition to what it called a 'presidential dictatorship'. The regime's gestures toward the Berbers were deemed insufficient. For example, while the amendments to the Algerian constitution, approved in a nationwide referendum in November 1996, recognised Amazighité (Berber identity) as part of Algeria's common heritage, they failed to recognise Tamazight as an official language. Kabylian unhappiness was expressed by the low turnout for the referendum – only 25 per cent in Tizi Ouzou, the provincial capital – with a large majority voting against the proposed amendments.[53]

Eighteen months later, in mid-1998, Kabylian anger burst forth in a way not seen since 1980. The background was twofold: the 1991 law making Arabic the sole language of all government and civil institutions and all commercial contracts was scheduled to go into effect on 5 July; and Lounes Matoub was assassinated by the radical Group Islamique Armée (GIA) on 25 June, just a few weeks after having returned from France, where he had lived for most of the time since his kidnapping and subsequent release in 1994. The Arabisation law, declared the RCD, was racist, and tantamount to bringing FIS to power; the proponents of the law accused its opponents of raising the issue to conceal their allegiance to the French language. Against this background, Matoub's assassination lit the spark. Matoub had only just finished preparing his fourth CD since the start of Algeria's civil strife. Its title song, 'Open Letter to...' constituted a powerful rejection of Algeria's post independence regime and a defiant assertion of Amazigh identity in the context of struggle. Amazigh lyrics were set to the tune of the Algerian national anthem, with the refrain 'And Betrayal, and Betrayal, and Betrayal'.

> The resurrected forces of injustice have brought tragedy.
> They have dyed our roots, which are now crumbling.
> They have used religion to paint Algeria Arabic...
> Hungry but peaceful, we will never submit
> As strong men and women, we will never wear the yoke
> No tragedy can impede our journey
> Just as floods do not unroll ancestry
> With our identity and wisdom, we will free Algeria.[54]

Lounes Matoub's funeral procession on June 28 turned into an anti-government demonstration of 100,000 persons which erupted into weeks-long outbursts of protest and violence in Kabylia, including attacks against government property and the tearing down of Arabic-language signs. Banners and slogans at the funeral procession included 'no peace without the Berber language', 'we are not Arabs', and '*pouvoir* assassin, [President

Liamine] Zeroual assassin'. The demonstrations subsided after several weeks, and the continued rivalry between the FFS and RCD weakened Kabylian leverage on the authorities.[55]

In *Le Monde*, Salem Chaker, the dean of Berberist studies, wrote that since 1980 the simple question for Berbers was 'to be or not to be'. The youth of Kabylia, in particular, had responded to the post-colonial era by asserting their Berber identity within the Algerian state. However, the regime's responses, from authorising cultural associations, to creating Berber departments in two universities in Kabylia, to faculties of Berber language in colleges and lycées, to a homeopathic dose of Berber on television, was insufficient, particularly in the light of relentless Arabisation. What was needed, Chaker declared, was to break the taboo: the Algerian state as constituted in 1962, was not 'ours' and must change. He advocated linguistic and cultural autonomy for Berber-speaking regions, especially Kabylia, within a democratic Algeria.

Chaker had already raised the possibility of a federalist model for the country. Other voices now also spoke explicitly of Kabylian 'borders' and 'areas' and called for the federalisation of the country. Indeed, the Canada-based Kabylian scholar Amar Ouerdane had published a text advocating federalism as a solution to Algeria's crisis, pointing out that the most advanced states in the world were federal states.[56] More recently, a petition initiated by Berber activists, intellectuals, and artists emphasised the demand for recognition of the Amazigh language in Kabylia and other regions, with the 'framework of linguistic and cultural autonomy', and as part of the 'construction of a genuine democratic alternative in Algeria'. A language, they declared, 'can only last on a well-defined territory and as a means of communication of a well-defined community'. The petition concluded by emphasising the imperative for 'the demand for Amazigh linguistic and cultural rights…[to] conserve its peaceful character and oppose firmly any tendency and manipulation toward violence'.[57]

For the Algerian authorities, complete repression of Amazighité in Kabylia was no longer possible. But to Berberist chagrin, the state relentlessly pursued manifestations of Berber identity elsewhere, prohibiting Tamazight inscriptions on signs, magazine covers, and cultural organisations, and prohibiting the usage of Tamazight first names outside Kabylia.[58] Tamazight, declared Algeria's new president 'Abd al-'Aziz Bouteflika, would never be consecrated in law as an Algerian national language.[59] With the Berberist parties holding less than 11 per cent of the seats in Algeria's parliament, their ability to lead a transformation of the Algerian state was clearly limited. Within Kabylia, however, the Berberist agenda had attained predominance.

International Berberism

The role of diaspora Berbers, primarily in France but more recently in other European countries and in North America, in promoting Berber identity has been absolutely crucial to the Berber culture movement in general, and to its particular manifestations in Algeria and Morocco. The establishment of the *Académie Berbère* in 1967 and the *Group d'Etudes Berbères* at the University of Paris-VIII-Vincennes,[60] and the ongoing publishing of the authoritative *Encyclopédie Berbère*[61] has been vital to the efforts to develop and standardise Tamazight as a written language and thus vital to the spread of Berber collective consciousness.[62] No less important but far less studied has been the cultural flourishing of Berber music and poetry, attracting a wide following among the *Beur*, France's North African Muslim and strongly Berber immigrants.

Considerable attention has been paid to the construction and expansion of a Muslim identity among France's North African immigrants as a response to their often difficult experiences at the margins of French society. The refashioning and development of a hybrid Berber identity among a portion of these immigrants has drawn scant notice by comparison.[63] But the impact on Berber affairs in Morocco and Algeria is there and sure to grow: The traffic between North Africa and Europe is two way. In addition, as is the case with Islamist opposition movements, the democracies of Western Europe and North America provide important operating space for Berberists, away from the repression at home. This crucial space, in recent years, includes a proliferation of internet sites, e-mail networks, and, most recently, the inauguration of a Berber satellite television station. Their use of the latest global technologies to spread their message notwithstanding, Berber activists characterise their fight as 'part of the vast movement of resistance to globalisation, which is a movement that is in essence against cultural identities'.[64]

Initial moves to institutionalise an international Berber movement came in 1994 at a film festival in Britanny dedicated to the *Peuple Amazigh* (the location could hardly have been coincidental, in light of the Bretons' own linguistic–cultural self-assertiveness in recent years). A pre-congress was held in September 1995 at Saint-Rome de Dolan, and in late August 1997, the First World Amazigh Congress (WAC) was held in Tafira, Canary Islands. Nineteen Moroccan cultural associations and 13 Algerian ones were represented, although the authorities at the very last minute prevented most of the Algerians from attending. Delegates from Libya, Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, and the host Canary Islands (where Berber was no longer spoken) attended, as did other representatives from nine European countries, the United States, and Canada. The delegates made considerable

efforts to underline the apolitical and independent character of the congress. However, policy and personal disagreements marred the meeting. Nonetheless, the fact of the meeting was a feat in itself.[65]

The WAC's second Congress met three years later in Brussels. Prominent among its resolutions were reference to the threat posed by the North African states against the organisation's independence; official and national recognition of Tamazight; and support for the establishment of a 'true Amazigh sovereignty' in all Amazigh lands, 'contrary to our preceding liberation fights which profited Arabo-Islamism'.[66] Three months later, the WAC's newly functioning Federal Council met in Paris, where it publicly decried the new pressures allegedly being applied against Amazigh activities in both Morocco and Algeria outside Kabylia, while characterising the Libyan regime as 'practising cultural and linguistic genocide' against the Amazigh people. The council also recommended the application of pressure within Europe so that the European Charter on regional or minority languages could be adopted and applied in all states. Disagreements within the Moroccan Amazigh movement, particularly over whether or not to form a political party, were the subject of discussion as well. The council avoided taking any specific stance, while recommending that the Moroccan movement *'concrétise…le marche national amazighe'* as quickly as possible.[67]

Conclusion

Writing in the early 1970s, Ernest Gellner wrote that 'the Berber sees himself as a member of this or that tribe, within an Islamically-conceived and permeated world, and *not* as a member of a linguistically defined ethnic group, in a world in which Islam is but one thing among others.'[68] Even in the context of the time, one may take issue with Gellner's unwillingness to categorise the Berbers as an ethnic group, while acknowledging Lawrence Rosen's observation that ethnicity constituted only one, and not necessarily the most important basis of any Moroccan's social identity.[69] Thirty years later. Gellner's postulation has clearly been superseded by events. The political, social, and cultural evolutions of Morocco and Algeria, coupled with developments within the Berber diaspora, have not only resulted in an increasing self-consciousness among Berbers as Berbers, certainly at the elite level and increasingly at the mass level, but have also given that self-consciousness a more explicit political dimension. The Kabylian Amazigh appear to fit the definition of a modern *ethnie*[70] which coexists uneasily with state authorities within a situation of overall uncertainty as to the future nature of the state. The Moroccan case is more amorphous, and less overtly political, thanks in part to more nuanced regime policies, but it is no less

part of the new Berber 'imagining'. Indeed, we can expect that the whole subject of determining Berber identity and its relationship with the state and other portions of Moroccan society will be a part of the larger picture in the years to come. A true Berber 'internationalist' perspective appears limited mostly to diaspora intellectuals, but their activities reverberate within both 'home' communities. Were Algeria and Morocco eventually to establish the much ballyhooed, but currently remote ideal of a 'greater Arab Maghrib', the Amazigh communities of both would most likely strengthen their ties with one another in ways that would promise to be most interesting. For now, though, and for the foreseeable future, the focus will remain state centred. With the Moroccan *makhzen* and the Algerian *pouvoir* each facing challenging and uncertain futures, Berber–state relations in each country are sure to be complex and multifaceted. No less significant will be the Berberist relations with other segments of Moroccan and Algerian society, particularly the Islamist movements. The process of reshaping and redefining the meaning of Moroccan and Algerian collective identities has already begun and will surely be fraught with tension and difficulty. Berberists have recently adopted an additional tack to advance their cause, following the path of other beleaguered minority groups by seeking inclusion in the growing global discourse on human rights. Ideally, for Berberists, the Moroccan and Algerian polities will evolve into ones both inclusive and more tolerant of diversity, allowing for cultural and linguistic flourishing within a state that practices real democracy, adheres to the rule of law, and respects human rights, thus allowing the state to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century.[71] In the meantime, in the words of two scholars, the Berbers may well have to practise 'unabashed cultural chauvinism' in order to preserve and defend their language and newly [re-?]awakened collective identity against the demographic tide of Arabic and French speakers, and to ensure a firmer dissemination of the explicit Berber *idée* from the elite to the mass level.[72]

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author wishes to thank Mordechai Tamarkin, Ofra Bengio, Meir Litvak and Gideon Gera for their helpful insights and suggestions, and Lisa Perlman for her linguistic polishing.

NOTES

1. Since antiquity, the indigenous peoples of North Africa between Egypt's Western Desert and the Atlantic Ocean have been known by the once contemptuous epithet 'Berber', from the Greek *barbaroi* (barbarian). The term has been gradually adopted by the peoples themselves, along with, more recently, 'Amazigh' (free man), who speak variants of the Tamazight language. In this article, I use the two terms interchangeably.
2. See, for example, Yamina El Kirat, 'Some Causes of the Beni Iznassen Berber Language

Loss', *Langues et Stigmatisation Sociale au Maghreb, Peuples Méditerranéens* 79 (April–June 1997) pp.35–54. Michael Brett and Elizabeth Fentress, in *The Berbers* (Oxford: Blackwell 1996) pp 276–7, consider the accepted percentages of Berber speakers in Morocco and Algeria to be 'decades out of date', and in fact significantly lower.
3. The phrase is Salem Chaker's, in 'Constantes et mutations dans l'affirmation identitaire Berbère' in S. Chaker (ed.), *Berbère, une identité en construction. Revue de l'Occident Musulman et de la Méditerranée* 44 (1987) p.31.
4. Benedict Anderson's notion of 'imagined community' has often been misinterpreted this way. For his real intent, see *Imagined Communities* (London and New York: Verso 1991) pp.5–7; for an emphasis on the manipulative aspects of nationalism, see Eric Hobsbawm and Terrence Ranger (eds.), *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
5. Anthony Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986) p.3.
6. Zighen Aym, 'It is Time for an Apology from North African Governments', *Amazigh Voice* 9/2&3 (Spring/Summer 2000) pp.11–2.
7. Mohand Tilmatine, 'Religion and Morals of Imazighen according to Arab Writers of the Medieval Times', *Amazigh Voice* 9/2&3 (Spring/Summer 2000) pp.14–5.
8. Aicha Lemsine, 'Berberism: An Historical Travesty in Algeria's Time of Travail', *The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs* (January/February 1995).
9. Brett and Fentress (note 2) pp.152,173.
10. Ibid. p.4.
11. Ibid. p.8.
12. John R. Gillis (ed.), *Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1994).
13. David Hart, 'Scratch a Moroccan, Find a Berber', *Journal of North African Studies* 4/2 (Summer 1999) pp.23–6.
14. Fatima Sadiqi, 'The Place of Berber in Morocco', *Berber Sociolinguistics, International Journal of the Sociology of Language* 123 (1997) p.13.
15. Moha Ennaji, 'The Sociology of Berber: Change and Continuity', in *Berber Sociolinguistics, International Journal of the Sociology of Language* 123 (1997) p.29.
16. See the powerful stories of Brick Oussaid, *Mountains Forgotten by God* (Boulder, CO: Three Continents Press 1989); and Muhammad Shukri, *For Bread Alone*, trans. Paul Bowles (London: Peter Owen Books 1973).
17. David Hart, 'Tribalism: The Backbone of the Moroccan Nation', *Journal of North African Studies* 4/2 (Summer 1999) pp.7–22.
18. For a new look at the Berber *dahir*, which includes an Amazigh activist's recent interpretation of the episode as having been manipulated by Moroccan nationalists to boost their credentials, when in fact it was the Berbers who had resisted the French more than the Arabs, see David Hart, 'The Berber Dahir of 1930 in Colonial Morocco: Then and Now (1930–1960)', *Journal of North African Studies* 2/4 (Autumn 1997) pp.11–33.
19. Lawrence Rosen, 'The Social and Conceptual Framework of Arab-Berber Relations in Central Morocco', in Ernest Gellner and Charles Micaud (eds.) *Arabs and Berbers: From Tribe to Nation in North Africa* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books 1972) p.173.
20. Moshe Gershovich, *French Military Rule in Morocco* (London: Frank Cass 1999) p.216; and Gershovich, 'The Impact of French Colonialism in Contemporary Morocco' (paper delivered at the 7th International Association of Middle Eastern Studies conference, Free University of Berlin, 4–8 October 2000).
21. Hart (note 17) pp.18–9. However, the second phase of the Rif uprising, particularly in January 1959, did constitute more of the traditional pattern of *siba'*, i.e. in the direction of seeking greater tribal independence. John Waterbury, *Commander of the Faithful* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson 1970) p.242.
22. Adel Darwish, 'Mohammed's First 100 Days', *The Middle East* (Dec.1999).
23. Waterbury (note 21); Remy Leveau, *Le Fellah Marocain, défenseur du trône* (Paris: Presses De La Fondation Nationale Des Sciences Politiques 1985).
24. Brett and Fentress (note 2) p.195.
25. Waterbury (note 21) p.244.

26. Azzedine Layachi, *Civil Society and Democratization in Morocco* (Cairo: Ibn Khaldun Center and Dar al-Ameen 1995) p.139.
27. *Amazigh Voice*, 3/2 (Nov. 1994): US Department of State. 'Morocco Human Rights Practices 1994'.
28. The text of Hasan's speech is in Moroccan RTM TV, 20 Aug. BBC Monitoring, Summary of World Broadcasts 4, *The Middle East*, 23 Aug. 1994, pp.19–20.
29. *Amazigh Voice*, 7/2 (Spring 1998).
30. Abdesselam Cheddadi, 'Pour une politique de la langue', *Langues et culture au Maghreb. Prologues* 17 (1999) p.34; for a practical manifestation of this common identity, see Mohamed Chtatou, 'The Influence of the Berber Language on Moroccan Arabic', *Berber Sociolinguistics, International Journal of the Sociology of Language* 123 (1997) pp.101–18.
31. From Conference Proceedings of 30th anniversary of the Moroccan Society for Research and Cultural Exchange (*Al-Amazighiyya al-An*) (Amazighness Now) (Kenitra, Morocco: Al-Bukeili Publishing 1998) p.7.
32. *Al-Jamaa Review* 4 (http.aljamaareview.com; publication of the Moroccan Islamist movement, al-*'Adil wal-Ihsan*). Ahmad 'Asid, *Al-Amazighiyya fi Khitab al-Islam al-Siyasi* (Amazighness in the Discourse of Political Islam) (Kenitra, Morocco: 1998 Al-Bukeili Publishing) pp.117–8.
33. 'Asid (note 32) pp.122–4.
34. Ibid. p.124.
35. *Al-Amazighiyya al-An* (note 31) p.124.
36. Brett and Fentress (note 2) p.92
37. *The Economist*, 13 Feb. 1999.
38. Daniel Byman, 'Explaining Ethnic Peace in Morocco', *Harvard Middle Eastern and Islamic Review* 4/1–2 (1997–98).
39. *Al-Amazighiyya al-An* (note 31) p.159.
40. Muhammad Shafiq, in *Al-Amazighiyya al-An* (note 31) p.28.
41. *The Times*, 17 Oct. 1999.
42. Adel Darwish, *The Middle East*, Dec. 1999.
43. Ibid.. This was not, however, the flag used by 'Abd al-Karim.
44. *Al-Jamaa Review*, no.4.
45. Moreover, says Marnia Lazreg, Kahina 'is the epitome of the appropriate woman whose constructed memory sustains struggles and politics that impact negatively on concrete women'. Marnia Lazreg, *The Eloquence of Silence* (New York: Routledge 1994) pp.20–1.
46. For a more detailed exposé and analysis, see Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, 'The Berber Question in Algeria: Nationalism in the Making?' in Ofra Bengio and Gabriel Ben-Dor (eds.), *Minorities and the State in the Arab World* (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner 1999) pp.31–52.
47. William Quandt, 'The Berbers in the Algerian Political Elite', in Gellner, *Arabs and Berbers* (note 19) pp.285–6.
48. Charles Micaud, conclusion to Gellner (note 19) p.436.
49. Brett and Fentress (note 2) p.228; Salem Mezhoud, 'Glasnost the Algerian Way: The Role of Berber Nationalists in Political Reform', in George Joffé (ed.), *North Africa: Nation, State and Region* (London: Routledge 1993), 153.
50. *Le Figaro*, 30 March 1994; *Middle East Quarterly* 1/2 (June 1994) 92–4.
51. Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 14 Jan.: From Broadcast Information Service, The Middle East and North Africa, Daily Report (DR), 18 Jan. 1995
52. 'Amazighité – Communiqué De La Présidence,' issued by the Embassy of Algeria, Washington DC, 23 April 1995; for an analysis, see *Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord* 34 (1995), CNRS Editions, 583–90.
53. Meir Litvak, 'Algeria', *Middle East Contemporary Survey (MECS)* 19 (1995) 220–1; and 20 (1996) 225–34.
54. Zighen Aym, 'Tamazight Lost Its Popular Singer and Activist', *The Amazigh Voice* 7/3 (Fall 1998) pp.5–6. The text of the song is on p.7.
55. Ibid. 22, pp.196–7.

56. *Le Monde*, 11 July 1999; Chaker, 'Quelques évidences sur la question Berbère?', *Confluences Méditerranée: Comprendre l'Algérie* 11 (Summer 1994); *Imazighen ASS-A*, October 1998 pp.8–9.
57. *Isalan-News*, 'Tamazight, National Language of Algeria and Proper Language of Kabylia', www.tamurt-imazighen.com/tamazgha/isalan _eng.html.
58. Statement by the Federal Council of the World Amazigh Congress, meeting in Paris on 25–6 Nov. 2000 (www.kabyle.com).
59. US Department of State, 1999 *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, Algeria*, 25 Feb. 2000.
60. Mohamed Tilmatine and Yasir Suleiman, 'Language and Identity: The Case of the Berbers', in Yasir Suleiman (ed.), *Language and Identity in the Middle East and North Africa* (Richmond: Curzon 1996) p.168; Paul Silverstein, 'Realizing Myth: Berbers in France and Algeria', *Middle East Report* (July–Sept. 1998) p.12.
61. As of 1999, 20 volumes, encompassing more than 3,000 pages of French language entries up to G had been published.
62. For the crucial historical importance of print capitalism in the development of modern nationalism, thanks to its dissemination of vernacular languages to wider audiences, see Anderson (note 4).
63. Silverstein (note 60) pp.11–5; Tilmatine (note 7) pp.170–1.
64. Second World Amazigh Congress, General Assembly, Université libéré de Bruxelles, 7–9 Aug. 2000.
65. Gabby Kratochwil, 'Some Observations on the First Amazigh World Congress (27–30 Aug. 1997, Tafira, Canary Islands)', *Die Welt Des Islams* 39/2 (July 1999).
66. *Isalan-News*, 'Final Declaration of the 2nd World Amazigh Congress', www.tamurt-imazighen.com/tamazgha/isalan_eng.html.
67. Statement by the Federal Council of the World Amazigh Congress, Paris, 25–6 Nov. 2000 (www.kabyle.com).
68. Gellner (note 19) introduction p.13.
69. Lawrence Rosen, 'The Social and Conceptual framework of Arab-Berber Relations in Central Morocco', in Gellner (note 19) p.156.
70. Anthony Smith defines a modern *ethnie* as a 'named unit of population with common ancestry myths and historical memories, elements of shared culture, some link with a historic territory and some measure of solidarity, at least among [its] elites' in *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era* (Cambridge: Polity Press 1995) pp.65–7.
71. *Al-Amazighiyya al-An* (note 31) pp.11, 23.
72. Brett and Fentress (note 2) pp.276–82.