netherlands 2005

 

The number of antisemitic incidents recorded in the Netherlands in 2005 – 150 − returned to the pre-2001 level. Repercussions of the murder of moviemaker Theo Van Gogh in November 2004 were still being expressed in tensions between Muslim and non-Muslim citizens of Holland.

 

the jewish community

An estimated 30,000 Jews live in the Netherlands today out of some 16 million inhabitants. The majority live in Amsterdam. Dutch Jewry is represented by three councils, based on affiliation: the Nederlands Israelitisch Kerkgenootschap, the Verbond van Liberaal Religieuze Joden and the Portugees Israelitisch Kerkgenootschap. The community, which sustains a variety of religious and educational institutions, publishes the newspaper Nieuw Israelitisch Weekblad.

 

extremist organizations and groups

Islamist Groups

According to the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service AIVD, several local Islamist networks are active in the Netherlands. Varying in number and size, they consist of second or third generation immigrants who have radicalized and developed into potential jihadists. As became apparent from activities of the Hofstad group (see below), they concentrate on specific local targets such as politicians and government and establishment figures and institutions rather than on random targets.

In mid-October 2005, seven suspects belonging to the Hofstad network were arrested on suspicion of planning attacks on the Second Chamber of Parliament and the AIVD building. Here, too, the war in Iraq appeared to be a motivating factor. In his video testament, one of the suspects, Samir A, referred to the fate of suppressed brothers in Iraq, Afghanistan and Palestine.

The Hofstad network consists mainly of young persons who were raised and reside in the Netherlands. Contacts with likeminded persons via the Internet, and lectures and meetings in private dwellings contribute strongly to their radicalization. Although the network operates locally and autonomously in the main, some members maintain contacts with radical Islamic figures abroad.

Though lacking a solid knowledge of Islam themselves, some members of Hofstad compile their own version based on Koranic texts taken out of context and an extremist interpretation of these texts which they designate as the truth. Thus, individuals such as Mohammed Bouyeri (‘Mohammed B.’, the suspected murderer of van Gogh), were able to give other young Muslims the impression of having an extensive knowledge of Islam.

Although the Hofstad network is characterized by its lack of a hierarchic structure, in 2004, the Syrian cleric Abu Khalid played a major role in the network’s ideological and religious development. After he fled the country, other radical Muslims within the network took on leadership functions.

Documents of militants such as ‘Mohammed B.’, Internet traffic of the network’s adherents and members, and last testaments found, show that the religious ideas of the Hofstad network are inspired by the ideology of the radical Islamist, al-Qa`ida affiliated Takfir wal Hijra. Its ideology includes explicit political objectives, such as the destruction of existing political and social structures and their replacement by purely Islamic ones. The use of violence against persons considered unbelievers or renegades is justified. Increasingly young female Muslims have been gaining prominence in the network.

Van Gogh’s murder in November 2004 and its aftermath had a negative effect on mutual trust between Muslims and non-Muslims in the Netherlands. Even more than in 2004, social discontent increased among parts of these communities following several incidents of arson at Islamic schools and mosques. Government measures, such as the dispatch of troops to Iraq and Afghanistan, and its statement that it was looking into the possibility of banning the burka (all-enveloping outer garment), were interpreted by some Muslims as being directed against all of them.

Social discontent is usually not expressed in a direct way. Often repercussions following an event are noticeable only after several months. This is due partly to the lack of a broadly-based organization which could function as an outlet for such emotions. In the case of the Moroccan community, to second and third generation immigrants Moroccan identity or ethnicity appears to be an insufficient binding factor for the existence of a viable organization. The Arab European League (AEL), for example, was unable to hold on to its initial success (see ASW 2003/4). An increasing number of Moroccan youngsters is therefore resorting to non-traditional Moroccan forms of Islam to express their identity. This Islamic ‘counterculture’ opposes both first generation Moroccans and Dutch society and the government. Many of them confine themselves to an ultra-orthodox way of live (expressed, for example, in their code of attire and conduct between the sexes), and in extreme cases seek to place the Shari`a above Dutch law, or express willingness to commit (terrorist) violence.

Salafi foundations and mosques, though small in number, also contribute to the radicalization of Muslim youth. For many years these missionary (dawa) groups propagated anti-integration and anti-western views. Moreover, some primary schools associated with Salafi mosques, provide extra-curricular lessons (such as religion and Arabic) in order to transmit radical Islamic views. Nevertheless, probably due to increased media and government interest, some ultra-orthodox Muslims have recently warned youngsters against the extremist and violent ideology of the Takfir wal Hijra doctrine, and explicitly condemned attacks such as those on the London underground in 2005. Hence, many radical youngsters no longer see them as true interpreters of their religion.

A limited part of the Turkish community has also proved vulnerable to radical Islamic ideology

 

The Right Wing

The year 2005 witnessed a renewed assault by right-wing extremist circles on Muslim institutions in the Netherlands, such as mosques and schools. Right-wing extremists also expressed their rage and frustration at the murder of Theo van Gogh (in November 2004) on right-wing Internet forums, as well as great dissatisfaction about the role of the government which, they complained, put too much emphasis on dialogue with Muslims.

The murder further inflamed feelings between the xenophobic and nationalist ‘Lonsdale’ (named after the brand of clothing they wear) youth and immigrant youngsters. A fight between indigenous and immigrant youngsters at a mosque in Venray and a fire at an Islamic primary school in Uden in spring 2005 prompted AIVD to start an investigation into Lonsdale youth, some of whom have contact on an individual basis with members of right-wing extremist circles. Many of the hundreds of hard-core neo-Nazis active in the Netherlands developed in the Lonsdale subculture.

The neo-Nazi Nederlandse Volksunie (NVU), led by Constant Kusters, was active only in regard to opposing the European constitution and entry of Turkey to the EU. The party considers the NSB – the Dutch collaboration party during the 1930s – moderate. They use the white supremacist website http://www.stormfront.org to express their views. The Radical Volunteer Force, which split from the NVU, remains limited in scope.

Ultranationalist parties and groups in the Netherlands appear to have greater electoral potential than neo-Nazi parties. Many Lonsdale youth identify with parties such as the Nationale Alliantie (NA) on issues such as the multicultural society. There was, however, no increase in the number of nationalist parties in the Netherlands. This is partly explained by the limited political motivation of these Lonsdale youth. Splintering appears to be an additional reason for the limited growth of right-wing extremist parties and groups. The Nieuwe Nationale Partij’ (New National Party), for example, disbanded itself, in February 2005 due to the exodus of members.

The NA continues to be the most active ultra-nationalist party in the Netherlands. On 11 June 2005 the NA held a demonstration in Rotterdam against the construction of a Surinam mosque. The demonstration proceeded peacefully, but the NA was the focus of media attention in June 2005 following an arson attack on their old mosque. Although the NA declared that it had nothing to do with it, a NA sympathizer was considered the main suspect. Following his arrest, several moderate NA members left the party, while a number of prominent party leaders also canceled their membership but continue to exercise influence behind the scenes.

 

antisemitism activity

According to CIDI (Israel Information and Documentation Center), at 159, the total number of incidents returned to the pre-2001 level. The fall may be attributed to the reduced number of e-mails and incidents of verbal abuse. Nevertheless, in the physical violence category, the 9 incidents were the second highest since 1999 (5 in 2004). These ranged from a fight at a video rental shop between five youths of North-African background and a young Jewish couple of about 18 to throwing a rock at a car and yelling: “Jew whore, they forgot to finish you off during the war.” The number of threats of violence was also high, at 14 (15 in 2004), ranking third since 1999. Incidents reported by schools in 2005 were down to 12 from 18 in 2003 and 2004. Other organizations also experienced a general decline in numbers of antisemitic incidents. One of the main causes was the relative calm in the Middle East in 2005.

The Meldpunt Discriminatie Amsterdam (Amsterdam Antidiscrimination Agency), registered 24 complaints about antisemitism in 2005 compared to 45 in 2004. The National Expertise Center on Discrimination for the Public Prosecutor reported that cases were down as well. According to the annual report of the MDI, antisemitism was no longer the largest category of complaints in 2005.

Antisemitic e-mails were down to 15 in 2005 compared to 121 in 2004. Everyday in-your-face antisemitism did not diminish as much. As in previous years, verbal abuse remained the largest category, with 42 incidents (78 in 2004).

In 2005 perpetrators of North-African origin accounted for 38 percent of reports of antisemitic incidents, compared to 41 percent in 2002, 43.5 percent in 2003 and 45 percent in 2004.

With respect to the Internet, the MDI has reported several hundred right-wing extremist sites, including Stormfront.org, Polinico, Nationale Alliantie and Holland Hardcore. These sites attack all minorities: Jews, Muslims, blacks, homosexuals.

The share of right-wing extremists in antisemitism is reflected primarily in instances of graffiti and vandalism of Jewish buildings and monuments. The graffiti regularly includes swastikas, white power symbols, ‘88’s (denoting ‘HH’ or ‘Heil Hitler’) and catchphrases such as ‘wir sind zurück’ (We are back) and ‘strafkampf=mijnkampf’ (prison camp = Mein Kampf).

Nine media incidents were registered as antisemitic or anti-Zionist. Gretta Duisenberg, chairwoman of the Comité Stop de Bezetting (Committee against the Occupation) and wife of the president of the European Central Bank, for example, claimed on the television program “The Black Sheep”: “They [Jewish women] annexed not only the Palestinian territories, [but also] the restaurant in the south [of Amsterdam]. That is how far they will go.” Propria Cures, an Amsterdam magazine for students, referred to a Jewish writer as “a Jewish bloody whore whom they forgot to gas during the war.”

 

responses to antisemitism

In March 2005 the Media Commissioner ordered the Dutch satellite company New Skies to cease transmitting the antisemitic and anti-western Hizballah satellite station al-Manar. In a letter to the Second Chamber of Parliament of 3 November 2005, Justice Minister Donner wrote that they were investigating potentially high-risk stations on the air in the Netherlands and how they might be blocked through existing or new instruments.

The reduced proportion of perpetrators of North-African heritage might be partly attributable to education and ‘dialog’ projects launched in cities such as Amsterdam. Following antisemitic incidents in the Diamant neighborhood, CIDI worked with the Turkish organization Milli Görtis and Tans (Moroccan and Islamic organization) to organize a meeting with leaders of political parties in Amsterdam. CIDI is setting up several grassroots projects in the neighborhood as well.

Thanks in part to various ‘dialog’ activities (such as football matches), there has been a considerable reduction in antisemitic incidents in Amsterdam’s de Baarsjes neighborhood where commemoration and liberation ceremonies held on 4 and 5 May were disrupted; Jews approaching the synagogue in the neighborhood were also regularly pelted with stones or called names.

The Interculturele Alliantie is a similarly successful project. Following an initiative of CIDI, two Islamic organizations (ISBO, the umbrella organization of Islamic schools in the Netherlands, and SPIOR, the Islamic Platform in Rotterdam), as well as the gay and lesbian rights organization COC and Rotterdam anti-discrimination bureau RADAR joined the ‘Classroom of Difference’ program in schools, aimed at eliminating all forms of discrimination, exclusion and prejudice. Everyone associated with the school is involved: students, teachers, staff and parents.

Diversion, a creative program for the development of multicultural projects, includes the ‘World War II in Perspective’ curriculum, in which Jewish and Muslim youths team up to teach students at general secondary schools and at occupational training programs about World War II and the Israeli-Palestinian-Arab conflict.

On 29 September Aad Veenman, head of the Nederlandse Spoorwegen (Netherlands Railways), admitted during the launching of an anti-racist campaign by the Jewish community, that his company took an active part in the deportation of Dutch Jews to extermination camps during World War II, by providing trains and personnel to deport Jews to camps in Germany and Poland. He apologized for the involvement of the company in Nazi crimes.

In 2005 antifascists attempted to prevent meetings of ultra-right-wing groups. As has been common in the past few years, disruption of the public order during large-scale manifestations came from the side of the antifascists rather than from their extreme right-wing opponents. In mid-May more than thirty antifascists were arrested in Arnhem during an action against a demonstration by the Nederlandse Volksunie.