In January 2000, a highly significant conference took place in Sweden -- the Stockholm International Forum on the Holocaust. Forty-five heads of state declared that the Holocaust “challenged the foundations of civilization,” and that “with humanity still scarred by genocide, ethnic cleansing, racism, anti-Semitism and xenophobia, the international community shares a solemn responsibility to fight those evils.” In March 2000, Pope John Paul II made a historic pilgrimage to Israel, during which he declared, at Yad Vashem, that the Catholic Church was deeply troubled by anti-Semitism and racism and was determined to denounce those evils and struggle against them. Moreover, in June 2000 Britain's High Court ruled against the British Holocaust denier David Irving in his suit against the American historian Deborah Lipstadt and her publisher, thus repudiating attempts to distort the historiography of the Holocaust.

Yet, while these events would seem to promise that the new century could be an improvement over the previous one in regard to anti-Semitism, an examination of the past decade indicates some troubling trends. Beginning in 1990 a steady increase in anti-Semitic violence was recorded, reaching a peak of 300 incidents in 1994. Despite the continuing decline since then, the number of violent anti-Semitic acts in 1999 was still 100 percent higher than in 1989.

The level of anti-Semitic activities worldwide in 1999 was similar to that of 1998: 32 major attacks (involving the use of a weapon or explosive), compared with 36 in 1998, and 114 major violent incidents (unarmed attacks on individuals and severe damage to private and communal property), compared with 121 in 1998.

Many hundreds of minor incidents, such as graffiti, slogans, personal insults and harassment, were recorded by Jewish communities and individuals worldwide, but were not numerically compared here by country in order to avoid distortion of the overall picture arising from the fact that well-organized Jewish communities have a better monitoring network than less well-organized ones. Also, the identity of the perpetrators, whether hooligans, criminals or ideologically-motivated zealots, is not easily discovered. This multitude of cases, coupled with an unmonitorable flood of verbal, electronic and visual anti-Jewish expressions, and frequent debates related to the Jewish people in politics and in the media, continued to exacerbate the situation in 1999.

Several recent developments should be noted. One of the most significant was the shift in focus from extremist Muslim anti-Jewish terrorism to violence committed and endorsed by extreme right-wingers holding classical anti-Semitic views. The growing tendency toward ultra-right-wing terrorism was evident especially in the US, where despite a 4 percent decline in incidents, the summer of 1999 witnessed some of the worst anti-Semitic attacks ever recorded. These included arson attacks on synagogues and armed violence in a Jewish kindergarten. A similar trend was noted in Russia, where ongoing political anti-Semitism, stemming partly from the weaknesses in the political system and its failure to enforce existing laws, may have influenced the shift from vandalism to violence, including bombs, arson and an assassination attempt. Consequently, it should be noted that Russian Jewry suffered more from anti-Semitic acts and expressions than the communities in Ukraine, Belarus or the Baltic republics. The link between aggressive ideology and propaganda of rightist circles and actual violence was evident in both Russia and the US.

The success of the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ), headed by Jörg Haider, and of the Swiss People's Party (SVP), whose leadership includes Christoph Blocher, highlights the electoral potential of nationalist populist parties. The victory of the FPÖ encouraged xenophobic extremist groups in the country and influenced their contacts with similar groups outside it. Moreover, in the wake of the election, an increase in anti-Semitic activities in Austria was noted. In Germany, the BfVS (Federal Office for the Defense of the Constitution) warned of a dramatic rise in the number of radical right groups and of extremists who were ready to employ violence.

A recurring and troubling trend in the Arab world has been the intensification of anti-Jewish expressions whenever a solution to the Israeli-Arab conflict seems to be at hand. Normalization is vehemently rejected by those opposing the existence of the State of Israel, as is globalization, which is also a target of extreme right groups in Eastern Europe. Both normalization and globalization, which allegedly counter national interests, are depicted in both the Arab world and in Eastern Europe, as well as elsewhere, as the product of Jewish world influence.

A 14 percent increase in anti-Semitic acts was reported in the UK which, like Scandinavia, witnessed a general increase in racist incidents. In Sweden, several terrorist attacks committed by persons with pro-Nazi and anti-Semitic views shocked the region at large. Australia reported a decrease in anti-Semitic incidents, although the figure was still 11 percent higher than the average over the previous nine years, while Canada's 11 percent increase may reflect an improvement in reporting. South Africa and Latin America were relatively quiet in terms of anti-Semitic incidents in 1999. In most of the Western world, the issue of freedom of expression versus the dissemination of specious propaganda remains unresolved.

Since it is the intensity and severity of anti-Semitism -- not the number or frequency of incidents -- and their relation to ideology and political developments that are crucial factors in assessing the situation, it may be concluded that the year 1999, though no more violent than the previous one, continued to be characterized by heated debates and falsifications concerning the Jewish people and its state. The impact of the promising start to the year 2000 on both the actions of extremists and on these polemics remains to be seen.

THE 1999 ELECTORAL SUCCESS OF NATIONALIST POPULIST PARTIES IN EUROPE

The last quarter of 1999 was marked by a dramatic change in the political standing of the extreme right in Europe. The scenario which most Europeans feared had become a reality. A nationalist populist party, the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ), led by the charismatic Jörg Haider, won 27.2 percent of the vote in the October 1999 general election, becoming the second most powerful party in the country. After four months of attempts to form a government without Haider’s party, which has strong ties to the extreme right, Wolfgang Schüssel, leader of the conservative Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP), announced the formation of a ruling coalition including the FPÖ.

Six months prior to its success in the general election, Haider’s FPÖ had increased its strength considerably in Carinthia, Tirol and Salzburg. In Carinthia, which borders on Slovenia and has a strong Slovenian minority, the FPÖ shocked Austrians and the world at large by gaining 42.1 percent of the vote, the largest share ever won by a single party in a state election. Some 26,000 former Social Democratic (SPÖ) and 8,000 former Christian Democratic supporters voted for the FPÖ. It should be noted that when Haider first became governor of this state in 1989, the SPÖ was the strongest party and the FPÖ was only able to govern in a coalition with the Christian Democrats. Two years later Haider was forced to resign as governor after praising the Nazis’ employment program.

The FPÖ was not the only European xenophobic party in 1999 to succeed at the polls in national elections. In late October, the Swiss People’s Party (SVP) won 22.6 percent of the vote, becoming the second-largest party in the lower house of the Swiss parliament. Its achievement was due, in no small measure, to the demagogic rhetoric of right-wing populist Christoph Blocher, head of the Zurich branch.

The FPÖ and the SVP share several ideological tenets, including xenophobia and opposition to immigration. Both Haider and Blocher emphasize the unique chof their people and nation, which are allegedly threatened by the presence of foreigners. These positions sometimes verge on outright racism.

Haider and Blocher both used the slogan “Stop asylum abuse” in their respective election campaigns. Haider, however, went further. FPÖ election posters called for an end to Überfremdung -- literally “swamping by foreigners” -- a catch phrase used by Hitler's propaganda chief Joseph Goebbels. Both parties stressed their opposition to multi-national institutions, which were seen as usurping the authority of the nation-state. Also, some leading personalities in both parties were associated with extremist elements – including anti-Semites and Holocaust deniers.

It may be assumed that xenophobia and opposition to the idea of a united Europe attracted many voters in both countries, although this may not have been the main reason for their electoral success. The anti-foreigner vote was not a response to major economic dysfunction (both countries are among the richest in Europe; Switzerland’s unemployment rate is less than 3 percent, while Austria’s is about 4.4 percent), but may have stemmed from deep uncertainties and fears, exploited by both parties, of a possible future economic collapse, caused by those who may be indifferent to the fate of these countries or seek to prosper from their economic distress. The threat of massive immigration which could jeopardize the high level of employment, would be understandable if unemployment were high and citizens had to compete with foreigners for jobs. But the contrary is true. Although the number of immigrants in both Austria and Switzerland is relatively large, expelling them would make little economic sense since the prosperity of these countries depends on the labor of foreigners.

The nationalist populist parties portray themselves as the only defenders of the “national interest” against the bureaucrats in Brussels. In addition, they claim to protect it from the corrupt establishment in their countries, which has allowed the steady influx of foreigners. After decades of coalition rule by the two traditional parties Haider, more than anyone, succeeded in exploiting an atmosphere of stagnation, corruption and patronage. Opposition to the political establishment seemed to serve as a prime motive in attracting a large cross-section of the population to Haider. They accepted his criticism of the long-standing Proporz system, which confined patronage of public jobs mainly to members of the two parties that had shared power since 1945.

The desire to be an alternative to the political establishment, and to preserve national identity in the face of mass immigration and multi-national institutions, is common to nationalist populist parties and the extreme right in Europe. Throughout the 1990s xenophobic parties, such as the Belgium Flemish Bloc, the French National Front and the German People’s Union (DVU), were relatively successful in local, and sometimes in general, elections but in contrast to Austria none of them ever became a viable contender for national leadership. The strong reaction in these countries to Haider’s success stems from the fear that the extreme right in Belgium, France or Germany might improve its political standing in the wake of Austria’s election results. In the words of German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer: “This is the first time an anti-European, xenophobic party with a very dubious attitude toward the Nazi past has come into the government of a member state… We have to take appropriate measures.”

Only a few voices in Western Europe not associated with the extreme right, such as Edmund Stoiber, leader of Bavaria’s Christian Social Union, hailed the FPÖ’s electoral victory. In Eastern Europe, with the exception of Hungary’s extremist and anti-Semitic MIEP and other parties of that ilk which welcomed it, Haider's rise to power caused apprehensions due to his anti-foreigner views as well as his rejection of European Union expansion to the east.

The general reaction in Europe was tantamount to a political boycott of Austria. In contrast to Gianfranco Fini, whose transformation of the neo-fascist Alleanza Nazionale into a democratic force was generally accepted as genuine, Haider was perceived by European statesmen as a dangerous opponent of the values of a new united Europe, although he is not a National Socialist and the FPÖ does not have a fascist agenda.

It is still unclear whether the unprecedented success of the nationalist populist parties in Austria and Switzerland is merely a temporary phenomenon or whether the movement will grow stronger, influencing and encouraging similar parties in Europe. Currently, their achievements do not match the general political atmosphere on the continent. Both the Social Democrats, which in the last national elections won in 11 out of the 15 member states of the European Union, and the center-right parties, which had considerable gains in the 1999 election to the European Parliament, are committed to the anti-chauvinist values of a united Europe. Thus, in spite of the difficulties and slow progress, the once almost utopian idea of a united Europe seems to have become an irreversible process.

Europeans are only now becoming more aware of the issues responsible for the electoral success of the right-wing populist parties. It is to be hoped that Europe will remain watchful and united in its desire to protect its democratic, social and economic values against those that threaten them.

Sources: “Europe’s Far Right,” BBC News Online, Jan. 2000; “Right-Leaning Parties Do Well in European Elections,” Time, 10-13 June 1999; Magali Perrault, “Trouble on the Island of the Blessed,” Central Europe Review (online), Oct. 1999; Ulrich Rippert, “Landslide Victory for Right-Wing Extremist,” World Socialist Web Site, 13 March 1999; Anne Swardson and William Drozdiak, “Europe Sees Ghost of Ugly Past,” The Washington Post, 3 Feb. 2000; Dominique Moisi, “Das Detail Haider,” Die Zeit 10 (2 March 2000); Syrnes Erns, “Der Doppelspieler,” Weltwoche, 28 Oct. 2000; Roger Cohen, “Schroeder’s Party is Set Back Painfully in 2 State Elections,” New York Times, 6 Sept. 1999; Ian Buruma, “Jörg Haider’s Other Message,” New York Times, 7 Feb. 2000; “Fascism Resurgent?” Economist, Oct. 1999; Denis Staunton, “Haider Leaves a Bitter Taste of Old Vienna,” Observer, 30 Jan. 2000; Marianne Arens, “Sharp Turn to the Right in Swiss Elections,” World Socialist Web Site, 4 Nov. 1999; “Right-Leaning Parties Do Well in European Elections,” Salt Lake Tribune, 15 June 1999.

ANTI-SEMITISM AND THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN RUSSIA

In 1999 the situation of Jews living in Russia remained equivocal. On the one hand, Jews continued to play a major role in the economic, social, cultural and political life of the country. On the other hand, extensive and open anti-Semitic activities continued against the background of the uncertain political situation. The presidential elections in March 2000 and the victory of Vladimir Putin have raised questions regarding the direction the new administration will take in light of some disturbing developments in the past year.

In recent years anti-Semitism has become an obvious and available weapon in the political life of post-communist Russia. The opposition to Yeltsin, especially the communists, frequently accused the government of “selling out” the country to Jewish interests, while the regime was generally hesitant in dealing with such allegations in order not to appear to be countering popular national views. However, some efforts were made to curb extremists and nationalists in 1999, a year of intensified political struggles. With the approach of the parliamentary elections, the government declared its intention, in January 1999, of introducing legislation “to combat political extremism,” a step that has yet to be carried out. Moscow Mayor Yurii Luzhkov banned a convention of the chauvinist and anti-Semitic Russian National Unity (RNE) and accused the organization of distributing Nazi symbols. The mayor also buttressed security measures around Jewish institutions. However, when it became , in the course of 1999, that Homeland -- All Russia, the political movement of Luzhkov and of former Premier Evgenii Primakov, had little hope of becoming a major electoral force, plans to fight anti-Semitism were shelved.

The struggle against extremism also suffered from the ambivalent attitude of Unity, the party set up to back Putin in his campaign for the presidency and whose ideology combined both left- and right-wing elements. By seeking to avoid any identification with “anti-nationalist” forces, the party, which could have provided important support for this cause, proved ineffective.

Jewish organizations in the West responded with some uneasiness to Putin’s victory. A newcomer to the political scene, Putin’s record is clouded by his past as head of the Federal Security Service (FSB) which, inter alia, closed the file against the anti-Semitic remarks of Communist deputy General Albert Makashov (see Anti-Semitism Worldwide 1998/9). Among the first reactions was the ADL’s appeal to Putin, in late March 2000, to denounce anti-Semitism, in light of the troubling statements made during the presidential race. Using familiar anti-Semitic allegations, the pro-government media had accused the Congress of Russian Jews and its president, Vladimir Gusinskii, who supported Luzhkov, of being a “fifth column of the West.” In the atmosphere that prevailed in Russia at the time, this attack was interpreted as being directed against all Russian Jewry.

In addition to political anti-Semitism, there were several other developments of concern to the Jewish population, namely:

- a sharp shift from hooliganism and vandalism (mainly cemetery desecration) to actual terrorist attacks, attempts at such attacks and threats to carry them out against Jewish institutions and personages.

- the plethora of nationalist, extremist and anti-Semitic organizations, both legal and semi-legal, which expanded their activities;

- the continued dissemination of blatant anti-Semitic propaganda, inciting citizens to violence against Jews, through the publications of extremist and nationalist groups (periodicals, newspapers and leaflets), which have a circulation of about one million copies a month;

- exacerbation of the tone in publications of the Russian Orthodox Church, which supports the activities of Russian nationalist and extremist parties;

- the first signs of the proliferation of anti-Semitic ideology from the northern Caucasus to the Muslim population in the heart of Russia;

- the continued policy of non-enforcement of the law in the face of anti-Semitism, including the authorities’ failure to take legal steps against the dissemination of racist and anti-Semitic propaganda (except for a short period prior to the parliamentary elections in Russia, as mentioned above), or to find the perpetrators involved in attacks against Jewish institutions, and lenience toward those who were caught in the act (declaring them mentally ill and stopping legal proceedings against them).

It seems that internal developments in Russia will play a major role in determining the future use of anti-Semitism as a political weapon. The Putin leadership will soon have to tackle the issue of rising violence against Jewish targets, the growing number of extremist organizations and the expansion of their activities, and the continuing dissemination of vitriolic anti-Semitic propaganda. Putin, whose patriotism is not doubted even by nationalist groups, is in a position to apply more pressure on extremists. A clampdown would help the new president to present a more positive image of his country in the West, if, indeed, good relations with the West are a priority of his administration. Nevertheless, any measures taken by Putin will be condemned by extremists as proof of his selling out to the West and to “Jewish interests.” This criticism will likely increase if Russia’s economic, social and political crisis deepens. The statements made by pro-government forces during the parliamentary and presidential election campaigns have troubled the Jewish world, which will continue to remain skeptical unless measures are taken against all forms of anti-Semitism.

Sources (1999): Interfax agency; WPS agency; Moskovskie novosti (weekly); Diagnoz (Russian Jewish Congress); Zavtra (Moscow daily); Russkii vestnik (Moscow daily); Kommersant (Moscow daily); Novoie vremia (Moscow).

ANTI-SEMITISM AND GLOBALIZATION IN CENTRAL AND EAST-CENTRAL EUROPE

During 1999 the issue of continuity and change returned to the fore in the post-communist states. In Slovakia, the formation of a new government after the 1998 election raised hopes that the attempts to rehabilitate wartime fascist leader Jozef Tiso and his legacy would be shelved. Yet, revisionist forces remained active, and only after protests by local and international Jewish and non-Jewish organizations, such as the ADL, as well as the media, was a plan to unveil a memorial plaque to Tiso in the town of Zilina cancelled at the last moment. Thus, despite a more favorable regime, revisionist attempts to whitewash the past have continued.

In Hungary, a row has developed over the naming of a street in Budapest after the country’s wartime leader Miklos Horthy. At the time of his reburial in Hungary in 1993, the Jewish community, as well as numerous Hungarian political and cultural leaders opposed to the present center-right government, vehemently resisted this step. The campaign to honor Horthy has been led by the extremist and anti-Semitic Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIEP), headed by Istvan Csurka.

In Croatia, the death of President Franjo Tudjman in 1999 heralded a new era, with presidential elections, the victory of the democratic opposition and the gradual, if not complete, demise of Tudjman’s political camp. In 2000 the new openness toward the West and the change in the nationalist tone will be tested by whether historical revisionism can be ended and the creeping rehabilitation of the Ustasha’s murderous legacy stopped.

In Romania attempts to rehabilitate the wartime fascist ruler Ion Antonescu persisted. As in Slovakia, large segments of Romanian public opinion opposed the events held to commemorate Antonescu, but the nationalists continued to portray Antonescu as a “true Romanian patriot” who allegedly saved Jews, rather than as a nationalist leader who was responsible for the death of some 350,000 Romanian Jews.

The principal target of anti-Semites in Central and East Central Europe in 1999/2000 was “globalization,” that complex process which has generated intense debate in various parts of the world. Extreme left- and right-wing attacks on globalization were bound to include anti-Semitism, since both sides could link several traditional anti-Semitic motifs to the discussion. Furthermore, the West’s intervention in Kosovo buttressed the anti-Semitic arguments of Central and East European extremists and nationalists.

Two extremist movements in the region, each with parliamentary representation, the MIEP and the Greater Romania Party (PRM), bitterly criticized the NATO intervention in Kosovo, although at times no more than other political and public groups in those countries. In Hungary, the country’s entry into NATO just a month before it found itself involved in a war waged by that organization against a neighboring state, generated a heated polemic. In Romania, where the government supported the NATO action as a means of furthering Romania’s strategic aim of joining that organization, the opposition also included traditional Orthodox solidarity with the Serbs.

In March/April 1999, the MIEP’s Magyar Forum published a series of lengthy analyses, many written by Csurka himself, in which US support for Israel’s strategic aims was linked to the wider interests of the Jewish lobby in the US and elsewhere. Thus, it was insinuated that a war in the Balkans served Jewish interests; or that the US launched a NATO strike to safeguard regional stability so that Jewish capital could flow freely and the Jews could proceed with their destructive global aims. These arguments, although irrational and unclear, were made because the extremists saw interests behind every international crisis.

The PRM was more explicit than the Hungarian MIEP. The party’s weekly, Romania Mare, printed pictures of a swastika beside the Star of David, equating Zionism with Nazism, together with photos of US Jewish officials – Albright, Berger and Cohen – who were allegedly urging Clinton to make war on the peace-loving Milosevic regime.

In addition to explaining the war in the Balkans in terms of Jewish-Israeli interests, the broader link made between Kosovo-Yugoslavia and globalization is significant. For anti-Semites, and even for other more well-intentioned critics of the NATO action, the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo and the continuing Balkan instability were upsetting the US-led enforced process of globalization. Thus, if it could be proven that the Jews were behind globalization, or that they were one of its major beneficiaries, then their connection to the Balkans would be evident.

The Jewish role and interest in globalization are an essential element in the anti-Semitism of Eastern Europe as well as of other regions. In post-communist societies, multinational companies, foreign investments and the new shopping malls are viewed by extremists as the West’s strangling of the “true” national fabric of those societies and their subordination to global interests. They allege that Jewish financiers and Israeli investors are spearheading the war which the capitalist-developed world is waging against the post-communist states.

In a typical analysis of global processes, the Hungarian right-wing weekly Demokrata published a review of George Soros' book on global trends. The conclusion of the author, Istvan Lovas, was that the Foundation for an Open Society, a huge project funded by Soros in Central and Eastern Europe, was led by “a hyper-aggressive, exclusivist, left-liberal Jewish hard core.” Lovas, whose collection of essays from the press predominantly featuring Jewish themes was published in 1999, linked Israel's expanding world interests to the alleged “ethnic bomb” it had developed in its biological research center, which could distinguish between Jews and non-Jews. Lovas complained that the liberal press, which applied “media terror in Hungary” -- a veiled reference to the press being in Jewish hands -- declined to treat the issue of Israel's supposed “race weapon.”

Globalization is seen by these groups as essentially anti-national and destructive to the national spirit and character. Since Jews possess these characteristics, it follows that they are best suited to carry out the role of globalization. The link between globalization and anti-Semitism is not new, but merely a modern version of traditional stereotypes and motifs which fit contemporary developments. The alien Jew, with his anti-national character and the “cosmopolitan” Jew who knows no boundaries and traditions, are presented as the main force behind supra-national expansion. These eternal Jewish interests are furthered by their well-known description in The Protocols of the Elders of Zion.

Globalization, the new banner of anti-Semites, is neither a left- nor a right-wing issue, nor is it exclusive to the populist ideologies of the area. It is convenient to lay the negative outcomes of the market economy and the dislocations caused by the dismantling of the command economy and of the communist party state at the doorstep of the Jews, the alleged bearers of this destructive process.

Sources: Romanian Mare (weekly), March-April 1999; Magyar Forum (weekly), March-May 1999; Havi Magyar Forum (monthly), March, April, May 1999; Demokrata (weekly), Dec. 1998, Lovas Istvan, Jobbegyenes (Straight Right) (Budapest, 1999), ADL press release, 8 March 2000, Nemzeti Sajtoszemle (National Press Review -- by-weekly review of the nationalist press in Hungary) 1 (2000); Jewish Chronicle, 1999-2000; ADL International News, 1999-2000; Jewish .Telegraph Agency, 1999-2000; Central Europe Online, 1999-2000; East European Perspectives (RFE/RL); Central Europe Review, 1999-2000; Michael Shafir, “Radical Politics in East Central Europe,” East European Perspectives 1-2 (1999-2000).

PUBLIC OPINION IN CHILE AND THE PLANNED NEO-NAZI CONGRESS

One of the most significant issues to attract public attention in Latin America in 1999 was the projected international neo-Nazi congress in Chile, which was to be held, according to the organizers, from 15 to 22 April 2000, to coincide with Hitler’s birthday. The course of events leading up to this congress, which was finally banned by the Chilean parliament, can serve as a case study of a successful campaign to arouse widespread opposition to neo-Nazi attempts to act unchecked and gain publicity.

In January 1998, after meeting with representatives of the right-wing nationalist organizations Arcania (Centro de Estudios Culturales) and Corporación Ecológica Nueva Era, Alexis López Tapia, editor of the Chilean Nazi publication Pendragón, announced that a congress would take place in Chile at which Nazi activists from 60 countries would discuss and update Nazi ideology. Although there is no registered Nazi party in the country, López Tapia claimed there were some 5,000 Nazi sympathizers.

By mid-1998 many public organizations and figures were protesting the congress to the Chilean authorities. Among them were the Israeli ambassador, Jewish organizations such as the World Jewish Congress (WJC), the Latin American branch of the WJC, the roof organization of the Jewish community CREJ, and Jewish youth. While government officials tried to allay public fears by declaring that the congress would not take place, the propaganda surrounding the event succeeded in turning it into a rallying point for radical nationalist and neo-Nazi groups. The Jewish community was especially concerned by the fact that authoritative sources had pointed out legal difficulties in banning the congress, since Chile had no anti-discriminatory legislation.

As plans for the congress progressed, CREJ increased its pressure on the government, including demands for the adoption of anti-racist/anti-discriminatory legislation. They tried to raise public awareness about the matter; for example, in a radio interview, community head Elimat Y. Jasón said that holding a Nazi congress in Chile was an event that should trouble all democratic Chilean society, and not only Jews. CREJ representatives also met with members of parliament from the Socialist Party, the Popular Democratic Party, the Christian Democratic Party and the right-wing National Renovation party.

Both houses of the National Congress opposed the planned meeting. On 13 July 1999, the deputies of the lower house voted unanimously to ask the government to take steps to ban it. A similar vote was passed unanimously in the Senate. Further, the deputies of the lower house signed a petition calling on the government to use all the means at its disposal to prohibit the congress and to control the activities of foreigners who might arrive to participate in it.

Prior to his election as president of the republic in November 1999, Ricardo Lagos also voiced his objection to the congress. Addressing a group of local B’nai B’rith representatives in Santiago de Chile, when he was the candidate of the opposition coalition Concertacion, he said that “when there are groups questioning the very basic principles of coexistence and violating people’s liberties, we have to act.” He stated that he was in favor of pluralism, but not in this case, where people could be hurt. Referring to the Holocaust, he said that in perpetuating its memory one must ensure the future by teaching future generations what happened.

The intense public pressure exerted by local politicians, congressmen, CREJ, other Jewish organizations such as the Wiesenthal Center, and individual members of the Jewish community, proved effective. In late 1999, the president of the republic, Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle, through his minister of the interior Raúl Troncoso and deputy minister of the interior Guillermo Pickering, announced the government’s decision to prohibit the event. Minister of Foreign Affairs Juan Gabriel Valdés, too, rthis stand to the international community.

In a statement issued on 17 February 2000, the Chilean government reiterated its determination to act to prevent the assembly, congress or program of any organization with links to Nazism from taking place on Chilean soil. Further, the government repudiated the totalitarian ideology of racism, xenophobia and other forms of discrimination which had been responsible for one of the major tragedies in the history of humanity.

As to legality, the statement emphasized that all the relevant international treaties had been ratified and integrated into Chilean legislation. Accordingly, Chile had the legal means to ban organizations such as the Nazi movement, and if necessary, it would refine its laws.

Chile greatly respected the Jews, the statement continued, as it did other minorities living in Chile. It also recognized the important contribution Chilean Jews had made to the country’s development and stressed its sensitivity to Jewish concerns about a possible wave of anti-Semitism in the country. Referring to the Holocaust, the government noted that it had sent representatives to the international forum on the Holocaust which took place in Stockholm from 26 to 28 January 2000, and had pledged, together with other nations, to fight genocide, ethnic cleansing, racism, anti-Semitism and xenophobia.

It is interesting to note that opposition to the congress was also expressed by the conservative, right-wing National Renovation. The highest party institution declared that the revival of a Nazi party in Chile and the dissemination of Nazi ideas were unconstitutional. It even went so far as to expel from its ranks Alexis López Tapia, who had used Pendragón to widely advertise the congress. López Tapia also operated a site on the Internet where he disseminated Nazi ideology and promoted the congress. Veteran Chilean Nazi Miguel Serrano, too, felt compelled to react: when interviewed by the leading newspaper El Mercurio, he referred to the congress as a “virtual” event and attacked the Jewish community for exaggerating the issue, adding that “Chilean Nazis do not exist.”

Under the new government of Ricardo Lagos, which took office in February 2000, the congress was eventually banned. This was one instance in which countering anti-Semitism and neo-Nazism publicly and directly proved effective. However, the lack of appropriate anti-discriminatory legislation and the continuation of neo-Nazi activities are some of the important problems that Chile, in this case, and other countries, sooner or later, will have to confront.

Sources: “Invitación,” Pendragón, Jan. 1998; “Encuentro Internacional Nacionalsocialista,” Pendragón, July 1998; “Chile to Ban Neo-Nazis from Millennium Event,” Jewish Chronicle, 6 Feb. 1998; “Neo-Nazis in Chile Plan First International Congress in 2000,” Ha'aretz, 21 Aug. 1998; “Jewish Leaders Seek to Head off Nazi Meet in Chile,” CNN Interactive Online, 9 Aug. 1999; “El Senado Chileno contra el anunciado congreso Nazi,” Oji, June 1998; Marcos Levy, “Profundo rechazo de Camara de diputados a congreso nazi,” Mundo judío, 16 July 1999; “Chile Prevents Nazi Congress,” Hamodia (in Hebrew), 1 Dec. 1999; Ricardo Lagos se pronuncia sobre los Nazis,” Mundo judío, 26 Nov. 1999; José Rodríguez Elizondo (Chilean ambassador to Israel), “Nazis y desinformación sobre Chile,” letter to the Stephen Roth Institute, 2 Dec.1999; “Declaración oficial. El gobierno de Chile reitera su rechazo a toda actividad nazi o neo-nazi en su territorio,” República de Chile, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, 17 Feb. 2000; “The Republic of Chile” (statement of the delegation of the Republic of Chile), Stockholm International Forum on the Holocaust, 26-28 Jan. 2000; “Renovación Nacional expulsó a Alexis López y rechazó congreso Nazi,” Mundo judío, 5 Nov. 1999.

ANTI-SEMITISM AS A COROLLARY OF GLOBALIZATION IN THE ARAB WORLD

On the eve of the year 2000 and the new century, the Palestinian semi-official daily al-Hayat al-Jadida published a cartoon depicting an old man addressing a young man and pointing to a dwarf with a skullcap and a Star of David. The old man, who symbolized the 20th century, was handing over to the young man -- the 21st century -- “the disease of the century,” as the caption above the dwarf Jew read.

The perception of the Jew as the malady of both the outgoing century and the incoming one refuses to fade. In fact, paradoxically, toward the end of the year, in the wake of the renewal of the Syrian-Israeli negotiations, the anti-Semitic campaign was intensified, especially in the Syrian press, through the use of “raw, brute, anti-Jewish calumnies,” as Washington Post 's Charles Krauthammer wrote. These manifestations were accompanied at times with threats by Islamists to strike at Israeli, as well as at Jewish, targets; thus, the Jewish American Middle East scholar Daniel Pipes asserted that anti-Semitism had become “primarily a Muslim phenomenon” and that “virtually all leaders in the Muslim world are anti-Semitic.” This is perhaps a sweeping assertion; nevertheless, there was no change in the representation of Israel and the Jews in the Arab media in 1999 compared to previous years, and anti-Semitic expressions generally continued unabated.

Why does the demonization of Israel and the Jews continue? This question is especially intriguing in view of the existing peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan and the ongoing, albeit intermittent, peace negotiations with the Palestinians and the Syrians. Rami Khouri, a Palestinian Jordanian commentator, offered an explanation, linking Israel’s behavior and actions to the “new brand of anti-Jewish anti-Semitism” that sees Israelis and Jews as “self-centered, violent, and above all law or the rest of humankind.” This could be manifested in “disproportionate violence against civilians in Lebanon” or any indiscriminate action against the Palestinians. However, this construction is insufficient and oversimplified. Anti-Semitism has increasingly become a constant in the Arab discourse and is related, as elsewhere in the world, to broader processes affecting Arab societies, such as globalization, the New World Order, the new Middle East, the market economy and normalization. In addition to the unresolved Arab-Israeli conflict, which continues to fuel anti-Semitic sentiments, these terms have become catchwords denoting, explicitly or implicitly, the old anti-Semitic motif of the Jewish/Zionist conspiracy to conquer and dominate the world. Although this motif is not new in the Arab anti-Semitic discourse, it received a new impetus when the globalization issue came to the fore. Hence, although still anchored in the Arab-Israeli conflict, anti-Semitism has progressively become part of the wider political polemic and is woven into the ongoing debate between the agents of change, liberalization, democratization and peace in the Middle East, and nationalists and Islamists who utterly reject these processes.

Globalization is perceived as a threat to the Arab and Muslim worlds not only because of its possible effect on their social cohesiveness and the strengthening of nationalist, reactionary and fundamentalist trends, but mainly due to its impact on the Arab-Israeli conflict. A conference held in Beirut in March 1999, entitled “The Arabs and the Confrontation with Israel,” dealt with perceptions of the conflict in the age of globalization and the power of the Zionist lobby in the United States. According to the speakers, among them Arab academics from American universities, the changes brought about by globalization have affected the Arab-Israeli conflict. The conflict has become marginalized in American diplomacy and Israel’s existence in the region is accepted by its neighbors as an indisputable fact; but the doubts surrounding its nature, its size and the way they should relate to it still prevail. The Jewish lobby was viewed as enjoying extensive powers over the American administration and the American national media, whereas the close links between Israel and international Zionism were said to sustain the former as a center of expansionism, heand hostility that limited its possibilities for natural interaction and peaceful coexistence with its neighbors.

International Zionism was seen as the driving force behind globalization and behind the idea of the clash of civilizations, which strove to present Islam as the enemy of Christianity and Judaism. Accordingly, international Zionism and Israel were implicated in the crises in Kosovo, Iraq, Chechenya, the Sudan and Libya, all of which involved Muslims, in order to weaken Islam and Muslim and Arab societies. All the killings, deportations and destruction in the world were the result of the New World Order, which the United States and Israel were trying to enforce in the name of so-called democracy, liberty and progress, explained Shaykh Muhammad Yazbik, Ayatollah Khamene’i’s representative in Lebanon, in a Friday sermon. The international forces which aspired to control the world were the allies of the Zionist enemy and supported its superiority, claimed `Abd al-Mun`im Salim Jabbara in the Egyptian opposition paper al-Sha`b. The Iraqi daily al-`Iraq found a link between the American attacks on Iraq and the general Zionist scheme in the Talmud and The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, which discuss the annihilation of the goyim, or foreigners, and especially the Arabs and Muslims, who are allegedly considered to be beasts and not human beings.

A cartoon in al-`Ahd , the Hizballah mouthpiece, depicted a caricature of a bearded and hooked-nose “Jewish” soldier, holding a bloody knife and kicking the Palestinian people; in the background, the monstrous Serbs were kicking the Kosovars, while NATO airplanes dropped bombs on the Serbs and flowers on Israel. The caption of the cartoon was “Ethnic Cleansing.” The editor of al-Sha`b, `Adil Husayn, a staunch opponent of globalization and normalization, saw the latter as a new scheme by the American-Zionist alliance to penetrate the Arab economies and gain control over them. Normalization was the flip side of the globalization coin. It symbolized the acceptance of the foreign Western Jewish entity as an integral part of the region and a further step in the Jewish strategy to invade and occupy the Arab world. (The issue of normalization is further discussed in the chapter on Arab countries.) Describing the 20th century as “the century of plots” in the Jordanian Islamic paper al-Liwa', Muhammad Nur al-Din Shahada referred to normalization as the last plot, and Egyptian pro-Islamist commentator Fahmi Huwaydi viewed the propagation of “the culture of peace” as an attempt “to distort history, damage national memory, erase the umma’s legacy” and subjugate the Arab mind. Egyptian writer Ahmad Baha’ al-Din Sha`ban developed this idea in his book Post-Zionism and the Lie of the Peace Movement in Israel (ma ba`d al-sihyuniyya wa-akzubat al-salam fi isra`il), published in Cairo in 1999 as part of a series of books on the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Surveys of Arab public opinion confirm that there is little desire for peace with Israel. Much of the Arab world still dreams of Israel’s elimination. According to a survey carried out at the end of 1999 by the Washington Institute among 1,600 Jordanians, Egyptians, Lebanenese and Palestinians, about 80 percent thought the conflict should continue and 54 percent wanted Israel eventually to disappear from the map of the Middle East. Arab writers also tend to differentiate between the attitude of the governments making peace with Israel, that is, “surrendering” to its will, and the vast majority of the Arab peoples. Hasan Duh, in the Egyptian opposition paper al-Wafd claimed that 99 percent would negate the existence of Israel. Similar views were voiced in the Jordanian daily al-`Arab al-Yawm by Muhammad As`ad Buyud al-Tamimi, and in al-`Ahd, in connection with the hostile reception given the Israeli hand-ball team in Qatar.

Any analysis of the Arab perception of Israel and the conflict in the era of globalization would be incomplete, however, without mentioning the proponents of democratization and change in the Middle East, who naturally are also the proponents of peace and opponents of the old myths of the Arab-Israeli conflict and anti-Jewish attitudes. One of the most revealing insights into this issue is the book The Democracy Crisis and Peace (azmat al-dimuqratiyya wal-salam), by Amin al-Mahdi, a member of the Egyptian peace movement, which was published in 1999 in Cairo. While blasting the Arab “culture of authoritarianism” and the “official intellectuals,” which were among the main causes of retardation, corruption, economic and social devastation and the violation of human rights, al-Mahdi attacks the demonization of Israel and the continued exploitation of the myth of The Protocols of the Elders of Zion.

Sources: al-Hayat al-Jadida, 14 March, 28 Dec. 1999; Washington Post, 7 Jan. 2000; New Zealand Jewish Chronicle, Feb. 1999; Jordan Times, 29 June 1999; al-Usbu`, 18 Jan. 1999; al-`Ahd, 20 July. 27 Aug., 13 Dec. 1999; al-Sha`b, 5, 12 Feb., 27 July, 3 Aug. 1999; al-`Iraq, 5 Jan. 1999; al-`Arab al-Yawm, 15 Jan. 1999; al-Dustur, 22 Oct. 1999; al-Liwa', 24 Nov., 29 Dec. 1999; Ma`ariv, 5 Nov. 1999; al-Wafd, 23 Nov. 1999; Ha`aretz, 28 May, 1 Nov. 1999; Civil Society, Oct. 1999; Baha' al-Din Sha`ban, Post-Zionism and the Lie of the Peace Movement in Israel (ma ba`d al-sihyuniyya wa-akzubat al-salam fi isra`il) (Cairo, 1999); Amin al-Mahdi, The Democracy Crisis and Peace (azmat al-dimuqratiyya wal-salam) (Cairo, 1999).