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Following the 1998 elections, the Hungarian Justice and Life Party of Istvan
Csurka became the first right-wing, anti-Semitic party to enter the Hungarian
parliament since the end of World War II. Hungary's entry into NATO and
the European Union was the subject of vehement attacks by this party, which
blamed world Jewish elements for subjugating Hungary's economic and
national interests to their own. The right-wing populist Independent Smallholders'
Party joined the new center-right government. While the Jewish
community remains a major propaganda target of right-wing extremism
and racism, the year 1998 witnessed no rise in violence against Jews.
THE JEWISH COMMUNITY
The 80,000 Jews living in Hungary, out of a total population of 10.5 million,
constitute the largest Jewish community in Eastern Europe, outside the
borders of the former Soviet Union. The great majority live in Budapest, with
smaller communities in large urban centers, such as Miskolc and Debrecen,
as well as in smaller cities. The Hungarian Federation of Jewish Communities
is the main body linking Hungary's Jews, with several other major organizations
active among various segments of the Jewish population. The Hungarian
Jewish Cultural Association publishes a monthly, Szombat (Saturday),
and conducts a wide variety of cultural and educational activities. Mult es
Jovo (Past and Present), a high-brow quarterly, publishes original and translated
essays on a wide variety of topics. Uj Elet (New Life) is the bi-weekly,
official publication of the Jewish community, whose content also reflects the
spiritual-religious revival among segments of the Jewish population.
POLITICAL PARTIES AND EXTRA-PARLIAMENTARY ORGANIZATIONS
The 1998 elections resulted in the downfall of the two-party coalition
between the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSzP) and the Alliance of Free
Democrats (SzDSz) and the victory of the center-right Alliance of Young
Democrats--Hungarian Civic Party (Fidesz), which formed a new government,
including the Independent Smallholders' Party (see below; also
General Analysis).
The Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIEP), led by Istvan Csurka,
won fourteen seats (out of the 386) and became the first right-wing,
anti-Semitic party to enter the Hungarian parliament since the end of World
War II. The party, which completely identifies with the aims of Le Pen's Front
National (see France), has brought its vocal nationalist and xenophobic
rhetoric into parliamentary life, adding a new dimension to Hungary's post-communist
political development.
Prior to the elections, the MIEP had intensified its populist appeal,
targeting especially the middle and lower middle classes and all those
disappointed by the economic and social consequences of the ruling
Socialist Party's four-year rule. Its emphasis on the "return of the
communists," "non-Hungarian" forces allegedly ruling the media and on
members of an "ethnic minority" -- meaning Jews -- in top positions of the
Alliance of Free Democrats, had a certain resonance among dissatisfied
elements. Following the defeat of the Socialists and the formation of the new
coalition, the MIEP warned of the "dangerous appetite" of the liberal élite,
which would continue and even intensify its "destructive" role against the
interests of the Hungarian nation. The MIEP opposed Hungary's joining
NATO and prior to the 1997 referendum on this issue, Csurka had warned
of "US-Zionist plans" to take over Hungary and sell out its interests under the
aegis of NATO (see also below). From the early stages of NATO's actions
against Yugoslavia in late March 1999, Csurka accused the West, in the March
and April 1999 issues of the weekly Magyar Forum, of acting as an agent of
Israel's long-range strategic interests, thus demonstrating his determination to
involve Jewish and Israeli interests in any international problem.
In the mid-1990s the Independent Smallholders' Party, led by Jozsef
Torgyan, was increasingly regarded as moving toward an extremist position.
The party which, prior to the 1998 election, underwent some organizational
and ideological changes, continued its populist rhetoric, albeit in a milder
vein, when it joined the government coalition. In fact, nationalist and anti-Semitic
expressions declined in 1997 and completely disappeared during the
1998 election campaign; thus, the threat of cooperation amongst nationalist
forces, with anti-Semitism as a common denominator, did not materialize. In
general, the Smallholders find themselves caught between their own populist
and nationalist rhetoric and their need to present a more realistic approach
toward economic and social issues, which are much more real than the
specter of "ruling liberal and Bolshevik forces." Torgyan criticized the MIEP
for its ties with Le Pen's FN, indicating that not all Hungarian right-wing
political forces approve of such relations.
Various neo-Nazi groups, especially the Hungarian Welfare Association
(the present name of the movement which has surfaced in various
forms and which openly adheres to the legacy of the wartime fascist Arrow
Cross movement), continued in their attempts to play hide and seek with the
authorities. While their numbers may not be significant, neo-Nazis, most of
them skinheads, are visible at public demonstrations. The movement's
monthly Magyartudat (Hungarian Awareness), which is distributed in some
5,000 copies, is vehemently anti-Semitic, engages in Holocaust denial and
espouses the ideology of the Arrow Cross.
The skinheads continued to display their violent sub-culture with its
racist, xenophobic and fascist symbols. One of their main defenders is
former MP Izabella B. Kiraly, editor of the extremist periodical Kotott Keve
(Tied Sheaf), published by the Hungarian Future in the Hungarian Past
Foundation. The journal appeals to "loyal Hungarian elements" and often
attacks Csurka for being too soft on some issues. As in other East European
countries, the skinheads act as "shock troopers" of Hungarian extremism,
manipulated by extremist politicians who seek to present a more respectable
and sophisticated image of themselves. Generally, the number of Hungarian
skinheads has not increased in the past year, and there could even be a
decline in their activities. Nevertheless, their violent sub-culture is a visible
threat to public order.
The extreme right group around the monthly Hunnia has been engaged
in a lengthy legal battle with a prominent Jewish activist, who accused the
journal of anti-Semitism and racism (see previous reports). In 1998 it
continued to publish vehemently anti-Semitic and Holocaust denial articles.
Moreover, as of September 1997 it began serializing a book written by a
Hungarian right-wing extremist émigre living in the West, who claims that
the Tiszaeszlar blood libel case of ritual murder by Jews in the late 19th
century was a historically proven fact.
ANTI-SEMITIC ACTIVITIES
The Jewish community remains a major target of extremist right-wing and
racist propaganda. However, the number of anti-Semitic incidents in 1998
remained on the same low level as in the previous year, with no rise in
violence against Jews. There were several reports of vandalized Jewish
tombs in provincial areas, such as in Debrecen in spring 1998.
Propaganda
The nationalist discourse in Hungary employs the vitriolic language of
exclusiveness and élitism that was typical of interwar Eastern Europe. The
Jewish role in the communist movement and regime is still frequently raised
in order to draw attention to the Jews as the main bearers of responsibility
for all Hungary's misfortunes. However, the public outcry over the Maczo
affair which was a prominent theme in the political discourse of 1997 (see
ASW 1997/ 8) subsided in 1998.
Hungary's entry into NATO and the European Union was the subject of
vehement attacks by Csurka's movement. Magyar Forum blamed world
Jewish elements, such as those represented by the Hungarian Jewish
philanthropist George Soros, for subjugating Hungary's economic and
national interests to their own. In this context, the US is presented as the
agent of Jewish financial interests, while the Jews are the bearers of extremist
ideologies, such as communism, which dominated during the short-lived
Soviet Republic of 1919 and again after World War II. With the growing crisis
in the Balkans, Csurka continued this line of "unmasking" the alleged Jewish-Israeli
interest in unleashing a campaign against Yugoslavia.
The spiritual, moral, financial, military and political enslavement of
Hungary is, according to Csurka, the main aim of the "global forces," led by
Jewish interests. In order to achieve this aim, the resistance and spirit of the
Hungarians must be broken. This task is being carried out by the "non-Hungarian
elements" ruling the Hungarian media, yet another of Csurka's
favorite motifs. The emphasis is always on media leaders who "barely speak
Hungarian," and who are engaged in "spiritual warfare" against the
Hungarian nation.
At the end of 1998, Csurka's propaganda focused on Bauer Tamas, an MP
from the Alliance of Free Democrats, who compared Csurka's rhetoric with
Nazi agitation. Magyar Forum carried a series of vehement attacks against
the "drugged-liberal" attack on Csurka's true Hungarian line. In its issue of 7
January 1999, Magyar Forum accused "Bauer Tamas' Nazi friends," the
Christian fundamentalist Assembly of Faith, of elevating the Jews to the level
of the Aryans in Nazi ideology.
On-line discussion groups on the Internet have also been the focus of
Csurka's attacks. In its issue of 14 January 1999, Magyar Forum criticized the
allegedly "racist," pro-Jewish line common among these groups, but it also
gave examples of more positive attitudes: for example, a message by a
person whose Hungarian grandparents saved Jews during the Holocaust and
who after witnessing an encounter between Palestinians and Israeli troops,
concluded that Zionism was "no different from fascism."
The neo-Nazi monthly Magyartudat stressed the Jewish origins of
Hungary's communist leaders and warned on the eve of the elections (1
January 1998) that the danger facing Hungary from the heirs of those who
"spilled Hungarian blood" was not over. Post-communist democratic and
liberal forces were branded as "Zionbolsheviks," and the article showed a
photo of an armed religious Israeli beside an Israeli flag, with the caption,
"We do not want this."
The Jewish-Freemason conspiracy theory appeared in Magyartudat (no.
2/ 1998), which provided a list of Jews and/ or Freemasons in contemporary
Hungarian history who were responsible for "destroying the national spirit."
Small neo-Nazi groups continued to mark anniversaries linked to their
past in order to manifest their presence. In January 1998 and 1999 Nazis and
neo-Nazis gathered for their annual commemoration of the birthday of
Ferenc Szalasi, founder of the Arrow Cross movement. The Federation of
Hungarian Resistance Fighters and Anti-Fascists protested the neo-Nazis'
activities. In February 1999 police broke up a gathering including neo-Nazis
from Hungary as well as from other countries such as Germany, Slovakia and
the Czech Republic, who were commemorating the anniversary of the
attempt by Hungarian fascist troops in February 1945 to break out from
Soviet encircled Budapest. Also in February 1998, eight policemen were hurt
when they raided a meeting at the Viking club, popular with skinheads.
ATTITUDES TOWARD THE HOLOCAUST AND THE NAZI ERA
The issue of compensation and restitution of Jewish property played in 1998
a major role in shaping attitudes toward the Holocaust and the deeds of
Hungarian fascists. Csurka's MIEP continued to lead attacks on the
unrelenting Jewish "pressure" on Hungary, and Magyar Forum attempted to
argue in numerous articles that in fact the Jews and the communists (of
Jewish origin) were waging an ongoing anti-Hungarian campaign. Criticism
of the Hungarian government on this issue became more vehement
following the government's undertaking, in 1998, to financially assist some
20,000 Holocaust survivors and return confiscated Jewish property in a plan
which was praised by Jewish organizations as a "model" for other East
European states.
One major tactic used to oppose alleged "Jewish blackmail" of Hungary
is to support some of the theses of Holocaust deniers, by arguing that the
number of victims in the Holocaust, in the case of Hungary, was lower than
the official figures. Csurka's paper argued that Jewish organizations inflated
the numbers of victims in order to demand more compensation.
Another favorite tactic in the anti-Semitic discourse is to shift the
discussion from the issue of wartime collaboration between Hungarians and
the Nazis, to the case of Israel, which is accused of numerous crimes against
the Arabs and which is allegedly never called to account.
The meager sums allocated by the Hungarian government as personal
compensation was heavily criticized by individual Jews as well as by leaders
of the Jewish community in Hungary and in the Jewish world. Magyar
Forum lashed out against this criticism, branding a public appeal written by
the leader of the organization representing Israeli Jews originating in
Hungary as an "Israeli warning" to Prime Minister Viktor Orban.
The neo-Nazi Magyartudat continued, in its two published issues of 1998,
to claim that "Zionist capitalists" caused World War II and to extol the ideals
of Ferenc Szalasi.
THE ROMA AND HUNGARIAN EXTREMISM
As in other East European countries, relations between the Roma and the
Hungarian population and the authorities remain problematic. While the
mainstream Hungarian media generally tackle the issue from a wider
perspective, attempting to analyze the reasons for the social and economic
poverty of the Roma and the level of criminal activity among them, the
tabloid press clings to classic stereotypes and tales of "Roma crime" are
abundant. It is becoming increasingly evident that the situation of the Roma
is yet one more sad legacy of the communist regime. The "anti-social"
attitudes often attributed to the Roma are in fact the consequences of
communist policies which left them as they were before communism on the
fringes of society. The new Hungarian government formed in 1998 has
promised to tackle the issue through a series of steps, including cultural
events and educational activities, intended to promote a rapprochement
between Hungarian society and Roma. As a result of economic dislocations
since the collapse of communism, the Roma question has come to the
attention of researchers and a new generation of educated Roma is engaged
in activities aimed at easing the tensions existing between the two sides.
Roma, whose numbers in Hungary range between 800,000 and one million,
constitute some 30 percent of the total unemployed in Hungary.
The Hungarian media devote considerable attention to the Roma
problem, which became one of the major issues in the 1998 general
elections. According to Nepszabadsag (3 January 1998), the Roma question
is "not only a social and cultural issue. It is a political issue, the yardstick for
measuring Hungary's Europeaness." The paper warned that "Hungary's
society cannot be healthy as long as the condition of the Roma community
does not improve radically."
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