THE JEWISH COMMUNITY

The 1979 Islamic Revolution brought about a dramatic change in the life of the Iranian Jewish community (almost 100,000 on the eve of the revolution; now somewhat over 25,000). Twenty-two years later, the life of the community is still largely influenced by three factors: the legacy of the past (see previous reports) and the Iranian-Shi‘i attitude toward non-Muslim communities; the basic principles of Islamic revolutionary doctrine and its inherent attitude toward religious minorities; and more recently, rivalries within the ruling élite -- the conservative institutions of power identified with Supreme Leader Ayatollah ‘Ali Khamene’i versus the pro-reform tendencies identified with President Mohammad Khatami. More specifically, the arrest in 1999 of 13 Jews in Shiraz on charges of spying for Israel has been accompanied by increased concern among Iranian Jewry and worldwide attention to their plight.

THE LEGACY OF THE PAST AND REVOLUTIONARY REALITIES

The history of Iranian Jewry, from the pre-Islamic era until the end of the Qajar regime (1796-1925), was marked, intermittently, by suppression, persecution and harassment. Under Pahlavi rule (1925-79), however, Jews enjoyed greater cultural and religious autonomy, experienced economic progress and had the same political rights as those of their Muslim compatriots. During the revolutionary upheaval (1977-79), their previous assets turned into considerable liabilities: in addition to not being Muslim, they were part of the Shah’s élite, and identified with Israel, Zionism and the West, all now considered Iran’s arch-enemies. The revolutionary doctrine, its inherent anti-Jewish tenets and numerous anti-Jewish statements by revolutionary leaders, intensified the Jews’ concern, as did the increasing incidents of harassment and persecution.

The doctrine of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, formulated prior to the revolution, was in fact distinctly anti-Jewish, combining Islamic -- particularly Shi‘i -- doctrine, with elements of European anti-Semitism (see Anti-Semitism Worldwide 1994). Once in power, however, his regime could not altogether disclaim the traditional responsibilities toward the dhimmis (protected non-Muslim minorities) that devolved upon a Muslim ruler, nor could it ignore the declared loyalty of the Jewish minority toward the new regime. Since then, officially, the regime has made a distinction between Jews and Zionists, which is still generally valid in public announcements, but is so blurred as to be often difficult to discern.

In general, religious minorities in Iran (except Baha’is, who are considered apostates from Islam) came to rely on a measure of tolerance and protection. They had representation in the Majlis (parliament); there was no governmental campaign or incitement against them, nor systematic harassment; and their freedom of worship was not substantially restricted. Yet, judging by Western standards, their situation was far from satisfactory.

In fact, Jews were made aware of their inferior status as a minority and felt insecure, as occasional derogatory statements continued to be made, even by leading officials. Events in the Middle East -- the peace process, Islamist terrorism, confrontations between Israel and the Palestinians or in Lebanon -- all constituted pretexts for such attacks, which intensified with the growing domestic difficulties (mainly economic) and the escalation in Israeli-Iranian animosity. Moreover, the publication of anti-Semitic literature (including many translations of The Protocols of the Elders of Zion), caricatures and numerous statements by revolutionary leaders (see mainly Anti-Semitism Worldwide 1994 and 1995/6) – had a cumulative impact on the Iranian people. All in all, government policy seemed to be sowing the seeds of hatred--consciously or unconsciously--yet preventing it from being translated into violence.

An examination of the Jewish experience in Iran reveals that Jewish flowering under the last Shah was exceptional, not the decline under the Islamic Republic. For the time-being, the precarious combination of instigation and restraint continues to mark government policy.

KHATAMI: NEW PRESIDENT, SAME REVOLUTIONARY SYSTEM

The circumstances that led to Khatami’s election in 1997, his generally more pragmatic tone and the more moderate statements following his election (mainly with regard to the West and the need for dialogue among civilizations), were bound to lead to some relaxation toward the Jews as well. The more open atmosphere since the election and the impressive measure of free expression in 1999 -- which reached a new peak on the eve of the elections to the Majlis in February 2000 -- had a positive effect on all the religious minorities. Nevertheless, the basic tenets of the pro-reform movement -- the stress on freedom, Iranian nationalism and the need for greater tolerance -- have so far failed to produce a significant change toward Israel or the Jews. Such issues were too sensitive for the pro-reform elements to raise in the midst of the fierce domestic debate. It is noteworthy that although the pro-reform camp seemed to have gained ground in 1999, real power was still in the hands of the conservatives (the supreme leader, the judiciary, the Revolutionary Guards and -- until the spring of 2000 -- the Majlis too), with the conservatives appearing to possess disproportionately more power in the ruling institutions than within the emerging civil society -- the president’s main power base. Over time, the life of the Jewish community, too, appeared to be influenced by the fierce ongoing domestic struggle for power.

The conservative press continued its aggressive tone, even when discussing purely Jewish issues, unrelated to Israel or Zionism. More often than not, they created a link between Jews and Zionism. Tehran Times, for example, repeatedly made this connection in its discussions of the Holocaust, alleging that it was “one of the biggest frauds of the outgoing century,” a story “made up by the Zionists to blackmail the West” in order to claim huge reparations. It regretted that whoever revealed “the truth” on the Holocaust in the West was persecuted, mentioning in this regard the Swiss Holocaust denier Gaston-Armand Amaudruz, who “proved with logic and evidence” that the Zionists’ claim that six million Jews were killed was “false and unsubstantiated,” and who, as a result, was sentenced to one year in prison under the Swiss anti-racism law. Similarly, the paper upheld the views of the British Holocaust denier David Irving, who lost his libel battle in a British court to defend his views on Nazi Germany and the Holocaust. Yet, it asserted, while the West paid reparations for “baseless claims,” it turned a blind eye to the havoc the Zionists played with the lives of Palestinians. Their attitude, the paper added, was “a token of their subservience to Zionist circles, particularly their submission to the pro-Zionist US administration” (Tehran Times, 10, 11, 12 April 2000).

On 7 May 2000 Tehran Times argued that as information became abundant, a “disguised form of mass brainwashing” was “growing like a malignant tumor.” The “main masterminds behind this intriguing cobweb of deceit” were the Zionists, who were pursuing their evil goal of dominating the human race. Portraying themselves as victims of harassment and racism, “they set the stage for their ultimate show of pity, the holocaust.” Moreover, the paper added, during World War II, some poor non-Zionist Jews were deliberately sacrificed to the hideous goal of the establishment of a Jewish state. According to the paper, “historical documents” proved that the massacre of Jews was “limited to the working class” -- indicating collaboration between the Nazi regime and the Zionist lobby in purging the Jews who were considered insignificant. After the war, it cont, the Zionists launched the second phase of their plot by occupying Palestine. Similarly, almost all the mass media in the West were influenced or controlled by the Zionists, and were trying to nip in the bud even the slightest criticism of Zionist schemes by prominent researchers or intellectuals. Tehran Times (14 May 2000), having “determined to reveal the facts on the holocaust in order to defuse the plots of the Zionists,” concluded that it was “nothing but a fraud.”

The Iranian press also published the views of the German-born Dr. Fredrick Toben (who lives in Australia and visited Iran in December 1999). Kayhan International (6 December 1999), wrote that Toben was jailed for having exposed the fabrications of the gas chambers. The Zionists’ claim of six million dead was false, the paper maintained. Hitler was a criminal, it agreed, but why distort facts “to magnify the killings of a few thousand Jews into the preposterous figure of 6 million.” Such baseless claims had held the German nation hostage for the past 50 years. In the Christian West, it noted, one could insult Jesus Christ and the fundamentals of the faith, but it was “a crime to question the holocaust.” Any “factual research” on the number of Jews killed in concentration camps, brought on “the wrath of Zion.”Therefore, not only should the “myth of the holocaust,” be investigated but also “the crimes of the Zionist entity” over “the past fifty-one years of its illegal existence.”

Tehran Times (4 July 1999) found the influence of the Zionist lobby in today’s world too obvious to need elaboration: “Most international financial institutions in the world are controlled and run by Zionists. Zionists prepare the ground through a propaganda bombardment and brainwash public opinion. They can even prevent scientific research if its conclusions do not fit their line.” Thus, it asserted, Roger Garaudy wrote a book, “based purely on research,” which challenged the Nazi Holocaust and other notions exaggerating the number of Jews killed, but due to Zionist influence in the French judicial system, he was “fined for revealing historical facts.” French FN leader Jean-Marie Le Pen, the paper added, was prosecuted for revealing facts about the Holocaust. The Zionists, who control the political and economic bottlenecks of the world, were “a small racist group who are opposed to any religion including Judaism.” In fact, all divine religions are opposed to racism, which “is why Zionists are opposed to all divine religions” (for Garaudy, see Anti-Semitism Worldwide 1998/9).

Here, again, the distinction between Jews and Zionism is also blurred. In fact, such repeated claims regarding the number of Jews who perished in the war appear to have had an impact. Israeli scholars who have met occasionally with Iranian intellectuals (who are certainly not anti-Semitic), report that they seemed convinced that the “six million” figure was highly exaggerated. When asked how many they thought were killed, the typical answer was “a few thousand.”

Some sources attempt to discredit the religious faith of contemporary Jews. In a series of articles entitled “Jacob’s Sons, Jews or Zionists?,” Tehran Times argued, that “under the pretext of settlement of the wandering tribes,” the name of Israel was used for Palestine. However, when Jacob’s sons threw their brother into the well, they distanced themselves from God. In fact, what the Zionists’ ancestors [i.e., the Jews] dropped into the well, was “the divine religion” (Tehran Times, 15, 16, 20, 22, 23, 24 May 1999).

THE ARREST OF 13 JEWS

The most serious incident to affect the Jews in Iran in 1999 was the arrest, early in the year, of 13 Jews, on charges of spying for Israel, and the trial and verdict over a year later. Those arrested included a university professor, several teachers in private Hebrew schools, a kosher butcher and a 16-year-old youth. The alleged evidence against them is secret. The leading defense attorney, Esma‘il Nowsari, said the only documentation he had received from the court was transcripts of the interrogations of his clients. Other than their own statements, he said, no proof of their alleged espionage was in their files (New York Times, 1 May 2000).

The arrests had a destabilizing effect on the Jewish community. In fact, the accusations of disloyalty to the Iranian state against the 13 were often interpreted -- explicitly or implicitly -- as being directed against all Iranian Jews. Nevertheless, even on such a delicate issue there were nuanced responses. Thus, following Supreme Court President Mohammad Yazdi’s statement (11 June 1999) that the accused were guilty and that they preferred Israel’s interests over those of Iran, and his implication that execution was a foregone conclusion, the conservative papers Kayhan, Jomhuri-ye Islami and Resalat (12 June) published editorials and comments critical of the arrested Jews. On the other hand, the pro-reform press only briefly reported the statement (although criticizing Yazdi for his attacks on liberals; such as Salam, 12 June). Tehran Times again adopted a hard-line attitude (10 June), as did Jomhuri-ye Islami (12 June). The latter accused the Mossad of using Jews in different countries against their own states. It quoted the Friday sermon in the town of Lamard, which claimed that the Jews had been the most obdurate enemies of Muslims throughout history. The paper added that the Jews’ links to acts of terrorism, their responsibility for the country’s economic deterioration and the devaluation of the Iranian currency were also being examined. Jomhuri-ye Islami (19 June) warned that the Zionist propaganda machinery was attempting to present the case as a political one.

The popular attitude toward the Jews was no less detrimental and increased their insecurity. “It’s getting bad for us here,” said a Jewish resident of Shiraz, typifying a genuine concern among the Jews of Iran at large. “There are private grumbles about discrimination,” the London Times wrote. “Government jobs are hard to come by, they say, and Jews have to wait much longer for travel documents and exit visas, and despite many petitions to the Majlis, Jewish schools must open on Saturdays” (Times, 7 September 1999). In fact, during the trial -- and mainly after the confession of some of the accused, several Jewish merchants’ premises were vandalized. Schoolchildren treated their Jewish classmates with contempt, and fear or shame kept some Jews from going to work. “This trial has created problems for the whole Jewish community in Iran,” said the president of the Association of Iranian Jews, Haroun Yashaya‘i, adding that he had “documents showing that several shops owned by Jews were attacked, and one was set on fire in Tehran” (AP, 24 May 2000). “Since this case started, the whole Jewish community in Iran regards itself under suspicion,” he said (AP, 2 July 2000). Newly-elected Jewish legislator Morris Mo‘tamed claimed “Jewish people felt insulted,” with the television focused on a specific minority and questioning its rights (New York Times, 30 June 2000). Defense lawyer Esma‘il Nowsari blamed the “reactionary law” that allowed the revolutionary courts to function, “where the judge is equivalent to God… Nobody can touch him, nobody has any control.” Like many others, he believed that confessions after 15 months of incarceration could not be considered valid (AP, 24 May). He added that the confessions had “a very bad impact,” as “Jews were turned into spies” (AFP, 21 June 2000).

On 1 July the judge convicted 10 of the 13 Jews of being spies, asserting that their years of religious piety were a cover for espionage and illegal aid to Iran’s enemy Israel. They were sentenced to prison terms ranging from 4 to 13 years. Most were convicted of being members of an illegal group, recruiting others to join it and “cooperating” with Israel. Two Muslim men convicted of aiding the spy ring were also convicted and sentenced to two and four years imprisonment. The court acquitted three other Jews who were also charged with espionage and two Muslims (New York Times, 2 July 2000). On 10 July an Iranian revolutionary court in Shissued an international arrest warrant for the ring-leader of the alleged espionage network, Isaac Baalhnes (a former teacher who left Iran for the US in 1991). The announcement added an international dimension to a case that had already aroused worldwide furor (AFP, 10 July 2000).

The verdict was considered moderate by some observers. Yet, the indictment of the Jews for espionage, the accusation of preferring Israeli interests over those of Iran and the verdict itself may pose a serious challenge to the Jews of Iran and has already aroused grave concern. The court’s summons of Isaac Baalhnes means that the file, like the wound to Iran’s Jews, will remain open.