OVERVIEW

The scope and violence of the antisemitic wave that swept Europe and North America concurrent with the second intifada, beginning in autumn 2000, was regarded by some Jewish leaders as unprecedented since World War II. This, in spite of the fact that in terms of numbers, 1994 was the worst year for violent antisemitism, witnessing 300 such incidents (the year 1993 was not far behind with 270 incidents), whereas in 2000, 255 cases were recorded: 66 major attacks (involving the use of a weapon, including knives and stones, or arson) and 189 other major violent incidents. Why, then, was it perceived as the worst year since 1945?

First, the many events which took place within a brief period, namely in October and November 2000, altered familiar patterns. The 1990s opened with an increase in the number of antisemitic incidents, due largely to the Gulf War. The period 1995–97 was relatively quiet, whereas 1998–99 were years of intensified antisemitic activity. Yet even this escalation was dwarfed by the year 2000 when major violent attacks more than doubled, from 32 in 1999 to 66, as stated, and other acts of violence increased by 50 percent, from 114 to 189. Thus, at the end of the decade, the achievements reached after 1994, thanks to better legislation and law enforcement, as well as intensified police activity and increased public awareness, seem to have been erased. It should be noted that during 1995–97 antisemitism, along with racism and xenophobia, was regarded by Jewish organizations as well as by governmental agencies, especially in democratic countries, as part of the global threat to public order.

The steep rise in numbers of cases perpetrated against Jews between 1999 and 2000 was not paralleled by anti-foreigner hostility. Moreover, 180 of these acts were concentrated in about six weeks, beginning during the High Holidays, and were directed mostly against synagogues and worshipers (about 60 in France alone), evoking concern that Jews and their religious sites might once again be considered easy prey.

The numerous threats, insults and calls to kill Jews, made in public speeches, in the media and on the Internet (which is used for anti-Jewish propaganda and for coordination among radical groups and individuals) were not included in the numbers presented here because of the difficulty in counting them. Moreover, the situation should not be analyzed by number of cases, but by their severity and the level of violence. Serious incidents, in which several people were killed, such as the attack in Pittsburgh in April or the complete razing of a synagogue, such as in Tashkent, Buchara, or Trappes (in the Versailles region), characterized the events of the year, although this tendency was already manifest in 1998–99.

Since the wave of antisemitism in 2000 was evidently inspired by the Palestinian intifada, which began in late September, one of the main issues analyzed here will be the link between events in the Middle East and Jews worldwide, and the relations between extremist Muslims and radical right-wing antisemitic activity. There is little doubt that the rise in antisemitic violence during the first years of the 1990s originated in Muslim extremist groups in Europe and the Americas and was connected to Middle East events. Yet it should be emphasized that during those years right-wing radicals, too, following their own agenda, were active against Jews and foreigners alike, especially in Europe. When, during the mid-1990s, curtailing the activities of extreme rightists was the primary concern of the police and of legislative action, Muslim violence against Jewish targets came to the fore, despite the fact that in the Middle East the years 1995–97 following the Oslo accords were relatively quiet ones. In 1998–99, the ideological and active resurgence of the extreme right, both in Europe and the United States, resulted in a large number of casualties. This tendency continued during 2000, until October, when neo-Nazis were arrested in Germany and Switzerland where it was discovered that they were stockpiling weapons for future actions in these countries and in others. Up to October some 90 cases of extreme right violence were recorded.

Since October Muslim activity has predominated. Nevertheless, increased efforts by the extreme right, possibly inspired and encouraged by Muslims, and of the extreme left, now revived after its decline in the 1970s, should not be ruled out. The central issue discussed in the following pages is whether cooperation between Muslims and rightists, hinted at in former years, will intensify.

Muslim attacks on Jews and synagogues in October and November were labeled as the work of individuals, motivated by identification with their counterparts in the Middle East and by deep religious emotions. Relating to these findings, Henri Hajdenberg, president of the Jewish communities in France, claimed that the attacks did not constitute an antisemitic wave, but a spontaneous outburst by frustrated immigrants living on the fringes of society. Yet, antisemitism had been evidenced previously by non-organized individuals from such circles. Comparisons to pre-World War II realities are not valid since radical circles, lacking pre-war charismatic leadership or ideologies, embrace instead so-called leaderless resistance: acting individually or in small groups that are easily organized and hard to expose, in the attempt to enforce a basic “anti-foreigner” worldview.

Another claim raised by observers was that the antisemitic outburst was rooted in religious feelings. According to this view, visits by non-Muslims to the courtyard of the al-Aqsa mosque and the Temple Mount, ignited the fire; thus, the violent reactions were directed mainly against Jewish religious sites and worshipers. This scenario brings to mind the prediction of Prof. Samuel P. Huntington of Harvard University that the next world clash would be one of civilizations, religions and cultures, principally between Islam and the West, represented by Jews and Israelis.

The violent incidents of October soon died down. The question, then, concerns the linkage between local interests of Muslim European and American communities and Muslim extremists recruiting support for their needs and using familiar antisemitic modes of operation. It should be remembered that October, a month of Jewish holidays, has for many years been the worst period for antisemitic incidents, because gatherings in closed buildings constitute an easy target. The fact that this was the common practice of Nazi troopers adds a darker significance to the present occurrences.

The year 2000 began with several hopeful signs: the Stockholm International Forum on the Holocaust, the clear-cut condemnation of Holocaust denier David Irving by a British court, and the visit of Pope John Paul II to Israel, including Yad Vashem. But the tide quickly turned: Irving was hailed as a hero by his admirers, the Vatican high echelons did not condemn the violent antisemitic attacks worldwide (although the Anglicans, for instance, did), and Jewish radical leftist anti-Zionist manifestations, such as Prof. Norman Finkelstein’s book The Holocaust Industry, were enthusiastically wel-comed, especially in Germany, and by the extreme right in particular. True to its sub-title, “Reflection on the Exploitation of Jewish Suffering,” the essay claims that the Holocaust is being exploited by American Jewish organizations to promote economic and political interests and by Israel for its anti-Palestinian policies. His arguments, even though completely refuted by serious researchers and publicists, have rekindled the image of the manipulative, greedy, power-hungry Jew.

During 2000 the Holocaust and antisemitism were important issues in election campaigns and the public discourse in several countries. The Jedwabne affair, for instance, triggered a stormy public debate, hitherto unknown in intensity in postwar Poland: the brutal torture and burning alive of 1,600 Jews of the shtetle by their Polish neighbors in 1941, revealed in a recently published research work, shocked Polish society because the Poles hadnot considered themselves killers in World War II. Still, the familiar pretext of Jewish collaboration with the Soviet occupiers prior to the German invasion, was re-used in the debate.

In Greece, ultra-right-wing members of parliament sympathetic to the Greek Orthodox Church blamed world Jewry for the socialist government’s decision to erase religious affiliation from state-issued identity cards, as requested by the European Community. Following a huge demonstration orchestrated by the Church and extreme right-wing circles, the small Jewish community suffered intimidation and vandalism.

In Romania, the chauvinist antisemitic Greater Romania Party became the second largest party in the parliament, with 21 percent of the vote, following the general election of 25 November, although its leader Corneliu Vadim Tudor was defeated in the second round of the presidential elections. In December, two visitors, who demanded to see “Auschwitz soap” with their own eyes, choked and seriously injured the security guard of the Jewish Historical Museum in Bucharest and vandalized the premises.

In recent years antisemitism has been a major political weapon of the nationalist and the communist opposition in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. The new Russian president, Vladimir Putin, has restricted the activities of the extreme right and hence the number of antisemitic incidents in 2000 was lower than in 1999. However, hundreds of antisemitic publications can be openly purchased, and Jewish leaders are concerned about Putin’s authoritarian regime, which might diminish the involvement of world Jewish organizations and of Israel in Jewish life in Russia.

The severity of the situation in 2000, especially its last months, prompted Jewish leaders to express their fear that the immediate memory of the Holocaust and World War II, which had set certain taboos and barriers against antisemitism, was beginning to fade, opening the door to a new and more dangerous era for the Jewish people.

ANTISEMITIC MANIFESTATIONS WORLDWIDE AS A COROLLARY OF THE AL-AQSA INTIFADA

During the year 2000 events in the Middle East and in the world converged, igniting concurrently anti-Israel as well as antisemitic manifestations. In the first part of the year, issues beyond the scope of the Middle East were brought into the Middle East discourse, triggering debates that combined anti-Israel with anti-Jewish expressions. In the last quarter of the year, however, after the outbreak of the Palestinian al-Aqsa intifada, events in the Middle East were extended to other parts of the world.

The aim of this survey is to investigate the link between the intifada and the dramatic wave of antisemitic incidents worldwide in the autumn of 2000. It will discuss the impact of Islamic antisemitic agitation, as well as the part played by extremist Muslims in perpetrating violent incidents. In addition, it will examine the role of extreme left and extreme right activists in these occurrences.

Over 250 violent antisemitic incidents against Jewish sites worldwide were perpetrated in the weeks that followed the outbreak of the intifada at the end of September. In contrast to former Arab-Israeli clashes, the main targets of these attacks were not institutions identified with the State of Israel, but Jews and Jewish sites. These acts of violence indicated a strong linkage between Arab and Muslim communities and events in the Middle East, and perceived identification on the part of these communities between the Jews and Israel.

The incidents took the form of:

• anti-Israel and anti-Jewish incitement, including calls to kill Jews;
• acts of vandalism against synagogues and Jewish buildings;
• physical assaults and harassment of Jews by Arab individuals.

During the first few weeks after the eruption of the al-Aqsa intifada pro-Palestinian demonstrators took to the streets of major cities in the West chanting anti-Israel and anti-Jewish slogans, including the battle cry Itbah al-Yahud (Slaughter the Jews). Responding to this jihad-like atmosphere, some Muslim believers considered themselves to be part of an anti-Jewish crusade. Consequently, violent incidents against Jews and Jewish targets were perpetrated in numerous countries.

The UK witnessed a 400 percent rise in anti-Jewish incidents for the month of October compared with the same month in 1999. Synagogues were vandalized in London; for example, the ark and children’s Torah scrolls at the Elstree and Burehamwood synagogues were completely destroyed. In addition, individual Jews were seriously injured following attacks, including a yeshiva student who was stabbed by an Algerian while on a bus, apparently in direct response to incitement by the London-based Islamist group al-Muhajiroun.

Attempts to murder Jews occurred at the same time in other parts of the world as well. In Montreal assailants, reportedly Canadian Arabs, beat a Jew until he lost consciousness and then tried to throw him onto the subway tracks. In New York a Hassidic Jew was stabbed, allegedly by a Palestinian. These incidents in North America were part of a series of violent acts, mostly against Jewish sites, particularly synagogues, such as the Molotov cocktail attack on the Beth Shalom synagogue in Edmonton, Canada, and the arson of Adat Israel synagogue in the Bronx.

In Germany, shortly before Yom Kippur, a crowd of about 100 Palestinian and Lebanese demonstrators tried to storm the old synagogue in Essen, today a Jewish museum and Holocaust memorial center. Other incidents in Germany in October – in which members of the extreme right were involved as well (see below) – included the brutal assault on a Jewish couple in Schwerin, attacks on synagogues in Dusseldorf and Berlin, desecration of cemeteries, and threats and fake letter bombs addressed to the leaders of the Jewish community.

In Belgium, radical leaders of the local Muslim communities incited anti-Jewish violence. In Antwerp demonstrators shouted anti-Jewish curses and threatened worshipers at a synagogue. In Brussels an elderly Jewish man was hospitalized after being assaulted by Arabs; synagogues and the Holocaust memorial in the Anderlecht quarter were stoned, vandalized or attacked with Molotov cocktails; and the Jewish library in Antwerp was vandalized. Similar events were reported from Salonika; Florence, Venice and Rome; Emmen and Oss in the Netherlands; Madrid; Malmö; Geneva; and Capetown in South Africa, as well as from Latin America. In Mexico City for example, the Beth Jacob school was vandalized. In Venezuela, graffiti equating Jews with Nazis appeared, a message disseminated also by the local media. This campaign was led by FEARAB, the umbrella organization of Arab Muslims. Comparisons were made between the Jews and Hitler, and the Star of David was juxtaposed with the swastika. Antisemitic manifestations were reported from Sao Paulo, Brazil, as well. In October, some 1,500 people marched down Avenida Paulista to the US consulate carrying antisemitic placards saying “Jews=Hitler II.”

The Arab/Muslim reaction worldwide to the intifada, particularly in Western Europe and North America, raised several questions, such as: Were the attacks on Jewish targets organized, or were they spontaneous acts of individuals? Were the perpetrators Arabs or Muslims from the local communities or had they come from the Middle East to carry out these attacks? Do these events necessarily prove cooperation or coordination betwactivists in the Middle East and Muslims in the diaspora? Do the Muslim communities at large condone or support these acts? Why did Muslim communities react so strongly? Did the incidents against the Jews mirror a deeper antagonism within the Muslim and Arab communities? How does the relationship with the Jewish communities reflect the wider dilemma of Arab and Muslim communities in the host societies regarding the question of integration or segregation?

There are no definite answers to most of these questions; some have diverse answers, which not only derive from differing reports, opinions and assessments, but also from the clandestine activity of the groups involved. The following observations throw light on Islamist activity in the world, particularly in Western Europe and North America and on the Muslim communities there.

Most Islamist groups began operating in different parts of the world during the last decade of the 20th century. Members of these groups had fled their countries of origin after committing subversive or terrorist acts for which sentences were passed upon them. Most notable among these groups were the Egyptian Jama‘a Islamiyya, the Jihad and the Vanguards of Conquest, the Algerian FIS (Front Islamique du Salut) and GIA (Groupe Islamique Armé), HUT (Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami) and al-Muhajiroun (see below). All these groups have branches in most European countries, but they enjoyed the greatest freedom in Britain, which had relatively lenient asylum seeking and extradition laws. Members of Egyptian groups joined the World Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and the Crusaders, founded in 1998 by Usama bin Ladin, the mastermind behind the terrorist attacks on the US embassies in Nairobi and Tanzania in that same year. These Islamist movements originally directed their activity against their indigenous states which, they claimed, had failed to address pressing socio-economic issues, and against the importation of Western ideologies and values, which were allegedly incompatible with Islamic tradition. Even bin Ladin’s paramount aim is still to remove the Saudi royal family because of what he labels their corruption, heresy and collaboration with the Americans. At the same time, hostility toward the Jews is part and parcel of their anti-Western/American world view.

Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hizballah are active particularly in Western Europe and the US. They are mainly involved in clandestine activities behind front associations, which raise funds for the movements and mobilize support. Head of Hamas Political Bureau Musa Abu Marzuq spent several years in the US until his arrest in 1995 and deportation in 1997. ‘Abdallah Shalah, who replaced Fathi al-Shiqaqi, who was assassinated in October 1995, as secretary general of the Islamic Jihad, also studied for several years in Florida. After a series of suicide bombings in 1995 in Israel, President Bill Clinton froze Hamas’ assets in the US. Although Hamas members in Britain were involved in terrorist attacks on Jewish and Israeli targets in 1994, the movement has generally refrained from acting outside Israel.

Two patterns can be discerned in the Arab/Muslim response in the West to the Middle East crisis: a) protests, demonstrations and submission of petitions against Israeli policies, which involved large segments of the Arab and Muslim populations in the West; b) calls for jihad and for killing Jews by leaders of radical Islamist groups, reflecting their own perception of the Arab-Israeli conflict but not necessarily that of the Muslim population at large.

On 13 October Ahmad Abu Halabiyya, a preacher in Gaza, incited Muslims on Palestinian television, claiming that “Almighty Allah” desired them “not to ally themselves with Jews and Christians, not to love them, not to enter into partnerships with them, not to support them, and not to enter into any contract with them.” He went so far as to instruct Muslims “not to pity the Jews but to fight them and to kill them wherever they are to be found.” Omar Bakri Muhammad, the leader of the London-based al-Muhajiroun, a group associated with bin Ladin, issued a fatwa (religious edict), calling for jihad against the Jews, which was disseminated through the Internet. Consequently, Muslim extremist groups organized a poster and leaflet campaign targeting Jews, some explicitly calling for their killing. Leaflets linked to al-Muhajiroun which were distributed in North London apparently led to the stabbing of the yeshiva student in mid-October. In the US, Shaykh Omar ‘Abd al-Rahman, spiritual leader of the militant Egyptian Islamist group al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya, who is serving a life sentence for the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center in New York, called on Muslim clerics to issue a fatwa to sanctify the indiscriminate killing of Jews. “Jihad is now a duty for the entire [Islamic] nation until Palestine and the Aqsa mosque are liberated and Jews are either pushed into their graves or back where they came from,” declared the shaykh (CNN, 5 Oct.; Jerusalem Post [JP], 6 Oct.).” Hizb ut-Tahrir held a meeting in Copenhagen on 21 October under the banner ”Jews Slaughter Muslims in Palestine – Is There a Savior?” Hizb-ut-Tahrir called on Palestinians living in Denmark to jihad. On 29 September, one day after the beginning of the intifada, muezzins in two Brussels mosques called their congregants to take revenge on the Jews. In Spain, a local Moroccan-born imam alleged that “a world without Jews would be a paradise”; that Hitler “only threw insecticide on the worm which was growing in the plant of Germany”; and that Jews opposed peace in the Middle East and only understood “the language of violence.” These calls echoed edicts issued in Arab countries, which endorsed suicide attacks and an all-out war against Israel and the Jews to save al-Aqsa and Palestine from Jewish occupation. Violent incidents, however, subsided despite the continuing violence in the territories. The reduction in numbers of attacks may be seen as a result of diminishing media interest in the intifada as well as increased security measures, and of the gradual decline in centrality of the religious dimension.

In contrast to the attacks on Jews and Jewish sites which, based on the evidence gathered so far appear to have been carried out by individuals, the demonstrations were partly organized expressions of popular protest, designed to show solidarity with the Palestinian struggle. The intensive preoccupation of the media with the events and the considerable Muslim/Palestinian propaganda fell on attentive ears. However, the Arab/Muslim response cannot be explained merely in terms of anger at the upsurge of tensions in the Middle East and opposition to Israel’s policies; it was also the result of deep frustration among Muslims over broad social and economic discrimination in Europe, and a renewed attempt by Islamist groups to exploit the situation in order to impose their militant agenda on Muslim communities in the world at large. They perceive the Arab-Israeli conflict as insoluble and the destruction of Israel not only as predetermined but as imperative in order to save humanity and civilization. During crises such as the al-Aqsa intifada, extremist fringe groups tend to gain support, using the opportunity to reassert their agenda. Observers note that whenever there are clashes between Arabs and Israelis, “extremist elements that have targeted Americans, Israelis, Jews and sometimes other identifiable groups are mobilized” (CNN, 5 Oct.). As noted above, the violent incidents against Jews should not be seen as endemic antisemitism, characterizing the entire Muslim and Arab communities throughout the world. In fact, Muslims who are willing to commit themselves to violence against Jews are marginal among these populations.

The strong Arab/Muslim reaction to the intifada was further proof of the power of religion to awaken and mobilize Muslims worldwide. Anthropologist Rema Hamami and sociologist Salim Tamari, both affiliated with Bir Zeit University, claimed that “the idea of shared sovereignty over Haram al-Sahrif [the Temple Mount] raised the sensreligious dimension – control over a highly contested sacred site – in the public arena (Arab as well as Israeli).” They claimed that by granting a police permit and protection to then opposition leader Ariel Sharon to visit the site, Prime Minister Ehud Barak linked the “humiliating deal offered at Camp David” to the event that galvanized the Palestinian street. In the process, it was inevitable that the protests would take on a religious character. Heavy media emphasis on the religious dimension of the intifada, they asserted, has encouraged popular notions in Israel, in the Arab world and among Muslim communities in the world, that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is “a Jewish-Muslim conflict: eternal and insoluble” (Rema Hamami and Salim Tamari, “Anatomy of Another Rebellion,” MERIP, p. 7).

The only other precedent that aroused a similarly angry response by Muslim communities – especially the British one – was the publication of Salman Rushdie’s Satanic Verses in 1988. In that case, too, alleged defamation of the Prophet and of Islam triggered the outburst of protests and the issuing of the fatwa by Ayatollah Khomeini sanctioning the killing of Rushdie. During the Rushdie affair hatred was also directed at Jews, considered to be behind the publication of the book. The protests and demonstrations served then as a springboard for uniting and reorganizing the Muslim community so that it might gain greater power and influence in the British political arena.

This same phenomenon could be discerned in the wake of recent events in the US and Britain. Aside from ad hoc organization for immediate action, representatives of Arab and Muslim national organizations sought to set up umbrella groups which would continue operating on a permanent basis, such as the meeting of representatives of ten Arab national organizations and a number of local organizations, which convened in </DIV>Washington in December to develop a consensus agenda and initiate meetings with White House and State Department officials. Arab American leaders who held their meeting against the backdrop of the continuing Palestinian intifada and growing anti-US sentiment in the Arab world, hoped to use these as a lever to bring about a change in the US approach to critical Middle East issues (al-Sharq al-Awsat, 11 Dec.). Similarly, in Britain an Arab Communities Forum was set up at the end of December to enhance cooperation and communications between British institutions and the Arab communities (Arab Communities Forum in the United Kingdom, 25 Dec. – MSANEWS). </DIV>

According to Prof. Abdul Hadi Palazzi of the University of Velletri in Rome, contrary to the assumption of Israeli researcher Esther Webman that Islamists are marginal groups in Muslim communities in the West, over 80 percent of European mosques are controlled by extremists who belong to radical pseudo-Islamic movements that have absorbed antisemitic motifs, such as the Jewish world conspiracy, to justify so-called political anti-Zionism. Similarly, Daniel Pipes, director of the Philadelphia-based Middle East Forum, considers all Muslim and Arab American organizations to be Islamist, and claims that moderate Muslims are rarely heard. Reviewing the reactions of leading Islamic institutions in the US to Joseph Lieberman’s appointment as the Democratic candidate for vice president, Pipes offered “an insight into the fears, hopes, and priorities of the radicals who speak for American Islam.” He contended that the differing responses to the nomination revealed that American Muslims are divided in their priorities. Some see the Arab-Israeli conflict as well as other issues, such as Kashmir and Kosovo, as their primary concern. Others insist that the American community’s interests come first. Muslims also disagree on the issue of participation in American politics. One trend supports the notion of integration into the American system, whereas the other, more militant one resists any involvement in American political life. He believes, however, that both trends reflect the same Islamist ambition – the “Islamization of America” (JP, 16 Aug.). These tendencies, which stem from the basic Islamic approach to living in the abode of war (dar al-harb) – the territory of unbelievers – seem to typify other Muslim communities in the West as well. Hence, Muslims waver between segregation and integration.

The Jewish community example serves as a model of integration to Muslim and Arab communities in the West. Three aspects of the Jewish experience are especially emulated: their almost unconditional support of Israel, their social and economic integration while preserving their identity, and their political leverage in the countries they live in. There are about six million Muslims in the US, mostly non-Arabs, and about two million Christian Arabs. Together, argued Palestinian American author Ray Hanania, “this constituency could become an effective voice influencing American politics.” Hanania considered Lieberman’s appointment as a failure of Arab American politics, citing in contrast the example of American Jewish influence over the US political scene. The key to their success, he said, lay in coalitions. American Jews by themselves are not powerful, but they build coalitions with other ethnic groups, setting aside their own interests in certain areas while demanding support in others. Another explanation was communications. American Jews understand the relationship between perception and reality, and invest in public relations, he said, whereas the Arabs have not succeeded in influencing the media and in establishing an Arab voice. Afraid to admit that the prominence of Jewish issues in the American media correlates directly with their own failure, they argue that “Jews control the media.” “The Arab American community could be the vanguard of a successful campaign to transform the US Congress and direct White House foreign policy on the Middle East,” he asserted, but instead, it makes excuses and blames “the Jews” (Ray Hanania, “Lieberman and the Failure of Arab American Politics,” 8 Aug. – hanania.com).

Instead of bemoaning the political influence of “Jewish Americans” in the US, suggested Jordanian journalist Rami Khouri, the Arab world should “rigorously analyze the American Jewish experience, understand the causes of their success, strength and prosperity, and make a serious effort to match their achievements” (Jordan Times, 8 Aug.). Although Khouri referred to Arab societies in general, his comments apply in particular to the Arab American community, if not to all Arab and Muslim communities in the West where there are large Jewish communities.

The Extreme Right and the Extreme Left – Cooperation and Moral Support

Muslim fury directed against Jewish communities was exploited by activists of the extreme right and the extreme left worldwide in order to vent their own criticism and hatred of Israel and Jews. It may be assumed that some of the violent incidents in autumn 2000 were perpetrated by right-wing extremists. Still beyond moral support, notably on the Internet, the extent of their operational cooperation with extreme Muslim groups remains unclear. Although common ideological grounds for such cooperation exists, at least in reference to Israel and Jews, overt evidence of this is scant.

The Extreme Left. The anti-Israel demonstrations in the autumn of 2000 were characterized by increasing participation of extreme left activists. In Buenos Aires, for example, a few days after the beginning of the intifada, radical Muslim groups organized a demonstration, with the aid of leftist organizations, in front of the Israeli embassy. In Rome, thirty thousand persons affiliated with the political left participated in an anti-Israel demonstration, while in Copenhagen the far left United List suggested during a session of the City Council that Israel Square in Copenhagen be renamed Palestine Square.

In keeping with the traditional rhetoric of the extreme left, comparisons of Israel with Nazi Germany and Israel’s policy toward the Palestinians with the Holocaust were frequent. In some demonstrations in which both extreme leactivists and Muslims participated, calls to kill the Jew were heard.

In Austria demands for the “destruction of the illegal racist-imperialist formation ‘Israel’” were reported at a demonstration organized by Austrian anti-imperialists together with Palestinian nationalists in Vienna in October. Austrian anti-Zionist hardliners and their Palestinian counterparts have built up close links, as could be observed during an “anti-imperialist summer camp” in Italy, organized by the Austrian Revolutionär Kommunistische Liga (Revolutionary Communist League – RKL), which hosted a Hamas delegation. In numerous propaganda leaflets distributed at the time, Israel was accused of the systematic “murder of children” and compared to the Nazi regime: “The capitalist-imperialist genocide of the Jews cannot justify the capitalist-imperialist genocide of the Palestinians. The victims of fascism become the new perpetrators through Zionism.” “Death to the Jews” was also shouted in France at an anti-Israel demonstration of the leftist anti-fascist MRAP (Mouvement contre le racisme et pour l’amité entre les peuples), as well as at other joint demonstrations of Islamists and the extreme left, including in Auckland, New Zealand.

The Extreme Right. The attitude of the extreme right toward Islamist activities is complex. On the one hand, Islam and the Muslim populations in general are considered a threat to the white race and its values. The extreme right incites equally against what they call the Islamization of the West and the so-called world Jewish conspiracy. Thus, it is understandable that Islamists, aware of the anti-Muslim and anti-foreigner sentiments among these groups, might refrain from aligning with them. On the other hand, since the early 1990s some right-wing extremists have expressed their admiration for Arab countries such as Iraq and Iran as well as for extremist Muslim groups which resist Israel and the US and struggle against “world Jewish domination ”

Today Holocaust deniers from Europe, the US and Australia are assisted by radical Muslim countries such as Iran. In Germany, security experts warn of possible cooperation between Islamist and far right extremists. In 1998, vice chairman of the radical right-wing NPD Hans-Günther Eisenecker described his vision of an “antisemitic internationale”: a worldwide alliance against liberal capitalism, embodied by Israel and the US. As potential partners Eisenecker named the Islamist movements, North Korea and Cuba. These ideas, however, are not widely accepted by right-wing circles.

The complicated relationship between the far right and Islamist groups is illustrated by the case of Hamas, whose activists cooperated with left-wing sympathizers (see above) and also took part in demonstrations of the JN (youth organization of the German NPD). The Internet site of White Youth 88 has links to the Hizballah and Hamas, and Thüringer Heimatschutz welcomes Internet users with the call “Freedom for Palestine.” In Sweden Radio Islam has for years been a forum for antisemitic and Holocaust denial activity of Arab nationalists and Islamists, as well as of the extreme right. According to the TV report Kennzeichen D. ( 6 Dec.), the Swiss Islamist Ahmed Huber lectured at the JN European convention on “Islam and the New Right.”

Antisemitic incidents in Germany rose throughout the year, most being attributed to radical right-wing activists. An analysis of the events which occurred in the autumn reveals that Islamist activities as a result of the hostilities in the Middle East coincided with traditional action days of the extreme right, i.e., Jewish holy days (Rosh Hashana and Yom Kippur), as well as with the anniversaries of the German unification (3 Oct.) and of the Reichskristallnacht (9 Nov.). Thus, it seems that radical Islamists and right-wing extremists inspired each other to carry out anti-Jewish attacks. Another example of the support of the extreme right for the Palestinian cause was a demonstration on 28 October in Coeur d’Alene, Idaho, in which Michael A. Hoffman II, director of Idaho’s Center for Revisionist Studies, protested the “Jewish Holocaust against the Palestinian people.” He carried a placard showing the Jewish Star of David equated with the Nazi swastika. Likewise, the Latin American extreme right website Ciudad Libertad de Opinión, headed by Argentinean neo-Nazi Alejandro Biondini, published the battle cry “Zionist committers of genocide, get out!” The website regularly updates surfers on events in Israel, supports the “Palestinian struggle for independence,” and publishes some of the harshest Arab and Palestinian anti-Israel propaganda, as well as the calls of Iranian Supreme Leader Khamene’i for jihad against Israel. During the month of February 2001, an anti-Israel Internet game, “The Stone Throwers,” was chosen by surfers as the “pick of the summer.” Similarly, in Brazil, a neo-fascist group, Acao Nacional, distributed pamphlets headed: “Zionists are killing Palestinian children.”

In Eastern Europe, the extreme right media was very swift in linking traditional antisemitic motifs with the outbreak of violence in the Middle East. Nationalist and extremist parties and movements combined their bitter criticism of Jews and Israeli policies with a sympathetic attitude to the Arabs in general and to Palestinians in particular. The Greater Romania Party in Romania and the Hungarian Justice and Life Party have for years championed the Iraqis under Western attacks as well as the Palestinians, claiming that Israeli interests dominate and dictate US actions. While the real attitude of these right extremists toward Arabs, Palestinians and Muslims may not be reflected in their verbal support for them, the intensity of their anti-Jewish feelings appear to overcome their racist and xenophobic aversion to Arabs and Muslims.

Antisemitic incidents in Eastern and Central Europe should not be connected automatically with events in the Middle East, although in some cases the connection is evident. Racist violence against Jews in the region does not need a Middle East pretext, but it certainly acts as a catalyst. Thus, in November members of the National Rebirth of Poland (NOP) demonstrated with pro-Palestinian and anti-Israel and anti-Jewish slogans, including the demand that all Jews be deported from the country.

A typical example linking Palestinian-Israeli-Jewish and East European perspectives can be found in one of the first reports on the tensions between Israel and the Palestinians, published in the far right Hungarian journal Demokrata. In its weekly review of 12 October, Demokrata wrote of the Palestinian boy killed while caught in Palestinian-Israeli crossfire: “… he died because he was Palestinian, he died because for a child who does not belong to the ruling minority it is dangerous to live.” This was followed by criticism of Hungarian-Israeli ties: “The child victim of this daily fascism and racism did not awaken Hungary’s civic leaders to the fact that the an enormous amount of capital flows to Hungary from Israel, a country rife with discrimination and state terror.” Istvan Csurka, leader of the extremist Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIEP), also linked the violence in the Middle East to Israeli investments in Hungary as well as the “military training in Israel of Hungarian citizens [of Jewish origin] who are returning to Hungary.” Csurka warned of the “danger” of the flow of Israeli economic interests to Hungary since “they [the Israelis] could finance an eventual war from Hungarian sources, and also the Middle Eastern crisis could spread to Hungary.” On 19 October 2000, as an expression of solidarity with the Palestinian cause, the MIEP organ Magyar Forum reported on blood donations by both Arabs living in Budapest and Hungarians to wounded Palestinians. Commenting on the screening on one of Hungary’s TV channels of the US movie Delta Force, Magyar Forum (12 Oct. 2000) mocked Jewish-Israeli film makers in Hollywood (Menahem Golan and Yoram Globus) for using racist stereotypes in portraying Arab hijackers: “Knowing who is directing the American film industry, it is just a matter of time the child-murdering Israeli soldiers will be portrayed as heroes and defenders of the weak. In a lengthy article on the violence in the same issue, the author writes: “In spite of the warnings by [Israeli] Chief Rabbi Meir Lau, in Israel there is an atmosphere of lynch against the Arab population: Arabs are caught in the streets at random, knifed, and beaten almost to death; shops owned by Palestinians are burned, and Christian cemeteries are desecrated.”

Before the November 2000 elections in Romania, the Greater Romania Party moderated its tone, for tactical reasons. However, in its coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, its paper Romania Mare continued to link international Jewish interests with Israeli policies. An interesting twist is its claim that Arafat’s demand for an international force in the area is in fact the fulfillment of biblical prophecies in the books of Zacharia and the Apocalypse: the war “between Arabs [sic] and Jews will degenerate into a world war” (Romania Mare, 16 March 2001).

The dramatic wave of violent incidents against Jewish targets in the autumn of 2000 confirmed the potential of the Arab-Israeli conflict to escalate ethno-religious enmity between Jews and Muslims worldwide. Since the beginning of the 1990s Middle East events, particularly the Israeli-Palestinian confrontation, have been interpreted by extremist Muslims and Arab nationalists as a world Arab/Muslim-Jewish conflict and their fury has thus been directed against the Jewish communities. The wave of violent incidents and demonstrations in October 2000 were influenced considerably by the religious dimension of the conflict, which has the power to mobilize the masses and instigate extremist believers into committing violent acts.

As the past has shown, cooperation among extremist elements poses a real threat to the well-being and safety of Jewish communities and Jewish individuals in the world. Unremitting monitoring of this phenomenon is thus of utmost importance.