Anti-Semitism Worldwide 1999/2000

THE RISE OF POLITICAL ANTI-SEMITISM IN POST-SOVIET RUSSIA

Markus Mathyl*

In October 1998, a decade after Pamyat had warned about the possibility of anti-Jewish pogroms, political anti-Semitism in Russia became a source of grave international concern. This was prompted by the public declarations of former General Albert Makashov of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF), who openly called for the murder of Jews.¹ Later, he clearly advocated discrimination against the Jewish population.² Makashov's statements were unprecedented in postwar European history: for the first time, a member of parliament from the nation's largest political party,³ which was also a partner in the government, had blatantly incited anti-Jewish violence. The fact that Makashov was neither excluded from the parliament nor censured by it and, moreover, was never held legally responsible for his statements, marks a definite change in the political culture of post-perestroika Russia, raising doubts about the country's democratization process.

This study will focus on anti-Semitic groups and individuals who played an important role on the Russian political scene during the 1990s and especially in the twilight of Yeltsin’s regime, in an attempt to prove that political anti-Semitism has become a central issue in post-Soviet Russia.⁴ Specifically, it will examine the political influence of these organizations and their anti-Semitic character, and only to a lesser extent their extremist rhetoric which, though shocking in itself, does not help clarify the larger political context that gave rise to and condoned it.

The following groups will be studied:

- the openly anti-Semitic Russian National Unity (RNE), the largest fascist organization in Russia today;

- the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) and its political allies;

- national governors of specific Russian regions, especially the governor of the Kuban region, Nikolai Kondratenko.

POLITICAL BACKGROUND

In August 1991, eight leading figures in Gorbachev’s administration and in the KGB attempted to stage a coup in a bid to restore “hard-core” communist law and order in the Soviet Union. Following its failure and the ensuing epochal events (outlawing of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the USSR), the conservative élite first lost, and then managed to rebuild its influence, ultimately unifying almost the entire anti-Yeltsin opposition into national patriotic blocks. In the second phase, from 1994 on, elements of this camp gained influence even over Yeltsin supporters. The most obvious sign of this development was the 1994 war in Chechenya, fought mainly to protect the vestiges of the empire. The current conflict there may be seen as an extension of this national patriotic trend, since it has received even greater support from all levels of society.

In the post-Soviet context, national patriotism signifies, first and foremost, a broad spectrum of groups, mainly united in coalitions ranging from neo-communists to various nationalistic groups, including neo-fascist organizations or their representatives.⁵ Beyond coalitions formed purely on the basis of expediency, newly developed “think tanks” synthesize this spectrum, providing it with a more uniform, anti-Western, anti-democratic and above all neo-imperialistic ideology.⁶ In this synthesis, anti-Semitism has played a decisive role both in cleansing the last vestiges of Marxist internationalism from communist ideology and in the interpretation of perestroika as an alien force aimed at destroying the protection of corporate state imperialism.

This kind of interpretation has often appeared in the form of anti-Semitic conspiracy theories, as demonstrated in the following text by Vladimir Yakushev, a leading communist member of the National Salvation Front -- the largest-ever national patriotic coalition, which was dissolved in 1993:⁷

This is typical of the exploitation by post-perestroika national patriots of the infamous late nineteenth century hoax. It makes clear just how far they will go in using anti-Semitism to unify the economically deprived and conservative élite levels of society, creating anti-Semitic coalitions similar to those of the late tsarist period.⁹

Anti-Semitism is used as a tool by the conservative élites to impede or halt the move toward democracy, which they see as opposing their power interests. They therefore describe it as a “demonic Jewish plan” to enslave the Russian people. In fact, the national patriotic coalitions founded in 1991 were led by high-ranking members of the military, lobbyists of the military-industrial complex, directors of major companies and members of the communist élite. At the same time, these coalitions managed to mobilize tens of thousands of citizens impoverished through hyperinflation to participate in the huge demonstrations of 1992 and 1993. The demonstrations contributed decisively to political destabilization and led to the open power struggle of 1993, in which the RNE fought for political power in Russia as the main armed unit of the pro-national patriotic parliamentary majority.

ANTI-SEMITIC ORGANIZATIONS

The fact that Russian National Unity (RNE) was able to develop so quickly from a small fascist group to a politically powerful organization illustrates the increasing radicalization of a segment of the Russian national patriotic movement. Moreover, the extremist wing of the movement did not isolate itself from its less radical members. At the same time, the growth of the organization indicated the broad tolerance and support given by state institutions to an openly fascist and anti-Semitic group, to which they granted legal status, logistic support and even assigned police tasks.

While in 1993 leading expert on fascism Vladimir Pribylovskii put RNE membership at 300 and considered it to have no political prospects, in 1998 observers estimated there were 25-40,000 fighters, plus perhaps twice as many members without paramilitary training.¹⁰

The roots of the RNE, as well as of most Russian fascist organizations, lie in the Pamyat groups, which were abandoned by younger, more radical members who were dissatisfied over their inactivity and strongly monarchist, reactionary position. The RNE was founded in 1990 by former Pamyat member Aleksandr Barkashov, who remains its uncontested leader and calls himself a Russian National Socialist.

The RNE is an authoritarian organization comprising three levels: brothers-in-arms, fellow fighters and sympathizers.¹¹ All brothers-in-arms are bound by a blood oath to follow the orders of the leader and comply with a code of honor, whose violation is avenged by blood. Betrayal is punishable by death. With this code, widely published in RNE newspapers,¹² the RNE has placed itself outside the constitution by giving power to a self-appointed leader whose commands are above the law. This in itself is sufficient legal grounds to ban the organization.¹³

Beyond the armed fighting groups and blood oath, the RNE is clearly oriented toward historical fascism in symbols and rituals. Black shirts, military uniforms, the Hitler salute, the organization’s symbol (a russified swastika), physical strength and readiness to fight are the benchmarks of fascism.¹⁴ Moreover, the RNE anthem proclaims that a “Russian Order” will rule the world.¹⁵

Roma, Sinti and Jews are not permitted to join the RNE.¹⁶ In addition, there are accounts of secret documents in which the RNE declared its position vis-à-vis non-Slavic peoples of the former Soviet Union. Barkashov's public statement that “the Jews should continue to make their way to Israel or America while they still can,” implicitly restated what reportedly appeared in those documents: namely, that Jews, Sinti and Roma should be exterminated in the case of a coup.¹⁷ Furthermore, in 1994 the RNE called for the murder of Jews in its newspaper Russkii poriadok (The Russian Order), which at that time had a print-run of 100,000 and which now publishes a million copies twice yearly. The movement’s battle hymn entitled “Rightward March” includes the words: “Our way is direct: belief, will, ability. Death to the Jew-Freemasons, to cosmopolitan dogs.”¹⁸

Largely due to the RNE´s participation in the struggle over the Russian parliament in October 1993 (when members of the Russian Supreme Soviet refused to abide by Yeltsin’s decree dissolving the parliament and ordering new parliamentary elections), the organization actually gained members and influence. As the main armed force of the pro-national patriotic parliamentary majority, the RNE provided some 200 fighters, among them bodyguards of opposition leader Aleksandr Rutskoi and other prominent politicians. In addition, they functioned as a special military attachment of the Security Ministry, which in the event of victory was to be institutionalized as the core of a unit aimed at combating the political opposition.¹⁹ Following the defeat of the parliamentary faction and Yeltsin´s strong personal stand, a myth of the RNE as hero and victim developed, which attracted many young new members.

It is important to stress that the defeated national patriots particularly exploited anti-Semitic conspiracy theories in order to reinforce their martyr image. Rumors in many national patriotic newspapers claimed that Israeli secret servicemen and members of Jewish organizations had fired on “Russian patriots,” and that rabbis had performed cruel ritual murder on defenders of the parliament.²⁰ After 1994, the RNE’s influence grew considerably following the general amnesty proclaimed by President Yeltsin. After the December 1993 election, he had been under pressure from the parliament -- which was once again dominated by national patriots -- to grant an amnesty to all participants in the October 1993 uprising. From then on, reports were received from various regions on the increased activities and official acceptance of the RNE, and near total failure of attempts to contain it.

According to the Ministry of Justice, the Secret Service and the movement itself, at the end of the 1990s RNE was registered officially as a political organization in about one-third of all Russian regions.²¹ RNE strongholds have developed around the so-called red belt surrounding Moscow, including the cities of Vladimir and Susdal, the Kuban region and the adjacent region of Stavropol, as well as the Moscow region. This demonstrates that the RNE is particularly influential in areas where the governor and public administrators are members of the KPRF or related parties.

In regional capitals such as Vladimir and Stavropol, the RNE has managed to attract many young supporters, from pre-school children up, through its summer camps, sports courses, pre-military training and support during army service.

Official cooperation with local authorities in pre-military training went so far that in Stavropol the 101st Brigade of the Interior Ministry was housed at a troop exercise area used by the RNE, where they helped RNE fighters train young Stavropolers.²² In Stavropol, and in other cities too, one could find RNE patrols, which since 1997 had been supporting units of the militia in guarding marketplaces and local trains.²³ The fact that many members of the organization had formerly served or were serving concurrently in the army and police probably contributed to the RNE’s close relations with the army and with Interior Ministry units, a fact which it publicized widely.²⁴

Despite some setbacks resulting from Moscow Mayor Luzhkov’s partially successful efforts to ban the RNE from the city, it remains a dangerous para-military and fascist organization that should be taken seriously. It became clear during the October 1993 uprising that this group is ready and determined to move into a power vacuum.

The fact that the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) is the primary successor to the large national patriotic coalitions is a conclusion supported both directly and indirectly by a variety of political observers. In 1994, Al’-Kods, a radical anti-Semitic periodical whose influence spans the national patriotic spectrum, reported that the KPRF had developed into the only viable power in Russia: “The rebirth of Russia can only be accomplished by the Communist Party which spares neither strength nor expense to rebuild a powerful Russia or greater Soviet Union.”²⁵ In fact, from the outset the KPRF was open not only to radical national communists of the Russian Communist Workers Party such as Makashov and Viktor Illuchin, but also to members of the fascist Union of Veneds, which indicates the KPRF’s rightist leanings.²⁶ The neo-pagan Union of Veneds takes a clear position in favor of “racial hygiene,” according to which white, yellow and brown people are not only different races but different species, and therefore it is unnatural to mix them. Out of this conviction, support for the KPRF’S predecessor was justified as follows: “The Soviet Communist Party turned to the protection of national interests by leaving behind old principles of class division that divide white people.”²⁷ Furthermore, on the front page of its party newspaper, the Veneds campaigned in 1994 for the KPRF and its leader Gennadii Zyuganov with the following words: “The largest organized patriotic party has emerged in our country.” Above Zyuganov's picture is the slogan: “The Vened idea is the Russian idea and the communist idea: the idea of social justice.”²⁸

Western researchers agree that the KPRF cannot be classified as a social democratic party, pointing out the dominance of national patriotic currents and concepts,²⁹ to which party chairman Zyuganov himself subscribes. Through his programmatic writings, Zyuganov emerges as an extremely conservative politician, whose ideology is reminiscent of that of Slavophiles Danilevskii and Leontev,³⁰ Spengler’s anti-Western cultural pessimism,³¹ Russian Orthodoxy,³² tsarist autocratism³³ and the conservative revolutionary Eurasians.³⁴ His theory of a global confrontation between the “Atlantics” and the “Eurasians” is a clearly anti-Semitic model injected into the national patriotic discourse, particularly through the publications of the influential nationalistic ideologue Aleksandr Dugin. Dugin describes Jews as the primary successors to the so-called Atlantic tradition, and declares in his book Conspirologia that a “secret Atlantic order” was responsible for the fall of the Soviet Empire.³⁵

Regarding the situation after 1991, Zyuganov has spoken openly of a “cosmopolitan world dictatorship,”³⁶ alluding to the anti-Semitic myth of Jewish world domination. The code word “cosmopolitan” was used by Zyuganov in other contexts as well. He spoke of a “russophobic radical cosmopolitan wing in the KPdSU [Communist Party of the Soviet Union],” of an “endless cosmopolitanism as the ideal of the new world order,” and of “a cosmopolitan financial and market oligarchy” controlling the world.³⁷

In his book I Believe in Russia, Zyuganov reveals that anti-Semitism is as much an integral part of his political ideology as it is the basis for his anti-Western orientation. He writes of the Industrial Revolution and the nineteenth century in general:

In another statement demonstrating his chauvinistic and anti-Semitic tendencies, Zyuganov suggested that Stalin would have needed only five to seven more years to “make his ideological perestroika irreversible.”³⁹ Indeed, the final years of Stalin’s rule were marked by the collective deportation of entire peoples,⁴⁰ the struggle against “cosmopolitanism,”⁴¹ the destruction of the Jewish Anti-fascist Committee⁴² and the introduction of state-sponsored anti-Semitism, all of which were directly connected with Stalin’s “ideological perestroika,” the establishment of Soviet patriotism as the state doctrine.

Zyuganov’s classification of Judaism as a “foreign religion”⁴³ to be controlled by the state⁴⁴ ignores the fact that Jews have lived for centuries within the boundaries of the Russian/Soviet Empire, which Zyuganov always calls Russia’s “natural geo-political area.” It is also significant that Zyuganov was in contact with the most reactionary elements of the Russian Orthodox Church, especially with the rabid anti-Semite Metropolitan Ioan, with whom he regularly met.⁴⁵

Anti-Semitism has been systematically integrated into party ideology by other high-ranking party officials, too. In the KPRF brochure on the “role of state patriotism in the transition to a new level of social development,” deputy party chairman Aleksandr Shabanov wrote: “We also notice that Zionism was always particularly active in Russia, because the idea of world domination would make no sense without controlling the country that had the most raw materials.”⁴⁶ Shabanov equates Zionism with world domination in connection with his analysis of the political forces competing in Russia today. Next to capitalism and communism, “Zionism” is the third independent political orientation, he says. Furthermore, Zionism has a typical clan structure aimed at weakening the state. Thus, he charges Zionism with crimes associated with threats to the Russian population -- such as the Mafia or political instability.

The party publicizes its ideology in numerous national and regional daily and weekly papers. The editorial policy of party-associated newspapers such as Pravda and Sovetskaia Rossiia⁴⁷ even provides a forum to such radical anti-Semites as Russian Orthodox Metropolitan Ioan and fascist Valentin Prusakov to express themselves on the “Jewish question.” Thus, old anti-Semitic myths such as the blood libel and the alleged threat of Jewish occupation of Russia are related to the circumstances prevailing in Russia today, and these ideas reach a circulation comparable to that of the democratic press.⁴⁸

It is important to note that the KPRF -- the country’s best-organized party with the most influential parliamentary representation -- has given greater legitimacy to anti-Semitism in Russia than it had at the end of the 1980s when the activities of Pamyat became a source of grave international concern. So-called red governors, through whom the KPRF exercises strong political influence outside the political center, have played an important role in the national patriotic counter-power struggle.

In contrast to the central government, in which the KPRF was involved from September 1998 until March 1999, there are several semi-autonomous areas administered by purely national patriotic coalitions, where anti-Semitism has been openly expressed and is semi-official. Aside from Stavropol, Pskov and a few other regions in the red belt around Moscow -- where anti-Semitic articles have appeared in local or regional newspapers and radical anti-Semitic groups such as the RNE enjoy official protection -- the Kuban area is the ultimate stronghold of radical national patriotism.⁴⁹ The region’s governor, Nikolai Kondratenko,⁵⁰ in a speech to 700 delegates of various youth organizations delivered in February 1998, called repeatedly for a “fight against Zionism.”

This speech is particularly significant because even after it drew vehement protests from democratic leaders, it was reprinted in Pravda, and thus disseminated beyond the Kuban area to the whole of Russia.⁵¹ The speech “exposed” Zionism as the cause of all present and historical evils that have afflicted Russia since the October Revolution. The words “Zionism” and “Zionist” are repeated 27 times in the speech -- which covers two pages in the newspaper - and there is no doubt that they refer to Russian Jews.

According to Kondratenko, Zionism is a “cruel and bloody policy” whose goal is to “achieve world domination.” Alleging that after the revolution every available position was filled by a Jew or, when no Jew was available, by a non-Russian, Kondratenko calls “cadre politics” the “catechism” and core of Zionism. He claims that Jewish “mixed marriages” were used as camouflage, so that it is difficult today to unmask Zionists with Russian surnames. Kondratenko closed his speech -- in which he defends Stalin's anti-Jewish measures and calls Gorbachev a traitor in the pay of Zionists -- with an appeal to youth to prepare themselves to rescue their nation. This is the only possibility, he says, to fight Zionism successfully.

Interestingly, this final call is absent from the Pravda article, but is included in the version reprinted in a volume of essays The Jewish Occupation of Russia.

There, the governor makes the following, extremely anti-Semitic threat: “Today we are making it clear to this dirty cosmopolitan accomplice -- Your place is in Israel.”⁵²

Following these statements, organizations such as the Congress of Russian Intelligentsia lodged a complaint against Kondratenko with the prosecutor-general for spreading anti-Semitic and fascist propaganda as well as racial hatred.

Legal expert Aleksandr Larin characterized the prosecutor-general’s refusal to initiate criminal procedures as tantamount to his support for a high-level successor of the Black Hundreds, and of Stalinist anti-Semitism and fascist racism.⁵³ It is noteworthy that psycholinguistic counter-witnesses were immediately found to testify that Kondratenko was not inciting racial hatred. Larin countered by referring to an apparent system behind the absurd historical omissions by Kondratenko. This system permitted the governor to denounce the entire political opposition of the Kuban area as “judaized” -- a tactic that proved successful politically. Whereas Kondratenko was elected only in the second ballot in 1996, the coalition he led two years later won, in the first ballot, more than 80 percent of the seats in the local legislative elections.⁵⁴

CONCLUSION

We have seen that even radically anti-Semitic politicians achieved power and influence during the 1990s, especially in the last years of the decade, holding positions as senior as governor. The increasing influence of radical national patriots could be seen also within the Duma, where deputy speaker Nikolai Baburin, as well as the opposition leader of the strongest Duma faction, Zyuganov, wrote in official articles that Russian Jews should have to prove their loyalty as citizens.⁵⁵ Despite such clearly anti-Semitic statements by influential Duma deputies, the Russian parliament as a whole has aborted legislation against fascist tendencies.⁵⁶

Anti-Semitism intensified in the post-perestroika period in four distinct ways. First, its representatives held higher positions than they did during perestroika and were striving for political control over the country. Second, both the viciousness of anti-Semitic propaganda and the number of radical anti-Semitic groups increased.⁵⁷ Third, despite the inin anti-Semitic propaganda, it became more difficult to prosecute, even in the most extreme cases.⁵⁸ Fourth, after 1998, the intensification in propaganda led to violent acts aimed at Jewish representatives and facilities.⁵⁹

Increasing anti-Semitism and its re-politicization raises serious doubts about the accepted thesis of an apparently irreversible trend away from state-sponsored anti-Semitism since perestroika.⁶⁰ Such a turnabout is not impossible. Future developments, however, depend on the influence which the national patriotic ideology exerts outside the movement. The fact that the new president, Vladimir Putin, rose to power on a wave of nationalistic fervor related to the war in Chechenya -- which clearly shows racist tendencies -- indicates public readiness to rally behind the call for a pure Russian Empire. The emergence of another “enemy number one,” people of Caucasian nationality, will not cause anti-Semitism to disappear, since anti-Semitism and racist xenophobia toward people from the Caucasus have a complementary rather than a mutually exclusive function in national patriotic ideology. Whereas people of Caucasian nationality are seen as the concrete enemy, the Jews represent the abstract and universal enemy that is “secretly ruling the world.”

* Markus Mathyl is a doctoral student at the Center for Research on Anti-Semitism at the Technische Universität, Berlin, and a fellow of the Heinrich Böll Foundation.

NOTES