Anti-Jewish motifs in the public debate on Israel
sweden: a case study
introduction1
Since the outbreak of the second intifada in September 2000
a pattern now familiar in Western political culture has re-emerged: again a
more critical stance toward Israel, specifically, of Israeli policies toward
the Palestinians, has been accompanied by reports of a rise in antisemitism.
Clearly, there has been a marked increase in anti-Jewish incidents in countries
such as France. Further – and not least in the case of France – within segments
of the Muslim or Arab communities in Europe, antisemitism has become more
visible than before. Also, notably, since the UN conference in Durban and the
events of 11 September, we have witnessed a revival of both anti-Zionist forms
of anti-Jewish propaganda and classical myths of Jewish conspiracies. The
center of the current onslaught lies in the Muslim and the Arab world, but some
of the ideas propagated have found supporters in the West as well.
It is still too early to estimate
the significance of the current wave of antisemitism in comparison to previous
waves, such as the one that swept the continent during the 1982 Lebanon War,
and which included widespread verbal attacks and stereotyping in the mainstream
media. The present situation, however, underlines the need for a better
understanding of how antisemitism is related to perceptions of and attitudes
toward Israel and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The charge, sometimes heard
in the public debate but occasionally also in scholarly discussions, that much
of the criticism of Israel is influenced by anti-Jewish prejudice, is highly
problematic. It is, of course, possible to suspect a deeper animosity behind
some of the more unbalanced reporting and comments on Israel, but pointing at
bias alone does not adequately substantiate the allegation.
Israel is, as has often been
stated, a state whose policies can and should be scrutinized and criticized in
the same way as the policies of any other state. Moreover, Israel is a
democracy and should be judged by the standards of that political system and
its basic values. This means not only that criticism of Israeli policies is
legitimate, but also that what might be understood as unfair or exaggerated
criticism may be explained in this context.
But what about the frequently
repeated charge of double standards – that Israel is judged by different
criteria from those applied to other, comparable states? Again, where this can
be shown to be the case, it may or may not indicate an attitude influenced by
prejudice. More importantly, if not accompanied by specific linguistic
expressions, the claim of underlying motifs cannot be analyzed scientifically;
hence their existence cannot be satisfactorily demonstrated.
None of this means that
anti-Jewish themes within the context of criticism of Israel cannot be
identified or assessed. They certainly can, but discerning them requires
careful study of the discourse, a precise examination of what was said or
written, and an analysis of the ideas, arguments and positions that emerge in a context that comprises the history and tradition of anti-Jewish
thinking as well as post-Holocaust and contemporary historical and political
realities. By applying this methodology, we can identify myths and
stereotypes and elucidate both change and continuity in the antisemitic
discourse.2
Research indicates that
antisemitism in Western political culture since the late 1960s has been
intimately connected to, and has emerged within, public debates relating to two
central topics: the Holocaust, on the one hand, and Israel and the Middle East
conflict, on the other. As the German historian Wolfgang Benz has pointed out,
post-Holocaust antisemitism in Europe to a large extent “feeds on feelings of
guilt and shame, expresses itself as a denial or trivialization of the
Holocaust, and masks itself as criticism of Zionism and hostility toward Israel.”3
The reality, of course, is not
the same in each country. Depending on a number of factors such as historical
legacy, wartime experiences and relation to the Holocaust, as well as postwar
history and political culture, the depth, intensity, expressions and legitimacy
of antisemitism vary greatly between different societies. West European
democracies, however, share common features, reflected in the evolution and
manifestations of the anti-Jewish discourse during the postwar era. Moreover,
while a Holocaust- and guilt-related antisemitism is more evident in countries
that were directly involved in the murder of European Jewry, it has gained
ground in former allied and neutral countries such as Sweden.
Antisemitism in postwar Sweden
Sweden has a history of anti-Jewish prejudice dating back to
the Middle Ages. Christian anti-Judaism contributed to the persistent ban on
Jewish immigration, which lasted until 1782, when Jews for the first time were
allowed to reside in Sweden without converting to the Christian faith. Their
political emancipation was completed in 1870. Although Sweden never experienced
a large-scale political antisemitic movement of the kind that emerged in
various European countries at the end of the nineteenth century, the
modernization of Swedish society strengthened anti-Jewish sentiments among
segments of conservative as well as radical and socialist bodies of opinion. In
literature, in the comic press, and subsequently also in films, Jews were
frequently depicted as racially alien and associated with what many saw as the
destructive forces of the new era: capitalism, socialism, urbanization and so
forth.
While the extent and strength of
antisemitism in late nineteenth century and early twentieth century Sweden
remain unclear, recent studies have shown that traditional religious and
secular anti-Jewish stereotypes remained an integrated and fairly well-accepted
part of Swedish culture until World War II. Negative perceptions of Jews also
influenced popular attitudes as well as restrictive government policies toward
Jewish refugees from Nazi Germany during the 1930s.4
As in many other countries, the
impact of the Nazi extermination of Europe’s Jews led to strong
delegitimization of and a taboo on antisemitism in the dominant political
culture of postwar Sweden.5 While there were occasional outbursts of
anti-Jewish rhetoric (as in the case of the assassination of the Swedish UN
mediator Count Bernadotte in Israel in September 1948), antisemitism was to a
large extent absent from the public debate during the first two decades after
World War II. Popular support for Israel was strong throughout this period, yet
pro-Israel sentiment also included a tendency to idealize Jews and the Jewish
state. This glorification, which stood in sharp contrast to the fairly
widespread negative attitudes toward Jewish refugees during the 1930s and the
war years, was often accompanied by references to a “bad conscience” or
feelings of “guilt” about the Jews.6
The Holocaust and the
delegitimization of antisemitism did seem to lead to a weakening of anti-Jewish
sentiments within the Swedish public, but long-held and deep-rooted prejudices
did not totally disappear. An undoubtedly limited yet significant revival could
be discerned at the end of the 1960s and the first half of the 1970s, when
militant anti-Zionism, propagated by small but influential revolutionary
Marxist and radical Christian groups, revitalized some popular stereotypes of
Jews.7 Although a more critical stance toward Israeli policies and
positions in the Arab-Israeli and Palestinian-Israeli conflicts emerged in the
public discourse, radical anti-Zionism had little legitimacy at the time. Yet,
anti-Zionist arguments, including anti-Jewish components, did slowly influence
some circles and intellectuals within the democratic mainstream of Swedish
politics, giving these claims a certain measure of respectability and extending
the boundaries of speech acceptable in the public arena. In parallel, the taboo
on antisemitism seems to have gradually weakened - a trend also observable in
the defense of Holocaust revisionism by some well-known Swedish left-wing
intellectuals at the beginning of the 1980s.8
The effects of these developments
could be seen in the reactions to Israel’s 1982 Lebanon War, which unleashed
marked anti-Jewish reactions in many countries. The scope and intensity of
these outbursts seemed to suggest that this antisemitic wave constituted a
watershed in the history of postwar European antisemitism. For the first time
since World War II, anti-Jewish sentiments on a broad scale had surfaced within
the mainstream political culture, not least within the media.9 Sweden
was no exception.
Before discussing the anti-Jewish
motifs that emerged in the Swedish public debate on Israel and the Lebanon War,
it is important to stress that most of the discussion, which in the main was
sharply critical of Israel, cannot be judged as antisemitic. The majority of
the articles published - however harsh in condemning the Israeli invasion, its
effects on Lebanese and Palestinian civilians, and what was seen as indirect
Israeli responsibility for the massacres in Sabra and Shatila – did not contain
visible antisemitism. Nevertheless, a significant minority of articles – news
reports, editorials, feature articles, readers’ letters and political cartoons
– did.
Christian Anti-Jewish Themes
An analysis of the Swedish debate elucidates both the persistence
and flexibility of anti-Jewish thinking. It shows how stereotypes and beliefs
largely absent from the public discourse for decades can be easily revived and
adapted to new circumstances. Although Sweden is one of the most secularized
countries in Europe, the anti-Israel mood created by the Lebanon War unleashed
a flood of age-old Christian anti-Jewish perceptions which were then woven into
– and rationalized as – criticism of Israeli government policies.
In general, it can be said that
the original theological construct of Judaism as the antithesis of Christianity
– the contrast between Christian love and forgiveness and Jewish
unforgivingness and malevolence – constituted a leitmotif in the
antisemitically tainted argumentation during the war. A recurring theme was
that of a specific Jewish vengefulness and cruelty, often referred to as an
“eye for an eye” mentality, an Old Testament wrath and bloodthirstiness that
was said to characterize Israeli behavior.
A columnist in a mainstream paper
wrote: “Israel is building its ideology on the Old Testament. We doubt that
there can be peace before this unyielding grip has loosened…How different the
New Testament is, with its extirpation of differences between Jews and others!”10
Dozens of readers’ letters contained the same reasoning: “Israel’s ‘holy
scriptures’ are, as is well known, important sources of inspiration when they
start their wars of conquest and extermination”; “Now the state [of Israel] has
sent its army to Lebanon in an Old Testament fashion.”11 It must be
difficult for a Christian, one letter stated, “to quietly accept the acts of
violence perpetrated by Jews. How does this correspond to the New Testament and
Jesus’ message of love?”12
These traditional perceptions
were also often integrated into a Holocaust- or guilt-related discourse. An
editorial in the leading social democratic daily Aftonbladet explained
the motifs underlying the Israeli invasion in the following way: “Israel is
taking a terrible revenge these days, revenge in accordance with the harshest
words in the Old Testament, revenge for the horrible suffering that befell the
Jewish people in Europe.” A few days later the same editorial writer claimed
that the Palestinians were being “exterminated” by Israel and that this
reminded him of “the persecution of the Jews in Europe.”13
Other papers followed suit. The
conservative Norrköpings Tidningar published a letter which, after
having claimed that Israel was committing a crime similar to the Holocaust and
that “the Jews of today remind one of the likes of Hitler,” stated: “It is
incomprehensible that Swedish Christians visit Israel as Israel’s lust for
vengeance has existed ever since World War II.”14
Grafia, the mouthpiece of
the graphic workers union, published – and later, when criticized, defended as
legitimate and not anti-Jewish - an analysis of Israel’s Lebanon War that
claimed: “As for the Israeli bombing of Beirut in the summer of 1982, even this
finds support in Judaism…Judaism, then, is a particularly warlike and murderous
teaching or ‘religion’…Accordingly, the expansionist global and genocidal
policy Israel pursues…is totally supported by the holy scripture of Judaism,
the Old Testament.”15 These perceptions were also articulated
without any reference to religion. The Lebanon War was, as one letter claimed,
a result of the Jews’ “hunger for power and insatiable lust for revenge.”16
Another common theme was using
the concept of “the chosen people” when criticizing the Israeli invasion. In
modern antisemitic thinking the concept of chosenness is often interpreted as
signifying Jewish racism – a belief in Jewish racial superiority – as well as
purported Jewish striving for power and domination. It is sometimes also used
as a code word to enhance traditional ideas of cruelty and bloodthirstiness
supposedly embedded in Judaism. All these ideas were manifest in the Swedish
press debate on Israel.
The notion of chosenness was
frequently suggested as an underlying explanation for Israel’s invasion of Lebanon
or for the often brutal consequences of Israeli warfare for civilians. One
article wondered whether “the legend that they are God’s chosen people” was
subconscious in their minds while they were pursuing that “cruel war.”17
“Now they are asking for help for the poor victims of the ruthless genocide
that ‘God’s chosen’ today are pursuing,” another said.18 Louder
protests are needed, a letter claimed, “since ‘God’s people’ are
indiscriminately…murdering thousands of defenseless humans.”19
“‘God’s chosen people’ have no right to kill innocent women and children,”
another writer asserted.20
The social democratic daily Dala-Demokraten
published a letter commenting on the massacre in Sabra and Shatila, which
included the following lines: “The Jewish year ended and the new one began with
a massacre. Women and children were murdered by ‘God’s elect nation’. However,
the war policy of the Israeli government finds support in the Bible.”21
The Grafia article quoted
above explained that according to Judaism “the Jews are God’s own people, a specifically
chosen people, superior to other peoples.” Jewish religion is “racist,” the
writer continues, “yes, Judaism even orders its chosen people to commit
genocide.”22
The concept of chosenness also
figures in anti-Zionist condemnations of the war. “Zionism,” one such article
claimed, “is a Jewish national movement that aspires for ‘God’s chosen people’
to rule the entire Middle East.”23 The editor of Proletären,
a communist paper that consistently demanded the elimination of Israel, wrote
with reference to Israel’s armed forces: “They are God’s chosen, with the right
to exterminate everything that comes in their way.”24
The fantasy of the Lebanon War
as the “chosen people’s” war was linked to other antisemitic stereotypes, such
as the image of the greedy, dishonest and exploitative Jew. The following piece
was published under the heading “Moses and Begin” in Västgöta-Demokraten:
If one believes the old source texts, Israel was God’s
chosen people. It is therefore perhaps not a difficult choice for such a
people, using all the means at its disposal, especially military options, to
strive to extend its chosen property and territory…
Jews and pawnbrokers used to
be virtually synonymous concepts, but things have moved on and they now invest
their assets in the West Bank, which pays a higher dividend…
We need to differentiate
between Christianity and Judaism – the Jews follow the law of Moses, a
specially composed story, particularly well suited to military and warlike
adventures.25
In the anti-Jewish discourse the
concept of chosenness also merged with the projection of the Holocaust onto Israel
or the Jews, with the pursuit of the Lebanon War as a replication of the
extermination of Europe’s Jews. In the social democratic daily Arbetet a
well-known writer portrayed the Lebanon War as a Nazi-like genocide rooted in
Jewish vengefulness after the Holocaust, as well as in Judaism’s idea of
chosenness.
There is a genocide going on in Lebanon. The black-winged
shadow of a swastika is being cast over Beirut. Children are being murdered
because the Jewish people were persecuted for hundreds of years by the
Christians of Europe…Human beings are of no import. Only chosen peoples matter.26
In Arbetarbladet a
columnist complained that the Holocaust “gave Israel a letter of indulgence
which has frequently been exploited.” Nobody, he claimed, dared criticize Israel
for fear of being accused of antisemitism. Now, with Israel’s war in Lebanon,
the situation is radically different: “One thing is totally clear: The Jews have
definitely forfeited their letter of indulgence.” The Nazi crimes against the
Jews, the article went on, were being repeated by Israel against the
Palestinians. There is a great similarity between “Hitler and the Nazis and
Begin and the so-called orthodox Jews.” The former saw the “Aryan race” as
superior to others, while the latter “see themselves as God’s chosen people,
with special rights in this world.” The columnist then gives the following
background to the Israeli war in Lebanon:
The Old Testament, still the Holy Scripture to the
orthodox Jews, gives advice to Israel on how to treat the enemy. It is
recommended that a city which has been conquered should be destroyed. Anything
alive should be killed. The enemies of the Jews must be exterminated. These are
second-rate people for whom Jehovah has no compassion.27
The discourse unleashed – but not
caused - by Israel’s war illustrates not only the persistence of traditional
anti-Jewish perceptions, but also the elasticity and adaptability of these ideas.
There were few age-old accusations or beliefs that could not be tailored to the
new postwar and post-Holocaust antisemitic discourse. The following passage,
which is part of a critique of Israeli policies published in Östersunds-Posten,
includes the accusation of Christ killing and links the concept of chosenness
to stereotypes of Jewish greed and shady business practices as well as to the
myth of Jewish political and financial power:
If one calls Israel a democracy, it is a democracy in the
spirit of Hitler…The Jews have been busy all over the world, applying their
business acumen and lack of scruples in order to acquire influence in the world
of finance and exert leverage on policy and presidential elections in America.
Because we know the Jews are God’s chosen people insofar as, in all periods of
history, in all countries, and by every means, they have chosen to steal the
property of others. Furthermore, the Jews killed Jesus, which for certain
fanatics here at home is such a sacred subject that it gives Israel absolution
for all of its foul deeds until the end of time.
The Holocaust related anti-Jewish discourse is influenced by more
than the complex problem of guilt. There is also a visible aggressiveness and
frustration that seems to stem from the restrictions imposed by the delegitimization of antisemitism. The article quoted above ends with a telling
sigh of relief: “The Jews have relinquished for all time the sympathy they
received during World War II by making use of the same methods.”28
The perception of Israel’s
Lebanon War as an expression of the “chosen people’s” murderousness and “Old
Testament” vengefulness attracted many supporters. Other ideas, too, though
less frequently used, demonstrate the persistence of the Christian anti-Jewish
legacy. The accusation of Christ killing is one such example. This motif was
introduced in a more indirect way, in a poem referring to Israeli policies that
included the following lines: “Benevolence has been set aside / and Barabbas29
remains on the loose.”30 But it was also, as we have seen, used in a
direct sense. A letter condemning Israel’s war, published by the social
democratic Västgöta-Demokraten, assumed that “since the Jews
had Jesus crucified, vertical relations … most certainly have become somewhat
strained.”31 In another example the writer claims similarities
between Israel and “Hitler’s Germany,” but adds hopefully: “It is not unlikely
that the Jews once again will be driven out of Palestine. God’s punishment for
what they did to his son?”32
This motif also entered the
anti-Zionist discourse. An anti-Zionist argued in Smålands Folkblad
that the Israelis were “racists, imperialists and terrorists,” and encouraged
those defending Israel to find out “who killed Jesus.”33
Another notion stemming from the
medieval anti-Jewish legacy is the association of the Jews with the Devil. Even
this motif figured in the Swedish debate on the Lebanon War. A letter-writer in
Folkbladet Östgöten wondered whether the Jews had “forgotten
the Hitler era” and added with reference to present-day Israel that “where
Jesus lived, suffered and died, the Devil reigns supreme.”34 Another
writer confessed to having “a strong feeling that it is Satan who is giving the
orders. Can we not detect the cloven hoof and long tail protruding from under
the threadbare cloak of religion?”35
In the mass-circulation Aftonbladet
a story resembling the age-old myth of Jewish ritual murder was woven into a
comment on the war. In a discussion of the massacres in Sabra and Shatila a
foreign correspondent referred to a visit to the Israeli occupied West Bank. At
the time, he recalled, a Palestinian child had been found murdered. The
perpetrator of this crime was not known, but the correspondent thought he knew
what had happened. Singling out Jewish settlers as suspects, he writes: “A
child disappeared and was found a few days later in a crevice, shot in the
head, ritually executed.”36
Power, Wealth and Conspiracies
The negative reactions to Israel’s Lebanon War served also
to reactivate other traditional stereotypes and beliefs. Among them was the
myth of Jewish control of world finance, politics and the media, and the
conspiratorial fantasies that often accompany such ideas. This mythology was
not as prevalent as the images of Old Testament vengefulness and
bloodthirstiness, but it did penetrate the debate.
Not surprisingly, ideas of Jewish
or “Zionist” control and manipulation of public opinion were strongest in far
left anti-Zionist argumentation. They had, after all, been part of radical
anti-Zionist propaganda since the late 1960s. The communist paper Norrskensflamman
supported, in an article, statements made at an anti-Zionist protest rally in
Göteborg, which included the claim not only that Zionism was a mirror
image of Nazism, but also that Zionism controlled the international media
network: “It is lies produced by Zionism that are vomited out through the
network of Western media. And the Swedish mass media is taking a very active
part in this.” An editorial in Norrskenflamman a few weeks later added
that Zionists shaped Swedish public opinion through their control of much of
the media and of publishing houses. The paper referred to “those Zionist forces
that are supporting Israel’s genocidal policy, for which purpose they have got
substantial resources at their disposal: a significant part of the Swedish
press, publishing houses and large capital interests. This [influence] makes
its mark on television and radio.”37
Similar motifs emerged in the
debate in the mainstream media. A letter in Västerbottens-Folkblad
claimed that there existed a “a very large and well organized Zionist lobby
that exerts much influence on the Swedish press and all other mass media, not
least radio and television.”38 An article published in Nya
Norrland explained that “Jewish organizations and pro-Israeli forces in the
world do everything in their power to mislead international opinion about what
is happening in Lebanon today.” These forces, the article went on, included
Swedish Television, the national public service television company, whose
re-run of the American series The Holocaust in 1982 had the single
purpose of “hiding the fact that the victims of inhuman treatment in the 1930s
have become the Nazis of our time.”39
A journalist writing in the
liberal Kvällsposten and in Barnen & Vi, a magazine
published by the Save the Children relief organization, considered that “Palestine
is a utopia as long as Israel exists.” Nothing could threaten Israel. “Israel
has the whole of world Jewry behind it, with all its influence and wealth.”40
In a few cases there were even
direct references to the myth of Jewish striving for world domination. In the
previously discussed Grafia article, the writer concluded that “Judaism
aims at cruel world mastery.”41 A letter in the liberal Göteborgs
Tidningen, which criticized American support for Israel, asked: “Do they
[the Americans] believe that they will benefit from future Jewish world
domination?”42
Although the hostility that
surfaced in the media discussion was seldom directed specifically against
Swedish Jews, there were a few exceptions. A Kvällsposten editorial
questioned the loyalty and “Swedishness” of Swedish Jews. “Swedish Jews,” the
paper wrote, “who blindly support the policy of the Begin government, obviously
see the conflict more through Jewish than Swedish eyes.” This behavior could
backfire on the Jews, the editorial warned, if “the Swedish people” were to
reject what Israel was doing. In order to avoid the wrath of the “Swedish
people,” Jews were advised to express “serious concern” over Israeli policy.43
In the conservative Helsingborgs Dagblad a letter was published in which
the image of innate Jewish cruelty was highlighted by references to both the
Lebanon War and to kosher slaughter in Sweden. “The Swedish government has given
millions of crowns to alleviate the suffering caused by Israel in its latest
attack. But there is suffering going on much closer at hand.” In Sweden, the
letter explains, “every week between three and four hundred chickens are
killed, slowly, to satisfy the taste of Swedish Jews.”44
Liberation Demonology
The analogy between Israel and Nazi Germany in the public
debate on the Israeli invasion is a topic that has been touched upon briefly
above. This theme deserves additional attention, however, since the projection
of Nazism and the Holocaust onto Israel and the Jews is a central element in
postwar and present-day anti-Jewish thinking and propaganda. The debate spurred
by the Lebanon War indicated that this motif was no longer the preserve of
extremist groups, but had gained legitimacy within the mainstream of public
opinion.
The characterization of Zionism
and Israel as racist and Nazi-like creations had been part of Soviet, Arab and
Western anti-Zionist propaganda at least since the end of the 1960s (in the
Soviet case it goes back to the German-Israeli rapprochement in the early
1950s). Following the pattern of the Soviet anti-Zionist campaign, Swedish and
Western European ultra-left groups had made use of these charges during the
1970s, but at the time they had little, if any, legitimacy within the
democratic political culture. Public reactions in 1982 showed this was no
longer the case. While it functioned as a catalyst for traditional
antisemitism, the Lebanon War also demonstrated that a broader spectrum of
public opinion was now willing to accept and reproduce the new anti-Jewish
motifs that had developed after and, to a large extent, as a consequence of the
Holocaust.
There appear to be several
reasons for this change of climate. The increasingly critical view of Israel,
no doubt connected to the right-wing nationalist policy of the Begin
government, is part of the background. Years of intensive anti-Zionist
argumentation might also well have influenced segments of the general public,
and although the Marxist new left had almost disappeared from the political
scene by the end of the 1970s, some of its ideas continued to surface in the
debate on Israel. Yet the problem of coming to terms with the mass murder of
European Jews and its historical, political, moral and psychological
consequences, seems to have been the major factor behind the increased
popularity and usage of images of Nazism and the Holocaust in the debate
relating to Israel and its policies vis-à-vis the Palestinians.
Over time, the taboo surrounding antisemitism also gradually weakened. This
increased the level of tolerance for expressions of hostility toward Jews.
These inversions of history have
coincided with a historical process in many West European countries where
postwar national self-images are being increasingly challenged – a process in
which the past relating to the Holocaust is often at the core. These
re-examinations and debates are not always welcomed and to some the projection
of the past upon the Jews seems increasingly attractive. The new formula – that
the Jews are the new Nazis, guilty of a new Holocaust – has relieved guilt
feelings and provided a new vehicle for anti-Jewish sentiments to be
legitimately expressed.
This, of course,
does not imply that all usage of Nazism and the Holocaust as metaphors or
analogies in postwar and contemporary political debate should be interpreted in
this way. These concepts have become symbols of evil in the postwar world and
as such are being used and misused for various reasons
- the political discourse in Israel being no exception. To a certain degree, this
reservation should also apply to the European debate on Israel. The exploitation of such images in
relation to the Jewish state, therefore, might not always be motivated by factors such as those outlined
above.
But it is crucially important to
acknowledge the fundamental difference between the application of these images
to Jews and the Jewish state and the use of Nazism and the Holocaust as
metaphors when discussing other topics. Moreover, when these images emerge as a
collective mass phenomenon, when significant parts of public opinion in Europe
transform the victims of antisemitism, Nazism and the Holocaust into mirror
images of their persecutors and murderers – as was the case during the Lebanon
War – the complex underlying motives must be taken into account.
Even if the motives behind this type of phenomenon can never be
fully explained, there are grounds to support the notion that such expressions are best understood as a form of liberation demonology.
The transformation of victim into executioner, of “the Jew” into Nazi, has
not only brought relief, but has also
given vent to an aggressiveness and frustration which
the issue of guilt and the muzzling of expression seem to have generated. This
interpretation would appear to be plausible if we look at the argumentation
which in many cases supported these representations – the recurring references
to “guilt,” to irritation over not being permitted to speak in unambiguous
terms about Israel and
collectivized assertions about the transformation of “the Jews” or “the
victims.” Moreover, it is given credence by the scope, intensity and, above
all, selectivity, in the pattern of association.45
The ease with which the imagery is accepted and disseminated,
however, is not adequately explained solely in terms of its satisfying
emotional needs or – which in part was the case when it was exploited in
anti-Zionist argumentation – serving political ends.
The portrayal of “the Jew” as a racist, a Nazi and a perpetrator of genocide is
also linked to an existing, well-cultivated tradition of reasoning. Since the
Middle Ages, Jews have been repeatedly portrayed as symbols of evil. The
representation of “the Jew” as a terrestrial incarnation of the Devil has been
superseded in the modern era by his depiction as the personification of
capitalism and communism. After Auschwitz, absolute evil was represented by racism and Nazism. That the Jews
in due time would also be identified with these phenomena, and that parts of
the European body of opinion found the linkage plausible, must therefore also
be seen against this background. The intimate connection of the new motifs to
existing widespread notions is also demonstrated by the fact that they were
often supported by and intrinsically interlinked with traditional myths and
stereotypes.
An examination of how Swedish
media reporting and debate treated and described other conflicts and atrocities
that took place at the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s (for
example, the Soviet war in Afghanistan, the Iran-Iraq war, the civil war in
Lebanon, the Syrian massacre in the city of Hama and the civil wars in
Guatemala and El Salvador) reveals that, they never aroused analogies or images
of Nazism and the Holocaust.46 It seems that it is only when Israel
is involved in a war or a conflict that Nazism, the Holocaust, Auschwitz and
the Warsaw Ghetto become immediate associations for significant segments of
Swedish (or other Western47) public opinion. From this we can
conclude that it is not the events themselves that unleash these associations,
but the identity of one of the involved parties: the Jews. These expressions
therefore cannot be satisfactorily explained by reference to the predominant
political rhetoric or the factual circumstances of the war. They should rather
be understood as primarily an effect of the historical, moral and psychological
problems that are a consequence of the Holocaust, as well as of older,
pre-existing patterns of anti-Jewish thinking, nourished by the new Holocaust
related resentment. An examination of the Swedish debate during the Lebanon War
supports this interpretation.
In July 1982 the communist and
anti-Zionist paper Proletären noted with great satisfaction: “The
accusation that Israel and Zionism use the same cruel methods that Hitler and
the Nazis employed against the Jews during World War II is no longer confined
to small pro-Palestinian groups – it has become widely accepted.”48
This observation was to a large extent correct.
Within the mainstream press these images quickly became epidemic.
With Lebanon as the stage,
European World War II history
was reshaped with the Jews in the role of Nazi
executioners and the Palestinians as Jews being exterminated. That this fantasy
had little to do with the war itself, but quite a lot with Europe’s and Sweden’s troublesome past is also shown by the generalizations that were
made. In many articles the writer disclosed not only new insights about Israel, but about
Jews in general. “What lessons did the Jews actually learn from Nazism?”49
“Ought not the Jews to have had enough of heinous acts during the Hitler
regime?”50 “Are they [the Jews] to be allowed to act in any way they
like just because they are ‘pitied’?”51 “It surprises me that the
Jews have learned nothing from their history.”52
These are all formulations typical of the discourse that emerged.
The way these insights are
presented follows a specific pattern. First, there is often a reference to the
sufferings of the Jews during the Holocaust; this is followed by the
“discovery” that the Lebanon War is a new Holocaust and that the Jews have
themselves become Nazi executioners. “Of course we should feel sorry about what
the Jews went through in World War II,” one article stated. But, it continued,
in Lebanon “an extermination is taking place similar to the one the Jews fell
victim to during World War II. They are now showing themselves to be the same
as the Nazis were then.”53 “Here in Sweden,” another writer
explained, “we grieved over, and were plagued by, Hitler’s mass slaughter of
the Jews in World War II. We could never have imagined that the Jews would be
the same wild mass murderers as Hitler’s simple-minded lackeys.”54 A
further example reads: “Without going into the atrocities of the Hitler period
in Europe , I felt deep sympathy for the Jews. But now I have changed. Now they
are themselves like Hitler…The Jews have become fascists.”55 If many
articles of this kind expressed relief, others were outspokenly aggressive:
“And forgetful of their own destiny during the Holocaust in Germany, they set
to work. And so they commenced their own Holocaust. ”56
This leitmotif appeared in
hundreds of editorials, comments, news reports, readers’ letters and cartoons.
An editorial in Västgöta-Demokraten clearly illustrates the
central themes behind the new demonology: liberation from frustrating
restrictions and/or feelings of guilt. “Throughout the centuries,” the paper
pointed out, “the Jewish people have suffered horribly and the terrible crimes
that were committed against them in Europe during World War II must never be
forgotten.” But, the editorial continued, the Christian West had been
“possessed by its bad conscience” which had led to the fact that nobody dared
criticize Israel “for fear of being accused of antisemitism.” In the case of
the war in Lebanon, however, this apparent barrier seemed to have fallen. “The
crimes committed against the European Jews are now being repeated against the
Palestinian Muslims,” it explained, and went on to suggest that the only just
solution to the conflict was “the abolition of the State of Israel in its
present form.” After the Sabra and Shatila massacre the paper stated that the
Israeli army was now identical to “the Nazi special units that acted in Belsen,
Auschwitz and Treblinka.”57
If traditional anti-Jewish themes
frequently surfaced in editorials, news reports and other material in the
leading social democratic daily Aftonbladet, the paper also more
systematically than most other publications transformed the Lebanon War into a
new Holocaust. On the front page of 17 June 1982, the editor-in-chief declared,
under the heading “Genocide”: “The State of Israel was created so that we all
collectively should atone for a terrible burden of guilt toward the Jewish
people.” From now on and for months to come every aspect of the Lebanon war
would be described in terms associating it with the Nazi genocide of the Jews,
the message being instilled through recurring headings such as “The Holocaust”
or “The Holocaust in Lebanon.”58
Aftonbladet’s correspondent in Lebanon reported on
Palestinians being taken to “concentration camps” and explained that “the
[Israeli] extermination of the Palestinian people” was now under way. The well
known photo of the Jewish boy guarded by SS troops in the Warsaw Ghetto was
placed alongside a photo of Palestinians surrendering to Israeli soldiers in Lebanon.
The text accompanying the pictures read: “Nobody forgets the photo from the
Warsaw Ghetto in 1943.” Today, it continued, “it is the Palestinians that are
being exterminated.”59 This message was also frequently repeated in
editorial comments. One of them stated: “In Lebanon the Israeli state is
staging its own version of the Holocaust.”60 Aftonbladet also
published numerous readers’ letters echoing this motif.62
The projection of the Holocaust
onto Israel, and onto Jews in general, also gained legitimacy from its usage by
leading politicians. Olof Palme, leader of the Social Democratic Party and head
of the opposition at the time, referred in a speech to the pain he had felt
seeing pictures of “Jewish children in concentration camps and ghettos and
realising the terrible crime that had been committed against them.” The same
pain, he continued, was now felt “when we see pictures of Palestinian children,
persecuted in exactly the same way. But this time it is Israel which stands
behind [the persecution].”62 The international secretary of the
Social Democratic party claimed that the war had led to “an extraordinary
reversal of roles. Today it is the Palestinians, not the Jews, who are being
persecuted and are threatened by ‘liquidation’… Today it is the Palestinians
who are locked up in a new Warsaw Ghetto.”63
The notion of the Holocaust being
replicated by its victims caught on rapidly. There were hardly any aspects of
the Nazi extermination program that were not imitated by the Jewish state.
Dozens of articles reported that the Palestinians were forced to wear a sign of
recognition similar to the star worn by Jews in Nazi occupied Europe and that Beirut
now resembled the Warsaw Ghetto.64 To a liberal commentator, the
Israeli bombardment of Beirut “brought the Kristallnacht of autumn 1938
to mind.”65 To the editor-in-chief of Smålands Folkblad,
the bombing was a terrifying parallel to “the Final Solution.”66
Others described the air raids as an “Israeli ‘Lebensraum’ massacre.”67
“One hundred Palestinians have been gassed to death,” a letter in Dagbladet
Nya Samhället claimed.68 The daily Sydöstran
accused Israel of crimes similar to “the Nazi system of using individuals from
what were considered inferior races for medical experiments.”69
Although Israel was the center of
attention, the concepts “Israel” and “the Jews” were, as pointed out, often
used synonymously in this discourse. Israel was compelled to repeat the crimes
committed against the Jews in Europe, thus revealing the true character of the
Jews or what they had become. Israel, then, in this context, functioned as “the
collective Jew,” both a symbol and an object of projection. This becomes
abundantly clear when looking at the way the message was often conveyed: “the
victims of inhuman treatment in the 1930s have become the Nazis of our time”;70
“the former victims of the Nazi racist extermination policy have switched roles
and have instead become executioners”;71 “the children that 37 years
ago were victims of…annihilation, today without any hesitation use the same
means against new children”;72 “the Jews of today remind one of the
likes of Hitler”;73 “the people that were threatened with
extermination by the Nazis…[today] repeat the crimes of their executioners”;74
“the Jews behave in the same way as Hitler and his gang”;75 ”it
seems as if the Nazi poison was somehow sucked up by the Jews.”76
Having constructed Israel as a Nazi state committing a Holocaust in Lebanon,
conclusions were drawn about “the victims of the 1930s,” “the former victims,”
“the Jews” and so forth.
Conclusion
The examination of the Swedish public debate on Israel’s
1982 Lebanon War elucidates some central characteristics of postwar and
contemporary antisemitism. Primarily, it demonstrates the intimate relationship
between antisemitism and perceptions, attitudes and reactions to Israel and the
Middle East conflict. It indicates that in mainstream political culture the
public debate on Israel is a major forum for antisemitism. There appear to be
several reasons for this. Two factors, however, are of fundamental importance.
First, as the prime Jewish actor
in the global political arena Israel is a focal point for latent antisemitism.
The Jewish state – in some cases its sheer existence, but more often its
policies and actions – serves as a stimulus for anti-Jewish sentiments and
prejudice to become manifest. Israeli policies, especially if seen as
provocative, are interpreted by parts of the public through a filter of
pre-existing, probably often unconscious, negative stereotypes and beliefs. As
was demonstrated during the Lebanon War, Israel, to a substantial number of
people, was not a state like other states and did not go to war for motives
similar to those of other states. Israel’s war became in the eyes of many a
“Jewish” war, pursued for specifically “Jewish” motives. Drawing from the
reservoir of both Christian and secular anti-Jewish perceptions, the Lebanon
War was transformed into a uniquely horrifying war in which “God’s chosen
people” expressed their “Old Testament” vengefulness and bloodthirstiness as
well as their racism, greed and striving for domination. Second, the debate on Israel
has been a major forum for antisemitism within mainstream political culture
because it constitutes the only public arena where negative attitudes toward
Jews can be legitimately articulated, since in this context they can easily be
packaged and rationalized as criticism of Israel or Zionism.
Reactions to the Lebanon War,
moreover, indicated that the strong anti-Israel mood was accompanied not only
by a more visible antisemitism, but also a greater tolerance toward anti-Jewish
expressions within the mainstream media. Although antisemitism lacked
legitimacy within the democratic political culture, a large number of respected
newspapers and periodicals published material that was quite openly
antisemitic, and which, under “normal” circumstances, would not have been
included. The level of acceptance with regard to antisemitism, then, seems to
rise and fall with the fluctuations of public opinion on Israel.
The Swedish debate on Israel’s
Lebanon War demonstrates the persistence of traditional Christian and secular
anti-Jewish myths and stereotypes. Although largely absent from the public
discourse for decades, historically- and culturally-rooted images were easily
reawakened and formed the kernel of the antisemitically tinged argumentation.
But the discussion that emerged also demonstrates the adaptability and
flexibility of antisemitism as well as the propensity for its renewal. It shows
that the consequences of the Holocaust play a crucial role in shaping the
features of postwar anti-Jewish thinking and it indicates that the projection
of Nazism and the Holocaust onto the Jewish state, or onto Jews in general,
constitutes a central element in the contemporary anti-Jewish discourse.
notes
1. This essay is to a large extent
based on Chapter 6 in Henrik Bachner’s study Återkomsten. Antisemitism i Sverige efter
1945
(Resurgence. Antisemitism
in Sweden after 1945) (Stockholm: Natur och
Kultur, 1999).
2. The fruitfulness of this
approach in analyzing both Israel- and Holocaust-related antisemitism has been
demonstrated in a number of studies. See, for example, Micha Brumlik, “Die Angst für dem Vater.
Judenfeindliche Tendenzen im Umkreis neuer sozialer Bewegungen” and Hajo Funke, “Bitburg und ’die Macht der Juden’. Zu
einem Lehrstück anti-jüdischen Ressentiments in Deutschland/Mai
1985,” in Alphons Silbermann &
Julius H. Schoeps, eds., Antisemitismus nach dem Holocaust. Bestandsaufnahme
und Erscheinungsformen in deutschsprachigen Ländern, (Köln:
Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1986); Lars Rensmann, “Entschädigungspolitik, Erinnerungsabwehr und Motive der
sekundären Antisemitismus,” in Rolf Surmann, ed., Das Finkelstein-Alibi. “Holocaust-Industrie” und Tätergesellschaft, (Köln: PapyRossa,
2001); Robert S. Wistrich, Hitler’s
Apocalypse: Jews and the Nazi Legacy (London: Weidenfeld &
Nicolson, 1985); Ruth Wodak, Peter Nowak,
Johanna Pelikan, Helmut Gruber, Rudolph de Cilla, Richard Mitten, “Wir sind alle unschuldige
Täter.” Diskurshistorische Studien zum Nachkriegsantisemitismus (Frankfurt am Main:
Suhrkamp, 1990).
3. Wolfgang Benz, “Tradierte und wiederentdeckte
Vorurteile im neuen Europa: Antisemitismus, Fremdenhass; Diskriminierung von
Minderheiten,” paper presented at the conference Antisemitismus in Europa,
Berlin, 1992, p. 2.
4. Lars M. Andersson, En jude
är en jude är en jude… Representationer av “juden” i svensk skämtpress
1900–1930 (Lund:
Nordic Academic Press, 2000); Steven Koblik, The Stones Cry Out. Sweden’s Response to the Persecution of the
Jews. 1933–1945 (New
York: Holocaust Library, 1988); Paul A. Levine, From Indifference to
Activism. Swedish
Diplomacy and the Holocaust; 1938–1944 (Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis,
1996); Ingvar Svanberg & Mattias Tydén, Sverige och
Förintelsen. Debatt och dokument om Europas judar 1933–1945
(Stockholm: Arena, 1997); Rochelle Wright, The Visible Wall. Jews and Other Ethnic Outsiders in
Swedish Film
(Carbondale/Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1998).
5. Antisemitism within the extreme
right is not treated in this article. The extreme right continued to openly
propagate Jew hatred, but it was marginalized, discredited and isolated and,
until recently, had little influence on the public debate.
6. Bachner, Återkomsten,
pp. 49–150.
7. Ibid., pp. 236–330.
8. Ibid., pp. 354–68.
9. Bernard Wasserstein, Vanishing
Diaspora. The
Jews in Europe since 1945 (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1996), pp. 231–2. Se also Simon Epstein, Cyclical
Patterns in Antisemitism: The Dynamics of Anti-Jewish Violence in Western
Countries since the 1950s, ACTA. 2 (1993), pp. 4–6.
10. Texto, Skövde
Nyheter, 15 June 1982.
11. Andersson, Västgöta-Demokraten,
19 June 1982; Tommy Rydén, Jönköpings-Posten, 5 July
1982.
12. Undrande, Östersunds-Posten,
19 July 1982.
13. Struve/Gunnar
Fredriksson, Aftonbladet 18 June and 23 June 1982.
14. Förvånad, Norrköpings
Tidningar, 18 June 1982.
15. Sigvard Casteberg [pseudonym of
Christopher Jolin], Grafia 20 (1982), p. 9.
16. Lennart Karlsson, Folket,
18 June 1982.
17. Magnusson, Dala-Demokraten,
1 July 1982.
18. Verner Jönsson, Nya
Norrland, 8 July 1982.
19. BH, Sundsvalls
Tidning, 16 June 1982.
20. Broderskap, Hallands
Nyheter, 24 June 1982.
21. E. van Gelium, Dala-Demokraten,
22 Sept. 1982.
22. Grafia. 20 (1982), p. 9.
23. Uno Nilsson, Västerbottens
Folkblad, 30 June 1982.
24. Proletären,.
51 (1982).
25. Emanuel, Västgöta-Demokraten,
21 Sept. 1982.
26. Clas Engström, Arbetet,
17 June 1982.
27. Vilda Wille, Arbetarbladet,
25 Sept. 1982.
28. E.R., Östersunds-Posten,
3 Sept. 1982.
29. In the New Testament, a
prisoner or criminal mentioned in all four gospels who was chosen by the crowd,
over Jesus Christ, to be released by Pontius Pilate in a customary pardon
before the feast of Passover.
30. Gumman, Folkbladet
Östgöten, 22 July 1982.
31. Fredsälskare, Västgöta-Demokraten,
12 June 1982.
32. Socialdemokrat, Värmlands
Folkblad, 31 June 1982.
33. “1926,” Smålands
Folkblad, 2 July 1982.
34. Människovän, Folkbladet
Östgöten, 18 June 1982.
35. Lapplands ABF:are,
Norrskensflamman, 10 Aug. 1982.
36. Staffan Heimerson, Aftonbladet,
25 Sept. 1982.
37. Norrskensflamman,
25 June and 3 Aug. 1982.
38. Östen Karlsson, Västerbottens
Folkblad, 8 Oct. 1982.
39. Nils Nilsson, Nya Norrland,
29 July 1982.
40. Leif Persson, Kvällsposten,
19 Sept. 1982 and Barnen&Vi.
4 (1982).
41. Grafia. 20 (1982), p. 9.
42. Ned med vapnen, Göteborgs
Tidningen, 17 Aug. 1982.
43. Kvällsposten,
22 June 1982.
44. AHP, Helsingborgs
Dagblad, 20 June 1982.
45. See also Wistrich, Hitler’s Apocalypse, pp. 237–40.
46. Bachner, Återkomsten,
pp. 416–20.
47. See, for example, Wistrich, Hitler’s
Apocalypse, pp. 238–48.
48. Proletären. 48
(1982).
49. Henrik, Expressen, 30 June 1982.
50. Walter, Expressen, 4 July 1982.
51. Demonstrant, Kristianstadsbladet,
14 July 1982.
52. Oscar Agnér, Dala-Demokraten,
3 July 1982.
53. PAU, Aftonbladet, 27 June 1982.
54. Maria, Västerbottens
Folkblad, 18 June 1982.
55. Besviken, Arbetarbladet,
25 June 1982.
56. Y. Palmgren, Arbetarbladet,
27 Aug. 1982.
57. B.A. [Berndt Ahlqvist],
Västgöta-Demokraten, 24 June and 23 Sept. 1982.
58. Carl-Johan Åberg,
Aftonbladet 17 June 1982. See, for example, Aftonbladet, 4, 5 Aug. 1982.
59. Aino Heimerson, Aftonbladet,
16, 17 and 29 June 1982.
60. Lars-Ragnar Forsberg, Aftonbladet,
8 July 1982. See also,
for example, Aftonbladet, 4 Aug. 1982.
61. PAU, Aftonbladet, 27 June 1982,
Gunilla J., Aftonbladet, 10 July 1982, Anders, Aftonbladet, 10 July 1982, Verner Jönsson, Aftonbladet,
22 Aug. 1982.
62. Olof Palme, speech at the
TCO-congress 1 July 1982, published in Dagbladet Nya
Samhället, 9
July 1982.
63. Pierre Schori, Stockholms-Tidningen,
28 July 1982.
64. See, for example,
Marianne Lundström, Västerbottens Folkblad, 2 July 1982, Axel
Gustavsson, Dala-Demokraten, 1 July 1982, Cherstin Hansson and Kristina
Lindström, ETC 1 (1982), p. 29, Sigbert Axelson, Broderskap.
39 (1982).
65. Ingrid
Segerstedt-Wiberg, Dagens Nyheter, 24 Aug. 1982.
66. Y.F., Smålands Folkblad, 25
June 1982.
67. Mats Åberg, Dagbladet
Nya Samhället, 22 June 1982. See also Arne Ljung, Göteborgs
Tidningen, 18 June 1982.
68. Åke Johansson, Dagbladet
Nya Samhället, 30 June 1982.
69. Sydöstran,
28 Sept. 1982.
70. Nils Nilsson, Nya Norrland,
29 July 1982.
71. Socialistiska partiet –
Örebro, Örebro-Kuriren, 24 June 1982.
72. John Hansen, Värmlands
Folkblad, 14 June 1982.
73. Förvånad, Norrköpings
Tidningar, 18 June 1982.
74. Verner Jönsson, Nya
Norrland, 11 Aug. 1982.
75. Förbannad
Malmöbo, Kvällsposten, 17 Aug. 1982.
76. Björn Wegerup, Sundsvalls
Tidning, 29 Sept. 1982.
