> >
Print

HUNGARY

Overall, political extremism is not on the rise in Hungary.There was a decline in anti-Semitic incidents compared with 1996. The question of the Jewish role in the communist regime was raised by MP Agnes Maczo of the Smallholders Party, who referred to Hungary's postwar communist leader Matyas Rakosi as "Roth Mano" (the red dwarf). Another theme exploited by the extreme right for anti-Semitic purposes was Hungary's entry into NATO and the EU. An important test case of the judicial system's attitude toward free expression will be heard in 1998, when the verdict will be given in the libel suit of the editor of the extremist publication Hunnia against the prominent Jewish activist Gyorgy Gado and others.

THE JEWISH COMMUNITY

The 80,000 Jews living in Hungary out of a total population of 10,500,500 constitute the largest Jewish community in Eastern Europe, outside the borders of the former Soviet Union. The great majority live in Budapest, with smaller communities in the larger urban centers, such as Miskolc and Debrecen, as well as in smaller cities. The Federation of Jewish Communities is the main body of Hungarian Jewry, and several other major organizations are active among various segments of the Jewish population. The Hungarian Jewish Cultural Association publishes a monthly, Szombat (Saturday), and conducts a wide variety of cultural and educational activities. Mult es Jovo (Past and Present) a high-brow quarterly publishes original essays and translations on a wide variety of topics. Uj Elet (New Life), a bi-weekly, is the official publication of the Jewish community.

EXTREMIST MOVEMENTS AND HATE GROUPS

Overall, political extremism is not on the rise. Hungarian society is learning to look forward and there is less emphasis on rehabilitating extremist motifs from the past. The ruling coalition of the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) and the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ) recovered much of its popularity in 1997 following a year marked by internal differences, cases of high-level financial scandals and austerity measures. The reversal of this trend was mainly due to signs of growing economic stability. The overall support for Hungary's joining NATO, as highlighted in the 1997 referendum, indicated that the vast majority of Hungarians are committed to the country's "return to Europe." However, as in other post-communist societies, the elements that feed extremism are still present, and the balance between a democratic transition and "return to Europe," and regression to a nationalist line, is often very fragile. Hungary could well be moving towards a Western style, two-party system, which would push nationalist and extremist forces even further to the fringes of political life. If this happens, extremist elements may intensify their attempts to delegitimize the "liberal-Bolshevik" coalition in power.

Several parties and organizations with easily obtainable publications continue to spread extremist ideas with racist and xenophobic messages. The Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIEP), led by Istvan Csurka, continued its anti-Semitic, nationalist and xenophobic rhetoric (see previous reports). The movement intensified its populist appeal, especially aimed at the middle and lower middle classes and all those disappointed by the economic and social consequences of the ruling Socialist Party coalition. Its emphasis on the "return of the communists," alleged "non-Hungarian" forces ruling the media, and the holding of top positions in the SZDSZ by members of an "ethnic minority" (meaning the Jews), have gained some ground among dissatisfied elements, even though the party's chances of winning parliamentary seats in 1998 remained slim. MIEP's rallies and public meetings, characterized by a fiery nationalist rhetoric, are well attended, and its publications are widely distributed; yet the Hungarian electorate has rejected Csurka's line. This was especially evident in the results of the 1997 referendum on NATO, when MIEP's warning of "US-Zionist plans" to take over Hungary and sell out its interests under NATO aegis, were rejected.

MIEP leader Istvan Csurka continued to foster his movement's ties with Le Pen's FN. Attending the FN congress in Strasbourg, Csurka called for cohesion among European nationalist forces and the coordination of goals to oppose the "impending alliance" of "left-wing and liberal forces." He stated that like the FN his party rejects charges of extremism, anti-Semitism and racism, stressing that he only wishes to protect national interests against "invading foreigners and their influence."

The Smallholders Party, led by Jozsef Torgyan, which underwent some organizational and ideological changes, continued its populist rhetoric, but seemed to have lost momentum. However, the "Maczo affair" (see below) again raised the question of the Smallholders' true stand on Jewish topics, and pushed the party onto the defensive.

The anticipated cooperation between nationalist forces, with anti-Semitism as a possible common denominator, did not materialize. In general, the Smallholders find themselves caught between their own populist and nationalist rhetoric and their need to present a more realistic approach toward economic and social issues, which are much more real than the specter of "ruling liberal and Bolshevik forces." Torgyan criticized Csurka's movement for its ties with Le Pen's FN, an indication that some Hungarian right-wing political forces reject the close association between the MIEP and the FN.

A member of the Hungarian parliament, Mihaly Kapronczi, who was elected on the Smallholders' list, joined Csurka's MIEP, and became an independent. Kapronczi, a former regional president of the Smallholders Party, was expelled after he lent the party premises to members of a right-wing organization, the Eastern Front Comradeship, representing Hungarian fighters on the Eastern Front during World War II.

The various neo-Nazi groups, especially the Hungarian Welfare Association, which has appeared in various forms and under different names, and which openly adheres to the legacy of the Hungarian fascist Arrow Cross movement, continued their attempts to play a game of hide-and-seek with the authorities. While their numbers may not be significant, neo-Nazis, most of them skinheads, are visible in public demonstrations. The movement's monthly Magyartudat (Hungarian Awareness), which is distributed in some 5,000 copies, is vehemently anti-Semitic, engages in Holocaust denial, and preaches the ideology of the Arrow Cross.

The skinheads continued to display their violent sub-culture, in the form of racist, xenophobic and fascist symbols. One of their main defenders is former MP Izabella B. Kiraly, who suggested in 1996 that all Roma should be deported and an independent state set up for them in the Danube estuary and defended the skinheads as "good Hungarian boys," continued to express her extremist views based on Hungarian exclusiveness. She is the editor of an extremist periodical, Kotott Keve (Tied Sheaf), published by the Hungarian Future in the Hungarian Past Foundation, which appeals to "loyal Hungarian elements." It often attacks Csurka for being too soft on some issues. In the May 21, 1997 issue she used Jewish stereotypes and anti-Semitic expressions when ridiculing a media figure's pro-Israeli broadcast.

The skinheads continued to act as the "shock troops" of Hungarian extremism. As in other East European countries, they are manipulated by extremist politicians who seek to present themselves as being more respectable and sophisticated. Generally, Hungarian skinhead numbers did not increased in the past year, and there seemed to be a slow decline in their activities; nevertheless, their violent sub-culture remains a visible threat to public order.

Small neo-Nazi groups continued to use anniversaries linked to their past in order to demonstrate their presence. In January 1997 they gathered to commemorate the 100th birthday of Arrow Cross leader Ferenc Szalasi. The Federation of Hungarian Resistance Fighters and Anti-Fascists protested the neo-Nazis' activities. In January 1998 a similar small commemoration took place attended by old Nazis and young skinheads.

ANTI-SEMITIC ACTIVITIES

The Jewish community remained a major target of right-wing extremism and racism. However, a decline was noted in anti-Semitic incidents in 1997 compared with 1996. The most serious incident occurred in June when a Jewish cemetery in the town of Balassagyarmat was defaced with swastikas and a tombstone smashed. A statement by the Federation of Hungarian Jewish Communities said that "this case shows how increasing numbers of people are coming under the influence of openly extreme right-wing ideology." Another Jewish cemetery was desecrated in the town of Tatabanya.

Propaganda

The nationalist discourse in Hungary employs the typical interwar East European vitriolic language of exclusiveness and ?litism. The Jewish role in the communist movement and regime is still frequently raised, as a convenient vehicle to draw attention to the Jews as the cause of all Hungary's misfortunes. One of the dominant themes in 1997 in this connection was the "Maczo affair." Agnes Maczo, a member of the Smallholders Party, who served as deputy speaker of the Hungarian parliament until she was forced to resign, referred disparagingly in parliament to Hungary's postwar communist leader Matyas Rakosi as "Roth Mano," meaning, in the thinly-coded language of Hungarian anti-Semitism, Jewish red dwarf. In the public outcry that followed, the Federation of Jewish Communities expressed its deep consternation over the expression of anti-Jewish views in the Hungarian parliament and the socialist chairman of the parliamentary Committee on Human Rights, Minorities and Religion called her remark "political anti-Semitism." Csurka's Magyar Forum, justified Jew baiting in reference to communist leaders, and further fueled its arguments by presenting a lengthy stream of evidence of the Jewish role in "destabilizing Hungary."

One of the major themes in the rhetoric of the MIEP was, as noted above, the issue of Hungary's entry into NATO and the EU. Magyar Forum blamed Jewish world interests, such as those represented by the American Jewish businessman of Hungarian origin George Soros, of suppressing Hungary's economic and national interests in favor of those furthering Jewish aims. The spiritual, moral, financial, military and political enslavement of Hungary was, according to Csurka, the major aim of the "global forces," led by Jewish interests. This aim was to be achieved by breaking the resistance and the spirit of the Hungarians. This task was being carried out by the "non-Hungarian" elements "controlling" the Hungarian media, yet another of Csurka's motifs.

The theory of a Jewish world conspiracy is central to Csurka's world outlook; moreover, as Magyar Forum of September 1997 noted: "The Jewish centers which decide the fate of the world are led by people with remarkable vision." For example, from its very inception the Zionist movement "prepared an alternative safe basis" for the Jewish question. As the Israeli experience fails, argues Csurka, and Israel cannot absorb the Jewish influx from outside, or cope with growing Palestinian opposition, the Jews are carrying out their secret plan to invade and take over the designated new safe haven -- Hungary.

The extreme right-wing group around the monthly Hunnia, which sued a prominent Jewish activist and former MP, Gyorgy Gado, for accusing it of anti-Semitism (see below), published articles, marketed books and tapes and promoted public lectures with clear anti-Semitic and anti-Zionist messages. In one issue it quoted a high school teacher from the town of Eger, identified by his full name, who described communism as "institutionalized Jewish fascism." In February 1997, it defined Israel as a "racist state." It often reprints vehemently anti-Zionist articles from other sources, such as a series from the US-based Liberty Publications.

In 1997, Hungary's national days were amply exploited by extremists. At the March rally, commemorating the 1848 revolution, organized by MIEP, some 50,000 gathered to protest the government's pro-NATO and EU policy. The speakers warned that Hungary was being subjected to "foreign repression" at the hands of the World Bank. On October 25, the anniversary of the 1956 anti-communist uprising, more than one hundred neo-Nazis, mostly skinheads, displayed anti-Semitic slogans and posters. At other political rallies, such as one held in early 1997 by Csurka's MIEP for the defense of Hungarian farmers, fascist symbols, such as Hitler's Mein Kampf, were visible.

ATTITUDES TOWARD THE HOLOCAUST AND THE NAZI ERA

The issue of compensation for Jewish property seized during World War II played a major role in 1997 in influencing attitudes toward the Holocaust and the deeds of Hungarian fascists. Again, Csurka's MIEP led the attacks against the continuing Jewish "pressure" on Hungary, and Magyar Forum argued in numerous articles that in fact the Jews -- and the communists (allegedly of Jewish origin) -- were continuously waging an "anti-Hungarian" campaign. Opposition was particularly vocal when the Hungarian parliament passed a law in early March 1997 setting up a 22.8 million dollar fund to compensate thousands of Hungarian Jews.

In this context the neo-Nazi monthly Magyartudat, in its May 1997 issue, wrote that the "Judeobolshevik" rule caused the death of some 2.5 million Hungarians and that in World War II, which was caused by Zionist capitalists, some 60 million white Europeans lost their lives. "Who will compensate them?" it asks. Similarly, the May 21, 1997 issue of Kotott Keve wrote that "the hands and financial interests of world Jewry were evident in the outbreak of the two world wars as well as in the territorial losses of Hungary. It is they who owe the world for the suffering they caused." It also compared the Jewish demand for compensation with Shakespeare's play The Merchant of Venice.

One major tactic to oppose the alleged "Jewish blackmail" of Hungary is the attempt to support some of the theses of Holocaust deniers, by arguing that the number of victims in the Holocaust, in the case of Hungary, was lower than the official figures, and by minimizing Nazi atrocities. Hunnia advertised a publication on the "Holo Legend." On 25 June 1997 it wrote of the "Holo-hyenas' attack against Switzerland," in which "international Jewry, maddened by greed and hatred" was lashing out at Switzerland. Magyartudat claimed not only that World War II was caused by "Zionist capitalists" but that the "alleged cruelty of the SS" was a "young girl's rosy dream compared to the conditions in Israeli jails."

RESPONSES TO RACISM AND ANTI-SEMITISM

In general Hungarian public opinion is sensitive to expressions of racism and anti-Semitism. Strong reactions to Maczo's remark on the "Hungarian-hating Mano Roth" came from various bodies and organizations, such as the parliamentary Committee on Human Rights, Minorities and Religion and the Allliance of Free Democrats, as well as from the media.

An important test case of the judicial system's attitude toward limiting free expression will be heard in 1998, when the verdict will be given in the libel suit of Hunnia's editor, Kunszabo Ferenc, against a leading Jewish activist and former MP Gado Gyorgy. Hunnia is demanding some 19 million forints as compensation from Gado, the B'nai B'rith organization and the Budapest chief prosecutor's office, who lost their 1994 case against Hunnia, on charges of publishing anti-Semitic materials. Hunnia's demands for freedom of speech are an example of the way extremist groups in most former communist states exploit newly won freedoms, in order to promote racial hatred and xenophobia.