Anti-Semitism Worldwide 1998/9

RETHINKING THE HOLOCAUST: AN OPEN DEBATE IN THE ARAB WORLD

Esther Webman*

The Holocaust and the symbols of the Nazi era have, as already pointed out
(see ASW 1996/ 7; 1997/ 8), been increasingly incorporated in Arab anti-Semitism.
The traditional approach of the Arabs in dealing with the Holocaust
was denial and revisionism, together with justifying the suffering which
befell the Jews, admitted Lebanese writer Samir Kassir.1 This approach,
which is still dominant in Arab writings, stemmed from the viewpoint that
the Arabs were not responsible for the Holocaust but suffered from its
consequences, especially due to exploitation by the Jews. The international
Jewish media capitalized extensively on Hitler's deeds, wrote Sayf 'Ali al-Jarwan
in the Palestinian paper al-Hayat al-Jadida. "The truth is that the
Jewish deportation is a false myth called by the Jews 'Holocaust' and exploited
by them to arouse sympathy ... Although Hitler's campaign against the
Jews inflicted on them a degree of oppression, it did them a service whose
benefits they continue to reap."2
Most of the studies carried out by "objective researchers" on the Jewish
Holocaust prove that the Holocaust was "a big lie and a myth spread by the
Zionist mind to mislead the world," explained the Jordanian paper al-'Arab
al-Yawm in an article entitled "Their Holocaust Our Cemetery."3 A similar
view was expressed in a Moroccan paper Le Matin (28 July) and in al-Ahram
(28 March).
Egyptian journalist Hasan Rajab, one of few Arabs who visited the death
camps at Buchenwald and Auschwitz, remained unconvinced that the
crematoria could burn six million people during the war, even if they had
operated day and night. Calling this blackmail "the religion" of the State of
Israel, Rajab explained that numbers played an important role in Zionist
literature because they determined the amount of compensation alleged
victims and their families would receive.4 Another Egyptian, Wagih Abu
Zikra, maintained that he still believed that the Holocaust was a myth
"created for blackmailing the world."5
Praising the courage of Roberto Begnini for making the film Life is
Beautiful, Khamis al-Khayyati referred to Jewish indignation over the film.
The Jews, he asserted, capitalized on "the gas chambers" and on the Jewish
Holocaust, and used them "to curb anyone who tries to defend his rights ...
first and foremost the Palestinians."6
Similarly, but less frequently, the Holocaust was presented as a barbaric
reaction to the Jewish refusal to show respect for Western societies by
assimilating into them.7 Radio Damascus also pursued this motif, claiming
that World War II documents had revealed the conspiratorial role of
Germany's Jews in exhausting the country and weakening its economy and
capabilities. "Whoever surveys these documents can understand the reasons
for the Germans' hatred of the Jews," it contended.8
Further impetus to the debate on the Holocaust was provided in 1998 by
three unconnected episodes: the proposed visit of 'Arafat to the Holocaust
Memorial Museum in Washington; the Vatican declaration of 16 March; and
the Roger Garaudy trial. All three contributed new dimensions to the
discussion of the Holocaust, maintaining it as a major issue in the public
debate for over three months.

THE PROPOSED VISIT OF CHAIRMAN YASIR 'ARAFAT
TO THE WASHINGTON MEMORIAL MUSEUM
In mid-January, on the eve of a renewed round of talks between the
Palestinians and Israelis in Washington, members of the American Middle
East team initiated the idea of a visit by 'Arafat to the museum as a gesture
of reconciliation that could improve the atmosphere of the Washington talks.
'Arafat agreed to the visit but the museum's board of directors refused to
extend an official VIP invitation to 'Arafat, causing a diplomatic blunder
which led to the dismissal of Walter Reich, the museum's director.9 The
canceled visit became a subject of debate in Palestinian and Arab circles.
Should 'Arafat visit the Memorial Museum? What would the visit signify?
Some believed the visit should take place to promote understanding and
reconciliation; some conditioned the visit on a mutual gesture of
acknowledgment by Israel of the suffering inflicted on the Palestinians; and
others opposed the visit absolutely.
'Arafat reportedly had a genuine interest in the Holocaust and was keen
to visit the museum and witness for himself the afflictions imposed on the
Jews during the war. The visit would give him an opportunity "to share with
the Jewish people its historical pains and to bring the two peoples closer
together," said his adviser Ahmad Tibi.10 Bilal al-Hasan, in the Saudi-owned
London paper al-Sharq al-Awsat, attributed the source of the debate among
the Palestinians not to their refusal to acknowledge that the Holocaust had
taken place but "because the Israelis refuse to admit the holocaust they have
inflicted on the Palestinians." No one in Europe and America had yet
acknowledged that they had set in motion this new holocaust, he said, and
concluded that if the visit had taken place, it "would not have been merely
a human gesture," but would have meant "bestowing a right on the Jews
without obtaining a major right which they are withholding from him."11
Considering acknowledgment of the humanitarianism of the other as
imperative, Halim Barakat wondered why it was always the weak and the
victimized that had to be the first to acknowledge the humanitarianism of the
strong, oppressive, arrogant and relentless enemy.12 The refusal to host
'Arafat was seen by Hazim Saghiya as contrary to the universalism of the
Holocaust. He praised 'Arafat's readiness to visit the museum and called on
the Palestinians to intensify the demand for their inclusion in the list of
Holocaust victims and hence for compensation.13 The Palestinian Jordanian
journalist Rami Khouri, who visited the Holocaust Memorial Museum
because he believed such a visit was "important to better understand the
meaning and the place of the Holocaust in the lives of the Jews, Israelis,
Arabs," thought that the episode was "a missed opportunity." He realized the
objection of Jews and Israelis to raising the issue of the Holocaust in the
same context as the Palestinian national catastrophe (nakba) and accepted
the difference between Jewish and Palestinian suffering, but he argued that
from the Arab perspective, "it is politically less compelling." Nevertheless, he
maintained, the key to resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict lay in acknowledging,
addressing and removing the fears of both sides.14
In the same vein, another Palestinian writer, Rasmi Abu 'Ali, called for
erecting a Palestinian center to commemorate the Palestinian catastrophe
and heroism. This would be a suitable answer to all the Jewish memorials
"effectively used by the Israelis and Zionists to keep the world's conscience
agitated and troubled."15 The idea of an Arab museum for Zionist victims
was also pursued by Egyptian Muhammad Sa' id al-Sayyid.16
'Arafat's acceptance of the invitation to visit the Holocaust Museum did
not stem from his personal desire to do so but from a wise political
calculation, argued al-Sharq al-Awsat' s editor, 'Abd al-Rahman al-Rashid,
who considered both the museum episode and the Garaudy episode as
manifestations of a state of crisis in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Holocaust,
he maintained, certainly happened and was a repugnant act, whether one
soul was victimized or five million, and there was no basis for its justification.
Al-Rashid added a new aspect, linking neo-Nazi activity with Hitler's Nazism,
and claiming that those Muslims who doubted the Holocaust failed to grasp
that they were concealing the persecution of Muslims by neo-Nazi racists in
Germany and elsewhere in Europe. "We disagree with the Israelis on almost
everything ... but we find ourselves with them in the rejection of Nazism."17
Others, however, dismissed the importance of the visit on the grounds of
the traditional Arab approach to the Holocaust. The Holocaust is not "an
Arab complex," wrote al-Hayat's editor 'Abd al-Wahab Badrakhan. "The
Arabs do not have Holocaust accounts in their wars with Israel. It is the other
way around. Israel used the Holocaust to justify its aggression against the
Arabs." The suffering of the Jews was found in museums, whereas the
suffering of the Palestinians inflicted by the Jews was occurring in reality; yet
people were required to acknowledge the suffering in the museums and
ignore the living one. Assessing the significance of Holocaust denial in the
Arab world, he maintained that Holocaust denial was not a dynamic force in
Arab thought.18
Palestinian member of the PLO Council Shafiq al-Hut thought that 'Arafat
was ill-advised when he agreed to visit the museum. Al-Hut criticized Arab
writers who believed that changing the Arab position toward the Holocaust
would lead to the end of the Arab-Israeli conflict and to historical
reconciliation. From this point of view he embarked on an analysis of "the
Arab position" toward the Holocaust in an attempt to prove that the
Holocaust had become a problem for the Arabs due to its politicization and
sanctification. However, no Arab or Palestinian could contest it from a
human or a religious perspective.19 Twelve Jordanian opposition parties
issued a statement on 17 January, in which they attacked Jewish claims about
the Holocaust and raised the possibility that 'Arafat's visit could deepen the
gulf between the opposition and the establishment in the Middle East and
expose the discrepancy between public opinion in the region and official
policy.20

THE VATICAN DECLARATION
On 16 March the Vatican released a document -- "We Remember: A
Reflection on the Shoah," which acknowledged the uniqueness of the Jewish
tragedy and discussed the role of the papacy and the Catholic Church during
the Holocaust. This declaration might have provided another occasion for
dealing with the meaning of the Holocaust in the Arab press, but instead it
generated a discussion on its political implications. Apart from informative
reporting,21 the most common reaction was that the document was yet
another gain for the Jews and Zionists and that the Vatican had gone too far
in admitting its people's sins.
The document aroused special interest among the Lebanese, among
whom a delicate balance in Christian-Muslim relations is barely maintained.
Shaykh Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, the spiritual leader of Hizballah,
expressed astonishment at the responsibility assumed by the Vatican for the
Christians' failure to aid the Jews at a time of acute chaos. "The church came
closer to the Jews and to Israel," leaving little room for pursuing the
Christian-Islamic dialogue, he said in his weekly Qur'anic lesson. In response
to a question on whether the document reflected Jewish attempts to control
the religious and strategic decisions of the Vatican, he reiterated the
traditional Arab argument that the Jews blamed the whole world for "what
had been done to them by Hitler." The Jews were not Hitler's only victims
but they succeeded in focusing the spotlight on themselves; and they
continued to arouse the world's conscience in order to extract political and
cultural concessions. The massacres committed in Palestine and Lebanon by
Jews who represented the Jews of the world, exceeded Hitler's deeds, but
he did not represent the Christians or Europe. He went on, "we do not find
a voice that sympathizes with the Lebanese and the Palestinians," which
proves the world's double-standards of morality.22
President of the Supreme Shi'i Council Shaykh Muhammad Mahdi Shams
al-Din also thought that the church had no reason to apologize because the
Holocaust was "a myth fabricated by the Jews and Zionists."23 A similar view
was presented by former Lebanese foreign minister, the Maronite Faris
Bouez, who apparently attached great importance to the document and
considered it detrimental to the Arabs and especially the Lebanese. During
his visit to Rome at the beginning of April and his meeting with the pope,
he deplored Israel's exploitation of the Holocaust and wondered why he had
apologized for the deeds of Nazism, which victimized even more Christians
than Jews. He explained that "Hitler acted for political reasons against the
Jews because they conspired against the state and created a state within a
state." Hitler's reactions was thus similar to the behavior of the Spanish
Queen Isabella in the 15th century and Tsar Nikolai II in the 19th century.24
The pope's document was seen as an additional phase in a process of
rapprochement between the Vatican, Israel and the Jews -- the
establishment of diplomatic relations in 1994; recognition of Jesus as a Jew,
and the proposed visit of the pope to Mount Sinai and "occupied Jerusalem"
to mark the beginning of the new millennium -- which ignored the Christian
communities of the Middle East.25 The Lebanese editor of al-Hayat in Paris,
Randa Taqiyyu al-Din, pointed to the weakening of the Eastern Church and
its Arab representatives in the Vatican, which led to the strengthening of the
pro-Jewish trend and to the enhancement of the Christian-Jewish dialogue.
She quoted Andre Riccardi, professor of the history of religions at the
University of Rome and a close aide to the pope, who called on the Arabs
to be more receptive of the papal way of thinking and to exert more effort
in promoting relations with the Vatican and the Christian-Islamic dialogue.26
The Egyptian journalist Muhammad 'Abd al-Mun' im contrasted the
closure of borders to Jews by Western countries, mentioned in the docu-ment,
to the Arabs' positive response to their immigration to Palestine, which
led later to the emigration and deportation of the Arabs. 'Abd al-Mun' im
welcomed the Vatican's repentance but expected, for the sake of justice, the
issuing of a similar document by the Christian and Jewish establishments for
past and present crimes committed against Arabs and Muslims.27 Another
Egyptian writer, Ridha Hilal, differentiated between the historical Catholic-Jewish
reconciliation and Christian-Zionist reconciliation, alluding to the
Protestant attitude to the Jewish return to Zion, which denies the rights of
Muslims and Christians in Jerusalem and Palestine.28 Assessing the political
repercussions of the document on the peace talks between Israel and the
Palestinians, Egyptian researcher Alfi Shannad wondered if the Palestinians
were doomed to pay the price for the rapprochement between the Vatican
and the Jews and whether Israel would use it to realize its political
ambitions.29
The Jewish-Israeli response to the document, accusing the Vatican of not
going far enough in formally apologizing to the Jewish people, was also
raised in the above-mentioned articles. This was offset, wrote Rami Khouri,
"by the Arab accusations that the Vatican went too far in admitting its
people's sins to the Jews." Khouri was one of the few Arab commentators
who considered the document "constructive and timely," not only for
contributing an "appropriate theological perspective on the ugly political
events of the recent past" but for providing "constructive moral and political
guidelines" as a standard of behavior and universal morality for all human
beings.30

THE GARAUDY TRIAL
On 7 January, the trial of Roger Garaudy opened in Paris, two years after the
publication of his book The Founding Myths of Israeli Politics, the basis for
his prosecution on charges of Holocaust denial and incitement to anti-Semitism
under the Gayssot Law. The sharp reaction of French Jews to the
book and the prospective trial prompted a wave of support for Garaudy in
Arab countries, both on the official and the popular levels during his visits
there in 1996 (see ASW 1996/ 7). The first quarter of 1998 witnessed a
"second Garaudy wave" in the Middle East, as Lebanese sociologist Wadhah
Sharara called the plethora of articles in the Arab press, in the wake of the
opening of the trial and Garaudy's new round of visits to the Middle East to
rally moral and financial support.31 These articles exposed Garaudy's views,
debating the meaning and ramifications of the trial and of the almost
unconditional support for Garaudy in the Arab and Muslim worlds. Several
themes seemed to emerge in the discussion:
a) The trial and the Gayssot Law were flagrant violations of the basic
freedoms of expression and thought.
b) The trial was an indictment of the West for its defunct democracy and
double moral standards.
c) The trial was directed against Islam since Garaudy was a Muslim
thinker who had defended an Arab and Muslim cause.
d) Garaudy was both Dreyfus the persecuted and Emil Zola, the savior
of truth.
e) International Zionism controlled the world media and manipulated it.
f) The Holocaust was sanctified by the Jews in order to allow them to
continue their mental and financial exploitation of the West.
g) Research and revision of data on the Holocaust was legitimate and
there was no subject too sacred to defy questioning.
Garaudy's views were also introduced to the Arab reader in various
translations of his works. A new translation of The Founding Myths of Israeli
Politics, with a preface by Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal, was published in
1998 and distributed at the Cairo book fair during Garaudy's visit. Chapters
of the book were published in the Libyan paper al-Jamahiriyya during
January. Al-Nahar published the full text of the Gayssot Law (14 February)
and Garaudy's critical view of the law, "The Right to Answer," published in
French in 1996.32 The Process of Liberty -- a new book by Garaudy and his
lawyer Jacques Verges on the trial proceedings -- was also translated into
Arabic and published in several papers.33 Al-Nahar also published, on 26
and 27 February, a translation of two articles by Jean Gabriel Cohen-Benedit,
written in 1979, during the debate over Robert Faurisson's book on the
< Holocaust. Benedit defended the right of research and claimed that Jewish
Holocaust survivors were being used as an argument against any criticism of
the State of Israel.

Supporting Garaudy
Under the slogan "Garaudy you are not alone," coined by journalist Salah
'Isa of the Egyptian leftist paper al-Ahali, 34 the campaign of solidarity with
Garaudy far exceeded the warm embrace of 1996. Arab intellectuals, human
rights activists, professional unions and political organizations all took part
in the campaign -- raising funds, issuing statements of support, submitting
protests to French embassies in Arab capitals, organizing rallies and marches
and holding seminars.
On 27 February the court handed down its verdict. Garaudy was convict-ed
of disputing crimes against humanity and fined F120,000 ($ 20,000). An
appeal court even increased the sentence in mid-December to a nine months
suspended jail term and F160,000 ($ 28,000) fine.
According to a decision of the Arab Lawyers Federation, Garaudy's
defense team was reinforced by an Arab lawyers delegation, which included
Egyptian 'Ali Hamid al-Ghatit and Moroccan Khalid al-Sufyani. A Palestinian
living in Switzerland, Tahir Shukri, gave testimony for the defense. In his
appearance before the court, al-Ghatit compared Garaudy to Voltaire, Jean-Jacques
Rousseau, Emil Zola and Egyptian writer Taha Husayn, all
considered brave thinkers who defended their opinions. He attacked France
for condemning a person seeking the truth and the Gayssot Law as an in-fringement
of free speech. When the verdict was read, a quarrel broke out
between a group of Betar youth and neo-Nazi activists, during which Arab
journalists claimed to have been beaten. Egyptian Foreign Minister 'Amru
Musa and the Iranian embassy in Paris submitted an official protest to the
French authorities.35
On 17 January, the twelve Jordanian opposition parties (see above),
described the trial as a "theatrical farce," exposing Zionist influence on the
Western media and society. It urged the public to condemn the trial and
demanded that the Arab and Islamic media expose Zionist plots and crimes
and disseminate Garaudy's writings.36 The Egyptian Journalists' Union
announced, on 10 January, that the trial was conducted contrary to France's
historical role as the cradle of civil liberties. A day later the Palestinian
Writers' Association expressed support for Garaudy's "brave struggle" for
freedom of thought and called for donations to assist him.37 The general
manager of the Information Ministry in the Palestinian Authority (PA), Sa' d
Basisu, explained that Garaudy symbolized the French people's conscience
and that he was being tried for defending the truth.38 Ahmad 'Abd al-Rahman,
another PA official, stated that Garaudy should have the right to
express his point of view on any subject, especially since no one argued with
all the books and films about the Holocaust which "have told what
happened to the Jews in an unbelievable and exaggerated manner."39 Similar
statements of support were issued by other writers, lawyers, journalists and
women's and youth organizations in Lebanon, Syria, Morocco, Kuwait and
Iran.40

Garaudy's Middle East Tour
In the period between the hearings and the verdict, Garaudy toured the
Middle East, visiting Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Egypt. After
the trial, in early April he visited Iran (see Iran). Reportedly, Garaudy's tour
was organized following an appeal for help to his friend Ahmad al-Qadidi in
Qatar.41 Therefore, Qatar was a major stop on his trip and the base for the
Committee in Defense of Garaudy. A similar call in September, before the
court's discussion of his appeal,42 did not elicit any response.
The UAE daily al-Khaleej called on its readers in January to send
donations and messages of support to Garaudy and explained that the aim
of the donations would be "to debunk Zionist allegations and to resist the
Zionist influence in France." According to one report, about $100,000 had
been raised, including a contribution of $50,000 by the wife of UAE President
Shaykh Zayd ibn Sultan al-Nahayan.43 The Arab Lawyers Federation, based
in Cairo, collected funds independently, and mobilized lawyers, journalists,
writers, workers and doctors to join the committee in support of Garaudy.
In addition to the demonstrations of solidarity held in Cairo, Jerusalem
and Gaza in January, and the submission of protest letters to the French
embassy and consulate,44 Garaudy attracted large audiences in each of the
countries he visited. In Qatar a high-profile conference brought together
several Arab Islamists, among them Shaykh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, an Egyptian
scholar based in Qatar; Fahmi Huwaydi, an Egyptian commentator; and
Islamist Muhammad 'Amara. Qaradawi, known for his anti-Israeli views,
stressed the fact that Garaudy's struggle against Zionism was supported by
one billion Muslims. Huwaydi compared the controversies aroused by
Garaudy and by Salman Rushdie, a theme also raised by Garaudy and many
of the articles on the affair (see below). The conference was apparently held
under the auspices of the wife of the emir of Qatar, Shaykha Muza.
Another major gathering which reportedly attracted a large crowd was a
seminar held at the Cairo international book fair. During his tour, Garaudy
refrained from touching upon the issue of the Holocaust. He mainly con-centrated
on the US and Zionism, and their unholy alliance, which could
allegedly lead to a third world war and to a clash between the Judeo-Christian
civilization and the Islamic civilization, perceived by them as
barbaric and backward. He accused Zionism of controlling 95 percent of the
world media but denied being anti-Semitic. He maintained that there was a
difference between Zionism and Judaism, and that he was against Zionism,
which was a hostile colonialist movement. He also attacked the Gayssot Law
as unjust, claiming it would inevitably lead to his conviction.45

Islamist Expressions of Solidarity
Among the staunch supporters of Garaudy were also Islamic organizations
and religious leaders. Garaudy met with Shaykh al-Azhar Muhammad al-Tantawi
and with Egypt's Mufti Nasr Farid Wasil. Wasil stated that it was
incumbent upon every Muslim to defend Garaudy and stand by his side.
Syrian Grand Mufti Shaykh Ahmad Kaftaro also expressed total support for
Garaudy, praising him as "a free thinker who does not compromise his
principles."46 Hamas leader Shaykh Ahmad Yasin sent a letter of support to
Garaudy "the French Muslim intellectual," stressing that all the intellectuals
in the world and all Muslims were behind him. He pointed to the double
standards and to the contradiction between the attitude of the West to
Salman Rushdie, the author who defamed Islam but was embraced by it as
"a man of intellect," and to Garaudy, who was being tried for speaking of
the Jews.47 Syrian Muslim scholar Muhammad Sa' id Ramadan al-Buti also
attacked the West for its differing treatment of Rushdie and Garaudy, and
urged the Arab and Muslim worlds to adopt a unified stand and condemn
the West.48 The trial was "a badge of honor" on Garaudy's chest, wrote
Egyptian Islamist scholar Muhammad 'Amara. Although disputing Garaudy's
interpretation of Islam, 'Amara and Buti claimed that this could not detract
from the feeling of pride that every Arab and Muslim should feel toward him
as he defended "our right cause in the face of Western hegemony and Zionist
blackmail."49
In response to a question during his weekly Qur'anic lesson, Shaykh
Fadlallah said that Garaudy's problem was that he had crossed "all the red
lines." First, he had become a Muslim, which had impelled Europe to try him
for his conversion. Second, the Jews controlled the European media, so it
was only natural that freedom of the media in many Western states
corresponded to freedom of the Jews to preserve their myths and fairy
tales.50 A statement of the Lebanese Amal movement also considered the trial
an affair which concerned all Arabs and Muslims.51

Themes in the Arab Debate over Garaudy
The major themes in the debate, introduced above, were raised by writers of
all ideological shades. It seems, however, that Islamists tended more to emphasize
the dichotomy between Islam and the West and to present the trial
as another manifestation of Western and Zionist hatred for Islam and Mus-lims.
As proof, the sympathy of the West for Salman Rushdie and for the Egyptian
professor Nasr Abu Zayd (banished from Cairo University in 1995 for his
modernist interpretation of the Qur'an) was contrasted to its attitude toward
Garaudy.52 The trial was further confirmation of Zionist clout and Muslim
powerlessness in the international arena, wrote a Saudi paper.53 Garaudy's
real crime, asserted Egypt's Rajab al-Bana, was his conversion to Islam.54
Garaudy's trial gave new impetus to the conspiracy theory, pointing to a
Jewish force maneuvering behind the scenes of regional and international
affairs. The Jews ruled the world by laws, claimed 'Adil Hammuda.55 The
Gayssot Law, explained the Egyptian lawyer 'Ali al-Ghatit, who joined
Garaudy's defense team, was enacted to incriminate anyone who demanded
the return of occupied Arab lands.56 The same Jewish hand that was behind
the trial was behind the Lewinsky affair and behind the ban on the British
historian David Irving from entering various countries, wrote Muhammad
Salmawi in his article "Look for the Jews" (see Arab Countries). 57
The main discussions thus focused on the political aspects and
implications of the affair for the Arab world. "Where are we in Garaudy's
trial?" was the topic of a debate held by a Lebanese paper with Lebanese
journalists -- one which accurately reflected the questions raised in the
debate and in interviews with a variety of Egyptian intellectuals and
journalists. "Is the trial a French affair, an issue concerning democracy or
another phase in the war with Israel?" Three positions seemed to emerge
among the Lebanese. One considered it an internal French affair; another
believed that the Arabs should take a stand on its more general aspects, such
as the issue of freedom of expression and the humanitarian aspect; and a
third regarded it as an Arab matter, strongly connected to the Arab-Israeli
conflict.58 It is impossible to introduce all the range of opinions, but the third
position appeared to be the dominant one. This was even more striking in
regard to the Egyptians, among whom stronger agreement prevailed. They
considered it imperative to focus on and expose Zionism and Israel's deeds
in "Palestine and South Lebanon." They emphasized the role of the Zionist
lobby in concocting the trial and criticized the violation of civil liberties in
France.59 Several Egyptian writers even gloated over the exposure of the
dubious democracy of the West.60
This consensus was broken by increasingly dissenting voices, mainly
among Lebanese, Palestinian and North African intellectuals. They rejected
this support, questioned its motives and advisability, and found it at odds not
only with the Western position but also with the Arab and Palestinian cause.
"The trial taking place in Paris does not involve the Arabs, the Muslims or
even the Zionists," wrote Hasan Nafaa, a professor of political science at
Cairo University, who wrote his Ph. D. dissertation on Garaudy in the 1970s.
"The Garaudy issue should be viewed in its true context: the trial of an
independent-minded French citizen and the suppression of free opinion in
a society which allows for the establishment of political parties such as the
Front National."61 Amina Rashid, head of the department of French culture
at Cairo University, also shared the view that the Gayssot Law strengthened
fascist trends in France.62
Some critics saw the overwhelming Arab sympathy for Garaudy as an
embarrassment, urging his supporters not to attack France or belittle the
Holocaust. Some lashed out at Arab human rights activists who campaigned
for Garaudy while failing to raise their voice against countless human rights
violations in their own lands.63
Although there were scant direct references to Garaudy's views on the
Holocaust, some speakers and writers touched upon the subject. The motifs
of Holocaust denial which appeared in Garaudy's book were rejected by
several writers and academicians, among them the Lebanese Ibrahim al-Ariss,
Samir Kassir, Hazim Saghiya, Wadhah Sharara, Hasan al-Shami and
Faysal Jalul; the Palestinians Edward Said, Majid 'Asqalani, Ray Hanania and
Mahmud al-Rimawi; the Paris-based Tunisian poet Tahir al-Bakri and the
Saudi 'Abd al-Rahman al-Rashid. They all considered support for Garaudy an
inappropriate choice of weapon in the struggle against Israel. Moreover,
solidarity with Garaudy meant agreement with the European extreme right,
which disseminated his views on Holocaust denial and harbored the same
feelings of hate toward Arabs and Jews alike. Adopting Garaudy's views,
they warned, did not serve the Arab cause. It not only placed the Arabs in
opposition to the prevailing stream in the world but also perpetuated
ignorance and erroneous ideas among Arabs. Embracing the myth of
Holocaust denial could easily lead to denial of the Palestinian cause. Attacks
on Israeli policies or Zionism should hence be separated from the issue of
the Holocaust, which was a historical fact and a deplorable crime against
humanity.64 Egyptian author Gamal al-Ghitani thought the Arabs should not
belittle the brutality of the Nazis against humanity.65 Christian Lebanese
writer Joseph Samaha believed that the myth of the State of Israel as a
product of the Holocaust should be dissipated and that what was done to
the Jews by the Nazis should be deplored. It was a positive sign that the
Europe which committed this crime suffered from a guilt complex. Samaha
considered that with the right approach the Arabs could implant their cause
in the consciousness of nations.66
There is no doubt, admitted Egyptian writer Muhammad Sid Ahmad, that
the Jews were persecuted in Western and Eastern Europe -- a persecution
which reached its peak with the Holocaust. But it is also true that after the
war the Jews managed to exploit the Holocaust to their advantage in the
Western media, exposing the racist crimes against them, but that after the
establishment of the State of Israel the Palestinians became the oppressed of
the second half of the 20th century.67 The memorandum of the Palestinian
writers (mentioned above) stressed that in no way did their solidarity with
Garaudy mean belittling the sufferings of the Jews at the hand of the Nazis.
Nevertheless, various peoples were the victims of the Nazis, and their
numbers and the way they were victimized were legitimate subject for
research.68 Several writers contested the fact that the subject of the Holocaust
had become "a black box" or "a forbidden zone" for research and was
capitalized on by the Jews. If it is a closed subject, wrote the Egyptian-based
Palestinian writer Muhammad Khalid al-Az' ar, then its political and mental
exploitation should also stop.69
The Palestinian Fu'ad Zaydan, who pointed to the millions of non-Jewish
victims of World War II, stressed that "the struggle against racist Zionism is
also a struggle against the falsification of history in order to preserve its real
place in the memory of humanity."70 The Arabs, said al-Hayat editor 'Abd
al-Wahab Badrakhan, "do not deny this Holocaust but they put it in
parentheses until the world (and Israel) acknowledge the other holocausts
which Israel perpetrated against the Arab world."71 A Jordanian academician,
Ayman Hanna Haddad, who lives in the US, found similarities in the
approaches of Garaudy and Daniel Goldhagen to the Holocaust. They both
dealt with a historical fact, but while one diminished it the other exaggerated
it; both presented a radical interpretation and reached unscientific conclusions.
Haddad discerned major lacunae in the articles on Garaudy published
in the Arab press, since most of the writers, supporters and critics did not
adopt a critical approach with regard to the facts, testimonies and conclusions
put forward by Garaudy.72 This observation was deplored by the
Egyptian Salah 'Izz, who contended that no expert on the subject of the
Holocaust existed in the Arab world who could provide a critical review of
the book. If we want expertise in the research of extermination, he went on
to say, we would be better off starting with what is happening to Muslims
in Bosnia or in other parts of the world.73
The debate over Garaudy, and the manifestations of solidarity with him,
did not stem from acceptance of his views on the Holocaust. His attack on
Zionism attracted much more attention and was readily incorporated into the
hostile discourse against Israel and Zionism. It seems that the stalemate in
the peace process and other political developments in the region, such as
the Iraqi crisis, polarized the dichotomy between "us" (the Arabs and
Muslims on the defensive), and the "others" (Israel, Zionism and the West)
-- and encouraged identification with Garaudy's cause. The debate went
beyond a mere discussion of the trial. It dealt with theoretical questions
related to the trial, such as freedom of expression, freedom of research, the
legitimacy of historical revision and the role of intellectuals in public life. But
even these discussions were not free of political ramifications. The trial was
perceived as part of a larger political struggle between Israel and Zionism,
on the one hand, and the Arabs and Muslims, on the other. "His views are
an inspiration for the Arab struggle against religious extremism and the
Zionist occupation," wrote Salah 'Izz.74
The positions also reflected on the moral values of the writers. "We are
with Zola in his defense of Dreyfus, as we are with Garaudy in his right to
expose the myths and deceptions on which Israel bases its policy, regardless
of who is being persecuted, the Jews in the case of Dreyfus or the
Palestinians in the case of Garaudy," wrote Muhammad Sid Ahmad.75 As
Arabs and Muslims, explained Salah 'Izz, our approach to the Holocaust
derives from the Islamic tenet that whether one million were killed or six
million or more, the crime against humanity is the same.76 This point was
also raised in the memorandum of the Palestinian writers.77
However, despite the overwhelming sympathy toward Garaudy, some
contended that the Arabs and Muslims had again demonstrated their
incompetence in defending him and that their expressions of support were
far from being effective.78 Criticism was also leveled at the opponents of
solidarity with Garaudy.79
Others believed there was a lesson which should be applied in Arab
countries. Some sought to convert the sympathy for Garaudy into political
action against Zionism and Israel, while others wished that the Arabs had
Garaudy's courage to criticize their own societies and manifest the same zeal
in defending similar cases before Arab courts.80
Samir Kassir claimed that the debate at times reflected personal feuds. He
was pleased that at last the unanimity in the Arab, especially the Lebanese,
press, had been broken and that it was possible for the first time to defend
the universalistic view of the Jewish extermination. Nevertheless, the attitude
toward the Holocaust in the Arab intellectual milieu, he admitted, entailed a
strange paradox. The Arabs designated a specific Arabic term for Holocaust
-- mahraqa -- which implied its uniqueness, but still vacillated between a
revisionist tendency and a universalistic approach.81
Why are the Arabs preoccupied with the Holocaust at this time? Does this
preoccupation reflect internal currents within the Arab world and a certain
maturity which enables it to deal with the past of the ultimate "other" in a
less emotionally charged way? Or does it reflect the trend in Europe -- both
Western and Eastern -- of coming to terms with the past?
Undoubtedly, it is too early to provide definite answers to these questions
since the process is only beginning, but these three episodes, and especially
the plethora of articles about Garaudy, have transcended specific questions
such as: Should 'Arafat visit the Holocaust Museum? Should the Arabs
support Garaudy? What are the implications of the Vatican declaration? The
discussion has evolved into a penetrating examination of the Arab attitude
toward the Holocaust and touched upon the perception of its universalism,
the universalism of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the place and role of
the Arab world and Islamic culture among nations and in civilization as a
whole.
Thus, it can be said that in today's global village the Arab world is not
indifferent to outside influences, particularly Western ones, and this is
especially so since many Arab intellectuals who actively participated in the
debate, such as Edward Said, Hazim Saghiya and others, live in the West and
are highly conversant with its culture and values. The readiness to accept the
uniqueness of the Holocaust and isolate its human implications from its
political consequences -- namely, the establishment of the State of Israel and
the suffering inflicted on the Palestinian people -- is gradually infiltrating
into the Arab discourse. Nevertheless, it should be stressed that the debate
over the Holocaust is still dominated by the politics of the Arab-Israeli
conflict.

NOTES
* Esther Webman is a researcher at the Stephen Roth Institute and at the Dayan Institute
for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv University.
1. Samir Kassir, "La Nakba recommencée?" Revue d'Etudes Palestiniennes 69 (Autumn
1998), p. 61.
2. Al-Hayat al-Jadida, 2 July. This article aroused a strong Jewish protest; see Arab
Countries.
3. Al-' Arab al-Yawm, 4 July.
4. Al-Akhbar, 14 July.
5. Al-Akhbar, 25 Sept. See also al-' Arab al-Yawm, 6 Sept.; R. Damascus, 5 July.
6. Al-Quds al-' Arabi, 19 May.
7. Al-Safir, 14 Jan.
8. Radio Damascus, 2 Sept.
9. Ha'aretz, 19, 25 Jan.; 20 Feb.; Washington Post, 21 Jan.; al-Hayat, 25, 27 Jan.
10. Al-Hayat al-Jadida, al-Nahar, 21 Jan.; Arol [Arabia on line], Haitham Ibrahim,
"Arafat's Holocaust Museum Visit Lopsided Gesture," www. arabia. com.
11. Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 27 Jan. --Mideast Mirror, 27 Jan. For additional views in this
vein see Ray Hanania, "Arafat and the Holocaust Museum," Palestine Times, Jan.;
Fadwa Fawwaz, "Holocaust Doesn't Justify Israeli Aggression," MSANEWS, 24 Jan.;
"The Ingenious Circle in Washington," www. hebron. com.
12. Al-Hayat, 27 Jan.
13. Al-Hayat, 20 Jan.
14. Jordan Times, 27 Jan.
15. Al-Hayat, 4 Feb..
16. Al-Ahram, 27 May.
17. Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 22, 24, 25 Jan..
18. Al-Hayat, 21 Jan..
19. Al-Watan al-' Arabi, 6 Feb.
20. Arol, 21 Jan.
21. Al-Hayat, 16, 17, 20, 24, 27 March; al-Ahram, 18, 24 March.
22. Al-' Ahd, 20 March.
23. Agence France Press (AFP), 22 March.
24. AFP, 2 April; Ha'aretz, 3 April; al-Nahar, Akhbar al-Khaleej, 6 April.
25. Al-Safir, 6 April.
26. Al-Hayat, 24 April.
27. Al-Ahram, 22 March.
28. Al-Hayat, 29 March.
29. Al-Hayat, 27 July.
30. Jordan Times, 21 April; Ha'aretz, 23 April.
31. Al-Hayat, 28 Feb.
32. Al-Nahar, 17 Feb.
33. Al-Ahram 9-23 Feb; al-Hayat al-Jadida, 10-22 Feb.; al-Dustur, 9-25 Feb.; also the
Bahraini al-Ayyam, the Qatari al-Raya and the UAE's al-Khaleej. The versions
were identical, differing only in titles and sub-titles.
34. Al-Nahar, 10 Jan.
35. Al-Ahram, 10, 17, 19 Jan., 28 Feb.; al-Hayat, 8, 9 Jan., 28 Feb.; al-Safir, 9, 17 Jan.;
Arol, 11, 12, 15, 26 Jan., 28 Feb.; al-Sha' b, 13, 14, 20 Jan.; al-' Ahd, 16 Jan;
al-Nahar, 16, 28 Jan., 24, 28 Feb.; al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya, 21 Jan.; Ha'aretz, 26
Jan., 1 March; al-Tasawwuf al-Islami, Feb.; al-Ayyam, 8 Feb.; al-' Alam, 21 Feb.;
al-Quds al-'Arabi, 28 Feb.; Majallat Filastin, March; AFP, 17 Dec. -- www.
arabia. com.
36. Al-Dustur, 18 Jan.; Arol, 18 Jan.
37. Al-Hayat al-Jadida, 11 Jan.; al-Hayat, 15 Jan.; al-Safir, 16 Jan.; Jerusalem Post, 20
Jan.; al-Nahar, 21 Jan.; Filastin al-Muslima, Feb.
38. Al-Ayyam, 16 Jan.
39. Reuters, 19 Jan. -- arabia. com.
40. Al-Nahar, 13 Jan.; al-Safir, 14,15 Jan.; al-Ittihad (Morocco), 28 Jan.; al-' Ilm
(Morocco), 4 Feb.; al-Bilad, 21 March.
41. Al-Sha' b, 9 Jan.
42. Al-Ahram, 26 Sept.
43. Arol, 12, 26 Jan.; Independent, 1 Feb.; al-Ayyam (Dubai), 12 Feb.; al-Hayat al-Jadida,
10, 13 Feb.
44. Al-Sha' b, 16 Jan.; al-Risala, 22 Jan.
45. Al-Hayat, 9, 17 Feb.; al-Hayat al-Jadida, 13 Feb.; Egyptian Gazette, 16 Feb.; al-Ahram,
15, 16, 17 Feb.; al-' Alam, 28 Feb.; Ha'aretz, 19 Feb.; al-Ra'y, 16 March.
46. Al-Safir, 13 Jan.; al-Sabil, al-Quds, 13 Jan.; Independent, 1 Feb.; al-Hayat, 12 Feb.;
al-Ayyam, 19 Feb.; Reuters, 19 Feb. -- arabia. com.
47. Filesteen al-Yawm on-line, 15 Jan. -- www. Palestine-info. org; R. Tehran, 27 Jan.
48. Al-Hayat, 28 Feb.
49. Al-Ahram, 20 March; al-'Arabi, May.
50. Al-' Ahd, 20 Feb.
51. Al-Nahar, 14 Jan.
52. Al-Sabil, 13 Jan.; al-Sha' b, 16, 20 Jan.; 7 April; al-Bilad, 17 Jan.; Ha'aretz, 20 Jan.;
al-Risala, 22 Jan.; al-' Alam, Jan.
53. Riyadh al-Jazira, 19 Feb. -- DR, 24 Feb.
54. October, 25 Jan.
55. Ruz al-Yusuf, 19 Jan.
56. Al-Ahram, 24 Jan.
57. Al-Ahram, 2 Feb.; al-Ahram hebdo, 4 Feb.
58. Al-Nahar, 14, 16 Jan.; al-Safir, 23 Jan.
59. Al-Safir, 23 Jan.; al-Nahar, 28 Jan.; al-Ayyam, 19 Feb. See also Samir Kassir, "La
Nakba recommencée?" p. 62.
60. Al-Ahram, 31 Jan.
61. Al-Ahram Weekly, 22 Jan.
62. Al-Nahar, 28 Jan.
63. Al-Ahram, 22 Jan., 18 Feb.; al-Ayyam, 19 Feb.; al-Hayat, 24 March.
64. Al-Jadid 22 (Winter 1998), p. 40; Al-Hayat, 13, 15, 20, 22, 23 Jan., 28 Feb., 12
March, 22 April, 11 May; al-Bilad, 26 Feb.; al-Nahar, 16 Jan., 28 Feb.; al-Safir, 19
Jan.; al-Sharq al-Awsat, 24, 25 Jan. For an analysis of Garaudy's opponents' views,
see al-Nahar, 27 Jan.
65. Al-Ayyam, 19 Feb.
66. Al-Safir, 23 Jan.
67. Al-Ahram, al-Ahram Weekly, al-Nahar, 22 Jan.; al-Hayat al-Jadida, 23 Jan.
68. Al-Risala, 22 Jan.
69. Al-Quds, 19 Jan.; al-Hayat, 16 Feb.
70. Al-Hayat al-Jadida, 13 Feb.
71. Al-Hayat, 15 Jan.
72. Al-Hayat, 7 Feb.
73. Al-Hayat, 12 Feb.
74. Al-Nahar, 10 Jan.
75. Al-Ahram, 22 Jan.
76. Al-Hayat, 12 Feb.
77. Al-Risala, 22 Jan.
78. Al-Sha' b, 9 Jan.; Ruz al-Yusuf, 12 Jan.; October, 18 Jan.; al-Risala, 22 Jan.; al-' Alam,
28 Feb.
79. Al-Nahar, 21 Jan.; Filastin al-Muslima, Feb.; al-Hayat, 22 April.
80. Al-Nahar, 17, 28 Jan.; al-Safir, 20 Jan.
81. Kassir, "La Nakba recommencée?" p. 63.