THE JEWISH COMMUNITY

The Jewish population of Russia at the beginning of 2001 was about 335,000, following a decrease of about 35,000 in the past year, of whom 19,000 went to Israel and the rest to Western countries or were lost through the negative birth rate. From the beginning of the wave of mass emigration in 1989 to the present, 286,300 Russian Jews have departed for Israel.

Organized Jewish activity continued, often with the increasing support of international Jewish groups such as the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee and Habad, which together contributed tens of millions of dollars to this effort. Russian Jewish millionaires, many of whom have key positions in local communal affairs, continued their contributions, but at a lower level than in the past.

A variety of Jewish organizations are active in most Russian cities with a large Jewish population. They are gathered under several umbrella organizations: the Russian Jewish Congress (REK), founded in January 1996 and led by millionaire Leonid Nevzlin, who replaced Vladimir Gusinskii on 1 March 2001; the Federation of Jewish Communities in Russia (FEOR), founded in November 1999 on the initiative of Boris Berezovskii and the Russian government, led by Habad Rabbi Berl Lazar; and the Federation of Jewish Communal Organizations of Russia (Va’ad), founded in December 1989 and led by Mikhail Chlenov. These organizations compete for the representation of Russian Jewry. They are, for the first time in recent history, divided along the general political lines of the country. The present Russian administration, including President Vladimir Putin, has been attempting to break up the existing organizations with the intention of creating a central Jewish body amenable to the government’s “Jewish policy,” which includes lessening foreign involvement, Israeli or Western, in the affairs of the local Jewish community, removing Zionist content from their activities and reducing emigration from Russia to Israel or to the West. However, organized Jewish activity involves only about 10 percent of the Russian Jewish population and is thus not a major factor in the life of most Russian Jewry. Primarily, the Jews are concerned with the domestic political, economic and security situation of the country, to which many have reacted by emigrating, principally to Israel.

In September 2000 the new Moscow Jewish Community Center was opened on the site of the Marina Roscha Synagogue, which was destroyed by arsonists in 1993. The ceremony was attended by President Vladimir Putin.

EXTREMIST ORGANIZATIONS AND ANTISEMITISM

In recent years antisemitism has been used as a weapon in the political battles within Russia, particularly by the Communist Party and its parliamentary faction, which accused the government of selling out to the Jews (see ASW 1999/2000). Concerned that opposition to racism and antisemitism would be construed as contrary to the national spirit, the government responded hesitantly. The Putin administration’s extremely nationalist character has altered the situation radically: its take over of political positions once occupied by the far right and far left opposition (Communist Party, National Bolsheviks, etc), plus the fact that only a few identified Jews serve in the new administration, have undercut the opposition’s claims, with the result that antisemitism has lost importance as a political and social issue in Russia today.

There has been a marked drop in the activity of extremist groups such as the neo-Nazis, who have suffered internal division. Aleksandr Barkashov, veteran leader of Russian National Unity (RNE), for example, was expelled from the organization on 22 September 2000 (for ideological and personal reasons) and replaced by his second, Oleg Kasin. The authorities increased surveillance of the activities of extremist groups, less because the administration opposes ultra-nationalist tendencies than because it is attempting to restrict freedom of political activity in general and to prevent political ferment. This government, however, is as reluctant as Boris Yeltsin’s was to enforce the law against the dissemination of racist or antisemitic propaganda and the existence of extremist organizations. Hundreds of antisemitic publications, newspapers, periodicals and leaflets continue to appear and tens of ultra-nationalist and antisemitic organizations flourish on the fringes of the political map, without interference by the authorities.

Defining Russia as the “key to white survival,” former US Ku Klux Klan leader David Duke has targeted it as a means to broaden his popularity internationally and find a receptive audience for his antisemitic message. He has visited Russia at least twice during the past year, meeting with leading nationalists and right-wing extremists. His booklet The Jewish Question through the Eyes of an American, which is actually a Russian version of the chapter on the Jewish question from his autobiography My Awakening, was also distributed in Russia.

Some 25 million Muslims live on the territory of the Russian Federation, concentrated mainly in the northern Caucasus, Tatarstan and Bashkirstan, as well as in the large cities (1.5 million in Moscow). With the collapse of the USSR the influence of Muslim countries, such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Pakistan, in the northern Caucasus increased significantly. Extremist Islamic tendencies intensified during the war in Chechenya when Chechen rebels were joined by extremist Muslims from the Middle East and Afghanistan, who came to their aid in their struggle against the Russian army.

Some Muslim organizations working among the local population are funded and guided ideologically by extremist foreign elements, mainly from the Middle East. Well aware of the dangers represented by Muslim extremism, the Russian government demanded in October 1999 that the governments of Syria, Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait prevent extremist Islamic factors within their respective borders from intervening in the internal affairs of Russia, including extending support to Muslim rebels in the northern Caucasus and Muslim extremists elsewhere in Russia. Despite these protests, guidance centers and centers for Islamic ideological indoctrination continue to exist throughout Russia. They work under cover of legitimate bodies, such as Muslim seminaries or the Society for Social Reform, headed by Ramis Khalitov and funded by the Kuwait Joint Relief Committee, a front for the terrorist Middle East-based Muslim Brotherhood. (The committee’s center in the FSU is in Chimkent, Kazakhstan, headed by a Jordanian citizen, ‘Ali Salah ‘Ali Zaitar.)

The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) reported on 17 October 2000 that it had uncovered cells of the Muslim Brotherhood movement in 49 of Russia’s 89 administrative regions, as well as in other FSU states. It stated that the heads of the Muslim Brotherhood in Russia coordinate their activities with Islamic terrorist organizations and leaders in the Middle East (such as al-Jama`a al-Islamiyya, al-Jihad al-Islami and Usama bin Ladin) and in Bosnia. The FSB report also noted that following the outbreak of the al-Aqsa intifada , the heads of the Chechen rebels in the northern Caucasus had informed the heads of the Palestinian terrorist organizations Hamas and al-Jihad al-Islami operating in the West Bank and Gaza Strip that they were prepared to send experienced Chechen fighters to their aid.

Summer camps for Muslim youth take place throughout Russia (near Moscow, Tiumen, Orenburg, Samara, etc.), with counselors from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Some young people are chosen to continue their studArab countries and some even undergo military training and are sent to fight against the Russian army in Chechenya.

ANTISEMITIC ACTIVITY

There were several violent antisemitic incidents in Russia in 2000, although fewer than in 1999. For example: Jewish cemeteries were desecrated in Nizhnii Novgorod on 4 June, and in Samara on 15 August. Community property was vandalized in Vladimir on 5 January, and in Nalchik, on 3 May. In Riazan a school was vandalized by members of the neo-Nazi RNE on 17 September. Russian extremist organizations held marches and demonstrations, such as the one in Moscow on 28 June in which 150 neo-Nazis participated.

The reaction of the authorities was irresolute, both toward antisemitism and racism and toward these demonstrations. A few legal steps were taken to control antisemitic propaganda, such as warning the editors of several ultra-nationalistic dailies and attempting to prevent the convening of chauvinist congresses in some cities. On the other hand, there was clearly a reluctance to take legal action against the dissemination of antisemitic material and those guilty of violent incidents were let off lightly. Nikita Krivchun, who attacked the director of the Cultural Center in Moscow on 13 July 1999, was declared of unsound mind by a Moscow court on 23 February 2000; he was sent for counseling and received no jail sentence. In Riazan the authorities claimed the damage to the Jewish school by young Nazis on 17 September was hooliganism.

The spread of antisemitic and anti-Zionist ideology, which began in the late 1990s among the Muslim population of Russia, was intensified in 2000 both by Chechen rebels in the Caucasus and by Islamist activists in the central regions of Russia. This propaganda has not, as yet, resulted in any confrontations between Muslims and Jews. Extremist Muslim propaganda centers include the Voice of Islam radio station, whose broadcasts from Dagestan include virulent antisemitism.